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
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**THE**  
**LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW.**



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THE  
LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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APRIL, 1879.

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ART. I.—*Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China, held at Shanghai, May 10—24, 1877.* Published by the Shanghai Presbyterian Mission Press.

THE volume before us contains some twenty or thirty papers read before a Conference of Chinese Missionaries of all Protestant Denominations, at Shanghai in May, 1877. The idea of this gathering had been suggested by the very successful Conference of Indian Missionaries held at Allahabad some five years before, and the subjects treated cover very much the same ground. The striking similarity in the character of the problems discussed at the two Conferences, cannot fail to suggest to the reader the very close affinities existing between the Indian and the Chinese work. The palm of masterly exposition and treatment must, however, be given, we think, to the Allahabad essayists and disputants. Not that we would undervalue the painstaking work in the volume before us, for no one can read it without enhanced interest in Chinese Missions. But Indian questions lend themselves to more fascinating methods of treatment; and Indian Missions from the priority of their establishment, the completeness of their equipments, and the larger number of men who have been drawn into their service have necessarily developed minds of a devotion, a refinement, and a statesmanlike grasp and order of view it would be difficult to match elsewhere.

The subjects of the Shanghai Conference essays comprise, "Native Religions; Preaching; Medical Missions; Itineration; Foot-binding; Work amongst Women; Educa-

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tion; Christian and Secular Literature; The Standard of Church Membership; The Native Pastorate; and some other matters." It will be impossible in the course of a short review to take up all the subjects discussed. It may perhaps be well to give a running sketch of the papers, pausing only on the subjects that seem to call for special comment or criticism.

The Conference proceedings were inaugurated by a good plain sermon on "The Missionary Commission," and an address on "The Work of the Holy Spirit," of more than ordinary vigour, beauty, and spiritual insight. The list of essays opens with one on "Entire Consecration Essential to Missionary Success." The most impressive points of the essay seem to be that "entire consecration does not mean celibacy," "that it is not good for man to be alone," and "that no more important influence can be exerted on heathen families than that of female married Missionaries." Entire consecration, we are further informed, means "a creed," and excludes "literary labour of great cost of time and strength." In dealing with the question of what constitutes Missionary success, the author of the essay tells us "that entire consecration is itself a great success," and "that not converts or gathering of congregations constitutes the highest Missionary success, but the thorough setting forth and holding up to the heathen of Jesus Christ and Him crucified." The means of securing the success thus defined are "mental training," "good manners," "Christian manliness," and "a holy life." We are next introduced to an essay on "The Field in its Magnitude," by a writer well known to the English public through an entertaining narrative of travels in North China and Manchuria. The title of the essay is made to cover sundry observations on "the vast mineral resources of the Chinese Empire," "the intellectual capacity of the Chinese people," and "the spiritual aspects of our work." Most of the essayists seem impatient of the texts to which they have been picketed by the committee of arrangements; and the lack of agreement between the papers and their titles, suggests the idea of a general stampede.

After "The Field in its Magnitude," came an essay on "Confucianism in its Relation to Christianity," from the pen of perhaps the most competent sinologue Chinese Missions have yet developed. The essay was excluded from the records of the Conference, on the ground that it

touched the question that has long divided Chinese Missionaries into three classes—the term to be used for God. In our judgment the treatment the essay received was a very serious blot upon the proceedings of the Conference, for the essays of several of the American Missionaries touched the question from their side, and that in a very objectionable form. To reconcile this inequality in the treatment of the different parties who introduced the subject, it is whispered that Dr. Legge's essay put Confucianism upon an equal platform with Judaism as a preparation for Christianity. From personal knowledge of the character of Dr. Legge's pulpit teaching and an intimate acquaintance with not a few converts he has trained, we do not suspect for one moment that the essay would put Confucianism upon the same level with Judaism as an *equally direct and inspired* preparation for Christianity; and those who would deny it the character of a providential preparation in any sense whatever, must either be discreditably ignorant of what its teachings really are, or belong to that narrow and purblind class that can see no Divine leading where its own special phrases are not yet current, and that still finds the fingers of one hand quite sufficient to count the census of "the elect." But the horror shown of Confucianism throughout the whole of the Conference proceedings fell little short of madness. Confucianism was the red rag of the Conference, and was no sooner waved in the air than somebody (generally an American) answered to the sign. The subject came up under preaching, schools, education of native agents, and never failed to elicit "foam." One speaker puts down the lack of feeling in the Chinese character to Confucianism. Objection is taken to a Chinese pastor saying that Christianity "supplements" Confucianism, a very harmless way surely of describing the relation of Christianity to any system that treats morality only on its human side. The same speaker says again "Confucianism destroys enthusiasm" (a statement very far from the fact), and that in our native preachers "there must be conversion from all other masters, particularly Confucius." An American lady who prepares an essay on "Woman's Work," goes out of her way to lecture the Missionaries, and tells them with that bouncing, didactic omniscience which seems to be the special product of American Female Colleges, "that it is the Confucian classics that mould the national character

as we see it,—non-religious, anti-progressive, self-conceited, narrow-minded." A godless Frenchman might just as well trace the insularity and grossness of John Bull to the New Testament. The same lady gives the gauge of her actual knowledge on these subjects in the next sentence, where she suggests that some competent person should prepare an epitome of Chinese history (!!) and literature (!!) for use in the schools." An able and experienced English Missionary, whilst ready to teach the Confucian classics in connection with Christian education, goes so far as to say that "Confucianism is the greatest enemy with which Christianity has to contend; but just as Mohammedanism is in Africa, because it contains so large an amount of truth." The last statement, of course, carries its own explanation, and is innocuous; but most of the preceding fulminations are obviously wild and ill-judged, and if at all common amongst the Missionaries must augur ill for the future of their work. There is no doubt that Confucianism is the predominating influence in shaping all Chinese modes of thought. Education is entirely Confucian, and the power of expression education confers is necessarily Confucian in its form. But it argues very imperfect methods of analysis to trace back the whole round of a Chinaman's sympathies and antipathies to the same source as the expression in which they are clothed. Nothing can fairly be called Confucian in Chinese character or belief that is not traceable to some particular precept or group of precepts in the Confucian classics. It would be just as reasonable to trace the hatred of the Moslem against the Frank to the monotheism of the Koran rather than to the rankling memories of the Crusades, as it is to trace what is unprogressive and anti-foreign in the Chinaman of to-day to the Confucian classics, rather than to race-prejudice, distrust of free-trade, and hatred of the war-waging barbarian. Most of the declaimers against Confucianism seem to ignore the distinction between strength and intelligent and necessary antagonism. Confucianism is the master force in all Chinese thought. But is it the greatest foe that Christianity has to confront? Certainly if its teachings are so hostile to the New Testament, that Christianity is compelled to threaten its very existence before it can hope to establish itself. Not, however, if its teachings are such that they will blend, and that without violence, into the moralities of the Gospel. Confucianism



is a system of ethical positivism from which the supernatural is excluded. It recognises the family, the community and the state, and the duties it teaches are duties growing up out of the relation of the individual to these three institutions. True we have embryonic nature and ancestral worships in the classics, but the classics themselves supply enough to counterbalance their own recognition of these things. When Confucius was questioned about paying religious rites at the grave of parents, he said, on the one hand our instincts protested against the idea of treating parents as dogs in their death, and on the other hand, if you were to say that parents were as conscious of these rites as though living, that would not be true, because they were not. We are told again that he rarely spoke of "spirits, and marvels, and feats of strength," that "life was not known, much less death," and that he accounted it "wisdom when he was really ignorant to know that he did not know," &c. Such admissions ought surely to be enough to enable the advocates of Christianity to limit the sphere of Confucian authority to teaching upon the subject of secular duties. Indeed Confucianism to a Chinese mind means mainly family, social, and state moralities, and the man who attacks Confucianism is always suspected of attacking these things, and put down as a Communist. Some who took part in the discussions of the Conference said they never referred to Confucianism in their preaching, but if the preacher does not start from a Confucian standpoint, a Chinese hearer will, and although the preacher, whose mind is running on one plane, may find great pleasure in his own exercise, the Chinese hearer, whose mind is running on an altogether different plane, will not be very sensibly affected. To ignore Confucianism and its phraseology means to ignore all existing ideas, and to try and create a new world of thought and feeling by beginning with the molecules of speech rather than with its organic forms. Our wise master-builders propose to pulverise their blocks of stone, and pile up their structures from atoms, rather than to shape and put into place the masses of solid thought already surrounding them. The stone is good although it may need many a toilsome stroke to bring into the lines of the Divine harmony. The way in which the strength of Confucianism has been misread into necessary antagonism to Christianity is lamentably childish. Because Con-

Confucianism has a good deal of the kind of strength that silicates give to the wheat-stalk we must not class it with the nightshade. It may not need to be cut up root and branch. Confucianism will survive as a harmless form of social and political philosophy long after Christianity has overspread the eighteen provinces, just as in some of the states of America we see corn sown in amongst the oaks of the old forests. The oaks are picturesque, and although the agriculturist would gladly see them out of the way, they perhaps don't do very much harm. When Christianity has conquered all Chinese thought, "the Four Books" and "the Five Kings" will be read in Chinese schools just as the Greek and Latin classics are read in our schools to-day, and the germs of error they contain will be in as little danger of germinating in the young Chinese mind, as the references to the old mythologies found in our classics are of vivifying in the brains of healthy English schoolboys. The Chinese system of education is perfect as a classical education, and Christianity can consist just as well with a classical as with a scientific education. But we must not suspect the Missionaries of that chicken-heartedness in the presence of Confucianism that their words might seem to indicate. A good deal of the horror of Confucianism is dramatic and springs up out of the term "controversy." It is very clear what the inevitable settlement of the term question must be if that settlement is made upon a Confucian basis, and those who take the side that must lose by such a settlement, naturally wish to exclude the least tinge of Confucianism from the education of the native preachers and the children of the native churches. To make the native preachers mortify themselves upon the question of Confucian culture in the way advocated by some of the speakers, will be to turn the circle of the Chinese ministry into a prison-house, where every inmate is required to adorn himself with short-cropped hair and literary drab; and to set aside the Confucian classics in the instruction of native Christians and their children, will simply end in limiting the Gospel to the lowest of the rural populations, and constituting Christianity the matron of a day-nursery for peasant babies, rather than the crowned keeper of conquered "strongholds."

The episode to which the paper last referred to gave rise, was followed by a paper on "Buddhism and Taoism in

their Popular Aspects," from a pen that has already given to the public a painstaking and reliable delineation of "Religion in China." The paper points out the marked degeneracy in the popular forms of these faiths. The position won at first by teaching a high and inspiring philosophy is now retained by sheer priestcraft alone. There is one particular, however, in which the popular mind has reacted to advantage upon the Buddhist faith. "The people's craving for immortality" has given rise to the doctrine of "the Western Paradise," which has largely displaced "the legitimate Nirvana of Shakyamuni." The paper is of course right as to matter of fact, but we half suspect the explanation is rather too wide. At the time when Buddhism and its capital doctrine of the Nirvana first spread in India, the people's craving was evidently for annihilation rather than for a positive immortality. Brahmanism and Caste were in the full flower of their strength, and the life of the great masses of the people was so void of all social good, and so crushed out by towering oppressions and despotisms, that the complete termination of all existence appealed more forcibly than any other idea to the popular cravings and susceptibilities. In China, on the other hand, with a government based upon more generous ideas, a social system that, notwithstanding grave blemishes, was vastly more human than the social system of the Hindoos, and a more complete and widespread mastery of the science of getting out of the world all the enjoyment that has been put into it; good seemed to outweigh evil; life was more manifestly worth the living; existence was felt to be better than non-existence, and the idea of the Western Paradise came by-and-by to overshadow that of the orthodox Nirvana. Modern parallels might be brought to illustrate these modifications and the causes underlying them. In reading the biographies of Schopenhauer and the European pessimists, it is easy to see how the preponderance of vexation and disappointment in their lives gave rise to that craving for non-existence rather than immortality, which they boldly avowed, and which made them Buddhists in everything but name. Unless under the influence of profound religious conviction and principle, men crave annihilation or Paradise, according to the measure of joy in their lives. The paper next speaks of Tauism, showing how in its modern form it practises upon the popular dread of evil

spirits, and is little better than a system of magic. The Tauist priests are often responsible for those popular panics, which sometimes spread like epidemics from city to city, and not unfrequently end in revolt and massacre. The Tauists have appropriated the ideas of the Buddhist Purgatories and introduced them into their teachings about the future life. In the discussion that followed the paper, we are told how Buddhism arrested the materialistic tendencies to which the agnosticism of Confucius gave rise, and that it has been of no inconsiderable service in maintaining some sort of testimony to the vanity of the present life. The value of such a testimony, amongst a people who are apt to become so completely intoxicated by present and visible good as the Chinese, cannot be over-estimated.

In turning over the pages of the Conference report, we next come to a paper on "Preaching to the Heathen: Matter and Manner." The paper is void of any such speciality as its title and occasion might seem to promise. After telling us that it is "the Gospel in its authority, necessity, import, obligation," that we are to preach, we are informed that the style of preaching it must be "simple, clear and plain," "earnest and affectionate," "intelligent and appropriate," "direct, pointed, practical," "experimental, interesting and attractive," and "Scriptural," advices that may, perhaps, be as cogent in Bau, Honolulu, Timbuctoo, and Dunrossness, as in Shanghai. The triteness of the essay was redeemed by the discussion to which it gave rise. One speaker indicated his sense of the importance of preaching by saying that ninety-eight out of every hundred Missionaries should be preachers. Of the remaining two one might be a philologist, and the other a school-teacher. The influence of the recent revivalistic movements in England and America, was a noteworthy feature in the addresses of some of the speakers. It was urged that Christ should be preached as a present Saviour from sin, and that immediate conversions should be always aimed at. Perhaps the revivalistic spirit as it shows itself in some of the addresses, and whose presence we must of course all hail with delight, is, perhaps, in just a little danger of overlooking the necessity for preliminary ideas before conversion can take place. If great waves of religious feeling were to come, as some people almost seem to expect, before the ideas to which they are the true response were well and deeply settled in

the national mind, new and gigantic systems of error and fanaticism might arise that would need centuries to disintegrate and remove. The advocates of a revivalistic style of preaching to the Chinese, seemed to overlook the succession of truths in the Christian system. A speaker, who was alive to the omission, took occasion to quote a remark made by the apostolic Burns to a brother Missionary; and nobody will distrust the worth of the remark from a man who was crowned with such splendid success as an evangelist: "Your preaching is too evangelical," meaning that there could be no knowledge of Christ possible to the Chinese mind till there was some preliminary knowledge of the nature of God. The Chinese mind will not vibrate to evangelical interjections and expletives, till tempered and tuned by long and careful courses of previous instruction. One speaker is so far carried away by revivalistic ideas as to deprecate the use of ridicule. To abstain from occasional ridicule in preaching to heathen congregations, is to let a whole world of force lie waste; for the Chinese sense of the ridiculous is almost unequalled in its keenness, and, if wisely worked upon, may at times give more purchase than any other point of leverage in the whole round of the Chinese character. Indeed, a Missionary may produce a more solid and serious effect by using a little banter and pleasantry now and again, than by earnest logic; and the preacher who pulls a long face, and wears a solemn air, is, as a matter of fact, making the most formidable attack upon the gravity of a Chinese audience of which he is capable. Two admirable papers on "Itineration" next came before the Conference for discussion. It seemed to be accepted as a Missionary axiom that itineration should be first "near" and then "far," and there was a very general consensus of testimonies that colportage apart from preaching was of little practical benefit. Two papers by two excellent and successful Medical Missionaries, describe the openings for Medical Mission work amongst the Chinese, and define the conditions under which it can be best carried out. The native faculty is ignorant of anatomy and physiology, has no knowledge of the nature of disease and the properties of medicines, and abjures the simplest forms of surgery. A Chinese pictorial primer, just published, indicates the position of the native doctor, by placing him midway between a priest and a fortune-

teller. We are told that the working expenses of a Missionary hospital, apart from the salary of the medical officer, need not exceed £200 a year; that the Medical Missionary should not undertake private practice amongst Europeans, and should by all means interest himself in the religious work of the hospital.

Several essays by ladies who have been engaged in teaching, visitation, and other forms of Missionary work, will, of course, be read with interest, and judged as mildly as possible. A rhetorical disquisition on "Foot-binding" intimates that the abolition of the practice within Christian families ought to be made a test of Church-membership. This view, however, did not seem to meet with general acceptance. Although nobody dissented from the axiom of one of the speakers that "a Christian woman should have a Christian foot," it was thought that that happy consummation would be best brought about by moral influences rather than by the exercise of Church authority. It was mentioned in the course of the discussion that the Emperor Kang Hi of the present dynasty resolved to end the evil on his accession to the throne, and issued an edict forbidding it. He was about to issue a second edict, when his advisers warned him that the step might possibly provoke a revolution, and cost him his throne. The essays and conversations on "Female Education" were far from encouraging. It transpired that not only are the girls in boarding schools largely supported out of Mission funds, but that money is even paid to secure the attendance of girls in the day schools. No surer method of damaging the interests of female education with the respectable classes of the Chinese could possibly be adopted. One lady, in a well-written essay, pleads that a Chinese girl can be supported on £6 a year, and reminds us of the enormous sums spent on charity schools in England. The appeal is characterised by the impulsive generosity and the economical short-sightedness we should naturally expect from a female pen. The Chinese have managed to get on hitherto without a poor-law, and Christianity will not be the social gain it has been in other countries if it educates the people for that humiliating dispensation. We must protest, too, against the confusion between the conversion of Eastern woman and her education in a Missionary boarding school by which these appeals are so often characterised. England has

had generations of Christian women whose religion was not kindled in Christian boarding schools. If we are to take the ground of some of the papers before us, alas for the souls of the poor creatures who passed into eternity before the Pentecost of tatting and crochet burst upon the Church. It is a consolation, however, to remember after all that the Christian woman grows with the growth of Christianity, and is not the special creation of a Mission boarding school. A much more encouraging account is given of house-to-house visitation by European ladies and the Bible women under their direction than of "Female Education."

The subject of "Education as a Missionary Agency" naturally occupied an important place in the deliberations of the Conference. The papers read were prepared by Missionaries who had taken an active part in educational experiments amongst the Chinese, and naturally held to one side of the question. The argument of one of the essayists, that science has been providentially put into our hands for evangelistic ends, as the power of miracle was put into the hands of the first Apostles, is obviously strained, and ignores what, alas! has to be told on the other side about the disintegrating influence of science upon faith. High schools in which science should be taught, it was said, would give access to the upper classes of Chinese society. This can never be true till foreign science has a position equal to that of native literature, and the Chinese Government alone can give it that position. It is a constant complaint of the European professors in the Imperial College of Western Science in Peking that whilst the Chinese Government is faithful to all its engagements with them, it puts no adequate seal of recognition upon the subjects they teach. Youths are sent to them who have been selected from the lower grades of native society, and who are destined for very subordinate appointments. In some of the entrance examinations for literary degrees the Chinese Government has given the alternative of mathematics instead of essay-writing to the competitors, and that is no slight step in advance; but till Western subjects are recognised in the examination for the higher degrees, it can scarcely be said that schools for instruction in Western science will give access to the better classes of the Chinese people. The Chinese youths who will by-and-by become the influential men of the empire

could only be reached by engaging famous native professors of Confucian literature at higher rates than they could command by their independent exertions, and establishing a system of colleges on purely native lines. Such a system would cost as much as a system of high schools manned by European professors, and would have this drawback, that it would subsidise what, after all, is not an ideal system of education. Missionaries might, perhaps, learn a lesson from a practice not unknown amongst Oriental races. When a man goes into the bazaar to make a purchase, he never fixes his eye at first upon the article he wants, or says a word about its price. If he were to make a prompt bid for the article he wants, the shopkeeper would make him pay in proportion to his eagerness, or perhaps even suspect an unknown value in the article, and absolutely refuse to sell. After deliberating over some dozen articles, he very incidentally lights upon the thing he has desired all along, asks the price in a tone of admirable indifference, and accomplishes the purchase at a minimum of both time and pence. If Western education is impatiently pressed upon the Chinese, it will be a very costly and difficult process to get it established: if the Missionaries wait with Oriental indifference and self-possession, and do not bid for the right of educating the Chinese youth, they may possibly soon have in their hands that very important force upon which their hearts are set. But whilst the idea of establishing high schools for heathen students did not seem to command very much support, the desirability of educating to the fullest possible extent *within* the Church was admitted on all sides. Native preachers were to have the widest and most liberal training the Missionaries were able to impart, and separate schools were to be formed for the children of native Christians, where they might be isolated from heathen influences, and trained upon methods in advance of the humdrum and old-world methods prevalent in the country at large.

Three essays deal with the subject of "Classical, Colloquial, and Secular Literature." The first gives an interesting view of the attempts that have been made to create a Christian literature in the current classical style. Some seven versions of the Bible, none of which will do more than just outlive the century, thirty or forty commentaries on different portions of the New Testament, and 521 publications in Theology and Narrative, besides hymn books and rituals, make up a fairly imposing list. The number



in the last division is surprisingly high, and shows what a large proportion must have disappeared from circulation almost as soon as published. With the exception of half a dozen tracts on current superstitions, a translation of the *Pilgrim's Progress* that is almost as piquant as the original, and one or two recent publications directed to the wants of the better educated amongst Chinese inquirers, very few of the Missionary publications seem to have so far hit the popular taste as to have any but the feeblest chances of survival. The essay on "Colloquial, or 'Vernacular,' Literature," as the writer prefers to call it, is full of special pleading, and assumes positions that, if in favour amongst the general body of the Missionaries, must irreparably discredit them as messengers to the educated classes of the Chinese. Versions of the New Testament, besides religious treatises of a more or less pretentious character, have already been published in eleven colloquial dialects. The aim of the paper on "Vernacular Christian Literature" is to establish some sort of parallel between classical Chinese and the Latin of the Middle Ages, and to show that the position of the men who are trying to give versions of the Scriptures in colloquial to the Chinese is identical with that of the first translators of the Bible into the common tongue of the people. The ambitiousness of the parallel is ahead of its accuracy. Had the power of reading Latin, in the days of the Tudors, been as common as the power of reading English now, had shopkeepers possessed such a mastery of Latin as to have written all their business letters in the language of the schools; and had the peasants, who could not even read, been in the habit of flinging off Latin quotations as freely as Baron Bradwardine in *Waverley*, the first translators of the Scriptures into the tongue of the people might not have felt the same crying need for their work they did. Not only does the production of colloquial versions involve a waste of strength, but in some cases it is a positive detriment to the progress of the work. In districts where the standard of education is uniformly low, they will be comparatively harmless. In districts, again, where the standard of education is high, and a colloquial literature of a respectable order exists, colloquial versions will be comparatively harmless. But in districts, again, where the standard of education is high, and where no native colloquial literature exists higher in character than the

literature of the London music halls, the dissemination of colloquial versions must prove an incalculable mischief. They provoke the scorn of the *literati*, and lower the standing ground of Christianity to that of the obscene publications that are issued in the same literary livery. If colloquial versions are to be published at all, they had better be published in Romanised character, as this keeps them beyond the notice of the Chinese *literati*. But a Romanised version is, after all, an inert and inanimate thing to the Chinese mind, and is a more than questionable investment of labour and money. Words are robbed of all their pictorial suggestiveness to the Chinese eye by being represented through the Roman character. The ideographic element in a Chinese character is a powerful stimulant of the imagination, and keeps reading from becoming leaden and insipid. The need for colloquial versions is very much exaggerated. The difference between learning to read a simple classical style and a colloquial is so slight that it may be fairly concluded the man who cannot succeed with the former will have to be taught through the ear altogether. Changes must come in the style of the written language of the Chinese. It is sure to burst its old bonds as scientific and theological ideas begin to germinate in the Chinese mind. But the Missionaries are misjudging their strength, and allowing themselves to be drawn aside from their true work to a profitless adventure, if they imagine they can anticipate, or help on, or determine these changes. In respect to Chinese literature, it may be said the whole country is "of one speech and of one language." The Missionaries who are toiling on colloquial versions, or rather whose teachers are translating them from classical versions under Missionary supervision, are but seeking to spread Babel into literature. We do not remember where it is predicted that the building up of the Christian Church should be connected with a new extension of the curses of the Confusion.

The essay on "Secular Literature" is a defence of the Missionaries who have left their first calling and taken lucrative positions as translators of European text-books on Law and Science under the Chinese Government. A story is told of a Missionary who spent some spare half-hours in talking geography to a Governor-General of the Fukien Province, and the Governor-General by-and-by published a very valuable book on the "Geography of Western

Countries." The essay does not scruple to intimate that the good done in these spare half-hours of conversation with the Mandarin was far greater than the good done by the Missionary in his more directly evangelistic efforts. The moral of the story seems to be that there are stronger and Diviner forces immanent in civilisation than in Christianity; that it would be well to put Jesus Christ into a corner for two or three decades, and bestow upon Mr. Keith Johnstone the honours of temporary teacher, saviour, and regenerator of the Chinese; and that it is a sublimer stroke of work to put a few glimpses of Europe within the horizon of a man dressed in silks, and with a peacock's feather in his hat, than to fire the soul of a man who only wears cottons and a plain red-braid button at the top of his cap with the purity and love of Jesus Christ, and to light up his eye with the vision of the wonders that lie beyond the stars.

Several healthy Evangelical essays discuss "The Standard of Admission to Full Church Membership," and "The best means of Elevating the Moral and Spiritual Tone of the Native Church." A paper by the chaplain to the English community in Shanghai on "The Duty of Foreign Residents aiding in the Evangelisation of China, and the best Means of doing so," passes in review diplomatists and officials, sailors, medical men, journalists, merchants, and foreigners in the employ of the Chinese, and betrays, in conclusion, those exaggerated views about the evils of Missionary sects which have been brought on to merchants' dinner tables in the East with the dessert since the first Chinese war, but that are as baseless in actual fact as they are canting and conventional in their forms of expression. The essayist suggests that if "the mists of prejudice were cleared away," the Missionaries might, perhaps, all agree to accept the teachings of the Apostles' Creed! It is just possible they might be able to accept as much in common as the ministers of that dubious unity of the Church represented by the worthy chaplain.

Next come a group of essays on "Self-Support in the Native Churches," "The Native Pastorate," and "The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Employment of Native Assistants." The writer of the paper on "The Native Pastorate" complains that, although he has heard native preachers deliver "pleasing and instructive sermons," he has never heard "a native preacher who pro-

duced a profound impression." An equally sad lament might be uttered about the preaching of the Missionaries. The fault is one that should be charged against the congregations rather than against the preachers. No profound impression can be produced upon a congregation till it has been so far saturated with Christian ideas and sensibilities as to make it responsive to the preacher's words. The essayist wisely prefers "adult converts to school converts for preachers;" but, to balance the wisdom of his preference, tells us, alas, that he "would not spend much time in training outside the Bible." In reference to the training of native agents, a very successful Missionary observed that, "in the present state of the country, native scholarship is of far more importance than foreign scholarship. A high English education is not found to inspire the Chinese with any great respect for the native who possesses it, whilst a thorough native education never fails to do so." The essays on "The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Employment of Native Assistants" deals with the disadvantages only. The employment of native assistants out of Foreign Mission Funds is "contrary to mental philosophy," and "objectionable on purely ecclesiastical grounds," inasmuch as it subjects native assistants who are members of native churches to the jurisdiction of Missionaries and Missionary societies. The first point is one that may be allowed to pass in virtue of its amusing obscurity; the second will appeal to those only who are affected by such an overpowering mania for Independency that they will resent those very mild modifications in favour of Presbyterianism Congregationalist churches necessarily adopt when they form themselves into Missionary corporations. The argument against the employment of native assistants, drawn from the mercenary character of some who have been taken into the service of the Church, is rather an argument for the removal of the Missionaries who have been so overdriven by their own ambition, or so lacking in the discrimination of character, as to make these blunders. It is an argument against grants of money by Missionary societies for a native agency at a stage of the work when the money can only be used for drawing away the bribable converts from other Missions. It is an argument against the hasty employment of new and untried converts. But we cannot see that the argument is of force beyond these points, and discredits the judicious

employment of a well-selected native agency. A note is appended to the foot of the essays, that "they must not be looked upon as representing a majority of opinions in the Conference." One speaker draws a distinction between the payment of men out of Mission funds who are acting as native pastors only, and the payment of men who are acting as evangelists. The first case he would think reprehensible, the latter perfectly right in principle. An essay characterised by quiet Christian wisdom and thorough familiarity with Chinese character deals with the question: "How shall the Native Churches be stimulated to more aggressive Christian Work?" Highly encouraging testimonies to Chinese zeal for aggressive work followed the essay. A paper on "The Use of Opium and its Bearing on the Spread of Christianity in China" gives a concise sketch of the history and growth of the opium trade, and presses the crime home upon the English Government in a form from which there can be no appeal. The essay has already been published as a separate pamphlet, and ought to be in the hands of every British householder. We are sorry to see that one of the speakers complains of incautious statements issued by the British Anti-Opium Society. As far as our experience goes, its statements have been very much under rather than over the mark.

An essay on "Ancestral Worship" is characterised by a piquancy of language and a power of generalisation that place it many respects at the head of the whole collection; but it unfortunately rests upon an inaccurate basis, and leads up through underground passages to the proscribed "term" question. The essay opens with a statement that is a timely signal of the rashnesses we may expect on almost every page. "Of all the people of whom we have any knowledge, the sons of the Chinese are most unfilial, disobedient to parents, and pertinacious in having their own way from the time they are able to make known their wants." We are then told that ancestral worship rather than filial piety is the principal religion of the Chinese; that the worship springs not from honour but fear of the dead, and its object is to alleviate the condition of the spirits in Hades and ward off from the living the calamities with which the dead might avenge any omission or neglect. Two or three interesting facts are given to illustrate the practical influence of ancestral worship upon the different departments of Chinese life. If a magistrate finds a man

guilty of serious crime, and upon inquiry learns that his parents are dead and that he is an only son, he will pass a much lighter sentence upon him than otherwise. "Magistrates shrink from the responsibility of placing a man whose duty it is to sacrifice to the dead in a position where he would be forced to neglect those sacred offices." A provincial judge can never become prime minister, as it is feared the spirits of those he has sentenced to death might avenge themselves by bringing disaster upon his administration. A Chinese emperor must always have a successor younger than himself, who will render the customary worship, "for this homage is never rendered by the elder to the younger." The essay next defines at length the Chinese belief in regard to the state of the dead. They believe in two stages of existence: the world of light and the world of darkness. They believe that those who have passed into the world of darkness need houses and food and raiment as in life. They believe that those who are in the spirit-world can see their friends in the world of light, and it is within their power to influence for weal or woe the destiny of their descendants and survivors. They believe that the government in the spirit-world is an exact counterpart of the government that prevails throughout the empire of the living; that there are judgment-courts and purgatories corresponding in all respects to the Chinese yamens and prisons, and that there are ranks of spirits presiding over the judgment-courts and purgatories corresponding to the endless gradation of Chinese officials, with an emperor at the top whose spiritual counterpart it is insinuated is to be found in "the Supreme Ruler" of the Classics and the "God" of the English and German Missionaries. As a Chinese prisoner may sometimes secure his liberty, and always get his hardships tempered through the use of money, costly Buddhist masses for the dead, and the transmission of paper money to the spirits by burning, are supposed to exert a genialising influence upon the rulers of the under world. "Fung Shui," we are told, "is the *status quo* between the living and the dead," and is the essence of ancestral worship. These (says the essay) are the ideas upon which ancestral worship rests, and the system has been in existence more than two thousand years. The latter statement, if made good, of course shows that the term Sheung Tai (Supreme Ruler) had corrupt associations when the Chinese Classics were receiving their last

touches, and possibly never did express any purely theistic conception.

The simple and consistent system into which the writer of the essay on "Ancestral Worship" weaves the heterogeneous elements of Chinese superstition possesses an artistic completeness that cannot fail to win admiration, and make the subject eminently readable and interesting; but it is based upon very serious inaccuracies. The Chinese system of the supernatural possesses no such seamlessness as the essay before us depicts. It is a parti-coloured patchwork, and not the complete and lifelike reflection of the temporal government we are here told to believe. Confucianism, a system of practical ethics, and Taoism a tissue of astrological speculation, knew absolutely nothing of purgatories. The popular conceptions of purgatory, which the essayist makes the basis of ancestral worship, came in with Buddhism. In the course of time Confucianism winked at these conceptions, and Taoism boldly adopted them as its own. Buddhism did not gain any foothold in China till the time of the Christian era. It would take a century or two for the conceptions of the Buddhist purgatories to work themselves into the popular mind, and so modify their outward forms as to become exact reflections of the visible Chinese judicature. But ancestral worship had already been in existence in some form or other for centuries. To make the belief in the Buddhist purgatories an essential element in ancestral worship, and to say the present system has been in existence for two thousand years, is to ignore all Chinese history. The writer again defines the superstition of "Fung Shui" as "the *status quo* between the living and the dead," and says that it is "the essence of ancestral worship." The definition is inaccurate. As far as the superstition can be described, it is the belief in a semi-physical and semi-spiritual force that determines the health and happiness of all within its circle. The points of the compass are looked upon as far weightier factors in this mystic force than the wills of disembodied spirits. If "Fung Shui" is "the essence of ancestral worship," ancestral worship must have lived without an "essence" for nearly two thousand years; for "Fung Shui" is never mentioned in classical literature, and is not much more than a thousand years old.

The essay, again, completely ignores the different shades

of belief amongst the different classes of the Chinese people. The belief in the Buddhist purgatories and the sentiment of ancestral worship are very distinct things in the Chinese mind, as shown by the different degrees of sensitiveness existing in relation to them. A Missionary may attack the first in his preaching without provoking the least expression of dissent from his hearers. Let him lay irreverent hands on the second, and he will find that he has stirred up a swarm of wasps. The two things did not grow together, and are not vitally connected. Educated Chinese scorn the idea of attaching any importance to the popular conceptions of the Buddhist hells. Many of them do not even believe that the spirits of parents are in any degree conscious even of the worship paid at their graves. The worship is paid on the simple ground that it tends to nourish and strengthen the filial sentiment in the hearts of the survivors.

Two essays on "Questionable Practices in Connection with Marriage and Funeral Ceremonies," seem to deal with a somewhat superfluous topic. An enlightened Christian conscience will condemn the practices that are absolutely evil in their tendency, and social usages that may have originated in superstition will lose all their vitality as Christianity exhausts old ideas of their force, just as living things die when placed under a receiver from which the air has been withdrawn. How many idolatrous customs survive like tenantless shells on the sea-shore amongst us in England to-day! They have become innocuous through the growth of the spirit of Christianity, and not through some conclave of early Missionaries to Britain, that noted down the exhibitions of Plough-Monday, and the reprehensible superstition of pelting newly married couples with old shoes.

An essay on "The Treaty Rights of Native Christians, and the Duty of Missionaries in Regard to their Vindication," is clear in treatment and reasonable in demand: deprecating, on the one hand, the exercise of any such influence as that with which French priests have been accustomed to overshadow their converts; and deprecating, on the other hand, the cold-blooded policy of forgetting the Toleration Clause in the Treaty, and yielding up native converts to the will of mad and merciless persecution. The days of tooth and claw, and survival of the fittest in the carnivorous sense, are gone, and if we gauge



the judgment of the age aright, it is that there shall be a fair field for all systems alike, and that what dies shall die of its own moral and intellectual weakness, and what lives must live by its own spiritual force alone. Toleration is not the piteous plea of Christianity for its own existence, but a right that the modern conscience is agreed to guarantee wherever it can assert itself, to Christian, Mohammedan, and Positivist, without respect of person and creed. The essay passes by one of the practical difficulties of the Toleration Clause, a difficulty the Chinese government probably does not yet appreciate in its full magnitude,—the influence of the practical outworking of the Clause upon the existing institutions of the Chinese Empire. The patriarchal system of government prevails throughout all the Chinese villages, and the elders of a clan have the power of inflicting the punishment of death upon its members. The municipalities of the towns and cities have recognised functions that stop short of those possessed by the elders of a village, but that invest them with very formidable powers; and the mischief is that the decisions of these quasi-judicial bodies are not revised by superior courts. Now as most serious persecution may be carried on in perfectly legal form through these clans and municipalities, the Imperial Government may be ultimately compelled, in the fulfilment of its toleration pledge, to step in and limit these powers, or revolutionise the organisations in which they are lodged. Testimonies were given in the discussion that followed the essay to the effect that the Mandarins are beginning to distinguish between the methods of Protestant and Roman Catholic Missionaries; and that the proclamations issued in accordance with the Che Foo Convention have already exercised a favourable influence throughout the country.

An essay on "The Principles of Translation into Chinese" is an ambitious, Latinised hash of grammar, logic, and theology, served up in the well-known style of Dr. Samuel Johnson. The Chinese language is spoken of as "the medium of linguistic expression for this great people," and the fact that the Chinese language admits of long sentences, is announced to us in the statement that "Chinese is by no means devoid of lengthened and weary discourse, the members of which are skilfully braided together by various particles and shifting adjustments, the deft interchange of which present a chain of obverse,

reverse, and revolving phases of thought," &c., &c. The drift of the essay, as far as we are able to read between the lines, is to condemn the idiomatic, but recklessly free, translation of the Scriptures in use amongst English and German Missionaries, and to justify the literal but dismally unidiomatic translation of the Scriptures used by a majority of the American Missionaries. Neither side has cause to cast the first stone. If we were to express a choice between two evils, we should be disposed to say, we will take as our starting-point a version that, however imperfect as a translation, is at least intelligible and idiomatic Chinese, rather than a version which, however accurately it may try to render the original, retains the English idiom, and can only be described as "pigeon" Chinese. In the discussion that followed, a successful author in Chinese, whilst of course admitting the necessity for translations of the Bible, Confessions, and Church Standards, gave the very wise advice, "Don't translate at all. Master a subject, and then produce an original compilation."

An essay on the question "Should the Native Churches be United Ecclesiastically and Independent of Foreign Churches and Missionary Societies?" treats the general subject of Church unity, and seems almost to anticipate the fusion of all evangelical Protestant Churches. When the essayist comes to deal with the question allotted him he answers it in the affirmative. His view would seem to have received very general support, one speaker affirming that the relation of Chinese Churches to ecclesiastical bodies in England and America was a perilous thing, and that the jealousy of the Chinese Government would be excited, should questions in the Chinese Church be referred to these foreign bodies for settlement. The views advocated may be applicable a century hence. Native churches will need the authoritative instruction, and guidance, and oversight of home churches for some generations, and to reassert that relation after it has once been surrendered, will be a far more difficult thing than to cherish it now. Missionaries often feel that it would give them great leverage for good if they had a dogma like that of Apostolic Succession, through which they could continue their power over immature converts and churches with tendencies to vagrancy. Separations will come of themselves and quite fast enough.

A paper on "The Inadequacy of the Present Means for the Evangelisation of China, and the necessity for greater effort and more systematic co-operation on the part of the different Societies so as to occupy the whole field," exhibits an almost perfect mastery of the geography of the Chinese Empire, and lays down the points from which the different provinces and portions of provinces must be approached, with the skill of an accomplished general. The amount of work sketched out, and that has not yet been touched in any sense or degree, is enough to paralyse us with despair. A wise and earnest essay on "The Training of Native Agents" closes the series.

The essays are followed by statistics of the various Protestant Missions, and a series of maps showing the places in which work has been commenced. No more striking proof could perhaps be adduced of the Divine force still immanent in Christianity, than a comparison of the men as made known to us in these discussions, not uniformly as clear sighted, or far-seeing, or imbued with as much Chinese culture, or of such delicate sympathy with Chinese thought and life, or so free from narrow prejudices as we could wish, and the vast work they have done, as shown to us in the maps and tables of statistics. We hope, by-the-by, that none of the maps are less accurate than that of the Canton Province. From the map in question places are omitted where the English Wesleyan and American Presbyterian Missionary Societies have had organised churches for years, and a place is put down as a Church Missionary Society Station where not a single sermon has yet been preached, and to which an untried man taken from another church had been appointed, who has since proved, as men who are ready to move about from church to church for employment generally do prove, worthless.

The most notable and gratifying feature of the Conference, would seem to have been its remarkable spirit of catholicity and friendliness. Missionaries of different churches, different nationalities, and widely divergent notions, met and talked together for a fortnight; and, with the exception of the unfortunate episode springing out of the essay on Confucianism, not a bitter word would seem to have been spoken, nor an uncharitable passion stirred. Plans of practical co-operation, moreover, were devised that will bear solid fruit in future days.

ART. II.—*Reports of Proceedings of the Representative Body laid before the General Synod of the Church of Ireland, 1871—1878.* Dublin: Hodges, Foster and Figgis.

WHATEVER difference of opinion may exist regarding the policy of the most important Act of Parliament passed since the Revolution, there is nothing more remarkable at this hour than the manner in which the anticipations alike of friends and foes as to the effects of disestablishment in Ireland have been falsified by events. Perhaps the very swiftness and decisiveness of the blow enhanced the difficulties of a calm judgment on the changes that were inevitable in the constitution and position of a Church which had its roots in three hundred years of the national history. Ten years have passed away since Mr. Gladstone expressed his desire that the passage from Establishment to Disestablishment should be effected, not like the overthrow of a building, but like the launch of some goodly ship, which, constructed on the shore, makes, indeed, a great transition when it passes into the water, but yet makes that transition without loss of equilibrium, and then glides on its bosom calmly and even majestically. It was only natural that the members of the Church chiefly affected should regard the change with undisguised dismay. They declared that to throw Protestantism on its own resources in a country predominantly Romanist was to imperil its very existence, that the reduction of its finances necessarily involved a contraction of its operations, especially in extensive tracts of the south and west, where congregation after congregation would go out like dying lamps; that the clergy, insufficiently supported because left to the voluntary liberality of individual landlords and the local peasantry, would be recruited from the inferior ranks of society, and would therefore lose the respect of their flocks as well as their free and independent position, while they would be subjected to the control of a laity intensely Puritan and resolved upon putting an end to what they regarded as the illogical compromise between mediæval divinity and modern thought which characterised the formularies of the Church. This was the strain of lamentation, especially among the Irish bishops and clergy, who seemed to feel certainly

much more than the laity the violence of the shock which Disestablishment was expected to give to the framework of Protestant society. On the other hand, those who sought the abolition of the Irish Establishment argued that to represent Protestantism as dependent on State connection was to represent it as a mere political institution that had never taken root in the hearts of the people, and was itself a signal proof, not of the evil tendency, but of the justice and expediency of the measure. They agreed, further, that instead of weakening the energy of Protestantism, Disestablishment would place it in a stronger attitude than it had ever been towards the aggressive Romanism that surrounded it; that the new constitution that would be called into existence would place in the hands of the laity the power to hold in check the incipient Ritualism of the clergy; that all classes of Protestants would be brought into a stronger league of fraternity, and that the clergy, only partially dependent upon the voluntary contributions of the laity, would suffer no eventual loss either of income or independence.

How far these two sets of anticipations have been falsified or realised it will be the object of the present article to exhibit with all reasonable brevity. We shall only say at present that, in all the various and complicated exigencies of ecclesiastical life that have arisen since 1871, the Protestant Episcopal Church has manifested a power of dignified self-government and of genuine Protestant work which shows there is no need to despair of its future existence. Great changes have taken place in its constitution and in its financial position; but it has not lost its identity with the Church whose annals are bright with the names of apostolic pastors like Bedell, philosophers like Berkeley and Whately, preachers like Jeremy Taylor and William Archer Butler, and divines like James Ussher, Charles Leslie, and James Thomas O'Brien. There is something very interesting to us in the narrative of its reorganisation. The outside public looked on not unsympathisingly as it watched from 1871 the development of the systematic organisation of the parish, the higher administration of the Diocesan Synods and Councils, and the legislative functions of the General Synod; while it could not but admire the masculine directness and vigour with which the laity grappled with the most difficult problems of finance, and made its influence felt in the

protracted and exciting struggle to purify the Prayer Book. The Episcopal Church has not only successfully borne the sudden strain upon its energies, but has drawn fresh vigour from the late crisis for a new and expanding career of usefulness and power.

We shall first endeavour to exhibit a succinct view of the financial changes wrought by Disestablishment; then we shall examine the peculiarities of the new ecclesiastical constitution suddenly called into being by the wrench which separated the Church from the State; and afterwards we shall give some account of the doctrinal position of Irish Episcopacy and the effect that will probably be produced by the revision of its formularies.

It is necessary, then, that we should first understand the exact position of the Irish Church before Disestablishment, that we may be the better able to appreciate the financial changes that have flowed from that important event. Happily, a single table from Dr. Ball's *Blue Book* shows us at a glance the annual revenues of the Establishment before 1869 :

	£	s.	d.
Bishoprics .....	74,524	7	10
Deans and Chapters .....	10,749	4	10
Minor Corporations .....	10,176	0	0
Cathedral Dignitaries .....	10,648	0	0
Beneficed Clergy .....	895,180	17	10
Ecclesiastical Commissioners .....	80,554	0	0
	<hr/>		
	£581,832	10	6*

When we add to this sum the estimated yearly value of see and glebe-houses, which is put down in the Report at £32,152 8s. 4d., we see that the Church of Ireland, containing by the last census rather more than 600,000 inhabitants, drew yearly from the State rather more than £600,000 a year. It is well known that the Episcopalians form nowhere an important element of the rural population of Ireland. They reside for the most part in towns, and there is no county in which they are not numerically inferior to the rest of the inhabitants. This fact is not without significance in estimating the efforts they have made to re-endow their Church. It must be remembered

\* This total sum represents the annual revenues "after deducting poor rate, expenses of collection, and quit rents," and "is exclusive of the value of houses of residence and lands in the occupation of ecclesiastical persons" (p. xiv.).

that the clergy were not sent adrift with the bare satisfaction of life-interests, for, by arrangements to be presently explained, they were placed in a position, not exactly to save all the capital received from the State, but a large portion of it, and thus to form a scheme by which their successors will receive an average income of about £200 a year exclusive of the value of their parochial residences, so long as the laity shall maintain their present standard of liberality.

It was most natural that the first thought of Irish Episcopalians, after Disestablishment, was to found a Central Sustentation Fund, somewhat similar to that of the Free Church of Scotland, which might be the means of strengthening the Church in its extremest borders on the principle of the wealthier districts supplementing the wants of the poorer. There would thus be a thorough centralisation of finance. It was the natural course to take for a Church constituted organically like Irish Episcopacy. But its position was very different from the Free Church of Scotland, which, remarkably homogeneous in its theological opinions, was, besides, at its foundation welded together by passionate controversies and common sufferings. There was, so to speak, a greater accumulation of moral energy, a greater liberation of force, in connection with the Scottish movement, than was at all to be expected in connection with the circumstances of the Disestablishment of the Irish Church. It was evident, however, at a very early stage, that the idea of a Central Sustentation Fund must be abandoned, however much it would have suited a Church which does not lie in a compact mass like Irish Presbyterianism in a single province, but drags its meagre length over the whole extent of the island and appears at a hundred points in detached fragments and unconnected outposts in the midst of the surrounding Romanism. In a word, the laity feared that a General Sustentation Fund would throw far too much power into the hands of the bishops and clergy, while their suspicions of the orthodoxy of many of their teachers were at the time greatly inflamed by the encouragement given to the circulation of Portal's Manual by some of the clergy in the Dublin parishes. There was a loud and instant demand for the revision of the Prayer Book. It was now clear that some other system of Church finance must be devised that would give the laity a more perfect and direct control over the support of their clergy. Many, at least, of the laity were disposed to suspend

their judgment with regard to what they ought to give till they could see what the Church was likely to become.

It was at length decided that, instead of a General Sustentation Fund, each diocese should provide a separate fund for itself, and that another fund, with the title of the "General Sustentation Fund," should be left in the hands of the Representative Body, to provide, not merely for the better support of poor parishes, but for the future endowment of the bishops. The scheme of Church finance, then, was to be diocesan. The system now established is worked in the following manner:—Each parish is assessed in a certain sum according to its ability, and that sum is paid to the Representative Body, and applied, partly to keep the capital received from the State intact, and partly returned in the form of stipends to the parish ministers. In other words, the Representative Body, who act as paymasters to the whole Church, give each clergyman his annuity together with his portion of supplemental stipend. We are now in a position to present two large figures which show at a glance the amount received by the Church from the State in satisfaction of life-interests, and the amount contributed by Irish Episcopalians during the last seven years to save their endowments and to provide for the future support of their clergy. Up till 31st December, 1877, the sum received from the State, along with a free present of the churches and cathedrals, was exactly £7,568,857 11s. 6d. The sum raised by the Church in seven years was £1,808,442 15s. 1d., or, say, up till the end of 1878, though we have no statistics of that year, about Two MILLIONS STERLING. This sum, which, no doubt, is swelled by generous contributions from England, is creditable to the hitherto unexercised liberality of Irish Episcopalians. The figures for each year are given in the last report of the Representative Body :

	£	s.	d.
1870 .....	229,753	14	2
1871 .....	214,709	8	4
1872 .....	248,445	1	8
1873 .....	230,179	11	0
1874 .....	257,021	2	1
1875 .....	218,499	3	8
1876 .....	212,094	7	7
1877 .....	197,739	6	7
	£1,808,442	15	1



There is a certain falling off in the last three years, but it is only right to explain that it does not arise from any decrease in the contributions to the stipend fund, which is the basis of the entire system of Church finance. It is due to the decline in legacies and in contributions from the London Sustentation Fund Committee, and to the fact that the last instalment of the large donations promised in 1869, and spread over five years, was paid off in 1874. There has, it is true, been a falling off in stipend in 1877 as compared with 1876. The figures are, for 1876, £124,424, and for 1877, £118,478. The Representative Body regret this decline, and point to the example of the Free Church of Scotland, which increased its yearly contributions from £68,704 14s. 8d. in 1844, to £172,641 18s. 3d. in 1877, as an instance of progressive growth in liberality eminently worthy of Irish imitation. Perhaps the depression of trade has had something to do with the slight falling off in the contributions of 1877.

We must now briefly notice the arrangement by which the yearly incomes of the clergy are secured in all time coming. The Representative Body were enabled by the Irish Church Act to accept from the Irish Commissioners a fixed sum in place of each annuity, and thus, on principles familiar to insurance societies, to create a fund for re-endowment out of the difference between the capital with its total interest, and the sum of the annual payment on each life. The results of this operation are as follows:—There were altogether, up to the latest recorded date, 2,380 annuities granted to 2,125 ecclesiastical persons, of whom twenty-one were laymen; that is, 2,104 incumbents and curates.\* There were in all 101 non-commutants up till the latest printed return. Up till the 31st December, 1877, the commutation capital amounted to £3,146,403 16s. 11d., charged with annuities amounting to £236,007 10s. The Representative Body say this capital, improved at four per cent., would be sufficient to pay off all the annuitants with an average age of forty-six years and ten months.† Of course,

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\* There were 1,459 annuities granted to 1,406 incumbents, and 921 annuities granted to 921 curates. But 141 of these latter annuities were held by incumbents in addition to their incumbencies, and sixteen were held by curates in addition to their curacies. In these 921 were included 201 curates who had not served in the Irish Church previous to the passing of the Irish Church Act. The Church Commissioners rejected 310 claims from persons claiming annuities as permanent curates.

† The amount of the Commutation Fund must go on diminishing so long as

the commuting clergy have a lien, not only on the interest, but on the principal of the Commutation Fund for the amount of their former incomes as long as they live, and it is the opinion of experienced actuaries that the fund will pay the incomes and leave a surplus after the death of the last commutant, independently of any effect of compounding. The entire commutation capital has, of course, not been preserved, having been considerably diminished in the way explained in the last foot-note, and also during the first few years by compositions and advances, according to the system deliberately, and, on the whole, wisely, adopted by the Representative Body. It will be remembered that Mr. Gladstone introduced into his plan of commutation an arrangement called compounding, by which the Church was enabled to reduce the number of its staff of clergy and to save a considerable sum of money for re-endowing the smaller number who should remain in its service. The Representative Body agreed to give the commuting minister a lump-sum in hand in full discharge of his annuity, part for his own benefit, and part to be devoted to the permanent endowment of the Church. Under this arrangement, according to the latest published return, 753 clergymen—that is, less than a third of the whole number—compounded. Only one bishop (Dr. Alexander, of Derry) compounded; and 452 incumbents and 300 curates; making 753 in all. The great majority left the Church to take service in English parishes, but a number remained in the service of the Church in Ireland, but under a condition imposed by the Representative Body that a deduction should be made from their incomes on account of their composition. The result of this composition process up till 31st December, 1877, was that £1,218,804 18s. 5d. was paid to compounders, and that £1,357,840 8s. 7d. was left as a balance in the hands of the Church for the permanent

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the Representative Body has to draw upon the principal to pay any portion of the annuities that will not be met by the interest. There will come a time when the interest alone will pay the annuities, but it would require an actuarial investigation to say when this time will come, and what balance will then be left. It is worth remarking that a great part of the success of the financial scheme of the Representative Body is due to commutation having been effected at three-and-a-half per cent., while the funds of the Representative Body have been invested at four-and-three-eighths per cent. The money market for the first few years after Disestablishment was much more favourable to investors than it is at present. The Commutation Fund and all the other funds in the hands of the Representative Body are credited with interest at four per cent., and the odd three-eighths pays expenses, and leaves a surplus every year.

support of its ministers. In order to assist in making up the difference between the interest of the commuted capital and the amount paid to the annuitants, and also to supplement their incomes, stipends to the amount of £134,559 19s. 11d. were raised under the diocesan scheme for the year ending 31st December, 1877. About this sum is raised every year for the same purpose.

It is now a matter of easy calculation to settle how much each minister of the Church will receive as his income through the operation of its several schemes. The reduction in the numbers of the clergy will naturally affect this calculation. The smaller the staff the higher the income. The number of clergy before Disestablishment was 2,104, if we may reckon by the number of annuitants. Their number now is 1,850—a diminution of 254, mostly in curates—but it is proposed to reduce the number still further till the staff consists of 1,438 clergymen, that is, 1,227 incumbents and 211 curates. This would involve a reduction from 1869 of 666 clergymen. Now, the incomes of the 1,850 clergy paid in 1877 amounted to a sum of £378,075 3s. 1d., that is, £243,515 3s. 2d. of annuities, and £134,559 19s. 11d. stipends under diocesan schemes. This gives each minister an average income of about £205, exclusive of a parochial residence. Of course, all the annuitants draw their old incomes for life, but on their death or retirement, the incomes will be more equalised over the whole Church than at present. Now, according to a return given in Charles's *Irish Church Directory*, there were only 111 clergymen before 1869 receiving less than £200 a year of income. We believe that the average incomes of the parish clergy were then about £240 a year, exclusive of the value of the glebes; so that the only change wrought by Disestablishment is a reduction in individual incomes of less than £40 a year. Mr. Gladstone was not far wrong, then, when he said that the change to be effected was "really only the fall of a few feet." But, then, if the number of the clergy is to be still further reduced to 1,438, the individual incomes will amount to about £263 per annum. All these various estimates, however, are conditioned upon the continued liberality of the laity. Any deficiency on their part will involve either the diminution of the staff of ministers or the lowering of their incomes. But in any case the clergy may be congratulated on still receiving a larger income

than is received by the ministers of any other Church in Ireland.

It is only necessary to add a few words concerning the value of the parish residences. In accordance with a proviso of the Church Act, certain portions of the glebe lands upon which the glebe houses stand were obtained at prices far under that for which they would sell in open market, and in many cases obtained for nothing, the incumbents, having previously to their purchase, received as compensation for their vested interests a sum exceeding the purchase-money itself. The Church received besides £23,000 for the dilapidation of glebe houses. This sum was insufficient, for the Representative Body have since laid out an additional £69,000 in repairs. Up till 31st December, 1877, they had paid for the purchase of the glebes £395,271 6s. 6d., contributed by various parishes and private donors. But then it was considered advisable to sell glebes unsuited to the present requirements of the Church, and the amount received for these was £68,961 11s., which, after deducting the price paid to the State for them—£34,846 15s. 4d.—left a profit of £31,036 14s. 6d., or, including dilapidation-money, £32,300 14s. to be placed to the credit of the parishes in which the glebes are situated, and to be used in purchasing or building more suitable dwellings. Up till 31st December, 1877, there were 710 glebes vested in the Representative Body by the Irish Church Commissioners—who seem to be very slow in their operations—out of 930 in all. Thus there was a nice provision in the matter of dwellings made for a large body of the Irish clergy out of the “glebe” arrangements.

We have now briefly to notice the provision made for the support of the two archbishops and twelve bishops who are to govern the new Church. It is the desire of the official body that the incomes of the bishops should not be dependent on annual subscriptions, but that they should be secured by means of a capital sum that is expected to yield £2,500 annually to each of the two archbishops, and £1500 at least to each of the twelve bishops. It was unfortunate for the prospects of this fund that two of the bishops (Drs. Verschöyle and Daly) should have died without commuting their annuities, and thus left the dioceses of Kilmore and Cashel without a shilling for re-endowment. Annuities were purchased for two of the bishops (Meath and Ossory) who have both since died. Very little commutation capital

remains to the credit of these two sees. The Bishop of Derry is the only compounder among the bishops, and has through an immediate sacrifice of income succeeded in endowing his see for ever with £2,000 per annum. The diocese of Down will soon be able to secure £2,000 to the successors of Bishop Knox. An effort is now being made in all the dioceses to raise a sum that will yield £17,500 a year. The amount required for this purpose, at 4 per cent., would be £437,500. But the amount actually raised so far, either by direct contributions or allocation from the General Sustentation Fund, which is far too heavily burdened already by the claims of poor parishes, is now only some £120,000. We cannot account for the backwardness of the laity in making a better provision for the support of their bishops. It is probably owing to the more pressing claims of the parish clergy than to any lurking jealousy which the laity may be supposed to entertain of the still considerable powers of the higher order of clergy.

We have already mentioned that the clerical staff of the Church has been considerably reduced, and that it is in contemplation to make a still further reduction. An apprehension very naturally exists lest this necessary process should involve the withdrawal of the parish clergy from extensive districts in the south and west, where isolated knots of Protestants are greatly exposed to the danger of being absorbed into the surrounding mass of Romanism. According to a return contained in the Report of 1877, there were 1,379 benefices before Disestablishment.\* Since that event 36 unions of parishes have been dissolved, and 178 parishes have been united. The number of benefices proposed to be maintained in future is 1,144, to be served by 1,138 incumbents and 203 curates. A glance at the return shows that the districts in the south and west are exactly those which appear to have suffered most by this process of reduction. But the loss is more apparent than real. It must be remembered, in the first place, that there are few Episcopalians in the rural districts of the south or west, except landlords and agents. There are generally good congregations in the towns, such as—(to take an example from one locality)—Ennis, Kilrush, and Rathkeale; and Disestablishment has rather increased than diminished the regular

Page 52. The figures in this return differ slightly from those we have already given. There is no explanation given of the disparity, which is not, however, a matter of much consequence.

church-going population. Besides, the parishes themselves were very small, and the union of parishes has enabled zealous clergymen to undertake larger work for better pay. The clergyman who gives an afternoon's service to an adjoining parish which, up till Disestablishment, had a clergyman of its own, receives £50 for his additional work, and finds, as several of them have admitted, advantage as well as delight in an increase to labours that were once far too light. In the diocese of Limerick, for example, where the number of parishes is reduced almost exactly one-half, each clergyman receives, on an average, £200 a year, besides a residence, and £50 for tending the wants of a neighbouring parish. Many churches have been shut up, but they had no parishioners, and in one parish in County Clare, the church was shut up because the people declined to make any effort to support a minister. Time will tell how these new arrangements will work, but it is necessary to remember that the Methodists and the Presbyterians appear in more or less strength at many detached points in the south and west, where the hold of Episcopacy has become weak, and will, no doubt, do their best to supplement the deficiencies of Episcopal administration.

This account of the financial efforts of Episcopacy would be imperfect if we did not mention that, in addition to a large expenditure in churches and glebe houses, there has been also a great amount expended in establishing a Good Service Fund, a Clergy Widows' and Daughters' Fund, and a Superannuation Fund to provide for the retirement of the aged clergy.

We must now very briefly notice the financial results of Disendowment to the Presbyterians of Ireland, who number rather more than half a million. As they had been already a self-governed community, it was not necessary, in their case, to have any readjustment, except in the single point of finance. The Irish Church Bill was originally drawn with the view of giving the 560 Presbyterian ministers compensation for existing life interests on the same principle as to the 2,000 ministers of the Established Church. But a great inequality was introduced into the terms of the final settlement by the House of Lords; for while the Episcopalians received about eight millions sterling, in addition to the churches, and, we may almost say, the glebes, the Presbyterians received barely £600,000. There

was nothing in the Act of Parliament to prevent the Presbyterian ministers from commuting their annuities for their own private benefit; but, by a resolution of the General Assembly, which was practically unanimous, the ministers resolved to commute their life interests for the benefit of the Church. All but ten have since commuted their annuities. The commutation capital on 31st March, 1878, amounted to £585,557 10s. 1d. It has been preserved intact and slightly increased. The interest of this sum has been, since 1871, applied to pay the annuities. Then a Sustentation Fund has been established to supplement the deficiency in the interest of the commutation capital, so as to bring it up to the amount of the old *Regium Donum*, which was about £70 to each minister, while an additional sum of £22 has been added to each income from the same source. Thus, the Presbyterian ministers are now paid £22 more than before Disendowment; and it is expected soon to be £30, in addition to the amount of their congregational stipend. Each minister receives an equal dividend; so the minister of the congregation which contributes £600 yearly to the Sustentation Fund receives no more than the minister whose congregation contributes only a few pounds. It is only fair to state that, for many years before 1869, the standard of ministerial support was steadily advancing among the Presbyterians. Indeed, their stipends are now one-half greater than in 1864, and their contributions to all religious objects, including stipend, are now about double those of the year in question. They raised last year (1877-78) for all purposes £154,953, which was £12,000 in advance of the income of the previous year. Their contributions to missions at home and abroad are larger than before. They have established a Presbyterian Orphan Society, which supports about 2,700 orphans, at a cost of about £10,000 a year; and they maintain a Bible and Colportage Society in connection with a system of colportage which is doing much to disseminate Bibles and religious literature through most of the counties of Ireland.

The Unitarians of Ireland lost their *Regium Donum*, like the Presbyterians, by the Irish Church Act. But they have taken no steps to re-endow their Church, and each minister has been allowed to commute in his own private interest. It is expected that the death or retirement of the existing ministers will involve the extinction

of Unitarianism in all the rural localities. This body is becoming less and less influential every day. Large numbers have joined the Episcopal Church, partly through intermarriages, partly from social considerations, and partly from a conviction that Episcopacy allows standing-room for a large amount of liberal speculation.

We shall next consider the *ecclesiastical* changes brought about by Disestablishment. It is an interesting fact that the Irish Church Act, in leaving the Protestants free to form a Synod, compelled the ecclesiastical authorities to admit the laity into their governing body. In this respect, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Disraeli, Mr. Bright, and Mr. Miall had a direct hand in drawing up the first canon of the Free Episcopal Church of Ireland. It was, therefore, at once in her power to become a self-constituted, self-regulating, self-sustaining body, capable of framing her own laws, choosing her own policy, and appointing her own officers, with no other restrictions on her freedom than are common to all religious communities. Having lately ourselves adopted a principle which admits the laity to the deliberations of our Conference, not on questions of doctrine or worship, but of economics, we cannot be expected to approve a constitution which places the laity on a full equality with the clergy on all matters whatever. Our only concern, however, at present is to present an historic account of the remarkable change in the constitution of Irish Episcopacy wrought by the admission of the laity to the Synods, and by the famous vote by orders, without expressing any further opinion upon it. It was somewhat unfortunate that, through what Dr. Reichel, vicar of Mullingar, rightly calls the indiscretion of the bishops, who seemed to dread a too democratic constitution, lay jealousies were early aroused with effects that are still operating with more or less force inside the Church. It was the pedantry of Primate Beresford in calling a meeting of Convocation that did the mischief, especially as an impression immediately went abroad—undoubtedly mistaken—that it meant to settle for the laity the terms on which they would be admitted to future conventions. But what stimulated the jealousy of the laity still further was the fact that in the interval between the meeting of the Convocation in September, 1869, and the Lay Conference in the following month of October, the bishops assembled at the Primate's lodgings in Dublin, and passed



a resolution that no act of the General Convention that was to frame the new constitution should be valid without their concurrence. They claimed an absolute veto on all legislation. The laity were very indignant, for they remembered that when the existence of the Establishment was threatened in the previous year, the bishops made no effort to avert the danger, but declared to the laity that they would not undertake the responsibility of directing their action under the circumstances. Though incapable of leading, the laity said they were not incapable of obstruction.

This statement is necessary to explain the determination with which the laity insisted from the very first on their right to a double representation in the General Synod. It turned out, however, as they now admit, an unfortunate demand, for no sooner was it conceded by the clergy, than the laity in turn conceded the vote by orders which was claimed as a protection by the clergy. The two concessions were very different in their nature and results. The laity assented to a system that, while promising them the most extended privileges, effectively deprived them of almost all real power. There is no better illustration of what the laity describe as the vicious working of the vote by orders than we find in the revision debates. "The dominant third"—as the Anglo-Catholic section of the clergy were wittily named—held the key of the position, and almost dictated their own terms. When Mr. Brooke, an evangelical layman, proposed to insert an additional question in the Catechism, defining the manner of Christ's presence in the Lord's Supper in the very words of one of the articles, it was lost because it could not command the support of two-thirds of the clergy, though 389 of all orders voted in its favour, and only 114 against it. When a motion was made—intended indirectly to repudiate sacerdotal authority—to allow the formula of absolution in the morning service to be used by the "deacon" as well as "the priest," 94 clergymen and 41 laymen voted for the exclusive prerogative of the priest, and 76 clergymen and 154 laymen against it. That is, there was an absolute majority of 95 members against it, and yet the vote by orders maintained the Roman Catholic distinction. Again, when an attempt was made in the committee of revision to substitute "presbyter" or "minister" for "priest," the bishops unanimously opposed the alteration, and though

the division was very close—23 to 25 votes—the sacerdotal party had a majority, and fixed down upon the Irish Episcopal clergy the character of a sacrificing priesthood. The concession became, in their judgment, still more fatal when it was agreed that no measure could be passed in the General Synod unless it was supported by a majority of two-thirds of each order—bishops, clergy, laity—present and voting, and that two-thirds of the bishops could throw out any measure, though supported by a majority of the clergy and the whole of the laity.

The government of the Church is based upon the parochial organisation. Every member of a congregation—not necessarily a communicant—has a right to choose twelve persons, who, together with the clergyman and two churchwardens, constitute the “select vestry.” This body has no spiritual function whatever, but is wholly concerned with the temporal economy of the Church. The next council is the Diocesan Synod, consisting of the bishop as chairman, all the clergy of the diocese, and at least one lay-delegate from each congregation. The highest body is the General Synod, which always meets in Dublin, and consists of the two archbishops and twelve bishops of Ireland, of 208 clergymen—that is, about one in nine of the whole number—and 416 laymen chosen by the Diocesan Synods. It is evident from these facts that while the form of government is still nominally episcopal, the bishops have far less power than in the days of State connection. The highest court of appeal is no bishops’ court, but the General Synod. The new constitution makes the bishops little more than the mere administrators of a few specific religious rites. An Irish Episcopalian lately said, “We have a lay-episcopacy now.”

The three most important duties of Irish Churchmen are to elect their bishops and their clergy, and to legislate for the interests of the Church. In the crisis of the discussions of ten years ago, the laity saw that the privilege of electing their own ministers would be no inconsiderable compensation for the loss of their endowments, and they consequently tried in the Synod to have this privilege thoroughly secured by the constitution. But they were unsuccessful. While the Old Catholics of the Continent have restored to the laity the ancient right of choosing their own spiritual pastors, the General Synod placed restrictions upon the exercise of this right, which virtually

nullifies the voice of the congregation. When a parish becomes vacant, three persons belonging to the congregation appear as nominators before a diocesan committee of patronage, consisting of the bishop, two clergymen, and one layman. The seven persons present—the majority, it is seen, not belonging to the congregation, the body most deeply interested—form an election board, and nominate a minister whose name is then presented for approval to the bishop, who may have already given two votes for him. If the bishop is satisfied, the election is ended; if otherwise, his solitary veto overrules the action of the six other nominators. It is also competent to the congregational nominators to leave the appointment absolutely in the bishop's hands. It is evident that this scheme of election allows no check on the power of an outside majority to force an unacceptable minister on a congregation. Yet, it is a good point that the diocesan and parish nominators respectively are not chosen for each occasion on which they are to act, but at once for a period of three years. A case occurred soon after legislation on the subject which illustrated its vicious operation. When, for example, St. Bartholomew's Church, Dublin, was vacant through the resignation of a clergyman who had almost emptied the church by his Anglo-Catholic observances, the Rev. Travers Smith, a well-known Ritualist, was chosen in opposition to the declared wishes of a large majority of the congregation, and to the votes of two out of the three parish nominators. It was the clerical nominators who turned the scale and forced upon the congregation a pastor who had openly expressed his approval of *Portal's Manual*. In County Donegal there is a parish named Laghey, which waged a long battle against the Bishop of Derry in the matter of a disputed election. For months the people barricaded the church, and would not allow the obnoxious clergyman to enter. The bishop had eventually to yield. It would be a juster recognition of the rights of congregations, in a matter so vitally affecting themselves, to leave the matter entirely in their hands, subject to the approval of the bishop. It is an advantage, however, under the present system that the bishop is brought face to face with the people's representatives, and cannot act in the seclusion of his own study. We regret to observe that patronage is still recognised in the Church. But an unlimited exercise of it is not allowed unless in the case of a donor

or his heirs who shall give an endowment of at least £150 per annum. The bishop is, besides, to have a veto on all appointments made after the lifetime of the donor.

The election of the bishops is naturally left in the hands of the Diocesan Synods, with the single exception of that of the Primate of all Ireland, who is to be chosen, not by the Synod of Armagh, but by the bench of bishops, who are required, however, to select one out of four bishops nominated by the Synod in question. The *Quarterly Review* suggested that the Irish Church should continue to accept its bishops from the Crown, but the advice has not been followed. There was a time when the Crown made the very worst nominations to vacant sees in Ireland, when the bishops were politicians or worldlings or profligates, such as Dean Swift might satirise with the most just severity; but the Irish Protestants are now in a position to select for their chief pastors, not politicians or statesmen or even the scions of great houses, but men distinguished alone by learning, piety, and administrative energy. In point of fact, at every election some man of exceptional eminence is usually recognised as having an absolute and unchallenged superiority. There have been seven vacancies in Episcopal sees since Disestablishment, and the appointments made have been in every way worthy of a communion which understands the sacred responsibilities of its position. All the new bishops belong to the Evangelical party.

It is not necessary to enter at length into any statement concerning the arrangements under the new constitution for the maintenance and exercise of discipline. The Irish Church Act put an end to the old ecclesiastical courts which once carried terror through the land and set aside also all the old ecclesiastical laws which had a large share in increasing the odium that attached to a too political Christianity. The new courts and canons, though in some respects admirable in themselves, have been regulated rather more by civil traditions than by Apostolic precept or example. The lowest tribunal is the Diocesan Court, composed of the bishop and his assessor, who is to be a barrister of ten years' standing at the Irish bar, and also a clergyman and a layman summoned by the bishop from a select list of six. In cases of mutual assent, the bishop can hear a case alone. An appeal lies to the court of the General Synod, which consists of an archbishop, a bishop,

and three Protestant lay judges. So far as we know, there have been no cases of discipline as yet submitted to the adjudication of any of the tribunals. The canons of discipline are of great importance, and have a thoroughly Protestant tendency. It is now formally declared to be illegal to have lights on the communion table, to elevate the cup or paten in the hands of the officiating clergyman; to use incense at any time; to carry any cross, banner, or picture, or to form any procession as a part of divine service; or even a cross may not be fixed on the communion table or its cover, or on the wall behind the table. It is yet to be seen how far the discipline of the new Church will be effectual in repressing the nascent tendencies to Ritualism already observable in many parts of Ireland.

We shall now proceed to consider the *doctrinal* position of the Irish Episcopal Church, so far as it may have been in any degree affected by Disestablishment. Up till a comparatively recent period it was remarkably homogeneous in the range of its theological opinions. High Churchmen here regarded it, as they do still to a certain extent, as a fortress of Puritanism. It was, indeed, dominantly evangelical, Biblical rather than ecclesiastical, in the cast of its theology, with a tendency to low rather than high views of Church authority. Its clergy might have been Arminian or Calvinist, but they had no sympathies whatever with Anglo-Catholic or Broad Church speculations. Thus, up till forty years ago, we cannot discover in Ireland what we now see in England, a comprehensive Church, chequered by a wide variety of religious opinions, led by parties who never coalesced into actual union, yet never till lately seeking absolute dominion by the extrusion of the others. It might be alleged that the absence of parties inside the Irish Church only argued the want of intellectual activity and religious earnestness as well as the absence of that sympathetic expansiveness which enables a Church to take up and express the various and complex impulses of true Church life. There is probably some truth in this statement. There is nothing more remarkable in its history than the absence of serious controversy in matters of faith till a comparatively recent period. But when the frost of the eighteenth century began to disappear in the early decades of this century, and men like Peter Roe, of Kilkenny, began to stir the broad and placid surface of religious routine, aided

effectively by the ardour of Methodism outside, which all the repudiation and scorn of the clergy could not drive into hostility or hatred, strange to say, the first break in religious uniformity was caused by those separatists who founded the sects of Walkerism, Kellyism, and Plymouth Brethrenism. The Rev. John Walker, the Rev. Thomas Kelly, and the Rev. John Nelson Darby were once clergymen in the Irish Church, driven out by the hard attitude of the bishops and the general worldliness of the clergy. But the Church itself underwent a deep religious change from the period of the Union, and saw itself at the era of Catholic emancipation in a position to pursue a successfully aggressive policy toward the Church of Rome. It was then it gathered in a host of converts of all ranks in society, including such distinguished ornaments of the Irish pulpit as Whelan, Kirwan, Moriarty, Sullivan, and Archer Butler. That was the time when Archbishop Magee confessed that the Reformation had only begun in his own life-time. It is difficult to see how a Ritualist movement could have arisen at any earlier period, and, as a matter of fact, there was not a trace of it till Bishop Mant, of Down, about the year 1840, began to introduce what were known as Puseyite ideas and usages into the most influential and Puritan of Irish dioceses. There was, of course, a great religious ferment leading to the complete discomfiture of the bishop, who felt himself confronted by the whole strength of Protestant traditions and by the deep Orange feeling of the masses in Down and Antrim. Still, from that hour to this, though not very considerably in the northern province, but notably since the appointment of Dean Trench to the see of Dublin, there has been a perceptible growth of High Church and Ritualist feeling, and a small but persistent and powerful party has been struggling with unfailing energy to make Anglo-Catholicism universally and exclusively triumphant. It could hardly be otherwise when we think of the intimate connection existing between the Churches of England and Ireland. There is no longer any doubt now of the existence of three parties inside Irish Episcopacy—the Evangelicals, who are still the vast majority of the 1,850 clergy; the Ritualists, who are insignificant in point of numbers but resolute and united in policy, and advancing rapidly both in numbers and in courage under the favouring auspices of the Archbishop of Dublin; and the Broad Church party, which

numbers only a few highly intellectual representatives of culture, but without the courage or the opportunity to make a distinct stand for their opinions. The Ritualist party has its chief seat in the diocese of Dublin, and the Rev. Dr. Maturin, of Grangegorman parish church, is its leader. He is also president of the "Irish Church Society," which, with a membership of ninety clergymen, declares war against popular Protestantism in the interest of High Church principles and observances. It is not too much to say that if the Ritualist theology should strike its roots more deeply into the minds of the Irish clergy it will separate them by an ever-widening gulf from the sympathies of the laity with effects most injurious to their own influence and position.

The question of interest for our present consideration is—How far has the incipient Ritualism of the Church been affected by Disestablishment? Has it advanced or declined since 1871? And, if it has advanced, has Disestablishment helped or hindered its growth? or will it be likely to supply a future and permanent check to its progress? There cannot be the least doubt that Ritualism has advanced since Irish Episcopacy became a free, self-governing community. When we remember the transformations of Divine worship that have taken place within the last ten years in the great cathedrals and churches, especially in Dublin and Cork; the marvellously rapid multiplication of all sorts of church festivals; the proceedings of the retreat at Blackrock, near Dublin, attended by twenty-two Protestant ministers, met, as avowed, to practise auricular confession, mainly promoted by members of Archbishop Trench's family and believed to be under his sanction; the admission of Judge Warren in the Synod that secret confession existed in a modified way in the Church; the boldness with which men like Dr. Maturin and Canon Travers Smith declare their belief in the real presence, priestly absolution, sacramental grace, and Apostolic succession; and the extent to which clerical priestism is gaining ground even among those thought to be Evangelical, we can have no hesitation in acknowledging with Dr. Reichel, of Mullingar, that sacerdotalism has taken the place of State Churchmanship to the deep injury of Irish Protestant Christianity. Yet we believe, as we have already hinted, that the Ritualist party is very small, though not so small as Bishop Alexander represented in

the Synod when he said that the whole of them could be conveniently put into an omnibus or a four-post bed. The danger lies in their propagandist spirit. They have not certainly as yet given any but two clerical converts to Rome. The Rev. R. Brooke, late rector of Kingstown, cannot find any but two—one of them the Rev. W. Maziere Brady, the well-known annalist—on the long list of those secessions, which mark the melancholy but natural development of High Church Tractarianism.

We believe that if there had been no Disestablishment, Ritualism would have been, perhaps, pretty much what it is at the present hour. But we have some reason to believe, notwithstanding, that Disestablishment supplies the power by which its progress can be effectively checked, if the Protestant laity of Ireland are true to their old traditions and the Reformation theology. There are several distinct checks in existence. The present Ritualistic clergy, it may be remembered, cannot be affected greatly by fears of the laity, because their incomes are absolutely guaranteed for life under the scheme of commutation. They are not dependent upon lay-support as their successors will be in the next generation. Then, remember that the future archbishops and bishops will, if we may judge by past elections, be thoroughly Evangelical, and as such may be trusted, if not to put down Ritualism, at least to lend it no official countenance. The successors of the present Archbishop of Armagh and Dublin will, beyond all doubt, be, according to the very conditions of their appointment, as Evangelical as the six or seven bishops who have been elected by the Diocesan Synods to vacant sees since the year 1869. It is a very significant fact, in its bearing on the soundness of Irish Episcopacy, that all the new bishops—Lord Plunket, of Meath, Dr. Darley, of Kilmore, Dr. Walsh, of Ossory, Dr. Gregg, of Cork, and Dr. Maurice Day, of Cashel and Emly—belong to the most earnest section of the Evangelical school. It is no wonder, therefore, that a High Church journal has expressed its indignation at the growing Puritanism of the Irish Bench, while it complains that the bishops are in the habit of inquiring into the spiritual dispositions of candidates for orders after the manner of Methodist class-leaders. It is now universally understood that none but Evangelical divines will be able to command the two-thirds majority of the lay and clerical votes for the vacant bishoprics. Lord



Plunket himself said some years ago that under the existing system of election it would seem highly improbable that many clergymen holding Ritualistic views will be appointed in future to positions of influence within the Church. Now, the bishops have undoubtedly been shorn of many of their exclusive privileges, but, as chairmen of the Diocesan Committees of Patronage, invested both with a double vote and an absolute veto, they still have it in their power to favour the election of none but Evangelical clergymen. In the next place, the laity themselves are not without power to repress or discourage Ritualism. Their general soundness cannot be questioned. The "Irish Church Society," already referred to, deplors the fact that, owing to the adhesion of the great mass of the people to "Popular Protestantism," it is impossible "for Church principles to make rapid progress." The fact that the popular Protestantism is "responsible for driving many of the candidates for orders to England" is itself a tribute to lay orthodoxy. Now, even under all the restrictions imposed upon popular election by the new constitution, the laity will have a considerable voice in the result. It is true that the four diocesan nominators may out-vote the three parochial nominators; but, if the bishop chooses to give effect to his Evangelical sympathies, a majority can be easily obtained for an Evangelical pastor. The people are now taking a far deeper interest in Church affairs than formerly. Occasionally they have shown their independence in a very characteristic manner. A clergyman in County Derry declared his disbelief in eternal punishment, and for several months afterwards his parishioners kept him out of his pulpit by locking the church gates against him. The Orange feeling of the masses in Ulster will be a powerful obstacle to the success of Ritualism, or anything savouring of an approach to Romish superstition. The people can also refuse to pay their parochial assessments, or they may reduce the amount, so as to imperil the support of an obnoxious pastor. A clergyman has expressed the hope that "such rules will be devised that upon the pastor will not fall the penalty for the wilful withdrawal of parochial contributions." We know a case in which a clergyman's income, due in January, has not been paid till May, because his congregation neglected to forward its assessment to the Representative Body. The laity, therefore, may be justly regarded as holding the key of the position.

If they are true to themselves, they can stamp out Ritualism.

We have reserved to the last place the consideration of the Revision made in the Book of Common Prayer in its probable effects upon the growth of Ritualism. When the Church was about to be disestablished, the laity saw that an opportunity was at hand for vindicating the genuine Protestantism of their Church. Seeing that the Liturgy was the rampart behind which Ritualism defended itself, they resolved to remove from it those seeds of mischief which, at least in England, had grown up from age to age in so many harvests of bitterness, and, accordingly, soon after Disestablishment, they loudly demanded Revision. The Protestantism of Ireland was thrown into the crucible of organic change, and a strong effort was made to do the work of Revision in a way that would produce no reaction more mischievous than the evils it was intended to remedy. We have already briefly referred to the device of the vote by orders, which, to a large extent, neutralised all the reforming efforts of the laity. Let us now briefly understand the nature of those alterations made in the Liturgy, which have all, undoubtedly, been made in a Protestant sense. The question is, have they really gone far enough? We have already referred to the new Canons which regulate the worship and discipline of the Church as pre-eminently Protestant. The Ornaments Rubric, which has done so much mischief in England, is omitted. Several changes are made with the view of giving greater freedom to Divine Service, such as the shortening of the services, and the division of those separate forms, which were once read in combination on Sunday morning—that is, Morning Prayer, Litany, and Holy Communion—into separate services, at the discretion of the clergyman. The new Table of Lessons significantly omits the Apocrypha and includes the whole of the Apocalypse. The Athanasian Creed is left in the Prayer Book, but the rubric directing its use on certain days is removed; so that, while the Creed as a standard of faith remains untouched, it is virtually banished as an element of worship. This is to revert to the general practice of Christendom, and even to the earlier practice of the Irish Church itself. There is an authentic story of a rector in County Armagh obliged by his bishop, at the instance of a complaining parishioner, to read the Creed to his congregation; but he practically

evaded the mandate by *singing* it along with the precentor. Then, the Form of Absolution used in the visitation of the sick, which says, in very sacerdotal language, "By Christ's authority, committed to me, I absolve thee from all thy sins"—is superseded by the ordinary Form of Absolution used in the Communion Service; and no change is made in the words of communion; but the Preface to the new Prayer Book, which came into use on the 7th of July, 1878, says: "As for the error of those who have taught that Christ has given Himself or His Body and Blood in this Sacrament, to be received, lifted up, carried about, or worshipped, under the veils of Bread and Wine, we have already, in the Canons, prohibited such acts and gestures as might be grounded on it or lead thereto; and it is sufficiently implied in the Note at the end of the Communion Service (and we now afresh declare) that the posture of kneeling prescribed to all communicants is not appointed for any purpose of such adoration." No change has been made in the formula of Ordination of Priests; for, as the Preface remarks: "We deem it plain, and here declare that, save in the matter of ecclesiastical censures, no power or authority is by them ascribed to the Church, or to any of its ministers, in respect of forgiveness of sins after baptism, other than that of declaring and pronouncing, on God's part, remission of sins to all that are truly penitent, to the quieting of their conscience and the removal of all doubt and scruple; nor is it anywhere in our formularies taught or implied that confession to, and absolution by, a priest are any conditions of God's pardon; but, on the contrary, it is fully taught that all Christians who sincerely repent and unfeignedly believe the Gospel, may draw nigh as worthy communicants to the Lord's Table, without any such confession or absolution." The new Liturgy makes no change in the Baptismal Service: in other words, it stands upon the Gorham judgment, or permits the same sort of freedom which that judgment permits in England. Therefore, an Irish clergyman may either affirm or deny baptismal regeneration without forfeiting his position. The Burial Service is still not to be used in case of those dying unbaptised or excommunicate; but a special burial service is provided for unbaptised infants and for adults who die after being prepared for baptism.

These are all the changes made in the Prayer Book, and it must be acknowledged that, with the exception of the

Baptismal Service and the use of the word "priest" to describe the minister of the Gospel, the amendments are all Protestant in their tendency. Some think the Church will be simpler and stronger from the cautious simplifications she has made in the Liturgy. The "Clerical and Lay Union" congratulate the Church upon the large measure of revision already effected, and consider that the three questions of the Real Presence, Auricular Confession, and Priestly Absolution, have been "set at rest" in a Protestant sense. The question then arises, How will the new Prayer Book affect the prospects of the Ritualist party? Opinions are much divided upon this point. We all know that Bishop Alexander of Derry had a temporary rupture with the Synod, and delivered a piece of severe invective against the Revisionists, partly for altering the Prayer Book at all, partly for the nature of the alterations made, but, most of all, for the new Preface, called sarcastically by the Ritualists "the Equivocation Clause," by which the range of interpretation is enlarged. He held that the effect of the changes is to lower the meaning of the Liturgy in the direction of Evangelical or, at least, anti-sacramental views. There can be little doubt upon this point. But the leaders of the Ritualist party do not seem to regard the new Prayer Book as offering any real obstruction to the propagation of their views. Canon Smith, of St. Bartholomew's, Dublin, has published a sermon on "Church Teaching under the Revised Prayer Book," in which he says that he accepts it on the ground that all the High Church teaching which he has been accustomed to dispense from his pulpit "is covered and granted by the new book." He shows, for example, how he can, consistently with it, teach the Real Presence, Priestly Absolution, and Baptismal Regeneration. Now, if this be so, the Bishop of Derry must have been needlessly concerned. It is also to be remembered that all the clergy ordained before Disestablishment have the right conceded to them of declining to recognise the Preface; and if, as Dr. Maturin says, it takes ten years to convert a congregation from Protestantism, the fear is that the Ritualists will have an opportunity sufficiently ample in point of time for establishing, if not extending, their operations within the Church. Canon Smith's view of the Prayer Book is confirmed by the secession of the Rev. St. George French, Incumbent of Stillorgan parish, Dublin, and of laymen like Lord James

Butler, on the ground of the remaining corruptions of the Prayer Book. It was a fatal mistake that the word "priest" was retained as the proper title of the clergy, for it contains in itself the germs of all the errors of Ritualism. The American Episcopal Church has a Prayer Book as Evangelical as any ever likely to be had in Ireland, yet, as it retains the vice of a clerical priesthood, there are churches in New York and other large cities as ritualistic as St. Alban's or All Saints', in London. It is not, perhaps, generally known that in translating the English Prayer Book into other languages, the High-Churchmen entrusted with the task took care to give expression to their peculiar theological ideas of the ministry. In the Latin version of the "Visitation of the Sick," the officiating minister is *Sacerdos*, in the Greek (1665) he is *Hiereus*, in the French, *Le Prêtre*, in the Hebrew, *Cohen*, "the priest," in the Welsh, *Yr Offeiriad*, and in Irish, *An Sagart*, the identical title of the Romanist clergyman. Comment is superfluous.

Now, when we consider that no attempts have been made since 1871 to bring offending Ritualists to trial—though, indeed, it is difficult to conceive how they could be convicted of heresy under the guarantees of the Irish Church Act, that clergymen ordained before it came into operation can contract themselves out of obedience to any new Articles or Canons framed by the Synod\*—we cannot believe that the new Prayer Book will be any serious barrier to the progress of Ritualism. The temper of the synods is, besides, known to be very adverse to prosecutions. When we find Canon Dobbin appealing in vain to the Cork Diocesan Synod to suppress the full-blown Ritualism of the Military Chapel at Ballincolig, and Canon Marrable equally unsuccessful in his appeal to the Dublin Diocesan Synod to have the rood-screen removed from Christ Church Cathedral, the prospect is not hopeful. There is at present a temporary quiescence of parties within the Church, owing to the pressure of financial difficulties, but the Evangelical party declare that revision is not finished, and that it must be resumed under conditions more favourable to a thorough exclusion of all Romish elements from the Prayer Book. Perhaps, with a bench of bishops, wholly Evangelical, and lay-delegates chosen, not from the higher

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\* Article 20 of Irish Church Act.

classes, as at present, but from the middle classes who are thoroughly and universally Protestant in principle and in feeling, and with a more direct lay-influence in the regulation of Church funds, the work of revision may be resumed under more favourable conditions.

There is one thought worthy of consideration in connection with the growth of a sacramentarian theology in Ireland, and that is, that it is mainly due to the want of a proper theological training on the part of the clergy. The *Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette* significantly says that out of 335 men ordained since 1870, and now serving in the Church, only 99 had a divinity testimonium, and that one bishop, out of some twenty or thirty candidates whom he has ordained in his diocese in a short episcopate, numbered just two who had held the divinity testimonium at the time of ordination. Primate Beresford complained in 1877 that candidates for ordination were now worse prepared than formerly. If no check is to be put upon the creation of this sort of clergy, we may expect that, in the course of time, there will be 500 out of 1,800 clergymen without the least evidence of theological fitness for the ministry. While students of law and medicine must pass through a definite curriculum of professional training, the candidate for the ministry is left to gather the knowledge necessary to fulfil his momentous functions very much as he may, tested only by the precarious ordeal of an episcopal examination immediately before entering on holy orders. It is, indeed, to this cause we may mainly ascribe the melancholy defections that have weakened and distracted the Church of England, leaving candidates for the ministry entirely at sea on the most fundamental matters of the Christian faith, and so open to every wind of crude speculation that is abroad in an age of transition and change. An uneducated ministry, unskilled in theological science, cannot sustain the interest of congregations by jejune pulpit prelections, and feels the necessity of invoking the aid of an imposing and fascinating ritual. But we are happy to observe that the best friends of the Church recognise the necessity of a reform in the method of ministerial training. The Primate says this can only be done by means of a well-supported school of divinity. Bishop Knox, of Down, has been for years urging a project for establishing a divinity school in Belfast, similar to that of the Presbyterians, as supplemental to the very effective

literary training of the Queen's College in that town. We have no doubt the project, or some analogous one, will be successfully carried out in due time, and when Irish Episcopacy has filled its pulpits with men, no longer deficient in that fulness and thoroughness of Biblical instruction, and in that breadth of doctrinal exposition, which the exigencies of the times demand, there will be less Tractarian theology and less demand for copes, and albs, and birettas, and incense, and candles.

In contemplating the altered position of the Irish Episcopal Church, it is gratifying to think that she will be no longer obnoxious to the mass of Irishmen on political grounds. She is no longer the law-Church, incapacitated by her very safeguards from exercising her powers of usefulness. In old times the rector was often a police-magistrate—his dignity hedged in with all the *prestige* of State-connection—but now he is merely the pastor of a flock. The present Bishop of Ossory said many years ago that there never was a revival of spirituality in the Church that did not bring with it a repugnance to the semi-warlike and political garb in which religion had in time past arrayed itself. The Roman Catholics, too, had long been taught by their clergy that Protestantism was a mere creature of the State, and must perish if deprived of its endowments. But events have proved it to possess a vitality far stronger than any of its foes imagined. The Protestant Episcopal Church is now in a position partaking of every better influence around her, and strong in the affection of her children, to pour into Irish society a sweeter and happier influence than she ever exercised, and to help, side by side, with a strong, ardent, watchful Nonconformity, to evangelise the whole land. She will no longer lead the quiet and unimpressive life that lost her so much ground in past times, and unfitted her clergy for coping with the untiring zeal and transcendent energy of the Romish priesthood. She will be no longer what her enemies have called her, a religious nullity, but will no doubt resume the work she began so well fifty years ago, when she showed her Roman Catholic countrymen the way to a more Scriptural faith. It was expected by those who promoted the disestablishment of the Irish Church that it might possibly lead to a union of all the Protestants of Ireland, or, in any case, that it would promote an harmonious understanding among the different denominations of Protestantism.

Neither of these expectations is likely to be soon realised, though liberal-minded men, like Dr. Reichel, feel the importance of a better understanding between the "two main branches of the Protestant name in Ireland." It cannot be disguised that the assumption of the title "Church of Ireland"—which it would be impossible to justify on either Scriptural, or logical, or historical, or philological, or even legal grounds—presents an obstacle to kindly co-operation. The farther fact that the Episcopal clergy are still disposed, as we see by the thirty-fourth canon, to regard all the inhabitants of their parishes, Romanists, Presbyterians, Methodists, or Independents, as under their spiritual jurisdiction, and bound to perform for them the necessary functions of their office, will be a fresh point of exasperation, and a hindrance to union or co-operation.\* It is not a good sign for secular rivalry to overrun the Church. Yet this course presents the danger that each party, in self-defence, eager to gain the ascendancy, and disposed to regard the enlargement of its neighbours as its own limitation, will strive to augment its own numbers by subtracting from those of its rivals, to push its forces into their territories, and to eclipse them by its own superior name and attractions. It cannot be denied that, apart altogether from the influence of political exasperation, the sacerdotal spirit is the main cause of an increasing separation between the clergy of the Episcopal Church and those of other Protestant denominations. In former times the law of the land assigned them a higher ecclesiastical position. Now they assert a higher position for themselves. The spirit of Bedell and Usher is not that of the present hour.

In conclusion, when we weigh advantages against disadvantages, it must be admitted that Irish Episcopacy has gained rather than lost in all the elements of Church power and prosperity by the severance of its relations with the State. It has become a self-governing body, with still ample revenues, no longer to be squandered upon sinecurists and drones, while the working clergy were kept in a state approaching to starvation, but to be applied, equably yet proportionably, among the 1,850 clergy still retained in its

\* The thirty-fourth canon prescribes that "when any person or persons are dangerously sick in any cure, the minister or curate, having knowledge thereof, shall visit them (although they have not previously resorted to the Church), in order to instruct and comfort them."



service. It has reduced its staff without diminishing its efficiency, borrowing the flexible and more unfettered energies of dissent. The bishops, withdrawn from the sphere of secular politics, are devoting their undivided energies to the advancement of the purely spiritual interests of the Church. There is no longer an absentee clergy. Rectors now, for the most part, do their own duty without the help of curates; they are no longer like the passive, easy-minded clergy of the last generation, but cultivate popular gifts, and are distinguished by the vigour and efficiency of their ministrations; while their dependence on their flocks for support has led to the most assiduous pastoral vigilance. Their successors will probably be drawn less from the higher orders and more from the middle classes, and will thus gain a readier access to the hearts of the people. It is a great point that Irish Episcopalians have thoroughly learned the lesson that the efficiency of an ecclesiastical body to grapple with systems of error and to maintain its own ground, depends not upon its political safeguards, but upon the efficiency, zeal, and piety of its clergy. The Church has shown its self-governing power in the wise and cautious manner in which it has readjusted all its parochial arrangements. We know how it was often paralysed by the want of elasticity in the parochial system arising out of the legal doctrine concerning the nature and rights of freehold tenure. Now, parishes can be divided, united, or modified at pleasure, and there is no longer any temptation to build churches where there are no worshippers. Altogether, then, the position of Irish Episcopacy is strong and hopeful, in spite of the incipient Ritualism which breaks its religious unity, and there is everything in its traditions to inspire the hope that it will become more than at present a great visible force, touching national life everywhere, and exercising a healing influence in a country distracted by the feuds of centuries.

ART. III.—*Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek.* By HERMANN CREMER, D.D. Translated from the German of the Second Edition by William Urwick, M.A. Second Edition. 1878. T. and T. Clark.

EVERY branch of human research demands before all things a clear definition of its terms. But theology demands much more than this. In other departments of research, writers may, to some extent, themselves choose the sense of their own terms: and if the sense be clearly defined, and maintained throughout, no confusion arises. But most of the words used in theology had a definite meaning in the minds of the sacred writers before systematic theology began. This meaning we must carefully seek for, and retain in our own use of the same terms. Else we shall be in danger of putting into the assertions of Holy Scripture a sense quite alien from the writers' intention, a sense derived from the modern associations of thought which have gathered round the English representatives of the original words. And we shall certainly lose much of the truth which the sacred writers designed their words to convey. Inattention to the meaning and use of Biblical words has been an abundant source of confusion and error.

Again, it is specially important to notice the gradual development of the significance of such words. All these were born on profane soil, and were servants once of the common things of common life. But, when they were called to enter the service of the temple of revealed truth, they were bidden to leave behind them, more or less, the associations of their earlier life; and were invested with a new significance. This significance became, in some cases, wider and deeper as the ages of the old covenant rolled by, until at last it received its full glory in the presence of the God-Man. Such words set forth, in their own history, the development of revealed truth. Therefore, not only as an essential condition of a clear and correct comprehension of the meaning of the sacred writers, but as a means of tracing the development of revelation, the study of the

words of the Bible has an importance which cannot be over-estimated.

Dr. Trench was one of the first to direct the more special attention of English students to this matter. His *Synonyms of the New Testament*, and especially the preface, deserves the careful study of all who read New Testament Greek. But this work is confessedly fragmentary. It does not attempt to cover the whole field of New Testament words. Indeed, until the appearance, eleven years ago, of Dr. Cremer's work, we had no important theological dictionary of this kind. Nor can it be said that even this work is all we desire. The writer occasionally fails, as we think, to grasp the central idea of the word under review and the correct development of that idea. But he has done real service by gathering together various passages in which the words of the New Testament are used by sacred and profane writers, and others in which their Hebrew equivalents are used. With care and honesty he has sought for the conception embodied in each word. And, even when he has failed to find it, he has in not a few cases pointed to a path leading in the right direction. While we regret that some words, important in our judgment, are either passed over altogether or slightly touched, we do not hesitate to say that the work before us is one of exceeding value. A translation, somewhat imperfect, of the first German edition was published six years ago. But it was scarcely in the hands of English readers when there appeared a second German edition, greatly enlarged and improved. Of this second edition, an English translation, beautifully got up and, as far as we have been able to compare it, satisfactory at all points, has just come to our hand. It not only puts the German work fairly before the English reader, but corrects some four hundred errors in the German edition.

Of the general characteristics of Dr. Cremer's work, and of the greater value of the second, as compared with the first edition, no better illustration can be given than his article on the word HOLY. It is enlarged from two pages to twenty pages. And so full is the collection of examples from all sources, and so good are some of the generalisations, that no one will rise from a study of it without profit. But, at the same time, we think that Dr. Cremer has hardly done justice to one central idea which underlies the many and various uses of this all-

important word. The importance of the subject has prompted us to endeavour to bring out into more prominence that one aspect. We have freely used the materials which Cremer has collected: and we as freely admit that whatever success we may attain is in some degree a result of the labours of the man whose work we are attempting to amend.

The etymology of the Hebrew word translated "holy" is uncertain and unimportant. For, at the Exodus, the word came suddenly into very common use; and was applied to objects so numerous, and henceforth so familiar to the eyes and thought of Israel, that from these objects its meaning would be accurately, though perhaps unconsciously, fixed in the mind of every Israelite.

How closely connected with the Mosaic ritual was the idea of holiness, may be seen in the fact that in Genesis the word "holy" never occurs; and the word "sanctify" only once, in a passage which probably received its literary form from the voice of Sinai. This one passage, and others containing cognate words, will be discussed below.

In the solemn opening scene of the Mosaic covenant, from the lips of God, and in a connection of thought wonderfully indicative of the nature of the Covenant He had come down to make, we hear for the first time the great word henceforth to be so deeply interwoven with the religious thought of Israel. The words, "Draw not nigh hither: for the ground on which thou art standing is ground of holiness" (Ex. iii. 5), introduce a covenant of which one great feature was to be holiness embodied in visible places and things, a holiness which made the holy objects partly or altogether inaccessible to man. God evidently meant that the ground stood in special relation to Himself; and that, because it was God's ground, none could tread it except at His bidding.

The "convocation of holiness" (xii. 16) was a calling together of the people, not for some secular purpose, but at the bidding of God and to work out His purpose.

"Sanctify to me the firstborn" (xiii. 2), is explained at once by the words, "It is mine," and "Thou shalt make all that open the womb pass over to the Lord: the males are the Lord's" (v. 12). Compare: "I have taken the Levites from among the children of Israel instead of all the firstborn: and the Levites shall be mine. For mine are all the firstborn. For, in the day when I smote all

the firstborn in Egypt, I sanctified to myself every firstborn in Israel, from man to beast. Mine they shall be" (Num. iii. 12, 13). Also: "They are given entirely to Me from among the children of Israel instead of," &c. (viii. 16, 17). "Every firstborn male thou shalt sanctify to the Lord thy God: thou shalt do no work with the firstborn of thy ox, nor shear the firstborn of thy sheep" (Deut. xv. 19). These passages make quite certain the meaning of "sanctify" in Ex. xiii. 2. The firstborn were to stand in special relation to God as His property; and were to be touched by man only according to His bidding, and to work out His purposes. In this sense they were holy.

The meaning, in the song of Moses (Ex. xv. 11—13), of "glorious in holiness," "the dwelling place of Thy holiness," will be evident when we have completed our study of the Mosaic ritual.

The words, "Ye shall be to Me a holy nation" (xix. 6) solemnly declare that the whole nation must be holy; and are explained by, "Ye shall be a peculiar treasure to me above all people: for all the earth is Mine." "Set bounds about the mount and sanctify it" (v. 23), develops iii. 5.

And now, beneath the shadow of the holy mountain, there rises before us the complicated solemnity of the Mosaic ritual: and of that ritual every vessel and rite bears on its front in broad and deep characters the name of "holiness." The tabernacle is called the "sanctuary," or holy place (Ex. xxv. 8). The outer chamber bears the abstract title, "holiness;" the inner one has the superlative name, "holiness of holinesses," conveniently rendered "holy of holies" (xxvi. 33). The same august superlative title is given to the brazen altar (xxix. 37), to the vessels of the tabernacle (xxx. 29), to the bodies of animals offered in sacrifice (Lev. ii. 3). In the last passage it is explained by the words, "The remnant from the meat-offering is for Aaron and for his sons: it is holy of holies from the burnings of the Lord." So absolute was the holiness of the brazen altar that whatever touched it became holy (Ex. xxix. 37, xxx. 29; Lev. vi. 18); that is, whatever touched the altar ceased by that touch to be man's, and must henceforth be used only for the purposes, and to work out the will, of God. Aaron and his clothes, his sons and their clothes, were holy (Ex. xxix. 21). So was the oil: "Upon man's flesh it shall not be poured, neither shall ye make any like it: it is holy, and shall be holy to

you. Whoever compoundeth anylike it, and whoever putteth any of it upon a stranger, shall even be cut off from his people" (Ex. xxx. 32). Houses, fields, and cattle, were made holy by consecration to God (Lev. xxvii. 9, 14). Their holiness is thus described, "The field shall be holy to the Lord, like the field of the Anathema: for the priest, the possession of it shall be" (v. 21). If a man wanted back an object he had sanctified, he must pay for it (v. 15). But some things were given to God by an irrevocable consecration, and were called "Anathema," and "holy of holies" (vv. 28, 29). The Nazarite was holy (Num. vi. 5, 8): and his sacrifice was "holiness for the priest" (v. 20). The censers of Korah were holy (Num. xvi. 37); and therefore could not be put to common use. The fourth year's fruit of Canaan was holy (Lev. xix. 24). The Sabbath is called holy: "Whoever doeth any work therein shall be cut off from his people" (Ex. xxxi. 14). Lastly, God says to Israel, "A holy people thou art to the Lord thy God: thee hath the Lord thy God chosen to be His, for a people of special possession beyond all the peoples which are upon the face of the earth" (Deut. vii. 6).

In all these passages, and in hundreds more, the meaning of the word "holy" is the same, and is clearly marked. These holy objects stood in a special relation to God as His property. Consequently, they were not man's. They had no human owner who could do with them what he pleased. To touch them, except at the bidding, and to work out the will, of God, was to rob God. The word "holiness," was the inviolable token of the Divine King of Israel.

The sanctification of the firstborn, the tabernacle and altar, Aaron and his sons, the Sabbath, and the people, is attributed to God (Num. iii. 13; Ex. xxix. 44, xx. 11; Lev. xxii. 32). For the devotion of these objects to God, originated, not in man, but in God. With very few limited exceptions, nothing could be given to God but what He had first claimed for Himself.

Moses also, as the minister through whom the devotion of these objects to God was brought about, is said to have sanctified Mount Sinai, Aaron, the tabernacle and its vessels (Ex. xix. 14, xxviii. 41, xxix. 1, xl. 9—13).

Since some of the objects claimed by God were themselves intelligent beings, and others were in the control of such beings, their devotion to God could take place only by man's

consent. Consequently, the priests and the people are said to sanctify themselves and some of their possessions (Ex. xix. 22, Lev. xi. 44, xxvii. 14). They did this, either by formally placing themselves or their goods at the disposal of God, or by separating themselves from whatever was inconsistent with the service of God. Hence, holiness implied renunciation of idolatry and of meats pronounced unclean (Lev. xx. 7, xi. 44, xx. 25, xxi. 1—8).

In Lev. xi. 45, xix. 2, xx. 26, xxi. 8, God solemnly declares that He is Himself holy. In two of these passages, the holiness of God is given as a reason for abstinence from unclean food; a third refers to the sanctity of the priests; the remaining one warns to honour parents, to keep the Sabbath, and to turn from idolatry.

It is quite certain that, in these four passages in which it is predicated of God, the word "holy" must represent the same idea as in the hundreds of passages surrounding them in which it is predicated of men and things. For, the number and variety and commonness of the concrete and visible objects to which the word was applied in the everyday life of Israel must have given to it a meaning clearly defined and well understood by every Israelite. By calling Himself holy, God plainly indicated that He possesses an attribute set forth by these holy objects. That the Creator could not be holy in precisely the same sense as the creature, was no disproof of this. For, an idea may be the same although its relation to the object in which it is embodied be different. Just so, when we speak of people as healthy and from this infer that their home is healthy, we have only one idea of health, although the one idea is differently embodied in a healthy man and a healthy place. We must therefore seek in the nature of God for an attribute which sets forth the idea already set forth in the priests, the tabernacle and its service, &c., and which bears to these created objects, rational and irrational, a relation similar to that of the Creator to the creature.

We have seen that "holiness" denotes God's claim to the exclusive use of various men and things; and that the objects thus claimed were called "holy." But, if so, the same word might also be correctly predicated of Him who claimed them. For His claim was a new revelation of His nature. The thoughts of Moses, Aaron, and Israel, about God must have been very different at Sinai from their

thoughts in former days. To Aaron, Jehovah was the God who had claimed from him a lifelong service. God's claim was a new era, not only in his everyday life, but in his conception of the nature of God. Therefore, the word "holy" which expressed Aaron's new relation to God, expressed also God's newly revealed relation to him. In other words, God was holy inasmuch as He claimed the exclusive ownership and use of the various holy objects, and thus claimed virtually the ownership of the entire nation. "Ye shall be to Me holy men: for holy am I, the Lord. And I have separated you from the nations to be Mine" (Lev. xx. 26). Since God's claim infinitely surpasses every claim ever put forth on behalf of the gods of heathendom, it reveals the majesty of God: and Moses could appropriately sing, "Who is like Thee among the gods, glorious in holiness?" (Ex. xv. 11). And Sinai, since there God solemnly announced His claim, was "the dwelling-place of His holiness" (v. 13). When the strictness of God's claim was manifested, he was said to "be sanctified;" as in the case of Nadab and Abihu (Lev. x. 8). When men yielded to God the devotion He required, that is, when in the subjective world of their own inner and outer life they put Him in the place of honour as their master and owner, they were said to sanctify God. So we read, "because ye sanctified Me not in the midst of the children of Israel" (Deut. xxxii. 51; Num. xxvii. 14).

Dr. Cremer, in his exposition of the holiness of God, seems to us to fail utterly. Instead of beginning with the more frequent and familiar use of the word as an attribute of men and things and time, he takes for his starting point its much less frequent use as a predicate of God; and from this he seeks to obtain a conception of holiness as predicated of the people. And he gives to the word "holy" when applied to God a meaning which has little in common with the meaning made so familiar to the Israelites by the various holy objects ever before their eyes. Dr. Trench properly gives "devotion to the service of Deity" as the fundamental idea of holiness; but does not attempt to explain the meaning of the word when applied to God.

We have now learnt, by study of the four later books of the law, what every Israelite must have learnt unconsciously from objects around him, that the word "holiness" denotes God's claim to the absolute proprietorship and use of certain objects: and we have seen it applied both to the objects



claimed and to the Great Being who claimed them. We notice also that God's claim put a lofty barrier between the objects claimed and all others, a barrier which separated the sacred objects from the mass of the nation.

From this point let us look back upon the Book of Genesis. It is as likely as not that the words "God sanctified the seventh day" (Gen. ii. 3) were written after the giving of the law: and, if so, they may have taken their literary form from Ex. xx. 11. The words, "And God blessed," &c. (Gen. ii. 3), certainly suggest that at the creation God pronounced a blessing on the seventh day. And, if so, that blessing, looked upon in the light of Ex. xx. 11, "The Lord blessed the Sabbath day and sanctified it," might be correctly spoken of as a sanctification of the seventh day. But this is immaterial. The sense of the word here corresponds exactly with the sense determined above. God claimed the day to be specially His own. "Turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on My day of holiness" (Is. lviii. 13).

In Gen. xxxviii. 21, as in Deut. xxiii. 17, a cognate word is applied to a profligate woman. This reminds us of the "sacred slaves" at Corinth, "whom both men and women presented to the goddess" (*Strabo*, b. 8, c. 378). The essential idea of holiness is found here, though in a peculiar form. Devotion to an impure idol brings with it impurity: whereas devotion to God implies separation from all impurity.

Another early trace of the word is found in the name Kadesh (Gen. xiv. 7, xvi. 14, xx. 1). This name, also given to other towns (Josh. xx. 7, xv. 23; 1 Chr. vi. 72), suggests that these towns were specially devoted to the worship of some deity. Compare the Greek name Hierapolis, given to a city in Phrygia celebrated for its temple of Cybele, and to another in the north-east of Syria, famous as one of the chief seats of the worship of Astarte.

Throughout the entire Old Testament the word "holy" has the sense determined above. Josh. iii. 5 recalls Ex. xix. 10; Josh. v. 15 points to Ex. iii. 5. In Josh. vi. 19 we read, "All the silver and gold, &c., is holiness to the Lord: into the treasury of the Lord it shall come." "They sanctified Kedesh in Galilee to be a city of refuge" (xx. 7): for the cities of refuge stood in a special relation to God. "A holy God is He, a jealous God is He" (xxiv. 19), reminds us of the close connection of the holiness and the jealousy

of God. For, the God who claimed the absolute proprietorship of Israel could tolerate no rival. Micah's mother said, "I have altogether sanctified the silver to the Lord" (Judges xvii. 8): for she supposed that by using the money to make an idol she was devoting it to the service of Jehovah.

In the Book of Psalms the word "sanctify" never occurs: only once in the other poetical books (Job i. 5), where it has its ritual sense. The word "holiness" is very frequently, "holy" sometimes, applied in the Psalms to God. He is the "holy one of Israel" (lxi. 22), &c. In Ps. lxxxix. 5, 7, as in Job v. 1, xv. 15, the word "holy" or "saint" denotes an angel. And naturally so: for our chief thought of the angels is that they stand in special relation to God, and are working out His purposes. "Aaron, the holy one of the Lord" (Ps. cvi. 16), reminds us of the ritual phraseology of the law. Only twice in the poetical books—"The holy ones which are in the earth" (Ps. xvi. 3), "Fear the Lord, ye His holy ones" (xxxiv. 9)—is the word "holy" applied to good men. These passages were prompted by a consciousness that the good man stands in a special relation to God as His own; and are thus an approach to the New Testament use of the word. The rarity of this use in the Old Testament arose from the fact that as yet holiness was revealed only in symbolic form. The inward reality could not be clearly seen until the appearance of Him who embodied in human flesh and blood what the symbols dimly shadowed.

In the later books of the Old Testament, traces of this moral use of the word are occasionally found. The lady of Shunem observed that Elisha stood specially near to God; and she spoke of him as "a man of God, a holy man" (2 Kings iv. 9). In prophetic vision Isaiah saw the day when "all that are left in Jerusalem will be called holy" (iv. 3), "a people of holiness" (lxii. 12). In the Book of Daniel the word "holy" is a frequent designation of the future people of God (vii. 18, 22, 25, 27).

It is interesting to observe that the destroyers of Babylon are called "God's sanctified ones" (Isa. xiii. 3), because working out the purposes of God. So, "Sanctify against her the nations, the kings of the Medes" (Jer. li. 27, 28). Notice also, "He that putteth not into their mouth, they (the wicked priests) sanctify war against him" (Mic. iii. 5): they proclaim war against him, professedly to carry out the purposes of God. Also "Sanctify an assembly for Baal"

(2 Kings x. 20) : the only passage in which the word is used for devotion to a false god. But it is used by one who for the moment professed to look upon Baal as the true God.

In the Books of Chronicles, and of Nehemiah, the words "holy" and "sanctify" are frequent, always in a ritual sense. Compare 2 Chr. xxiii. 6, "Let none enter the house of the Lord except the priests. They shall come in : for they are holy."

We will close our review of the Old Testament conception of holiness by quoting the last words of one of the latest and greatest of the prophets, who foresaw in the far future the realisation of the ancient symbols. "In that day shall there be upon the bells of the horses Holiness to the Lord : and the pots in the Lord's house shall be like the bowls before the altar. Yea, every pot in Jerusalem and in Judah shall be holiness to the Lord of Hosts. And in that day there shall be no more a Canaanite in the house of the Lord of Hosts" (Zech. xiv. 20, 21).

The above quotations are a sample of some 800 passages in which the word "holy" and its cognates are found in the Old Testament. The number and variety of the passages make the meaning of the word perfectly clear and beyond doubt. In a great majority of them it is applied to creatures rational or irrational ; and denotes that they stand in a special relation to God, as His possession, and that therefore man may not use or touch them except at His bidding and to do His word. This special relation to God arises from God's own claim, in consequence of which these objects stand, apart from anything man does or fails to do, in a new position. This may be called objective holiness. In this sense, God sanctified them for Himself. But since some of the objects thus claimed were intelligent beings, and others were under the control of such beings, the word "holiness" is used to denote the condition of those who surrender themselves or their possessions to the claim of God. We may speak of this as subjective holiness.

We have seen that, after God had stamped upon the word "holy" this unmistakable and important meaning by applying it to the objects claimed for His own, He solemnly applied it to Himself. This use, of which we found only six cases in the Book of the Law, becomes very common in the Book of Psalms and in the prophecies of Isaiah. God sanctified Himself by vindicating in word or deed the inviolability of His claim. Men sanctified

God and His name by rendering the devotion He claims. As the one Being who claims absolute ownership and supreme devotion, He is the Holy One.

We come now to the Translation of the Seventy, in which we see Hebrew thought robing itself in European language, and thus unconsciously equipping itself for the conquest of the West, a conquest destined to exercise so mighty an influence upon the history of the kingdom of God, and the fortunes of the world. A word was needed to receive, and to carry forth unalloyed to the nations who spoke Greek, the great truths wrapped up in the Hebrew word we have just been studying.

A very common word, an almost exact Greek counterpart of the Hebrew word, was ready for the translator's use. Whatever, man or thing, was supposed to stand in some special relation to a deity, was said, without consideration of its inherent quality, to be *ἱερός*. And we have seen that this was the radical Hebrew conception of holiness. It is, however, significant that the Greek word is never used, whereas the Hebrew often is, as an attribute of God. But, in a few passages, Greek writers assert the great truth that of all sacred objects the good man is the most sacred; and they thus approach the moral conception of holiness, of which we have found traces in the Old Testament, and which is so conspicuous a feature of the New. Therefore, in spite of the above-mentioned shortcoming, it might seem that the word *ἱερός* was no unworthy Greek representative of the Hebrew conception of holiness.

From this honour, however, the word was, by the Seventy Translators, with one consent, utterly and rudely thrust out. As a rendering of the adjective "holy," it never occurs. And only once is the substantive *ἱερόν* used in its frequent New Testament sense of "sanctuary," namely, in that one strange passage in which we read of the sanctuary, not of Jehovah, but of Tyre (Ezek. xxviii. 18). The reason is not far to seek. *ἱερός* had been polluted by contact with the corruptions of idolatry; and was therefore unfit for service in the Temple of God. Of this we have had an illustration in the "sacred" prostitutes of Corinth. It is true that in the Hebrew language a similar corruption had defiled one member of the family of sacred words (Deut. xxiii. 17). But the defiled member was rigidly excluded from the service of God: and the defilement went no further. Whereas, in Greek, the defilement reached and

saturated every member. With the Hebrew word, as a result of its consecration to the service of Jehovah and in spite of the occasional profanation of sacred things, were associated ideas of purity and goodness. With the Greek word, in consequence of the fearful debasement of idolatry, were associated conceptions the vilest and worst. Another word must therefore be found to carry to the nations of the West, in its purity, the Hebrew conception of holiness.

This honourable office was conferred on the comparatively rare word, *ἅγιος*. Its rarity was a recommendation. For, that it had so few associations of its own, made it the fitter to take up the meaning and appropriate to itself the associations of the Hebrew word. And its associations, though few, were suitable. In classic Greek it is never found as a predicate of gods or men; and was therefore free from the ideas of imperfection and sin which belonged in the minds of idolaters both to gods and men. It is frequently used by Herodotus, and occasionally by other writers, to describe temples of special sacredness; and seems to denote the reverence which their connection with the deity, *ἱερόν*, gave them a right to claim. It is probably akin to *ἄζωμα*, used by Homer to denote reverence for the gods and for parents. Compare a well-known passage, *Iliad*, i. 21. It was evidently a nobler and purer word than *ἱερός*. The difference arose from the fact that, owing to the degradation of idolatry, there were objects supposed to stand in close relation to the gods, which had no claim whatever to man's real reverence. A very good instance of the distinction is quoted by Dr. Cremer, "Amorous and untamed men are unable to abstain even from the most holy bodies," Plutarch, *Conviv.* 5, 682, C; which Cremer properly contrasts with the "sacred" bodies of the "sacred slaves," Strabo, 6, 272.

Such being the associations of the words, the Seventy Translators, moved by a delicate appreciation of the difference between the gods of heathendom and the One God of Israel, rejected *ἱερός*, which was already occupied by conceptions partly impure, and chose *ἅγιος*, which was in part unoccupied and in part occupied by a pure conception, viz. reverence, to receive and bear to the nations of Europe the definite Mosaic conception of holiness. To represent the modifications of the Hebrew word, the Seventy thrust aside the existing though rare derivatives of *ἅγιος*, and

derived directly from *ἅγιος* a family of words of which every member was altogether new in Greek literature.

The use, in the Apocrypha, of the word *ἅγιος* and its cognates, corresponds exactly with its use in the Septuagint, that is, with the use of the Hebrew word. The purely ritual use is found in Judith xi. 13, "The firstfruits of the corn, and the tithes of the wine and the oil, which they kept, having sanctified them for the priests who present themselves before the face of our God; and in 1 Mac. x. 39, "For the holy things which are at Jerusalem, for the expenses suitable to the holy things." Compare Sir. xlv. 4, "In his faith and meekness, He sanctified (Moses), He chose him out of all flesh; v. 6, He exalted Aaron to be holy like to him." In v. 10, we have Aaron's "holy robe." So xlix. 12, "A people holy to the Lord, prepared for glory of eternity." From the days of the week God "exalted and sanctified the Sabbath," (xxxiii. [xxxvi.] 9). God is "the Holy One from Heaven," who redeemed Judah from the hosts of Sennacherib (xlviii. 20). We read of "the holy book" (2 Mac. viii. 23). The word *ἱερόν* appears in the sense of "sanctuary" in 2 Mac. v. 15. This was now safe: for the conception of holiness was indissolubly linked to *ἅγιος*.

In the Apocrypha, as in the Septuagint, the word *ἅγιος* simply takes up the ideas associated with the Hebrew word; and passes them on unchanged, as an almost lifeless body, awaiting the new life soon to be breathed into it by a new and more glorious revelation.

The New Testament writers perpetuate and develop the Old Testament conception of holiness. It was still remembered that the firstborn was "holy to the Lord" (Luke ii. 23). The emphatic teaching of Ex. xxix. 37, &c., that "whatever toucheth the altar shall be holy," was not forgotten. For, our Lord appeals in argument to the truth that the temple had already sanctified (sacrist) the gold used in its construction; and that the altar day by day sanctified (present) the gifts laid upon it (Matt. xxiii. 17, 19). As in the Septuagint translation of Neh. xi. 1, so in Matt. iv. 5, xxvii. 53, Jerusalem is called the holy city. For it stood in a special relation to God. The opening words of the Mosaic Revelation (Ex. iii. 5) still lived in the memory of the people (Acts vii. 33). The temple was still "the holy place" (Matt. xxiv. 15; Acts vi. 13, xxi. 28). The word "holy," which in Job v. 1, xv. 15, Dan. viii. 13 is a

designation of the angels, as of persons who stand in a special relation to God and do His bidding, is applied to them as an epithet in Matt. xxv. 31, Luke ix. 26, Acts x. 22. Similarly, though in lower degree, it is applied to the prophets (Luke i. 70; Acts iii. 21), as in Jer. i. 5. Herod knew that the Baptist was a man whose conduct agreed with the Law, and who stood in a special relation to God, "a righteous and holy man" (Mark vi. 20).

Very conspicuous, especially in the writings of St. Luke, is the term "Holy Spirit," already used in the Septuagint as a translation of "Spirit of Holiness" (Psalm li. 11; Isaiah lxiii. 10). The Spirit of God claims the epithet as being in a very special manner the source of an influence of which God is the one and only aim. All other influences tend away from God. He is, therefore, in a sense shared by no other inward motive principle, "The Holy Spirit."

The holiness of God, so solemnly asserted in Leviticus, and so frequently in Isaiah, is mentioned in the New Testament only in John xvii. 11, Heb. xii. 10, 1 Peter i. 15, 16 (quoted from Lev. xi. 44), Rev. iv. 8 (a repetition of Isaiah vi. 3), and Rev. vi. 10. The meaning of 1 Peter iii. 15, "Sanctify Christ as Lord in your hearts" (the reading is undoubted) is, "Render to Christ, in the inmost chamber of your being, the reverence which belongs to Him who claims to be your proprietor and master;" and is little or nothing less than a declaration that Christ is Divine. That the name of God may evoke such reverence in the hearts of those who speak or hear it, is the meaning of the prayer, "Thy name be sanctified" (Matt. vi. 9).

So far the conception of holiness has advanced little beyond the development attained in the Old Testament. The greater frequency of holiness as an attribute of the Spirit is, however, a mark of that better Covenant of which the indwelling and sanctifying presence of the Spirit is so conspicuous and glorious a feature. And, the similarity of the use of the word in the Old and the New Testament is a proof how fully the Old Testament conception of Holiness lived on in the minds of the people.

In the Person and Life of the Incarnate Son of God, the Biblical Idea of Holiness receives its full development and realisation. On the eve of His incarnation He was announced by the angel as "The Holy Thing" (Luke i. 35); the neuter form leaving out of sight all except that He would be an embodiment of holiness. He was acknow-

ledged, both by His disciples and by evil spirits, to be "The Holy One of God" (Mark i. 24, John vi. 69). Himself declared that the Father had "sanctified Him and sent Him into the world" (John x. 36); and that day by day "He sanctified Himself" (xvii. 19). The ascended Saviour is spoken of as "The Holy and Just One" (Acts iii. 14), "The Holy Servant" of God (iv. 27). He "was marked out as Son of God according to a Spirit of Holiness (Rom. i. 4). He is probably "The Holy One" of 1 John ii. 20; and is called "Holy and True" in Rev. iii. 7.

Since "holiness" is thus solemnly predicated of the Son of God, we expect to find in Him a perfect realisation of the idea imperfectly shadowed forth in the Mosaic ritual. We expect to find Him standing in a special relation to God, and living a life of which the one and only aim is to advance the purposes of God. Our expectation is realised. The Son of God declared, "It is My meat to do the will of Him that sent Me and to complete His work" (John iv. 34); "The Son cannot do anything of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing" (v. 19); "I seek not My own will, but the will of Him that sent Me" (v. 30); "I came down from heaven not to do My own will but the will of Him that sent Me" (vi. 38); "I have glorified Thee on the earth, having finished the work which Thou gavest me to do" (xvii. 4). We read that, "The life which He liveth, He liveth for God" (Rom. vi. 10); "Christ did not please Himself" (xv. 2); "You are Christ's: and Christ is God's" (1 Cor. iii. 23); "Being faithful to Him that made Him" (Heb. iii. 2); "He offered Himself spotless to God" (ix. 14).

In Jesus we see a life, lived in human flesh and blood, of which God was the one and only aim. All the powers, time, and opportunities of Jesus were used, not to gratify self, but to work out the Father's purposes. And this devotion to the Father was rational. The human intelligence of the man Jesus, mysteriously informed by the Divine intelligence of the Eternal Son of God, comprehended and fully approved and appropriated the Father's eternal purpose to save mankind through the death of His Son: and of this intelligent approval every word and act of the human life of Jesus was a perfect outworking. And in this sense, in a degree infinitely surpassing whatever had been known before, the incarnate Son of God was holy. Consequently, His body was a temple (John ii. 21), and a sacrifice (Heb. x. 10); and Himself a high priest (iii. 1). Whatever holiness



belonged to the vessels and ritual of the Mosaic covenant, belonged to Him and to His life : whatever in them was imperfect, found in Him its full realisation.

We notice further that, under the old covenant, the holy men were separated by their holiness from the common work of common life. This was very conspicuous in the last of the prophets, in that "righteous and holy man" (Mark vi. 20), in whose person and teaching were summed up whatever had been revealed under the earlier dispensation. The contrast of John and Jesus is the contrast of holiness as revealed in the Law, and as revealed in the Gospel. John lived in the wilderness, away from the dwellings of men, and ate strange food. Jesus lived a common life, toiling at a trade, enjoying social intercourse, partaking of human hospitality, and eating the food set before Him. This teaches plainly that holiness in its highest degree, *i.e.* that the highest conceivable devotion to God and to the advancement of His kingdom, does not imply separation from the common business of life. And when we see Jesus using the opportunities afforded Him by this common intercourse with men to advance the interests of the kingdom of God, we learn that even the common things of daily life may be laid on the altar of God as a means of doing His holy work.

We saw that under the old covenant, devotion to God implied separation from whatever, in symbol or reality, was opposed to God. Now, all sin is opposed to God : for sin, in whatever form or degree, tends to misery and destruction, whereas God's purpose is life and happiness. Consequently, the holiness of Jesus involves His absolute separation from all sin.

Again, the only purpose of God which we can conceive of as having a practical bearing upon us, is God's purpose to save men from sin and death, and to set up the eternal kingdom of which Christ will be king and His people citizens. Consequently, to us, devotion to God implies devotion to this one purpose. And this one great Divine purpose is inseparably linked with our conception of holiness. Therefore, since to realise this purpose God sent His Son into the world, the Saviour spoke appropriately of Himself as He "whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world" (John x. 36). And, in reference to His own daily devotion of Himself to this enterprise, He said, "I sanctify myself" (xvii. 19).

From the great Author and Archetype of renewed

humanity, we have now obtained a complete conception of holiness. We have seen a man, though God yet perfect man, whose life was a perfect realisation of one purpose, viz., to use all His powers, time, opportunities, to advance the kingdom of God: and we have seen that this purpose was a result of an intelligent comprehension, and a full approval, of the Father's purpose. In virtue of this intelligent, hearty, continued appropriation of the Father's purpose, and in virtue of its realisation in all the details of the Saviour's life, He was called the "Holy One of God."

We now come to study the idea of holiness as embodied in redeemed mankind. A conspicuous difference of the Old and New Testament use of the word meets us at once, viz., that, in the Acts of the Apostles and elsewhere, all church members are indiscriminately called "saints," "holy persons" (Rom. i. 7, xv. 25, 31, &c.). This is a complete contrast with 2 Chr. xxiii. 6, "Let none come into the house of the Lord save the priests. They shall come in: for they are holy. But all the people shall keep the watch of the Lord." But it fulfils the prophecy of Daniel, who speaks of the future people of God as the "people of the saints of the Most High" (Dan. vii. 27, 18, 22, 25). We also notice that the New Testament writers call believers "saints" without thought of the degree of their Christian life or the worthiness of their conduct. This use may be explained by an Old Testament analogy. The priests were "holy" whatever might be their conduct. For, God's claim that they should be His, placed them in a new position; and could not be set aside by, although it greatly aggravated the guilt of, their unfaithfulness. Just so, God claims for Himself all those whom He rescues from the penalty of their sins. And, whatever they may do, His claim puts them in a new and very solemn position. They may be, like the Corinthians, "babes in Christ" and "carnal" (1 Cor. iii. 3): like the Corinthians, they are still "sanctified in Christ Jesus" (1 Cor. i. 2). The word "saint" is therefore very appropriate as a designation of the followers of Christ: for it declares what God requires them to be. To admit sin or selfishness into their hearts is sacrilege. It also points out their privilege. By calling His people saints, God declares His will that we live a life of which He is the one and only aim. Therefore, since our own efforts have proved that such a life is utterly beyond our power, we may take back to God the name He gives us, and claim that that name be

realised by His power in our heart and life. This is the objective holiness of the Church of Christ.

But, although, as claimed by God, all the children of God are holy, it is evident that the full idea of holiness is realised in them only so far as they yield to God the devotion He claims. Consequently, the word "holy" also denotes actual and absolute devotion to God. And holiness is set before the people of God as a standard for their attainment. So 1 Cor. vii. 34, "That she may be holy both in body and spirit;" parallel with "How she may please the Lord:" Eph. i. 4, "That we may be holy and blameless:" v. 27; Col. i. 22; 1 Thess. v. 23, "May the God of peace sanctify you:" Heb. xii. 14, "Follow after holiness:" 1 Pet. i. 16, "Be yourselves holy in all behaviour." The sacred writers here urge their readers to claim a realisation in themselves of God's purpose that they live a life of which He is the one and only aim. This is the subjective holiness to which God calls His people.

We also notice that frequently in the New Testament the ideal life which Christ died to realise in His people is said to be a life in which all our powers are put forth to advance the purposes of God. So Rom. vi. 11, "Reckon yourselves to be living for God in Christ Jesus:" v. 19, "Present the members of your body, as servants, to righteousness, for sanctification: xiv. 7, "None of us liveth for himself; for, if we live, we live for the Lord:" 2 Cor. v. 15, "He died that they who live may no longer live for themselves but for Him who died for them:" "Ye are not your own" (1 Cor. vi. 20): but "Christ's" (iii. 23). The life here described is a life of holiness.

Since holiness denotes God's claim to the service of His creatures, it is predicated of both spirit and body (1 Cor. vii. 34; Rom. xii. 1; 1 Thess. v. 23). For God claims even our body, that its powers may work out His purposes.

Since holiness as set forth in the Mosaic ritual was a prophetic outline of the holiness required in us, the various holy objects of that ritual were types, as of Christ, so also of His followers. We are a temple (1 Cor. iii. 16, vi. 19), a priesthood (1 Pet. ii. 5, 9), a sacrifice (Rom. xii. 1). Our glorified life will be a Sabbath-keeping (Heb. iv. 9).

Very interesting is 1 Cor. vii. 14, "The unbelieving husband is sanctified in the wife." Since the people of God are holy, it might be thought that, as in Ezra ix. 2, "the seed of holiness" ought to separate itself from contact with

the unholy. St. Paul says, No. The Christian wife, in virtue of the universal priesthood of believers, lays her husband upon the altar of God, and in all her treatment of him seeks to advance the purposes of God. Therefore, in the subjective world of the wife's inner life, the husband, unbeliever though he be, is a holy object, and the wife's intercourse with him is a service of God. St. Paul proves the correctness of this view by showing that if the principle of separation from the unbelieving were accepted it would in some cases compel the Christian mother to forsake her children, who evidently, in spite even of their possible rejection of Christianity, had a claim upon their mother's care. Whereas, he says, on the principle that to the Christian wife the heathen husband is a sacred object, the children also are sacred and therefore fit objects of a Christian mother's care. And if it be right for her to live with her children, some of whom may be adult idolaters, on the same principle it is right for her to live with her husband. Thus, from the case of the children, St. Paul proves the case of the husband.

Equally interesting is 1 Tim. iv. 5, "Every creature of God is good, and nothing is to be cast away, when received with thanksgiving: for it is sanctified through the Word of God and prayer." The "Word of God" is the voice of God (Gen. i. 29, ix. 3), by which God devoted vegetables and animals to be food for His rational creatures. This universal word was for a time restricted by the Law, which declared that only certain specified animals were holy: but the restriction had been solemnly revoked (Acts x. 13), and the original word was again in force. Thus, by the Word of God, all manner of food was consecrated for the use of the sacred people. The general word "prayer" refers to the "thanksgiving" of v. 4. Our thanks to God is the testimony of our conscience that we believe our food to be His gift to us; and is therefore a proof that we eat it "for the Lord." "He eateth for the Lord: for he giveth thanks to God" (Rom. xiv. 6). Consequently, whatever food we eat with genuine thanksgiving, is, by God's original word, and by our thanks, which is a recognition of that original word, made holy food suitable for the holy people. But the same food, if eaten without this intelligent recognition of it as God's gift, would, in spite of its objective sanctification by God's original word, be unholy and defiling (Rom. xiv. 14).

Since the devotion to God of ourselves, our powers, and possessions, is a result not only of God's original purpose and claim, but also of His power working in us the devotion He requires, He is in every sense the Author of our holiness. Since our surrender to God's claim is the result of His claim, and since His claim is the immediate outworking of His inmost essence, the holy man is a "partaker of His holiness" (Heb. xii. 10). Since apart from the death of Christ it would be unjust (Rom. iii. 26), and therefore impossible, for God to bring near to Himself those who by their own choice and sin had separated themselves from Him, our sanctification comes through the death of Christ. "In the will of God we have been sanctified by the offering of the body of Jesus Christ" (Heb. x. 10): "That He might sanctify the people with His own blood" (xiii. 12). Since our holiness is wrought in us by the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit, who becomes the soul of our soul, and leads out our thoughts, purposes, words, and actions, towards God, we read, "sanctified in the Holy Spirit" (Rom. xv. 16), "sanctification of the Spirit" (2 Thess. ii. 13; 1 Pet. i. 2). But, although sanctification is thus entirely God's work in us, it is nevertheless to be an object of our effort, and in some sense our own work: for we must "follow after holiness" (Heb. xii. 14), and "cleanse ourselves, accomplishing holiness" (2 Cor. vii. 1). Since the Word of God is the instrument by which God puts before us holiness as an object of our effort, and calls forth in us faith, the one condition of all Gospel blessings, God "sanctifies us by the Truth" (Jno. xvii. 17). If, to-day, God is the one aim of our life, we "are clean because of the Word which Christ has spoken to us" (John xv. 3), and because, through His blood and death, in fulfilment of the Father's eternal purpose, we have received the Holy Spirit, who is given to be the personal directing principle of all who believe the spoken Word. Although we do not meet the exact phrase, "Sanctification through faith," we gather by sure inference from a great mass of Bible teaching that "belief of the Truth," i.e. belief of the Word spoken by Christ, is the one condition on which we obtain the "sanctification of the Spirit." We therefore venture to believe that God now works in us, and thus gives to us, the devotion He requires; and to expect that He will maintain it in us, by His own power, amid the enticements of the world, to the end of

life. And what we dare to believe, God works in us, "according to our faith."

We have now, by study of the Old and New Testaments, obtained a clear conception of holiness as understood by the writers of the Bible. It is God's claim that His creatures use all their powers and opportunities to work out His purposes. We have seen that holiness, thus understood, is an attribute of God. For, His claim springs from His Nature, even from that love which is the very essence of God. His love to us moves Him to claim our devotion: for only by absolute devotion to Him can we attain our highest happiness. We have also seen the idea of holiness realised in the Son of God, who took upon Him our flesh, lived a human life on earth, and now lives a glorified human life upon the throne of God, simply and only to accomplish the Father's purposes of mercy. We have seen the same idea realised in the Spirit of God, who ever goes forth from the Father that He may lead us to the Father, and whose every influence tends to accomplish the Father's purposes. The same idea is in part realised in all the adopted children of God. For God has claimed them to be His own: and His claim puts them, whatever they may do, in a new and solemn position. But the complete idea of holiness is realised in them only so far as their entire activity of body and mind are the outworking of a single purpose to accomplish the purposes of God.

The life just described is the ideal Christian life. And it is the noblest ideal we can conceive. For it sets before us an aim, the best possible aim, an aim which we can pursue at all times amid all the various and varying circumstances of life, and in the pursuit of which we can use all our powers. Now, all human effort receives its worth from the object aimed at. No act is trifling which tends to realise some great purpose: whereas the greatest effort which aims at nothing beyond itself is valueless. An aimless life is poor and worthless. But all self-chosen aims must needs be earthly and selfish. For the stream cannot rise above its source. Therefore, God, in order to ennoble even the humblest of His children, has given Himself and His own purpose of mercy to be their single aim; that they may thus, by directing their efforts towards the realisation of His purposes, themselves rise daily towards God.

Again, devotion to God implies complete victory over all sin : for all sin, in thought, word, or deed, tends to hinder God's purposes of mercy. Therefore, holiness implies purity. And we notice that complete victory over all sin is indissolubly connected in Scripture with that devotion to Himself which God requires. "Let us cleanse ourselves (aorist) from all defilement of flesh and spirit, accomplishing holiness" (2 Cor. vii. 1): "Reckon yourselves to be dead to sin, but living for God" (Rom. vi. 11). The exhortation in the former of these passages implies the possibility of that to which St. Paul exhorts. And the command to reckon ourselves dead to sin and living for God, implies that, in the moment we reckon it, God will realise in us by His power the reckoning which at His bidding we make. The words "dead to sin" express, in the strongest possible form, complete separation in purpose from all sin.

But purity is not holiness. For purity is a mere negative excellence; and might be conceived of as existing without activity. Indeed, a mere negative sinlessness has sometimes been the aim of mistaken effort. Holiness implies the most intense mental and bodily activity of which we are capable. For it is the employment of all our powers and opportunities to advance God's purposes: and this implies the use of our intelligence to learn how best to do His work, and the bodily effort which His work requires. Consequently, holiness sets to work all our powers, and sets them to work in the best direction. It gives to intellectual effort its noblest aim; and guards intellectual success from the perils which surround it. It gives the noblest motive for the care and development of the body: for it shows us that the powers even of our perishing body may work out eternal results. And it gives the only pure motive, and a very strong motive, for effort after material good: for it teaches that this world's wealth may be a means of laying up treasure in heaven. Thus holiness quickens, develops, and elevates all our powers.

Again, holiness not only develops, but satisfies, the intelligence. The mind of the holy man contemplates with full approval the one aim towards which his ceaseless efforts are directed. And his best judgment selects from the means at his disposal those which seem to him most fitted to attain this end. Thus the holy man, and he

only, lives a life strictly in accordance with the dictates of his reason. In him, that which is by nature highest, viz., the mind, actually rules; and that which is by nature lower, the body, attains its highest well-being by acting under the direction of that which is nobler than itself. Consequently, in him, there is perfect harmony, and perfect peace, combined with the highest activity.

Again, while we aim at the realisation of God's purposes, His purposes become our own. That which God desires, commends itself to us as worthy of our desire. But God's purpose is the salvation and well-being of mankind. This becomes, therefore, the one purpose of the holy man. But he cherishes this purpose, not merely from sympathy with those who are perishing—for some of them have few claims on his sympathy—but because, by devotion to God, he has felt the power of that love which moved the Father to give His only Son to save a ruined world.

We observe that this ideal life is practicable, in the highest degree, to all persons in all positions in life. The man who has fewest powers may use them all for God. And the man whose circumstances are most adverse may yet make it his single aim to do all he can to accomplish the purposes of God. And, if so, even adversity will show forth the glory, and thus help forward the work, of Him whose grace is ever sufficient. That holiness is possible to all men always, is some proof that the teaching which claims it is from God.

Another proof of the same is found in the fact that holiness is not only possible in, but fits a man for, every position in life. By making men right with God, it makes them right with each other. We have seen that the man who makes God's purpose his own will seek to do all possible good to those around him. He will therefore be a good father, a good citizen, a good neighbour, and a tradesman pleasant to deal with.

It has often been asked, What is religion? It is holiness. That man is most religious who most constantly and intelligently uses his various powers, and the opportunities which each day brings, to work out God's purpose of mercy to mankind. This is the end to which all the so-called means of Grace are subordinate. They are of value only as far as they attain this end in us.

It has been well said that Purpose is the autograph of Mind. Wherever purpose is, there is mind. And where-



ever mind is directed towards the Great Source of mind, there is holiness.

Holiness is capable of infinite growth. It is true that, when we learn that God claims to be the one aim of our every purpose and effort; and when, after fruitless personal efforts to render to God the devotion He requires, we learn for the first time that God will work in us by the agency of the Holy Spirit and by actual spiritual contact with Christ, the devotion He requires; and when we venture to believe that God does now and will henceforth work even in us this devotion to Himself; and when we find by happy experience that according to our faith it is done to us—it is true that, when we experience all this, the experience thus gained becomes an era in our spiritual life. We feel that we are then holy in a sense unknown to us before. But our holiness is still imperfect. At the end of every day we acknowledge that we have failed to work out fully into all the details of the day the one purpose which has by the grace of God been the mainspring of our action; and that we have often chosen unsuitable means. But each day we learn better what will, and what will not, advance the purposes of God; and each day our one great purpose permeates more fully our entire thoughts and more fully directs our entire activity. In this sense personal holiness is capable of infinite development.

In this article we have sought, by study of the Mosaic ritual, to understand the holiness which Christ came to realise in His people. This process may be profitably reversed. The holiness proclaimed by Christ explains, and is the only conceivable explanation of, a great part of the Mosaic ritual. It has frequently been observed that the only explanation of the Mosaic sacrifices, and of the prominence given to blood in the Mosaic ritual, is the great Truth that in later ages Christ came to save mankind by His own death; and that apart from the death of Christ the Old Testament sacrifices are meaningless, and therefore unaccountable. It is equally true that the prominence given in the Old Covenant to ceremonial holiness receives its only explanation from the holiness taught by Christ. For from the New Testament point of view we see that, in order to teach men, in the only way they could understand, that God claims that they look upon themselves as belonging to Him, and use all their powers and time to work out

His purposes—we see that, in order to teach men this, God set apart for Himself, in outward and visible and symbolic form, a certain place, and certain men, things, and periods of time. Afterwards when in this way men had become familiar with the idea of holiness, God proclaimed in Christ that this idea must be realised in every man, and place, and thing, and time. Thus in the Biblical conception of holiness, we have an explanation of a marked and otherwise inexplicable feature of the Old Covenant; we have a link binding the covenants together; and a light which each covenant reflects back on the other.

The results obtained above prove sufficiently the usefulness of a study of Bible words. And in this study Dr. Cremer's *Lexicon* renders valuable assistance.

We cannot, however, conclude this article without mentioning two great works without which this article, and probably the books of Trench and Cremer, would never have been written, viz. the Hebrew Concordance of Fuerst, and the Concordance of New Testament Greek by Bruder. These works bring before us the entire Bible use of the word we seek to understand; and thus enable us to observe the various objects to which it is applied, and the various connections of thought in which it occurs. They thus enable us to learn the meaning of Bible words in a way similar to that in which we learnt in childhood the meaning of the words of our mother tongue. It is to be regretted that these works are expensive. Fortunately, the Greek Concordance, which is by far the more important, is also much the cheaper, of the two. It is of greater real value than an ordinary theological library. For the Old Testament, an English Concordance will render good service. It is true that it fails us in a few interesting passages, such as Gen. xxxviii. 21, 2 Kings x. 20, Micah iii. 5, which because they contain the word in an unusual sense, cast special light upon its central idea; but in which, because of this unusual sense, it is rendered by an altogether different English word. In spite, however, of this drawback, the help of an English Concordance is not to be despised. But the possession of a concordance by no means sets aside the need for such a work as that of Dr. Cremer. The concordance gives us only the raw materials of our study. And every one who has honestly tried to grasp the central idea of a Bible word has felt the difficulty

of doing so, and is ready to welcome the aid of a fellow-traveller along this difficult road.

Our recommendation must be accompanied by a word of caution. The use neither of a concordance nor of a lexicon must ever supersede the careful consecutive study of Holy Scripture. This is the only safe method of obtaining a knowledge of the way of salvation as set forth in the Bible. To grasp the Truth as held and taught by the Sacred Writers, we must patiently follow their train of thought. But this can be done only by carefully seeking the meaning of the words they use. And as an aid in our search we warmly commend the honest and laborious New Testament Lexicon of Dr. Cremer.

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ART. IV.—*The Life of Thomas Fuller, D.D., with Notices of his Books, his Kinsmen, and his Friends.* By JOHN EGLINGTON BAILEY. London: B. M. Pickering. Manchester: T. J. Day.

It is little to the credit of English literature that no complete edition of such a classic as Fuller has ever appeared. Separate works have been published. The series issued by Tegg is the most extensive; but it is far from complete, and, however meritorious in some respects, falls far short of satisfying the requirements of a critical edition. That Fuller deserves the honour of such an edition needs no proof. He is the wittiest of divines and Church historians. His books are treasures of pithy wisdom. No author has contributed more to collections of gnomic sayings. His wit is always good-tempered, pure, and reverent. During life he was one of the most popular of preachers and writers, and his writings are just as well adapted for popularity of the best kind still. Yet, with the exceptions named, he is only to be had in the old folios, which are dear and hard to get. The very fact that even the folios are rare in sales and booksellers' catalogues is the result and evidence of their intrinsic worth. No one who has them parts with them save from necessity. They are books to be kept at one's elbow and dipped into in leisure moments. Fuller has always been a prime favourite with book-lovers. Coleridge says: "Shakespeare, Fuller, Milton, De Foe, Hogarth! As to the remaining mighty host of our great men, other countries have produced something like them; but these are uniques. England may challenge the world to show a correspondent name to either of the five. I do not say that, with the exception of the first, names of equal glory may not be produced, in a different kind. But these are *genera*, containing each only one individual." Lamb, Southey, Henry Rogers, are equally enthusiastic.

How is it that Cambridge University has never given the honour of such a memorial as we have spoken of to one of her most famous sons, and a son who wrote the first history of his *alma mater* in his most characteristic style?

Strange, too, that the Church of England has so forgotten one who was a typical Churchman, "a stout Church-and-King man," and that when the Church's fortunes were at their lowest ebb.

Mr. Bailey's *Life* is one that none but an enthusiast, full of an antiquarian and heraldic lore, like Fuller's own, could write. Its eight hundred pages contain everything ever likely to be known on the subject,—a perfect thesaurus of Fullerian knowledge. No point which travel, inquiry, and loving pains could illumine is left obscure. Like Masson's *Milton*, on a smaller scale, the *Life* is really a history of Fuller's times in so far as these bear on the subject. The history of every place, building, or person intimately associated with the subject is epitomised. Not the least portion of the labour expended on the work must have been consumed in collecting and verifying this subsidiary information about obscure scenes and persons. No better editor could be found for such a task as we have indicated than the author of this *Life*. We believe that Mr. Bailey has been long engaged on an edition of Fuller's sermons, which have hitherto existed only in a scattered form. We hope that lovers of "Good Old Fuller, the Worthy," will not have to wait much longer for the appearance of the work.

Some idea of the thoroughness of the *Life* may be gained from the fact that the first chapter of twenty-one pages deals only with Fuller's name and namesakes. Not only did friends and enemies ring the changes on his name, but he himself, with his inveterate love of punning, could no more resist the temptation than a kitten could refrain from playing with its own tail. One of the plates in his *Pisgah-Sight of Palestine*, bears the legend, "*Ager Fullonum*—Fuller's Field." In one of his latest works, written in self-defence, he says: "As for other stains and spots upon my soul, I hope that *He* (be it spoken without the least verbal reflection) who is the *Fuller's* sope, Mal. iii. 2, will scour them forth with His merit, that I may appear clean by God's mercy." One of his editors remarks, "Not only Fuller in useful matter and varied interest, but *fuller* in spirit, and *fuller* in wit, in fact, Fuller throughout." From the commonness of his name, Fuller has often been confounded with others. That he should be confounded with a Nonconformist, Andrew Fuller, is strange. The latter has often got the credit of one of his most pathetic sayings:

"Our captain counts the *image of God* nevertheless his image cut in *ebony*, as if done in ivory, and in the blackest Moors he sees the representation of the King of heaven,"—a powerful appeal for the negro slave. Less strange is the confusion with Thomas Fuller, M.D. (1654—1734), himself a wit and collector of proverbs. The only difference in name and title is that between M.D. and B.D. To the former, instead of the latter, has sometimes been attributed the couplet on a left-handed writing master:—

"Though nature thee of thy right hand bereft,  
Right well thou writest with the hand that's left."

We wonder whether Thomas Fuller, M.D., answered to his namesake's ideal physician, "an eagle's eye, a lady's hand, and a lion's heart." The namesake of whom our Fuller is proudest is Nicholas Fuller (1557—1626), the scholar and divine, to whom he has given a place in the *Worthies of England*. Nicholas was one of our earliest Biblical critics, and his works gained the esteem of continental scholars. He was settled at Allington, Wiltshire, "a benefice rather than a living, so small the revenues thereof. But a contented mind extendeth the smallest parish into a diocese, and improveth the least benefice into a bishopric. Here a great candle was put under a bushel (or peck rather), so private his place and employment. Here he applied his studies in the tongues, and was happy in pitching on (not difficult trifles but) useful difficulties, tending to the understanding of Scripture. . . . He was the most eminent for that grace which is most worth, yet costeth the least to keep it; I mean humility, who in his writings doth as fairly dissent from, as freely concur with, any man's opinions" (*Worthies*). "He was the prince of all our English critics; and whereas men of that tribe are generally morose, so that they cannot dissent from another without disdain, nor oppose without inveighing against him, it is hard to say whether more candour, learning, or judgment was blended in his *Miscellanies*. By discovering how much Hebrew there is in the New Testament Greek, he clearth many real difficulties from his verbal observations." The chief home of the Fuller name and kin is in the south-east counties of Essex, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire, the early seat of the woollen manufacture, with which fullers had much to do. To which branch of the race Fuller belonged, Mr. Bailey has failed to discover. He is

inclined to think that Fuller's father came from London, inasmuch as the son's acquaintance with the capital seems to go back to an early date. In 1660 he says: "I have known the city of London almost *forty* years; their shops did ever sing the same tune, that *Trading was dead*. Even in the reign of King James (when they wanted nothing but thankfulness) this was their complaint."

Fuller was born in 1608, in the Northamptonshire village of Aldwinckle, between Oundle and Thrapston. Here his father was rector of St. Peter's Church. The same village was the birthplace of another great English classic. Dryden was born in the rectory of All Saints, in Aldwinckle (Saxon = old shop). The rectory house of St. Peter's was pulled down eighty years ago. No doubt it was such a house as Fuller describes, "a substantive, able to stand by itself,—made to be lived in, not looked at." Of his native county, he writes: "If that county esteems me no *disgrace* to it, I esteem it an *honour* to me." And again of the county-town: "The air is clear, yet not over-sharp; the earth fruitful, yet not very dirty; water plentiful, yet free from any fennish annoyance; and wood, most wanting now of days, sufficient in that age." "What *reformation* of late hath been made in men's judgment and manners, I know not. Sure I am that *deformation* hath been great in trees and timber; who verily believe that the clearing of many *dark places*, where formerly plenty of wood, is all the *new light* this age hath produced. Pity it is no better provision is made for the preservation of woods, whose want will be soonest for our fire, but will be saddest for our water when our naval walls shall be decayed." In allusion to its manufacture of shoes and "stockens," he describes Northampton as "standing on other men's legs."

Son of a clergyman, he was early destined for the same profession. Sons of clergymen, he observes, have not been more *unfortunate* but more *observed* than others. Of Francisus Junius, who devoted his son to the law, he says: "Like to many nowadays, who begrutch their pregnant children to God's service, reserving straight timber to be beams in other buildings, and only condemning crooked pieces for the temple; so that what is found unfit for city, camp, or court—not to add ship and shop—is valued of worth enough for the Church."

His maternal uncle was Davenant, Bishop of Salisbury, of learned fame and Puritan leanings. He was a deputy

to the Synod of Dort, and author of several works which are read still. Mr. Bailey says of him, "He had strong Calvinistic leanings, but was supposed to have an inclination to Arminianism. He strongly advocated the doctrine of universal redemption," p. 77. We cannot reconcile these statements. No Calvinist, such as Davenant was, and no one of "strong Calvinistic leanings" could hold the doctrine of universal redemption. It was to the Bishop that Fuller was indebted for his two valuable preferments, a Salisbury prebend and the rectory of Broadwindsor. Bishop Davenant was anxious beyond measure to avoid the reproach of being "worse than an infidel," virtually using his episcopal patronage to portion off his nieces. There was evidently no press or public opinion to watch such things in those days. The bishop's will, given in full by Mr. Bailey, is a curious document in this respect.

It is indicative of Fuller's bias to ecclesiastical history that a favourite of his childhood was Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, to which English Protestantism owes so much, and which he vindicated against objectors. Fuller afterwards held a curacy in Waltham Abbey, where Foxe wrote his great work. He says: "When a child, I loved to look on the pictures in the *Book of Martyrs*." "It were a miracle if in so voluminous a work there were nothing to be justly reprov'd; so great a pomegranate not having any rotten kernel must only grow in Paradise. And though, perchance, he held the beam at the best advantage for the Protestant party to weigh down, yet generally he is a true writer, and never wilfully deceiveth, though he may sometimes be unwillingly deceived." His own racy English was also fed by early acquaintance with the Bible. Bible words are still common in Fuller's native district. Washerwomen call their tubs "vessels." A gardener wishes for rain to "mollify" the earth. "Disannul" is common. Cambridge was Fuller's school and university in one, as he was only twelve years old when he went there. His uncle Davenant was then President of Queen's College, to which he belonged. His tutors were his cousin, Edward Davenant, and John Thorpe, B.D. Among his contemporaries were Waller, Herbert, Milton, Taylor, Lightfoot. He proceeded B.A. 1625, M.A. 1628, B.D. 1635, and D.D. by royal command in 1660. In 1629 he became "*Tanquam Socius*" of Sidney Sussex College, of which Dr. Sam. Ward was Master. "*A Tanquam* it seems is a Fellow in all things



save the name thereof." He also defines him as "a Fellow's Fellow." Of Dr. Ward he writes: "He was counted a Puritan *before* these times, and Popish *in* these times; and yet being always the same, was a true Protestant at all times." He well describes him thus: "He turned with the times as a rock riseth with the tide," with him a favourite image of constancy. What Fuller says of Hebrew is well worth observation. "Skill in Hebrew will quickly go out, and burn no longer than 'tis blown." The reason of this is obvious. Greek and Latin are largely interwoven with English, and are therefore more or less constantly before us. But it is not so with Hebrew, and with respect to it the proverb holds good, "Out of sight, out of mind."

In 1630 he was made curate of St. Benet's (Benedict's) Church, Cambridge, by the authorities of Corpus Christi. The period of his curacy was remarkable for three things—a visitation of the plague, Hobson's death, and Fuller's first publication. The plague was brought by two soldiers, and wrought great havoc in the town with its uncleansed streets and heavy, fennish air. The University was broken up. One of its victims was Hobson, the London carrier, immortalised by Milton. In addition to his carrying business, he was farmer, innkeeper, maltster, and let out horses. He was greatly patronised by the University. He kept forty horses ready in his stables, but always compelled customers to take the one nearest the door. Hence the phrase, *Hobson's choice*. He was a parishioner of St. Benet's, and buried by the curate, Fuller. It was in St. Benet's that Fuller preached the sermons on *Ruth*, which were not published till 1654, as an antidote to their surreptitious publication by others. This is enough to show the attractiveness of his ministry even at this early time. His first publication was a poem entitled *David's Hainous Sinne, Heartie Repentance, Heavie Punishment*. While the work is not without indications of vigour both of thought and style, it bears on its face the faults which Fuller shared with the age, and would scarcely have survived if it had stood alone. Fuller's strength lay in prose, not poetry. In 1631 he was made Prebendary of Salisbury Cathedral, and in 1634 rector of Broadwindsor, in Dorset. Between these two years he probably spent a good deal of time with his uncle at Salisbury. He writes afterwards: "Travelling on the Plain (which, notwithstanding, hath its risings and fallings), I discovered Salisbury Steeple

many miles off; coming to a declivity, I lost the sight thereof; but climbing up the next hill, the steeple grew out of the ground again. Yea, I often found it and lost it, till at last I came safely to it, and took my lodging near it. It fareth thus with us whilst we are wayfaring to heaven: mounted on the Pisgah-top of some good meditation we get a glimpse of our celestial Canaan (Deut. xxxiv. 1). But when, either on the flat of an ordinary temper, or in the fall of some extraordinary temptation, we lose the view thereof. Thus, in the sight of our soul, heaven is discovered, covered, and recovered; till, though late, at last, though slowly, surely, we arrive at the haven of our happiness."

Broadwindsor is a good living and wide parish. Lewesdon and Pillesdon Hills, of about equal height (960 and 940 feet), overlook it, and serve as landmarks to ships in the Channel. Sailors know them as the Cow and Calf. Fuller has not forgotten to record the local proverb, "As much akin as Lewson Hill to Pilsen Pen," i.e. none at all. Mr. Bailey asks, whether the view from Lewesdon suggested the idea or title of his "Pisgah-sight." In modern days, Archdeacon Denison and S. C. Malan have followed Fuller in the living. Wherever Fuller's home was, he surrounded himself with friends. At Broadwindsor he was intimate with the Rolles, Pouletts, Napiers, Drakes, Windhams, and others. He was eminently sociable, the soul of geniality, good at story-telling, in which his strong memory did him good service, and was, therefore, welcome at every table. The groups of friends, whom Mr. Bailey sketches for us, embrace much of the contemporary history of Fuller's days. We have no doubt that in these social intimacies Fuller realised his own ideal of a "Faithful Minister." *He is strict in ordering his conversation.* As for those who cleanse blurs with blotted fingers, they make it the worse. It was said of one who preached very well and lived very ill, 'That when he was out of the pulpit, it was pity he should ever go into it; and when he was in the pulpit, it was pity he should ever come out of it.' But our minister lives sermons."

The present Broadwindsor pulpit is the same one in which Fuller preached. Anent the belfry, a resort of birds, Mr. Bailey aptly quotes: "Birds, we see (Ps. lxxxiv. 3), may prescribe an ancient title to build in our steeples, having time out of mind taken the same privilege in the tabernacle

and temple. Yea, David in exile, debarred access to God's public service, doth pity his own, and prefer the condition of these fowls before him. And although no devotion (whereof they were incapable), but the bare delight in fair fabrics, brought them hither, yet we may presume according to their kind they served God better than many men in that place, chirping forth morning and evening praises to the honour of their Maker."

His diligence in study during these years must have been great, for in 1639 appeared one of his best and most characteristic works, *The Historie of the Holy Warre*, a history of the Crusades. The frontispiece alone is a curious study. At the upper part is Europe, at the lower the holy sepulchre. Towards the latter is marching in state a procession of kings, knights, bishops, children, women, old and young. From it is returning a small remnant, fleeing before pestilence, the Saracen, and death, the rest lying slain on the ground. In the two upper corners are the portraits of Baldwin and Saladin, in the two lower the arms of Jerusalem and the Crescent. The picture is the crusade in epitome. The first four books contain the history itself, and conclude: "Thus, after an hundred, ninety, and four years, ended the Holy War; for continuance the longest, for money spent the costliest, for bloodshed the cruellest, for pretences the most pious, for the true intent the most politic the world ever saw. And at this day the Turks, to spare the Christians the pains of coming so long a journey to Palestine, have done them the unwelcome courtesy to come more than half way to give them a meeting." The fifth book is called a "Supplement," and it is added "only to hem the end of our history that it ravel not out;" but this is the most characteristic part of the work. Fuller pours out his stores of knowledge in the most delightful way on all manner of subjects—knights, templars, superstition, Jerusalem, the different crusading armies, heraldry, &c. He says, "The Turk's head is less than his turbant, and his turbant less than it seemeth; swelling without, hollow within. If more seriously it be considered, that state cannot be strong which is a pure and absolute tyranny. His subjects under him have nothing certain but this: that they have nothing certain, and may thank the Grand Signor for giving them whatsoever he taketh not away from them. . . . We have just cause to hope that the fall of this unwieldy empire

doth approach. It was high noon with it fifty years ago ; we hope now it draweth near night. . . . Heaven can as easily blast an oak as trample a mushroom." Fuller's hope is, unfortunately, still deferred. On a curious map in the work he says : " Of thirty maps and descriptions of the Holy land, which I have perused, I never met with two in all considerables alike ; some sink valleys where others raise mountains ; yea, and end rivers where others begin them ; and sometimes with a dash of their pen create a stream in land, a creek in sea, more than nature ever owned. In these differences we have followed nature as an impartial umpire." The *Holy War* at once established Fuller's position as a popular author. A second edition was issued the next year, and a third seven years later. Others followed, and in 1840 the Aldine edition.

In the celebrated Convocation of 1640 Fuller sat as proctor for the Bristol diocese. It was Charles's illegal attempt to prolong this Convocation after the dissolution of Parliament, in order that the clergy might vote the money which Parliament refused, that provoked extreme measures on the other side. All who took part in it were fined heavily, Fuller's fine being £200. Fuller acted with the moderate party, but he was in a minority, and had to suffer with the rest. Our interest, however, is not in the ecclesiastic, but in the preacher and author. It was at this time that he became known in London as a popular preacher. In 1640 his first volume of sermons was published under the title of *Joseph's Parti-coloured Coat*, in allusion to the variety of topics embraced—"Growth in Grace," "How Far Examples may be Followed," "An Ill Match Well Broken Off," "Good from Bad Friends," "A Glass for Gluttons," "How Far Grace may be Entailed," "A Christening Sermon," "Faction Confuted," besides a "Comment on 1 Cor. xv., in part." His quaint, homely style, practical dealing, outspokenness, antithetic sharpness, are here in all their strength. "Drunkards are distinguished from the king's sober subjects by clipping the coin of the tongue.—It is an old humour for men to love new things ; and in this point even many barbarians are Athenians.—Esau went to kill his brother Jacob ; but when he met him, his mind was altered : he fell a-kissing him, and so departed. Thus the waves of the sea march against the shore, as if they would eat it up ; but when they have kissed the utmost brink of the sand, they melt.

themselves away to nothing." The book has always been popular, and reappeared in 1867.

In 1641 he lost his rectory, under what circumstances we are not told, his place being taken by a parliamentary minister. We find him next as chaplain at the Savoy Chapel, in the Strand, where he acquired great influence as a preacher over the neighbouring nobility. His *Holy and Profane State* appeared in 1642. It consists of a series of sketches of character and qualities, the first four books delineating the good, the fifth the bad. The essays are after the pattern of Bacon and Feltham, and display great knowledge of human nature and power of description. Even the high doctrine laid down as to the rights of kings did not prevent the work becoming the favourite which it has remained ever since. Three editions appeared during the author's life; but Fuller asserted that both this and other works of his really passed through more editions, the publisher retaining the number on the title-page for purposes of his own. The *Holy State* was republished in 1840 and 1841.

Three sermons which Fuller not only preached but published at this time on the questions at issue between the king and Parliament led to his withdrawal from London to Oxford, where the king was then holding his court. The first, preached on the Fast-day, Dec. 28, 1642, was on *Peace*, its nature, the general and particular hindrances to it, the means for securing it. He denies that all the sins are on one side. "Think not that the king's army is like *Sodom*, not ten righteous men in it, and the other army like *Zion*, consisting all of saints. No. There be drunkards on both sides, and swearers on both sides, and whore-mongers on both sides, pious on both sides, and profane on both sides. Like Jeremy's figs, those that are good are very good, and those that are bad are very bad, in both parties. I never knew nor heard of an army all of saints, save the *holy army of martyrs*, and those you know were dead first, for the last breath they sent forth proclaimed them to be martyrs. But it is not the sins of the army alone, but the sins of the whole kingdom which break off our hopes of peace; our nation is generally sinful. The city complains of the ambition and prodigality of the courtiers; the courtiers complain of the pride and covetousness of citizens; the laity complain of the laziness and state meddling of the clergy; the clergy complain of

the hard dealing and sacrilege of the laity; the rich complain of the murmuring and ingratitude of the poor; the poor complain of the oppression and extortion of the rich. Thus every one is more ready to throw dirt in another's face than to wash his own clean. And in all these, though malice may set the varnish, sure truth doth lay the groundwork." Among the means recommended is that of petitioning king and Parliament in the interest of peace. Accordingly we find a petition presented to the king the next month to this effect, and among the names of those who presented it is that of *Doctor Fuller*, who is generally identified with our Fuller. The presentation of these petitions gave great umbrage to the Parliamentary party. The next sermon, on 2 Sam. xix. 30, preached on March 27, 1643, was in a still bolder strain on the king's side. The monarchical bias running through it could not be mistaken. At the same time he does not advocate unconditional surrender. We doubt whether Charles would have negotiated on Fuller's basis of compromise and mutual concession. He says, "For our king's part, let us demand of his money what Christ asked of Cæsar's coin, Whose image is this? Charles. And what is the superscription? *Religio Protestantium, Leges Angliæ, Libertates Parlamenti.*" And again, "Nowadays all cry to have peace, and care not to have truth together with it. Yea, there be many silly Mephibosheths in our days that so adore peace that to attain it they care not what they give away to the malignant Zibas of our kingdom. These say, 'Yea, let them take all, laws and liberties, and privileges, and properties, and Parliaments, and religion, and the Gospel, and godliness, and God Himself, so be it that the Lord our King may come to his house in peace.' But let us have peace and truth together, both, or neither; for if peace offer to come alone, we will do with it as Ezechiah did with the brazen serpent, even break it to pieces and stamp it to powder as the dangerous idol of ignorant people." His praise of the king would scarcely be grateful to most of the party that held London. "Look above him; to his God how he is pious! Look beneath to his subjects; how he is pitiful. Look about him; how he is constant to his wife, careful for his children! Look near him; how he is good to his servants! Look far from him; how he is just to foreign princes!" But the boldest note was struck in the third sermon preached in

July on Reformation, which throughout was a covert attack on much that passed under the name of reform.

It must not be forgotten that in those days the pulpit wielded the influence which now belongs to the press. The London ministers were powerful enough to reverse resolutions in Parliament (p. 264). It could scarcely be expected that the party in power would tolerate in the Savoy pulpit doctrine like that of the sermons quoted above. In June it had been decided to tender to every man in the parish churches an oath of allegiance to Parliament. Fuller had taken the oath with reservations; but after his third sermon it was re-presented to him to be taken without qualification. He felt that he could not comply, and in 1643 quietly withdrew to the king at Oxford. In his opinion, "a resolution is a free custody; but a vow is a kind of prison, which restrained nature hath the more desire to break."

For the next four years Fuller's was a wandering life, spent amid strife and the clang of arms. He did not stay more than a few months in Oxford. A sermon which he preached before the king, in which he advocated moderation and spoke freely about the sins of royalists, gave huge offence to the extreme spirits who formed the majority. His sincerity and loyalty were impugned. In this respect he shared the fate of Ussher and Chillingworth. Straitened means also compelled him to seek some means of livelihood. He therefore joined Sir Ralph Hopton's force as chaplain, accompanied it in its marches, and spent a short time in Basing House during the memorable siege. In 1644 we find him with the Royalist forces in Exeter, "the ever faithful city." Here the queen gave birth to a princess, Henrietta Anne, and then fled to France. Fuller was appointed chaplain on the establishment of the infant princess, an office which left him free to pursue his studies as far as war would permit. Beside producing several minor works, he was all this time collecting material for his two great works. He allowed no local antiquities to escape him, his enforced wanderings being thus turned to excellent account. The curious, anonymous *Life of Fuller*, published in 1661, says of him in this particular:—"With the progress of the war he marched from place to place; and wherever there happened (for the better accommodation of the army) any reasonable stay, he allotted it with great satisfaction to his beloved studies. . . . Indeed, his business and study then was a kind of errantry, having proposed to

himself (in addition to his *Ecclesiastical History*) a more exact collection of the *Worthies General of England*, in which others had waded before, but he resolved to go through. In what places soever therefore he came, of remark especially, he spent frequently most of his time in views and researches of their antiquities and church monuments; insinuating himself into the acquaintance (which frequently ended in a lasting friendship) of the learnedest and gravest persons residing within the place, thereby to inform himself fully of those things he thought worthy the commendation of his labours. It is an incredible thing to think what a numerous correspondence the doctor maintained and enjoyed by this means. Nor did the good doctor ever refuse to light his candle in investigating truth from the meanest person's discovery. He would endure contentedly an hour's or more impertinence from any aged church officer, or other superannuated people, for the gleanings of two lines to his purpose. And though his spirit was quick and nimble, and all the faculties of his mind ready and answerable to that activity of despatch; yet in these inquests he would stay and attend those *circular rambles* till they came to a *point*, so resolute was he bent to the sifting out of abstruse antiquity." Fuller himself in the *Holy State* thus pictures the *True Church Antiquary*:—"Some scour off the rust of old inscriptions into their own souls, contenting themselves with superstition, having read so often *Orate pro animâ*, that at last they fall a-praying for the departed; and they more lament the ruin of monasteries than the decay and ruin of monk's lives, degenerating from their ancient piety and painfulness. Indeed, a little skill in antiquity inclines a man to Popery; but depth in that study brings him about again to our religion. A nobleman who had heard of the extreme age of one dwelling not far off, made a journey to visit him, and finding an aged person sitting in a chimney corner, addressed himself unto him with admiration of his age, till his mistake was rectified; for 'Oh, sir,' said the young-old man, 'I am not he whom you seek for, but his son; my father is farther off in the field.' The same error is daily committed by the Romish Church, adoring the reverend brow and grey hairs of some ancient ceremonies, perchance of but some seven or eight hundred years' standing in the church, and mistake these for their fathers, of far greater age in the primitive times."



That these years of leisure from public work bore rich fruits in other respects is shown by the fact that between 1645 and 1647 four notable works appeared, *Good Thoughts in Bad Times*, *Andronicus*, *The Cause and Cure of a Wounded Conscience*, *Good Thoughts in Worse Times*. The first was sent forth in 1645, the year of Naseby. It was the first book printed in Exeter, and contains a century of meditations under the head of Personal Meditations, Scripture Observations, Historical Applications, Mixt Contemplations. In spirit and aim the work is akin to Taylor's *Golden Grove*, Thomas a Kempis, Browne's *Religio Medici* published two years previously. It was published in 32 mo., for portableness. The quiet air of brooding over its pages, and its seasonableness to the times, made it a favourite at once, and the success led Fuller afterwards to add two companion volumes. Here is one meditation: "Lord, when young, I have almost quarrelled with that petition in our (*ours* though proscribed) Liturgy, 'Give peace in our time, O Lord;' needless to wish for light at noonday; for then peace was so plentiful, no fear of famine, but suspicion of a surfeit thereof. And yet how many good comments was this prayer then capable of! 'Give peace,' that is, continue and preserve it; 'give peace,' that is, give us hearts worthy of it and thankful for it. 'In our time,' that is, all our time; for there is more besides a fair morning required to make a fair day. Now I see the mother had more wisdom than her son. The Church knew better than I how to pray. Now I am better informed of the necessity of that petition. Yea, with the daughters of the horse-leech, I have need to cry, 'Give, give peace in our time, O Lord.'" Up to 1680 the work had passed through nine editions, and there have been several modern editions.

*The Cause and Cure of a Wounded Conscience*, 1647, was written for the comfort of his own heart in times of distress. "There are twenty-one separate dialogues, admirably constructed and connected together." To the wounded in spirit, he says, "1. Constantly pray to God that in His doctrine He would speak peace unto thee. 2. Be diligent in reading the Word of God. 3. Avoid solitariness, and associate thyself with pious and godly company. 4. Be industrious in thy calling." The touching conclusion shows what depths of feeling there were in that genial soul. "And now God knows how soon it may be said unto

me, 'Physician, heal thyself,' and how quickly I shall stand in need of these counsels which I have prescribed to others. Herein I say with Eli to Samuel, 'It is the Lord, let Him do what seemeth Him good;' with David to Zadock, 'Behold, here I am, let Him do to me as seemeth good unto Him;' with the disciples to Paul, 'The will of the Lord be done.' But, oh! how easy it is for the mouth to pronounce, or the hand to subscribe these words! But how hard, yea, without God's grace how impossible, for the heart to submit thereunto! Only hereof I am confident, that the making of this treatise shall no ways cause or hasten a wounded conscience in me, but rather on the contrary (especially if as it is written *by* me, it were written *in* me) either prevent it that it come not at all, or defer it that it come not so soon, or lighten it that it fall not so heavy, or shorten it that it last not so long. And if God shall be pleased hereafter to write 'bitter things against me,' who have here written the sweetest comforts I could for others, let none insult on my sorrows; but whilst my wounded conscience shall lie like the cripple at the porch of the temple, may such as pass by be pleased to pity me, and permit this book to beg in my behalf the charitable prayers of well disposed people, till Divine Providence send some Peter, some pious minister, perfectly to restore my maimed soul to her former soundness. Amen."

*Andronicus; or, The Unfortunate Politician. Shewing, sin; slowly punished. Right; surely rescued*, 1646, is nominally a life of the Grecian Emperor Andronicus Comnenus, A.D. 1163—1185, but in reality a running satire on the men and events of Fuller's own day. It was published anonymously, and ran through four editions. It was also translated into Dutch. The fact of the book having been licensed for publication proves, at least, that considerable freedom of speech was allowed in the days of the Commonwealth.

*Good Thoughts in Worse Times*, 1647, follows the lines of its predecessors, but is more outspoken in its royalist sentiments. One meditation concludes with the wish: "May I die in that government, under which I was born, where a monarch doth command." "There was not long since, a devout, but ignorant Papist dwelling in Spain. He perceived a necessity of his own private prayers to God, besides the Pater-nosters, Ave-Maries, &c., used of course in the Romish Church: But so simple was he, that how

to pray he knew not. Only every morning, humbling, bending his knees, and lifting up his eyes and hands to heaven, he would deliberately repeat the alphabet. 'And now,' said he, 'O good God, put these letters together to spell syllables, to spell words, to make such sense as may be most to thy glory and my good.' In these distracted times I know what *generals* to pray for: God's glory, truth and peace, his Majesty's honour, privileges of Parliament, liberty of subjects, &c. But when I descend to *particulars*, when, how, by whom I should desire these things to be effected, I may fall to that poor pious man's A, B, C, D, E," &c.

But we have outrun the history. In April, 1646 Exeter surrendered on honourable terms, which, Fuller says, were well kept. The garrison and others were allowed to compound for their estates. Fuller made his peace with Government in a characteristic way. He happened to be staying at the Crown in Paul's Churchyard. In his petition to be allowed to compound he writes CROUNE in capital letters, and ends with "he shall, &c.," instead of "he shall ever pray."

After this we find him paying a long visit to Edward Montague (afterwards Lord Montague) at Boughton Park. Montague was an old college friend, and Boughton Park was near Aldwinckle, so that Fuller was now among early friends and scenes. Here he translated Ussher's *Annales* into English. For some unknown reason, it was published anonymously. Montague was one of the patrons to whom the *Holy War* was dedicated. He belonged to the Parliamentary party. It is pleasant to see that the most bitter strife that has divided Englishmen within recent centuries did not extinguish private friendship or bar personal intercourse. Fuller was also intimate with the Earl of Warwick, a great favourer of the Puritans and champion of Parliament. Fuller's well-known moderation facilitated such intercourse. His fervid loyalty to Church and King never blinded him either to faults on his own side or virtues on the other. He, in common with many good Royalists, said that the King had the better cause, and the Parliament the better men. Nothing is more common in writers on the Royalist side than cheap jests at the expense of preaching tailors, weavers, cobblers, &c. Fuller says: "It seemeth marvellous to me that many mechanics (few able to read, and fewer to write their names), turning

soldiers and captains in our wars, should be so soon and so much improved. They seem to me to have commenced *per saltum* in their understandings. I profess, without flouting or flattering, I have much admired with what facility and fluentness, how pertinently and properly they have expressed themselves, in language which they were never born nor bred to, but have industriously acquired by conversing with their betters." But even on this subject he cannot repress his wit. "Not that I write this (God knoweth my heart) in disgrace of them because they were bred in so mean callings, which are both honest in themselves and useful in the commonwealth; yea, I am so far from thinking ill of them for being bred in so poor trades, that I should think better of them for returning unto them again." In the very year of the Restoration Fuller expresses himself thus of Cromwell: "Have we not seen O. Cromwell, from a private gentleman ascend by *gradation* to be a protector of three nations, and by his courage and wisdom, rather 'than any right; a more absolute power possessed by, and larger tribute paid unto him than unto any king in England?" Contrast this with the violent language on this subject of most of the writers on Fuller's side. South's references to Cromwell are among the bitterest paragraphs in the English language. He certainly forgot his own sermon on *Loving our Enemies*.

Indeed, Fuller's charity is carried so far that we find him in continuous intercourse with Sir John D'Anvers of Chelsea, one of the regicides. This is one of the points in Fuller's life which even Mr. Bailey does not fully elucidate. He tells us (p. 81) that while Fuller refers to John Goodwin and Milton, he avoids mentioning them by name because of their approval of the king's execution. He tells us also (p. 430) how the execution plunged Fuller into the profoundest grief. We should therefore at least have expected him to shrink from contact with one who took an active part in the condemnation and whose estates were confiscated at the Restoration. Yet no change comes over the intercourse. In 1654 Fuller preached a sermon in commemoration of Sir John's recovery from sickness. If there had been any explanation of the inconsistency, our biographer would doubtlessly have given it. He nowhere professes to claim perfect consistency for his hero.

Fuller dedicates two sermons on *Assurance* and *Contentment*, preached in 1647 and 1648, to "The Honourable

and truly noble Sir John D'Anvers, Knight." The latter sermon is of extreme rarity, no copy being found in the British Museum or the Bodleian. The only copy known belongs to Dr. Riggall, of Bayswater, a great lover of old English authors. The sermon will no doubt be included in Mr. Bailey's forthcoming volumes. The text is 1 Tim. vi. 6, which, he says, is an antidote to the former verse, wherein is set forth "the worldling's prayer, creed, and commandments, which is their daily desire, belief and practice; and all contained in three words, *Gain is Godliness.*" The divisions are, "(1) *A Bride*: Godliness. (2) *With a Bridemaid*: Contentment. (3) *With her great Portion*: Gain. (4) *With the present payment thereof*: down on the nail: is." Godliness and contentment are like Saul and Jonathan, "lovely and pleasant in their lives, and in their deaths are not divided. These twin graces always go together." The following is truly Fullerian: "Ask the tenacious maintainer of some new upstart opinion what godliness is. And he will answer, It is the zealous defending with limb and life of such and such strange tenets, which our fathers perchance never heard of before; yea, which is worse, such a person will presume so to confine godliness to his opinion as to ungodly all others who in the least particular dissent from him. Oh, if God should have no more mercy on us than we have charity one to another, what would become of us? Indeed Christ termeth His own a little flock. But if some men's rash and cruel censures should be true, the number of the godly would be so little, it would not be a flock." And again: "It is a true but sad consideration how, in all ages, men with more vehemency of spirit have stickled about small and unimportant points than about such matters as most concern their salvation. So that I may say (these sorrowful times have turned all our tongues to military phrases), some men have lavished more powder and shot in the defence of some slight outworks which might well have been quitted without any loss to religion than in maintaining the main platform of piety, and making good that castle of God's service and their own salvation. Pride will be found upon serious inquiry the principal cause thereof."

During these wandering years Fuller held several Lectureships in London churches, among others one at St. Clement's, Eastcheap, where Pearson about the same time preached his sermons on the Creed. Fuller also preached

at St. Dunstan's East. He tells the following story: "I confess, some ten years since, when I came out of the pulpit of St. Dunstan's East, one (who since wrote a book thereof) told me in the vestry, before credible people, that he in Sydney College had taught me the art of memory. I returned unto him, that it was not so: for I could not remember that I had ever seen his face; which, I conceive, was a real refutation." The following story is as good. Once conversing with a *Committee of Sequestrators* at Waltham, "they fell into a discourse and commendation of his great memory; to which Mr. Fuller replied: 'Tis true, gentlemen, that fame has given me the report of a memorist, and if you please I will give you an experiment of it.' They all accepted the motion, and told him they should look upon it as an obligation; laid aside the business before them, and prayed him to begin. 'Gentlemen, your worships have thought fit to sequester an honest, poor, but Cavalier parson, my neighbour, from his living, and committed him to prison; he has a great charge of children, and his circumstances are but indifferent. If you please to release him out of prison and restore him to his living, I will never forget the kindness while I live.' 'Tis said the jest had such an influence upon the Committee that they immediately released and restored the poor clergyman." Echard speaks of Fuller's "prodigious memory." Fuller says in his *Holy State*: "Some say a pure and subtle air is best; another commends a thick and foggy air. For the Pisans, sited in the fen and marsh of Arnus, have excellent memories, as if the foggy air were a cap for their heads." Round his portrait in the *Worthies* are the words, "*Methodus mater memoriæ.*" His rules are: "Soundly infix in thy mind what thou desirest to remember; overburthen not thy memory, to make so faithful a servant a slave; spoil not thy memory with thine own jealousy, nor make it bad by suspecting it; adventure not thy learning in one bottom, but divide it betwixt thy memory and thy note-books; moderate diet and good air preserve memory," &c. Pepys tells of Fuller dictating to "four eminently great scholars together in Latin, upon different subjects of their proposing, faster than they were able to write, till they were tired."

In 1648 Fuller received the curacy of Waltham Abbey, Essex, from the Earl of Carlisle. Here Foxe wrote his *Martyrology*. Here also Bishop Hall had been curate

twenty-two years and preached his famous *Contemplations*. Fuller characterises his predecessor as "Not unhappy at controversies, more happy at comments, very good in his characters, better in his sermons, best in his meditations." Here, probably, Fuller began his acquaintance with another kindred spirit, Izaak Walton, who may often have angled in the Lea, which runs past the town. At Waltham he had a dangerous attack of small-pox, which was cured by the use of saffron from the neighbouring town of Saffron Walden. At Waltham, too, Fuller was near London, which he often visited, chiefly for the purpose of consulting the library at Sion College. The curacy was held in combination with London Lectureships. We find him lecturing at St. Bride's as well as at St. Clement's. He often made longer journeys in prosecution of historical and antiquarian inquiries. Mr. Bailey, a Manchester man, does not omit to note the indications of Fuller's visit to "our county" (p. 514).

At Waltham he fell into controversy both with Baptists and Quakers, saying of the latter, "such as now introduce *Thou* and *Thee*, will (if they can) expel *mine* and *thine*." George Fox replied with as much sharpness. Against the Baptists he wrote his *Infants' Advocate*, the conclusion of which is as admirable as it is quaint: "For mine own particular, because I have been challenged (how justly God and my own conscience knoweth) for some moroseness in my behaviour towards some dissenting brethren in my parish; this I do promise, and God giving me grace I will perform it. Suppose there be one *hundred* paces betwixt me and them in point of affection, I will go *ninety-nine* of them, on condition they will stir the one odd pace, to give an amicable meeting. But if the legs of their soul be so lame, or lazy, or sullen, as not to move that one pace towards our mutual love, we then must come to new propositions. Let them but promise to stand still and make good their station; let them not go backward and be more embittered against me than they have been, and of the *hundred paces* in point of affection, God willing, I'll go *twice fifty* to meet them."

From Waltham he issued, in 1650, one of his best and most characteristic works, *A Pisgah-Sight of Palestine, and the Confines thereof, with the History of the Old and New Testament acted thereon*. The work was a costly one, owing to the number of engravings and maps. The frontispiece,

designed by Klein, a native of Rostock, settled in London, is very elegant. Another plate contains the thirty-three shields of the patrons by whose help the work was published. As to contents, the work embodies all that was known in those days of the geography of Palestine. The first part gives a general description of Judæa, the second deals with the tribes, the third treats of Jerusalem and the temple, the fourth refers to surrounding nations, the tabernacle, garments, &c., of the Jews, while the fifth is one of Fuller's delightful miscellanies. The researches of former authors and travellers are digested, condensed, and duly arranged, and the whole illumined by the radiance of the author's quaint wit and comment. Every page is curious. The whole book is steeped in Scripture. Of Jerusalem he says: "As Jerusalem was the navel of Judæa, so the Fathers make Judæa the midst of the world, whereunto they bring (not to say *bow*) those places of Scripture, 'Thou hast wrought salvation in the midst of the earth.' Indeed, seeing the whole world is a *round table*, and the Gospel the *food* for men's souls, it was fitting that this *great dish* should be set in the midst of the *board*, that all the guests round about might equally reach unto it; and Jerusalem was the *center* whence the *lines of salvation* went out into all lands." He thus states and answers an objection made to the plates: "The faces of the men which bear the great bunch of grapes are *set the wrong way!* For being to go south-east to Kadesh-barnea, they look full *west* to the Mediterranean Sea. You put me in mind of a man who being sent for to pass his verdict on a picture, how like it was to the person whom it was to resemble, fell a-finding fault with the *frame* thereof (not the *limner's* but the *joiner's* work) that the same was not handsomely fashioned. Instead of giving your judgment on the map (how truly it is drawn to represent the tribe) you cavil at the *History-properties* therein—the act of the *graver*, not *geographer*. You know, sir, when I checkt the graver for the same, he answered me, that it was proper for *spies*, like *watermen* and *ropemakers*, for surety sake to look one way and work another!" The old editions of *Pisgah-Sight* are dated 1650, 1652, and 1662 respectively. Of Tegg's reprint, 1869, Mr. Bailey says: "This is a very faulty edition; printed, but not edited. The marginal notes and comments are omitted; and such spellings as *manumitted*, *array*, *knitted*, *gaiety*, &c., are



put in the stead of Fuller's *manumised, ray, notted, gayitry, &c.*"

In 1651 appeared *Abel Redivivus*, a series of one hundred and seven lives of modern divines, of which Fuller contributed seven as well as the Epistle to the Reader. "He was not responsible for the Latinity of the title." One of Fuller's best, but least known, works is a series of twelve sermons on the *Temptations of Christ*, preached in St. Clement's Church, and published in 1652. There was only one edition. Three sermons are devoted to each temptation—to "Despair," "Presumption," "Idolatry," respectively. Under the first head he says: "He can, as extend the quantity, so improve the quality of meat, that coarse diet shall cause strength and health as well as dainties; as in the case of Daniel's pulse. 'Show me not the meat, but show me the man,' saith our English proverb. When I behold the children of poor people, I perceive a riddle and contradiction between their fare and their faces: lean meat and fat children; small beer and strong bodies; brown bread and fair complexions. Nor can I attribute it to any cause but this, that the rich folk generally make long meals and short graces, whilst poor men have short meals and long graces. I mean, that they rely more upon God's blessing than their own provisions." Under the second head: "Now, seeing the former temptation of Satan was to despair, this next to presumption, we learn, the devil will endeavour to make men reel from one extremity to another. The possessed man 'oft fell into the fire, and oft into the water.' (Satan's world hath no temperate climate, but either torrid or frozen zone.) Sometimes he casteth men into the fire of ill-tempered zeal; sometimes into the water of Acedia, or a carelessness what becomes of their soul; sometimes into the fire of over-activity, to do nothing just; sometimes into the water of too much idleness, to do just nothing." It is a pity that this work is so difficult to obtain.

A minor controversial work, *The Triple Reconciler*, was published in 1654. In it Fuller deals with three disputed questions of the day: Whether ministers alone can exclude from the Lord's Table; Whether unordained persons may preach; the use of the Lord's Prayer. While maintaining his own opinions, he does this in a moderate and peaceable temper. He says in the dedication: "I know what success commonly attends all umpires and arbitrators,

that often they lose one, and sometimes both of their friends betwixt whom they intercede. Meek Moses could not escape in this kind; but when seeking to stone two striving Israelites, the party who did the wrong fell with foul language upon him. I expect the like fate from that side which doth the most injury, and am prepared to undergo their censure."

Fuller's greatest works—those for which he had been preparing many years—were published last. In 1655 appeared his *Church History of Britain*, and connected with it *The History of the University of Cambridge*, and *The History of Waltham Abbey*. The Preface speaks of twelve books. The work contains only eleven, but *The History of Cambridge University* was meant as the twelfth. The old folio contains upwards of 1,100 pages, all running over with the richest humour. The history was the first of modern English Church histories, and subsequent writers have never failed to go to it for material. The dates are wonderfully exact. The judgments pronounced are sober and impartial. Even the innumerable digressions have a method and purpose of their own. Fuller mentions among his authorities the State records in the Tower, the journals of Convocation, Sir Thomas Cotton's Library, and the best antiquaries, among whom Ussher is specially mentioned. In another work he thus speaks of the labour bestowed on the history: "Give me leave to add that a greater volume of general church history might be made with less time, pains, and cost: for in the making thereof, I had straw provided me to burn my brick; I mean, could find what I needed in printed books. Whereas in this *British Church history* I must, as well as I could, provide my own straw; and my pains have been scattered all over the land by riding, writing, going, sending, chiding, begging, praying, and sometimes paying, too, to procure manuscript materials." In its own line, i.e. in all that is Fullarian, the work can never be superseded. The Dedications form a remarkable feature of Fuller's works, and contain some of his happiest writing. But those prefixed to the *Church History* excel all the rest in quantity and character. Not only has each book a long Dedication, but each century or section has its special patron. There are no fewer than seventy-five Dedications addressed to eighty-five patrons and patronesses. Coleridge wrote at the close of his copy of the history: "Wit was the stuff and substance of

Fuller's intellect. It was the element, the earthen base, the material which he worked in; and this very circumstance has defrauded him of his due praise for the practical wisdom of the thoughts, for the beauty and variety of the truths, into which he shaped the stuff." The dates of the old editions are 1655 and 1656. Of modern reprints the one published by Tegg has gone through four editions. But the best is the Oxford one, edited by Rev. J. S. Brewer, M.A. Mr. Brewer says: "A careful examination of Fuller's authorities, with the statements made in his narrative, has ended in a result favourable to his industry, judgment, and accuracy."

A year or two later Fuller had to appear before Cromwell's Commission of Tryers for "the approbation of public preachers." In his difficulty he waited on John Howe, to request his good offices, which were freely rendered. The interview between the stout Episcopalian and the spare Nonconformist is very interesting. Fuller said, "For you may observe that I am a pretty corpulent man, and I am to go through a Passage that is very strait; I beg you would be so good as to give me a shove, and help me through." On coming before the tribunal, he was asked, "Whether he ever had any experience of a work of grace in his heart," to which he replied, "That he could appeal to the Searcher of hearts that he made conscience of his very thoughts." The Tryers were quite satisfied.

In 1655 he became Rector of Cranford, Hounslow Heath, by the gift of Lord Berkley. Through all these distressing times Fuller was more fortunate than many of his brethren in having a settled home.

A work rarely met with is Fuller's *Appeal of Injured Innocence*, published in 1659, in reply to Peter Heylyn. It has only been reprinted in modern times in Tegg's edition of *Fuller's History of University of Cambridge*, 1840. Heylyn and Fuller were old opponents. Both were Royalists and Churchmen to the backbone; but the former was as extreme as the latter was moderate. Indeed, Fuller's sin in Heylyn's eyes was his moderation towards Dissenters. In 1659 Heylyn published his *Examen Historicum*, in which he animadverted on the mistakes, falsities, and defects of "some modern histories," Fuller's among the number. He no doubt hit some blots; but these were magnified and multiplied beyond all reason. From title-page to conclusion nothing was right. The title should have been

Church *Rhapsody*, instead of Church *History*. The dedications, heraldry, epitaphs, stories, are "impertinences." Above all, a "continual vein of Puritanism" runs through the book. To this attack the *Appeal* is the answer. Fuller is at first doubtful whether he should take up the challenge, and remembers the prohibition of revenge. But "the distinction came seasonably to my remembrance, of a man's *righting* and *revenging* himself." He next remembers that *mutes* at the bar are judged guilty. Still more, the credit of the ministry is at stake. He then replies *seriatim*. The whole piece is full of happy retort. He is fully Heylyn's equal in argument, and his superior in temper. As to the passages of heraldry, he says, they "are put in for variety and diversion, to refresh the wearied reader." His closing letter, "To my loving Friend, Doctor Peter Heylin," is nobly conceived and put. Fuller says: "Death has crept into both our clay cottages through the windows, your eyes being bad, mine not good; God mend them both, and sanctify unto us these monitors of mortality; and, however it fareth with our corporeal sight, send our souls that *collyrium* and heavenly eye-salve mentioned in Scripture! But indeed, sir, I conceive our time, pains, and parts may be better expended to God's glory, and the Church's good, than in these needless contentions. Why should PETER fall out with THOMAS, both being disciples to the same Lord and Master?" He then gives Heylyn another bit of heraldry: "Let me, therefore, tender unto you an expedient, in tendency to our mutual agreement. You know full well, sir, in heraldry two lioncels rampant endorsed are said to be the emblem of two valiant men, keeping appointment and meeting in the field, but either forbidden fight by their prince, or departing on terms of equality agreed betwixt themselves. Whereupon, turning back to back, neither conquerors nor conquered, they depart the field several ways (their stout stomachs not suffering them both to go the same way), lest it be accounted an injury one to precede the other. In like manner, I know you disdain to allow me your equal in this controversy betwixt us; and I will not allow you my superior. To prevent future trouble, let it be a drawn battle; and let both of us 'abound in our own sense,' severally persuaded in the truth of what we have written. Thus, parting and going out *back to back* here (to cut off all contest about precedency), I hope we shall meet in heaven face to face

hereafter. In order whereunto, God willing, I will give you a meeting, when and where you shall be pleased to appoint; that we, who have tilted pens, may shake hands together." The controversialists did meet and shake hands together.

In the train of the *Good Thoughts*—but scarcely with equal steps—follow the *Mixt Contemplations in Better Times*, published in 1660 amid the hopes of the Restoration. The motto prefixed is that of Fuller's whole life:—"Let your moderation be known to all men: the Lord is at hand." Would that this had been the spirit of the new order of things! What became of moderation when the Act of Uniformity was passed in 1662, with its baleful consequences descending and multiplying from generation to generation? But Fuller did not live to see those evil days of an arbitrary, high-handed policy. He worked with voice and pen for the Restoration. When it came, he returned to his old haunts in the Savoy and the prebend's stall at Salisbury. He might have resumed the rectory of Broadwindsor, but does not seem to have done so. He was also destined for a bishopric, but this design never took effect. On Sunday, August 12, he preached in the Savoy Chapel, although then a fatal sickness was on him. Malignant typhus soon appeared, and any chance of recovery was precluded by the barbarous surgery of the day, which drew from the sufferer twenty ounces of blood. He died on Thursday, August 16, 1661, at the age of fifty-three. In his delirium he talked of his books, called for pen and ink, and said that by-and-by he should be well and would write it out.

The book by which Fuller is perhaps best known was published posthumously. *The History of the Worthies of England* appeared in 1662. The work represents the collection and toil of a busy life. Though it wants the author's revising touches, it was left substantially complete. The plan is to go over England shire by shire, giving a life of the most notable characters that each one has produced. It is thus the first of English biographical dictionaries, but a biographical dictionary written by Fuller, with all his point and terseness and humour. It is no doubt the distinctly English flavour that has made the *Worthies* such a favourite with Englishmen, and especially with the English squires and gentry. Mr. Bailey says, "The contents of Fuller's last folio have always made it a favourite book. It has

ever been familiar to English gentlemen and country squires of the old school. A worthy clergyman of my acquaintance, who had loved and admired Fuller for over sixty years, was on one occasion asked by a country justice in the house of the latter, 'Do you know that book?' pointing to a copy of the *Worthies*. 'Yes,' said the minister, 'nearly every word of it.' Hereupon the squire remarked, 'I don't care much about books; but the Bible and Fuller's *Worthies* satisfy me in the matter of reading.'" The *Worthies* is a gallery of English portraits—portraits of all that is best and noblest in the land—done by a master-hand among word-painters. Fuller is as great a master as Reynolds or Gainsborough among portrait painters. That passionate love of England which lies so much deeper than all our differences, nowhere beats more strongly than in his last work. Here is one vignette: "James Cranford was born at Coventry in this county (where his father was a divine and schoolmaster of great note), bred at Oxford, beneficed in Northamptonshire, and afterwards removed to London, to St. Christopher's. A painful preacher, an exact linguist, subtil disputant, orthodox in his judgment, sound against sectaries, well acquainted with the Fathers, not unknown to the schoolmen, and familiar with the modern divines. Much his humility, being James the Less in his own esteem, and therefore ought to be the greatest in ours. He had, as I may say, a broad-chested soul, favourable to such who differed from him. His moderation increased with his age, charity with his moderation; and had a *kindness* for all such who had any *goodness* in themselves. He had many choice books, and (not like to those who may lose themselves in their own libraries, being *owners* not *masters* of the books therein) had his books at such command as the captain has his soldiers; so that he could make them at pleasure go or come, or do what he desired. This lame and loyal Mephibosheth (as I may term him), sadly sympathising with the sufferings of Church and State, died rather infirm than old, Anno 1657." Of Henry de Essex, who, in a battle with the Welsh, "betwixt traitor and coward, cast away both his courage and banner together," he says, "He himself, partly thrust, partly going into a convent, hid his head in a cowl, under which, betwixt shame and sanctity, he blushed out the remainder of his life." On this Charles Lamb comments:—"The fine imagination of Fuller has done what might have been pronounced impossible; it has given an

interest and a holy character to coward infamy." Fuller enumerates five ends which he proposed to himself in the work. "First, to gain some glory to God; secondly, to preserve the memories of the dead; thirdly, to present examples to the living; fourthly, to entertain the reader with delight; and lastly (which I am not ashamed publicly to profess), to procure some honest profit to myself." The matter was drawn from printed books, records in public offices, private manuscripts, information from relatives of many of the worthies. The work is not, of course, without defects. The lives are mostly those of Fuller's own school of thought and view. There are large sections of English society which are not included in the picture. But we must rather be thankful for what we have than complain of what we have not. There are also many blanks, especially in the matter of dates, which we may attribute to Fuller's premature death. Beside the two impressions of 1662, there are two modern editions, one in 1811, in two vols., edited by John Nichols, F.S.A., the other in 1840, in three vols., by Dr. Nuttall, neither of which is very readily or cheaply met with.

This paper would be very incomplete if it omitted special reference to the grace of which Fuller was so distinguished a preacher and example—moderation. He has a choice essay on the subject in the *Holy State*, beginning with Hall's maxim, "Moderation is the silken string running through the pearl chain of all virtues." Another essay on the same subject might be constructed out of the scattered allusions and illustrations in his other writings. His birthplace lay between the birthplace of Brown, the Independent, and Tresham, a Papist. Hence he says, "My nativity may mind me of *moderation*, whose cradle was rocked between two rocks. Now, seeing I was never such a churl as to desire to eat my morsel alone, let such who like my prayer join with me therein:—God grant that we may hit the golden mean, and endeavour to avoid all extremes—the fanatic Anabaptist on the one side, and the fiery zeal of the *Jesuit* on the other, that so we may be true Protestants, or which is a far better name, *real Christians* indeed." In his *Pisgah-Sight* he mentions two springs in the tribe of Reuben, one sweet the other bitter, but which together made a sanative bath, and comments, "as if nature would thereby lesson us that moderation wherein extremities agree is the best cure for all distempers." A favourite

saying of his was, "The very work of moderation is the wages of moderation." Both in his essay and in *The Truth Maintained*, a controversial piece published during his stay in Oxford (pp. 244, 284), he is careful to distinguish between moderation and lukewarmness. In the former he says, "The lukewarm man eyes only his own ends and particular profit; the moderate man aims at the good of others and the unity of the Church." In the latter, "First, the lukewarm man (though it be hard to tell what he is who knows not what he is himself) is fixt to no one opinion, and hath no certain creed to believe; whereas the moderate man sticks to his principles, taking truth wheresoever he finds it, in the opinions of friend or foe; gathering an herb though in a ditch, and throwing away a weed though in a garden; secondly, the lukewarm man is both the archer and mark himself, aiming only at his own outward security; the moderate man levels at the glory of God, the quiet of the Church, the choosing of the truth, and contenting of his conscience; lastly, the lukewarm man, as he will live in any religion, so he will die for none; the moderate man what he hath warily chosen will valiantly maintain, at least wise intends and desires to defend it to the death. . . . And time will come when moderate men shall be honoured as God's doves, though now they be hooted as owls in the desert." The apostolic grace of moderation, so lacking in Fuller's days, is not too abundant in ours.

We ought not to omit mention of the excellent bibliography of Fuller's works, and the exact indices—*Nominum*, *Rerum*, *Locorum*, *Verborum*—which add so much to the comfort of a reviewer and to the value of Mr. Bailey's admirable *Life*.

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ART. V.—1. *The Tripartite Nature of Man, Spirit, Soul and Body, Applied to Illustrate and Explain the Doctrines of Original Sin, the New Birth, the Disembodied State, and the Spiritual Body.* By the Rev. J. B. HEARD, M.A. Fourth Edition. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, George Street. 1875.

2. *Outlines of Biblical Psychology.* By J. T. BECK, D.D., Prof. Ord. Theol., Tübingen. Translated from the Third Enlarged and Corrected German Edition, 1877. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 88, George Street. 1877.

THE volume which stands first on our list is by no means new. It has passed through several editions, and has not been without a certain influence on the religious thought of the day. With the principle laid down at the outset we are in entire agreement, the principle namely that, whatever may be said of physical science, "psychology and ethics are the two subjects on which the Bible may be expected to speak with authority." There is a Biblical psychology, wider, deeper, nobler than the psychology of experience and observation, just as there is a Biblical system of ethics, wider, deeper, and nobler than any which has been propounded by uninspired men. The theology of the Bible must be based on its psychology. In writers specially inspired of God to communicate His mind to man, we naturally look for vivid and clear conceptions as to the nature, not only of the Being whose will they announce, but of the beings to whom they announce it. And we find accordingly that the Scriptures contain a revelation of man no less than a revelation of God.

So far we are in accord with the present writer. But having said thus much, we have said nearly all that we can bring ourselves to say in the way of approval of his work. He is a man of wide reading, and of an all too lively imagination: he is evidently a man of strong evangelical sympathies. His purpose in this book is to "underprop

our current evangelical theology with a sound psychological principle." By so doing, he would rescue theology at once from the assaults of a rationalism which denounces it as uncritical and superficial, and from a bondage to authority which trammels it as effectually as papal infallibility does the Church of Rome. From such evils, if they do indeed so grievously afflict us, we think the deliverance he promises is no salvation at all. It is always a signal for caution when the concocter of some new medicine proclaims it as a universal panacea. Men suspect enthusiasm at once. It is even so in the present instance. Accept Mr. Heard's tripartite theory, and the clouds that have so long obscured orthodoxy will clear away, and the controversies that have barred its progress and hindered its development will be laid to rest for ever. We fear the prospect is illusory. Before we can accept it, we must consent not only to violate but to annul all canons of criticism and all laws of thought. And after we have accepted it, our liberty will prove to be but an exchange of masters, and we shall have to appeal to our new and self-constituted "authority" to extricate us from the embarrassments into which his leadership has betrayed us. In short, we deem it unfortunate for the interests of the tripartite theory that it should have had for its advocate a genius so irrepressible as Mr. Heard's. These charges are sufficiently weighty: we must proceed to make them good. In doing so, it will be necessary to select a few points for consideration: a minute investigation of the whole work would be obviously impossible within our limits.

We must pass over his criticisms of the dichotomist view of human nature as commonly received in the Church from the beginning, and his explanations of the disappearance of the correct theory, which, as the teaching of Scripture, ought to have firmly held its ground. For that disappearance, we may observe in passing, he alleges two different reasons. "The Latin language wanted the precision of the Greek, and *spiritus* and *anima* never acquired the same precision of meaning as *pneuma* and *psyche*." Here the difficulty is a linguistic one. "With the error of Apollinarius, who denied to Christ a human *pneuma*, the reaction came, and trichotomy fell into disfavour, and was neglected even in the East. In the West it cannot be said to have ever received the attention it deserved. Tertullian opposed it from the first, and Augustine thought it safest to neglect

it." Here the difficulty is a theological one. Had there been no theological difficulty, the linguistic one would not have counted for much. But to pass from this.

In the third chapter we have a trichotomist version of the Biblical account of the creation of man. It is introduced by a significant caution, to the effect that, "revelation being a progressive manifestation of the truth of God, the discovery of man's nature must be also progressive." The reason for this we do not see, particularly as the revelation professes to carry us back to the birth of the race, and treats its first representatives as moral agents. The gradual revelation of the Trinity, quoted as a parallel, affords no analogy at all. The revelation of the Spirit did not wait for the incarnation of the Son. The Spirit of God is seen working (Gen. i. 2) before the creation of man. Mr. Heard himself unwittingly raises another presumption against this assumed reticence of Scripture. Of the two accounts of man's creation he passes over the first (Gen. i. 26), as describing rather "what man was intended to be than what he actually is." Supposing him correct in this explanation, it follows that the same revelation which, as being progressive only, does not declare to man all that he actually is, is nevertheless prophetic of what he is ultimately to become. Surely his present state is likely to be described with at least as much clearness as his future dignity. What Gen. i. 26 means is shown by Gen. v. 1, "*In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made He him.*"

Let us now, however, with Mr. Heard, address ourselves to the second of the two accounts of man's formation. "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life (or lives); and man became a living soul." Two distinct sources are here pointed out, the author tells us, from whence man "was taken," the dust, and the breath of lives. We should have thought two sources indicated a twofold nature, but we are wrong. The sources are two, but they give rise to a threefold nature. How are the two explicated into three? By means of the plural form of the word "lives," the uninstructed reader will say. In this he is mistaken. The plural form of "lives" is important, but the exact import of it Mr. Heard cannot determine. "It may or may not refer to the twofold division into the intellectual and active powers, or the natural and moral as generally

adopted by psychologists." It may be the plural of dignity. Or it may indicate the presence of God's Spirit with our own—as if the Divine Spirit must have been absent without a special inbreathing. In any case the secret of the trichotomy does not lie here. It lies in the fact that, upon the junction of the body and spirit, man "became a living soul." "The soul, which we may here provisionally describe as the *ego*, or the *nexus* between matter and mind—is the meeting point between the higher and the lower natures in man." This is a most disappointing explanation. We were looking for three natures, and we have only found two natures and a nexus or "meeting-point." A nexus is not a nature: it is only an adjustment of two things, which may be of the same or different nature, in a particular relation. But may not the union of two different things produce a third? They may, but in this case several difficulties present themselves. In the first place, the text does not say that the soul is the product of the spirit and the body. Mr. Heard himself tells us that the force of the Hebrew preposition—not rendered in English—is local. If local, it cannot be causative. The meeting-point is only a meeting-place. Secondly, the two natures here supposed to generate a third are diametrically opposed, the one having the properties of mind, the other the properties of matter. Of which will their issue, the soul, partake? If of the former, it is of the same nature as the spirit. If of the latter, it is of the same nature as the body. It cannot combine the two, for their properties are mutually incompatible, *e.g.*, it cannot be both extended and unextended, it cannot be both intelligent and unintelligent, and so on. Nor can this third nature be of some other complexion, different from either of its constituents, for no third substance is known. When we have enumerated the properties of matter and those of mind, we have exhausted all known properties, and there remain none to be attributed to the third substance, of which in fact, for want of such properties, we can form no conception. Thirdly, when we consider all the known elements of the human constitution, we find that they are accounted for already. The inbreathed lives include or may include the natural and moral powers, and the body is the animal nature. What room is there, then, for a third nature?

A fourth difficulty is one not at all essential to the con-

ception : it is of Mr. Heard's own importing. He illustrates the union of spirit and body from the marvels of chemical affinity. "Just as oxygen and hydrogen gas, when uniting in certain proportions, lose all the properties of gas and become water, a substance which seems to have nothing in common with its two constituent elements, so the animal and the spirit, combined in certain proportions, as definite as those of oxygen and hydrogen, though not as easily described by numerical ratios, produce a third and apparently distinct nature, which we call the soul." Has water nothing in common with hydrogen and oxygen, such as mass, volume, divisibility? Are its constituents opposed as spirit and body are? And must not the constituents vanish before the new third substance can appear? In all this we see nothing that reminds us of Mr. Heard's trichotomy. The chemist unites two substances into one, but confesses he has lost the two in doing so. Mr. Heard unites two into one, but will have it that all three exist severally in the mixture. In the course of the chapter from which we have been quoting, Mr. Heard condemns without giving reasons "the loose and unsatisfactory views of psychology for which our popular commentators are mainly responsible." Supposing our representation correct, we fear he must share this responsibility with them. And now, having made good this one position, we might thankfully rest from our labours. If the third nature be only the meeting-point of the other two, it will surely disappear from our reckonings, and a dichotomy will be established. If it be their chemical resultant, they will in like manner disappear, and the unity of human nature is established. But we should have under-estimated the ramifications of error if we were to suppose that our work is at an end. Error is like a banyan tree : though the parent trunk may be removed, there remain myriads of branches which, having rooted themselves in the earth, are become trunks in their turn, and require each its own special application of the axe.

It seems needful to caution the reader that he must forget Mr. Heard's account of the genesis of the soul, before he proceeds to the next two chapters. Their titles are, "The Relation of Body to Soul in Scripture," and "The Relation of Soul and Spirit in Scripture." The relations of body and spirit to each other are hard enough to conceive, but what shall we say of their relations to such an

unsubstantial thing as their "meeting point?" Dismissing from our minds the unsatisfactory mode of its production, and investing it, as desired, with the dignity of a separate nature, let us attend only to the distinctions drawn for us between the soul and its lower and higher companions, the body and spirit.

On the former of these distinctions, as found in Scripture, we need not dwell at any length. Mr. Heard rightly declines to claim for the sacred writers any pretensions to strict physiological accuracy. Not so with their psychology. "While Scripture assumes the connection between mind and body, it is everywhere silent as to the nature of that connection. . . . The Hebrews probably inclined to the opinion that the soul was diffused through the body, and that the whole body was an organ of intelligence, and was not localised in some one organ, as modern physiologists too much incline to think." From this Mr. Heard draws a strange conclusion. "Thus the *nephesh* (the word rendered 'soul' in Gen. ii. 7, and almost everywhere else) is not the *mind*, or soul, or spirit; but the man who thinks, wills, and acts." This is not a distinction between body and soul, but a fusion, or rather confusion, of the two. The word "soul," which in Gen. ii. 7 meant a third nature, is now asserted to mean throughout the Old Testament, "the entire nature of the mind breathing through the entire nature of the body." So that soul is neither the meeting point of body and spirit, nor a third nature engendered by body and spirit, but the identity, or at least the inter-penetration, of the two.

In the next chapter, "On the Relation of Soul and Spirit in Scripture," we have the following sample of Mr. Heard's reasoning. "It is said of the Word of God, that it pierces sharper than any two-edged sword: the proof of its power of piercing is this, that 'it divides and discerns between soul and spirit,' 'as if' (for the latter is not a fresh instance of its penetrative power, but a comparison by which we may judge of it) 'of joint and marrow.'" The "as if" is an interpolation. The doubled conjunction of the Greek is exactly rendered in the Authorised Version by "*and* of the joints and marrow," and indicates, not a comparison of one pair with another, but the continuation of a series. This Mr. Heard by implication admits on the next page, where he tells us that in this passage "we come to the important truth that the trichotomy of man's nature, body, soul, and spirit, is only discovered under the Spirit's convincing

power." Similar to this is his treatment of the words "dividing asunder." Penetration through the soul into the spirit is given as the rendering of it on page 63. Dividing between soul and spirit is the rendering of it on page 64. On page 79 it is added "all that ἀκρι μερσμου (dividing asunder) implies is that the sword of the Spirit pierces through the soul of man into his spirit," and then, as if to clench the self-contradiction, "but penetration is not dissection." The meaning of this last no doubt is that there can be only an ideal and not a real separation of soul and spirit, and of the former part that even this ideal separation can only be effected, i.e. the distinction can only be made known, by the Holy Ghost. But the language is very misleading, and the sentiment evolved from it infers an identity between soul and spirit resembling that just asserted between soul and body, and equally destructive of a "distinct and separate nature."

On page 64, Mr. Heard criticises Plato's tripartite division as not corresponding with that of St. Paul. "Plato, as an intellectualist, assigned to reason or νοῦς the sovereign place. . . . In Scripture psychology the intellect holds the second place, not the first." Thus Mr. Heard differs from Plato. But it does not follow that he agrees with St. Paul. In a previous chapter, quoted above, he has already assigned to the pneuma the intellectual and active powers. Into this we cannot further enter.

Our readers must now prepare for an astounding discovery, one which they would never have made for themselves, and for which the interpretation of Heb. iv. 12 will hardly have paved the way, though seemingly designed to do so. The full meaning of the statement that "the trichotomy of man's nature is only discovered under the Spirit's convincing power," will be seen in the light of the following paragraph. "The true trichotomy of human nature is not to be sought, at least in any explicit form, in the Old Testament." How does this compare with the first passage quoted by us from our author? There it was stated that psychology was one of the two subjects on which the Bible might be expected to speak with authority. Now, one half "the book of knowledge fair" is for us "expunged and razed." On page 47 we are told that in Gen. ii. 7 "we cannot fail to see that an exact system of psychology is alluded to." And on this ground the following position is taken. "Whatever allowance may be made for the loose

and popular expressions of the Bible with regard to astronomy and the positive sciences generally, we neither expect nor desire such indulgence to be extended to its use of psychological terms." But on page 66 we read, "We cannot agree with those who would give the words *ruach* and *nephesh* a precise psychological meaning throughout the Old Testament." The first time that *nephesh* was used of man, viz., in Gen. ii. 7, it meant the third nature evolved from soul and body, and here we saw "the accuracy of Bible psychology." In opposition to this we now learn (p. 68) that "the Hebrew *nephesh* has a lower meaning than the English soul. The contrast that we express between soul and body, they expressed by spirit and soul. *Ruach* and *nephesh* had each a lower meaning than we now attach to them, *ruach* referring to what we should now call the soul, and *nephesh* referring to what we should now call the body." So a determinate meaning is alternately asserted and denied, and when these oscillations have subsided, we find there is a determinate meaning still, only a lower one than had been previously accepted!

The best way to remove this slur from the reputation of the Old Testament will be to quote its own utterances. There are cases in which, as being its instrument, the body is included with the spirit under the term soul. Thus Lev. v. 2, "if a soul touch any unclean thing;" 4, "if a soul swear;" 15, "if a soul commit a trespass." There are also cases in which the soul's relations with the body are adverted to, as Psalm cvii. 5, "hungry and thirsty, their soul fainted in them;" Prov. xix. 5, "an idle soul shall suffer hunger;" xxvii. 7, "the full soul loatheth the honeycomb," &c. But its most frequent use is of a loftier kind. It is used of the spiritual principle in circumstances which place it in direct contrast to the physical, the circumstances, namely, of dissolution, in Gen. xxxv. 18, "as her soul was in departing." It is used of the intelligence, pure and simple, in Prov. xix. 2, "that the soul be without knowledge, it is not good." It is used of the moral nature in man, the seat of moral responsibility, in Ez. xviii. 4, "the soul that sinneth it shall die." Beyond this we need not push our inquiries. We can very well believe that *ruach*, the word usually rendered spirit, refers to "what we should now call the soul," for in our opinion the two words can at most but represent different aspects of one indivisible substance. What we do not see is, how the convertibility of the two



terms should count as an argument for trichotomy. It is not simply that the Hebrew "spirit" stands for the English "soul." It stands just as suitably for the Hebrew "soul" too. Thus in Isa. lvii. 16, "For the spirit should fail before me, and the souls which I have made."

Let us next examine Mr. Heard's treatment of the New Testament. "With the teaching of our blessed Lord, the true psychology of Scripture begins to emerge from the mists and shadows of a carnal dispensation." "Begins to emerge:" we must mark that. No sudden illumination is to be expected even here. "We find the contrast between the worth of the soul and the body brought out by our Lord for the first time. The dimness that hung over the mental vision of Moses, David, Hezekiah is gone." We had always inferred that Moses showed some appreciation of the worth of the soul from the superior choice he made in Egypt, and from the whole course of his history. The sixteenth Psalm is alone sufficient to answer for David, or the twenty-third, or almost any other of the productions of his pen. And as to Hezekiah, we do not think the lament he uttered "in the cutting off of his days" should be taken to represent the views of a man who had heard the words, if not read the writings, of the evangelical prophet.

In what way did the true psychology begin to emerge? "The first step was to make the contrast clear between soul and body, and to distinguish the *nephesh* or *psyche* from the mere animal life, with which it is often confounded in the Old Testament." This task was a perfectly gratuitous one, by Mr. Heard's own admission. The distinction we make between soul and body the Hebrews were already competent to make, he says, and did make by the use of the terms *ruach* and *nephesh*. Our Lord did but express the same distinction by a new pair of terms. His teaching is as clearly dichotomist as that of the Old Testament. Mr. Heard's explanation of His meaning takes away that honour from the Old Testament which our Lord uniformly renders to it. It makes Him a feeble and halting expounder of truths which, on the theory, were of vital importance to man's salvation. It converts the conversation with Nicodemus—the clearest summary in Scripture of all that Christ came to do and to teach—into a bundle of paradoxical enigmas, themselves requiring a key.

It is worth while to dwell a little on Mr. Heard's statement of the relation of Christ to Nicodemus. According

to him all Nicodemus's difficulties about the new birth arose from his inability to divide between the soul and the spirit. According to him our Lord withheld the explanation because the Holy Ghost was not yet given. But if so, why did our Lord mention either the human spirit or the Divine? Why not have avoided all reference to them and their mysterious relations? If "that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" means what the trichotomist says it means, what further explanation is there to be given? The mystery is no mystery at all, and does not require all this parade of preparatory mystification. All that our Lord needed to say was this: Man has two parts already, body and soul, but before he enters My kingdom he must have a third, namely, a spirit, and this he will receive from the Holy Ghost. We cannot but observe further Mr. Heard's curious inversion of the "earthly and heavenly things" of which our Lord speaks. Christ puts the doctrine of the new birth among the earthly things which it was a marvel that "a master in Israel" did not know. Mr. Heard says He spoke of it as one of the heavenly things, and, finding Nicodemus did not understand, "broke off" and turned to such earthly things as the brazen serpent, the type of His cross. We fear this slipshod method of handling Scripture will hardly commend itself to our readers.

For a full manifestation of the mystery of the spirit we must travel on beyond the Day of Pentecost. "With the gift of the Divine pneuma, the existence of a third or pneumatical part in man became as distinct as it was before obscure." Let us see, then, what happens upon the lifting of the veil. "The dying Stephen commends not his soul, or the rational and moral life, in God (*sic*); but the spirit; the Divine and regenerate nature quickened by the Holy Ghost, and created in the image of Him that formed it." For "in God" we should probably read "into the hands of God." But this is only a specimen of the innumerable typographical errors which Mr. Heard has allowed to remain uncorrected through four editions of his work. Why Mr. Heard should have overleaped another chapter subsequent to the one which narrates the story of the Pentecost, we do not know. He would have found recorded there the deaths of two other disciples quite as famous as Stephen, though not on similar grounds. Of Ananias and Sapphira it is severally stated that they "gave up the

ghost," and none knows better than Mr. Heard that the word rendered ghost is invariably "pneuma." What they gave up then, according to Mr. Heard, was "not the rational and moral life, but the spirit, the Divine and regenerate nature quickened by the Holy Ghost." But who, with the fifth chapter of the Acts before him, can believe this? If it were true, it would follow that they did not die at all. But, passing over this, let it be noted whose phraseology it is that Stephen uses. It is almost identical in form with our Lord's final invocation, which in its turn is borrowed from the thirty-first Psalm. Now the question arises whether Stephen did not mean the same by "spirit" that our Saviour did, and, if so, whether our Saviour did not mean the same by it that the Psalmist did? If he did, what becomes of the lower sense of the term "spirit" in the Old Testament as compared with the New? If he did not, how can it be maintained that either Christ or the protomartyr suffered death at all?

We are but on the threshold of the New Testament revelation of trichotomy, and have the strongholds of that doctrine yet to encounter. Before proceeding to them we must pause and consider how, in Mr. Heard's view, the New Testament throws back its light upon the Old. Our readers—those of them at least who are unfamiliar with trichotomy—must have been puzzled already to find that the pneuma needs imparting or developing no less than revealing by the Holy Ghost. Taught by Mr. Heard to regard the "spirit" as breathed into man at his creation, it was about the meaning of the "soul" alone that there could be any doubt. Now, however, the soul has, without any foregoing definition of its functions, usurped all power, place, and prerogative in the composite structure of our being. The soul is no longer the missing link between the spirit and the body. But something else is missing. One of the two main constituents which the soul had for its office to bind together has mysteriously disappeared. The pneuma has vanished, without, as it would seem, any such detriment either to the body or to the uniting soul as would threaten the integrity of the man. This demands some explanation.

The explanation we are looking for is to be found within the limits of the present chapter, but will need comparing with later statements if its precise significance is to be defined. Commenting on 1 Cor. xv., the author says, "The

psychic and pneumatic natures are next contrasted by the Apostle, as supplying, the one the centre of our present body of humiliation, the other, the centre of the glorified resurrection body. As there is, he says, 1 Cor. xv. 45, a natural body, so there is also a spiritual body. . . . That the first nature is a psychical nature only, he proves by the text in Gen. ii. 7, which is the ground text on which all Scripture psychology rests. The first Adam was made a living soul, the second Adam was made a life-giving spirit. Thus we have the text and its interpretation, and on the authority of the Apostle all question is set at rest as to the meaning of Gen. ii. 7. Adam, however he may have received the breath of lives, and became capable thus of becoming a spiritual being, was only at first a living soul or creature. The nephesh of the Hebrew, as we have seen, suggesting no higher thought than that he was a creature like others, albeit 'breathing thoughtful breath.' He was of the earth, earthy, and hence his name was Adam. In this case the soul and not the spirit was the centre of his personality."

We will not dwell upon the unfairness of referring to the whole man what is evidently applied only to his physico-spiritual relations. Nor will we do Mr. Heard the injustice of supposing him to have forgotten all he has said about the dignity of Adam's spiritual nature. But it is now plain under what very considerable reserves his former exposition of Gen. ii. 7 must have been written. It would seem as if that text, no less than Gen. i. 26, must have been meant to describe rather what man was intended to become than what he was actually made. His receiving the "breath of lives" is marked by the "plural of dignity," but it failed to make him a spiritual being. It only made him "capable of becoming a spiritual being." With the body formed out of the dust, and the soul—the joint product of the body and spirit—it is otherwise. Mr. Heard is not ashamed to avow it. "The first pair were created, as we have reason to suppose, adults in stature and intellect"—the intellect being now assigned to the soul—"but infants in spiritual growth and experience. . . . On this we may rest with some degree of confidence, that the pneuma in Adam was given in its rudimentary or infant stage of growth, and that he was placed in Eden for that very purpose, that he should grow in grace and in the knowledge of God, as he had no need to grow in bodily stature, or possibly even in in-

tellectual power." From all this we are compelled to draw some unfavourable inferences. One is that, of the three parts of Adam's nature, that alone was rudimentary which came direct from God. The body was formed out of the dust, and that was fully developed. The soul was the resultant of the spirit and the body, and it was replenished with needful vigour. The spirit was the very breath of God, was neither created nor engendered, was in fact an emanation of Deity, and yet "in spirit man was an infant." This is our first inference. Our second is equally absurd. It is that the infantile spirit, uniting with the mature body, could produce a fully developed soul. And where, after all, is the Scriptural warrant for Mr. Heard's assertion? What is the foundation on which he "rests with some degree of confidence" for the proof of a doctrine like this? There is none given, except the Apostle's statement that the first man as contrasted with the second was a living soul and not a quickening spirit—a statement reasonable enough in reference to the resurrection, but without any bearing on Adam's spiritual nature. If it proves anything in that connection, it proves his utter destitution of the spirit, not his possession of it in a rudimentary form.

It is easy to see how trichotomy will be brought to bear on original sin and original righteousness. Mr. Heard sets aside the theological text, Gen. i. 26, as prophetic of man's ultimate condition, in this respect making light of the Apostle's view of it as describing his original condition, and that to which the new man must be restored. Freed from the encumbrance of this hostile witness, Mr. Heard's next step is to assert that Adam's original righteousness was no righteousness at all. "He was born (!) innocent, and also endowed with inherent capacities for becoming spiritual. . . . By innocent we mean that negative kind of goodness which is distinct from holiness in that it lacks the sense of the presence of God. A lamb is innocent, for instance; it fulfils all the ends of its nature, and in the right order and way" (p. 167). Here we cannot but inquire whether Adam really did "lack the sense of the presence of God," and whether the first visit he received from his Maker is likely to have been that which took place on the day of the Fall? And if he lacked that sense of the Divine presence before the Fall, how did he become aware of it afterwards?

Let us make one more quotation. It opens in the usual style of those who are seeking to square the Bible with

hypotheses of their own invention. "When we turn from systems of theology to the fountain head of Scripture, we collect that Adam was not created innocent and holy, but innocent and capable of becoming holy; not holy and immortal, but capable of becoming holy by not eating of the one tree in the garden, and so of attaining immortality by having a right to eat of the other tree. He was innocent because he had a well-balanced nature, in which the passions had not got the mastery over reason, as they now have; but he was not created holy. We cannot indeed conceive of holiness as a thing created out of hand. . . . Inattention to this distinction between innocence and holiness, which is the same as the distinction between the psyche and the pneuma, has led to strange misrepresentations of the nature of Adam's probation, and the effect of his fall on us" (p. 173). Cannot conceive of holiness as a thing created out of hand? Can we not? Surely Mr. Heard unduly contracts the powers of the human mind. Of one thing we are certain, Mr. Heard's mind has entertained the conception. Let us turn back a few pages. "Of the second righteous Adam, the Lord from heaven, we read that He increased in wisdom and in stature, and in favour with God and man. The intellectual and physical growth are referred to in the first clause, the spiritual or moral (for they are two sides of the same thing) is referred to in the second. Thus the trichotomy of man is here distinctly referred to, and in the case of the holy child Jesus, spirit, soul, and body, all harmoniously grow and unfold, as bud, blossom, and fruit do in the living tree. We reject instinctively, in His case, the thought of anything prodigious or premature in the development of His faculties. We think of the blessed Spirit dwelling in Him (given, it is true, without measure), but still proportionate to His capacities and powers. As the intellect and stature were that of a child, so the spiritual receptivity. The pneuma in Him was beyond that of other ordinary children, but not disproportionate with what would have been the case had Adam reached the standard he was intended to attain to, and as a spiritual nature, and now adopted Son of God, had begotten a son in that likeness, and after that image. Christ, the second Adam, is rather thus the pattern of what Adam's children would have been, had he not sinned, than of what Adam was, when first made and put into Paradise. The distinction is important, as it enables us to see what

man has lost by the Fall. He has lost the power of propagating a spiritual progeny *ex traduce*."

The distinction is also important as it enables us to see that Mr. Heard can conceive of "holiness as a thing created out of hand." He has no difficulty in conceiving of "the holy Child Jesus." He would doubtless have no difficulty in adopting the angel's description of Him as "that holy thing." Indeed, for Mr. Heard the conception should be easier than for most men. The distinction between innocence and holiness being the same as that between the psyche and pneuma, he has but to imagine a pneuma as fully developed as the psyche, and the conception is complete. Not only can he conceive of Christ as holy in a sense that Adam was not: he can conceive of every other human being—had Adam only become holy—as born with their pneumata as fully developed as was that of the Virgin's Son.

Adam's original righteousness being thus mere innocence, his probation was a probation *for*, but not *of*, righteousness. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil was to "test him for spiritual existence." "Without some such probation, it would be impossible for man at all to exercise the spiritual faculty of knowing and serving God." "There is no scaling a height without passing along the brink of deep precipices; so it was that with a possibility of failure man was permitted to make the attempt to rise from the animal to the spiritual, and to become in effect, as he was in idea, the image of God upon earth. Under that attempt he failed; and where Adam failed, all his posterity fail also." The Fall then was only a failure to rise. A test was provided for Adam, in the steadfast endurance of which he would have developed his pneumatical capacity, and attained the power to fulfil all righteousness. What was the alternative to such a course? Simply, an ordinary reader would suppose, that he would remain in his original undeveloped state. The penalty, we should imagine, would be his being confined to that state of mere innocence in which he was first formed. Adam would continue to be a more intelligent brute. But this is a mistake. "Not being holy, having only the germ of holiness, he was blinded by Satan. First the woman through lust, and then the man through pride, were in the transgression. Flattered and fooled by Satan, who was a liar from the beginning, they took of the tree and did eat.

That instant the spark of the Divine image in man was quenched."

This is very hard to understand. We had been told that moral and spiritual were two sides of the same pneumatical capacity, that the pneumatical capacity was undeveloped, and man by consequence only innocent and not holy. How then could he be "in the transgression?" If the absence of the moral faculty proves that Adam could not work righteousness, the absence of the same faculty must be taken to prove that he could not commit sin. This difficulty Mr. Heard appears to feel in the following passage. "It is futile to inquire what would have occurred had Adam's psychical nature withstood temptation and resisted the devil. That it did not resist, by no means implies that it could not, or lessens the guilt of our first parent. But, on the other hand, we should not describe his guilt as greater than it really was. How far the higher or pneumatical nature was in our first parent, whether as a germ only, or as so far grown as to give his transgression the character of a sin against light—a spiritual sin, as well as a sin of lust, such as St. John classifies these sins—it is impossible for us to say. . . . But of this we may be sure, that as Adam's was a psychical nature, and angels' who kept not their first estate a pneumatical, so the sin of Adam was psychical, and that of angels pneumatical." This only complicates the question. If the pneumatical faculty—the moral and spiritual nature—was grown sufficiently to make Adam's transgression spiritual sin, then surely it was grown sufficiently to constitute him prior to the transgression righteous. If it was not so grown, it was not a spiritual sin, not a sin against light. How then could it be a sin at all? Is not every sin a sin against light? Mr. Heard suggests that it was a psychical sin, due to the failure of the psychical nature to withstand temptation. But if the psychical nature is not the moral nature, how can there be such a thing as psychical sin? Mr. Heard says Adam's sin was pride. Such also, the Scripture says, was the sin of the fallen angels. If pride was a spiritual sin in them, was it not a spiritual sin in him whom they tempted to transgress? One thing is clear, that the Divine Being addressed Adam as possessing a moral and spiritual nature, both when He gave him the command and when He came down to inquire as to its observance. The whole narrative



assumes a development of man's moral nature equal to that of his psychical and physical powers. The possibility of his violation of its laws is no greater difficulty on this supposition than on the other.

What now, we must ask, becomes of the pneuma thus thwarted in the first stages of its growth? To this question a variety of answers are given, which it is hard to reconcile with Scripture and experience, and harder still to harmonise among themselves. In a passage already quoted Mr. Heard, speaking of the transgression, has told us, "that instant the spark of the Divine image in man was quenched." This seems to have been felt to be too strong, for in the preface to the first edition he says that the pneuma is "dormant, though not quite dead." In the preface to the second this is explained to mean "dead as to its higher or spiritual functions, properly so called; while, at the same time, it is only dormant as the rule of right and wrong between man and man." And the harmony of this is seen from what follows: "Death and sleep are only differences of degree—in the one, there is the suspension of sense; in the other, of all the functions of life."

The pneuma of Adam, then, becomes the conscience of all his descendants. Three points for inquiry occur to us, viz., its sphere, its fidelity to its functions, and its power. As to the first, Mr. Heard makes a statement which is contradicted by the testimony of all mankind, himself included. Conscience is "only dormant," i.e., it is feebly active, "as the rule of right between man and man." This is an undue limitation of its province. All admit that the authority of conscience extends equally to the relations between man and God, and that these form both the chief subjects of its witness and the norm by which its other utterances are regulated. Mr. Heard admits the same. On page 157 he says, "But though man has fallen, conscience nevertheless remains as the distinguishing faculty of man; the mark of his superiority lies in his sense of moral accountability to an unseen but righteous Judge. He is more excellent than the brute in other respects, but in one he stands out unique and peculiar. His thoughts 'the meanwhile accuse and excuse one another.' He has a conscience which tells him of a God and a hereafter. . . . It is a testimony to what God intended us to be." On page 169 Mr. Heard says, "He has instincts after God which nothing but God can satisfy,"

and these he distinctly calls "cravings of conscience." He also speaks of conscience as "the knowledge of good and evil" which is "our life and God's life," and therefore "God's life within us."

The same passages will illustrate the fidelity of conscience to its functions. Here, indeed, Mr. Heard expressly affirms and denies the same proposition. On page 102 he says, "Man is not born with a depraved, but a dormant spirit. This makes the saving difference between his case and that of devils. But he is a fallen man with a depraved sense-consciousness, a darkened self-consciousness, and a dead or dormant God-consciousness." In the original preface he says, "The pneuma is that part of man which is made in the image of God—it is the conscience, or faculty of God-consciousness which has been depraved by the Fall, and which is dormant, though not quite dead." On page 207, speaking of conversion, he says, "Conscience has hitherto turned us away from God instead of to God. . . . Conscience in the unawakened man keeps him as far as it can at a distance from God. It witnesses to the holiness of God and approves His law as holy, and just, and good. But conscience, until convinced of sin, does not use the law lawfully. It lowers the standard of God's requirements, and accepts partial as a composition for entire obedience, for which there is no warrant in the Word of God, but quite the contrary. Thus it is by playing us false, and saying, Peace, peace, when there is no peace, that our conscience keeps us at a distance from God and God at a distance from us." Surely stronger testimony could hardly be given to the possible depravation even of God's monitor within the breast.

As to the energy with which conscience prosecutes its functions, the author's tones are equally various. In regard to its power to assert its dominion, he is consistent enough in denying it. But as to the loudness of its voice put the following statements side by side. On page 12, "All that remains of the pneuma is that feeble flutter of conscience which witnesses for God, not so much by approving, but by accusing and excusing our thoughts." On page 170, "In Tacitus' age men believed nothing about the old gods of Rome, but they could not disbelieve in the furies which tormented a Nero. Men lose all other belief in God but as an avenging Deity; but when they part with

this, then it is time to call in the sword of God, and save the world by destroying it."

The tripartite theory is next applied to explain original sin, and to solve all difficulties connected therewith. From what has been said on original righteousness it will be gathered that the explanation is not very satisfactory. Mr. Heard's objection to the ordinary view is thus stated. "If original sin were something positive, and which passed down as unsound states of the body are transmitted until either the taint was worn out or it wears out the race that suffers from it, we do not see how we can avoid the conclusion that God, who is the Author of nature, must be also the Author of sin." Whether Mr. Heard's own view will do more than shift the difficulty a step farther back, our readers will judge for themselves. Mr. Heard says, "God withdrew from Adam the presence of His Holy Spirit, and thus the pneuma fell back into a dim and depraved state of conscience toward God. We need not suppose more than this fatal defect allowed to continue, and Adam to propagate a race under the unspiritual condition into which he had fallen, and we have enough to account for the condition of man as we see him to this day. Original sin is thus a privation, judicial we admit; but a privation only of original righteousness, or the image of God in every man. Given this one fact, that man was intended to become spiritual and has failed of this end, and all that divines call original sin is easily explicable."

If all be true which we have quoted from Mr. Heard as to the manner in which conscience fulfils its functions, it is difficult not to recognise in this deprivation that very depravation which is all that divines contend for. What stronger evidence can there be of something positive in birth-sin than the fact that conscience itself may lead us away from God, and cry, "Peace, peace," when there is no peace? What greater difficulty can there be in the propagation of a moral taint in the human constitution than in the propagation of the constitution itself? And, if the facts of human wickedness be what they are, how does a small variation in the theory of its hereditary character relieve the difficulty which presses on the government of God? Mr. Heard himself admits that for man in the circumstances he describes not to decline to evil would suppose a continued miracle on God's part. And he has

the candour to add, "We dare not attempt a theodicy of evil in general."

Closely connected with this subject is the question of traducianism and creationism, which is also supposed to be solved by the distinction between soul and spirit. The author's view is expressed as follows: "We are on the side of Traducianism, so far as to hold that body and psyche, or the sum total of the powers of the natural man, are transmitted by generation. As to the pneuma, or Divine image in man, that we consider to be dormant since the Fall. The capacity is, we admit, transmitted, but it is a dead capacity." The traducianist theory here appears to be applied, not only to the natural powers, but also to the spiritual capacity. In fact, what Mr. Heard has said of original sin would have no meaning if it were not so. How are we astonished then, on turning a few pages, to come upon the following: "The ruach, or the pneuma, is that which comes from God, and is of God. Its etymology implies an inspiration or afflatus; it is 'the candle of the Lord' in the spirit of man." On first reading this we thought the reference must be to the formation of Adam in Paradise. But the next sentence undeceived us. "And we admit that the traducian hypothesis does not account for the transmission of this pneuma from father to son. For the pneumatical part of the tripartite nature of man, we revert to the creationist theory."

How then is the defectiveness of the pneuma as manifested in the unregenerate to be explained? This is accounted for by a new distinction. "The pneuma of all men comes from God at birth by a general creationist power, such as that which the risen Saviour breathed on His disciples. But the pneuma is quickened in the regenerate to a higher and Divine life by a special creationist power, such as the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, when it sat upon each of them. The first birth of the pneuma is general; the second, or new birth, is particular." Thus traducianism for the pneuma is done away, and creationism reigns in its stead. But this revolution is not accomplished without the sacrifice of two important principles. In the first place, if traducianism disappears, original sin disappears with it. And in the second, the responsibility for the defectiveness of the pneuma, instead of being laid to the account of Adam, is thrown upon the direct act of God. The fault in Mr.

Heard's account of man's creation is repeated in that of the continuation of the species. All that does not come from the hand of God is well-developed: that which does is maimed, powerless, and ready to vanish away.

Before taking leave of original sin we should like to quote a passage from the early part of this volume in which Mr. Heard unsays beforehand a good deal of what he has been saying in these later paragraphs. On page 15 we find the following: "If the first Adam was by his constitution psychical only, with a capacity however for becoming spiritual, then it is self-evident that when he fell he forfeited that capacity, and tended to become, first earthly, then psychical, and finally devilish or devil-inspired, since the pneuma, if it is no longer led of God, must be given over to the inspiration of the wicked one (Jas. iii. 15). Now since like produces like, fallen man could only transmit to his posterity the nature which he had." Here, first, traducianism is the prevailing theory: man could only transmit the nature which he had. Secondly, the nature which elsewhere is said to be an emanation of God, and to be deadened only and not depraved, is distinctly stated to be capable of becoming "devilish or devil-inspired," nay, to be under a necessity of becoming such if no longer led of God. Thirdly, since like produces like, and man can only transmit to his posterity the nature which he himself has, it follows that, if the pneuma in him should have become "devil-inspired," the nature he transmits to his posterity, so far from being faulty merely in a privative sense, is tainted with the very deadliest evil, that spiritual wickedness namely which is said to be the peculiar infamy of fallen angels. Nay, more than this. The evil transmitted must vary with the moral condition of the parent. If he is earthly, his offspring will be earthly; if psychical, psychical; if devilish, devilish. Truly we find it hard to realise the author's promise that if he can only induce us to change our point of view, and adopt his own, "original sin will then be seen in a new light, not as a hard and forbidding dogma, but as the simple and only way of accounting for the fact of sin abounding that grace may much more abound." Nothing can ever infuse a sweet expression into the "forbidding dogma" of original sin, for the reason that nothing can ever soften down the features of the carnal mind, which remains for us as for the world before the Flood a hideous

metamorphosis of the image of God into the image and likeness of His foe.

Our readers will not be surprised that the heading of the next chapter should be, "Conversion to God explained as the Quickening of the Pnuma." With a good deal that it contains we are in hearty agreement, because it is equally true on any hypothesis. Take for instance the following pithy sentences. Speaking of the contrast in many cultivated men between their spiritual and intellectual natures, Mr. Heard says that in them "the state of spiritual death is the more awful because it is conjoined with moral and intellectual life." And again: "Sensibility is not spiritual-mindedness." "The love of God and hatred of sin are inseparable, and when they are found together, as they invariably are in the case of the really awakened, there we may pronounce with the greatest confidence that a work of grace has begun." Many more such passages might be quoted, all indicative of keen insight into, and deep sympathy with, the struggles of a soul newly awakened to a sense of its misery and danger. But these are aside from the main scope of the argument. In this chapter Mr. Heard discovers two great faults in evangelical orthodoxy, for both of which he has the one remedy, viz., a return to what he conceives to be the Scriptural doctrine of the pnuma.

The first fault in evangelical orthodoxy is said to be—and we do not know that we can exculpate all of it from the charge—its magnifying the grace of God in our redemption to the neglect of the claims of His law. "The doctrine which is according to godliness is this, that Christ died for our sins to enable us to die unto sin, and to rise again unto righteousness. In dying He condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law may be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. Those who do not grasp the distinction between the psyche and pnuma fail to make clear to themselves, or at least to make clear to others, the connection between the justifying and sanctifying grace of Christ. Being justified freely, i.e., forgiven freely by His blood, preachers tell us that we ought to give ourselves to Him who so freely gave Himself for us. Gratitude is thus called in as the motive which is to constrain us to live no longer to ourselves, but to Him who loved us, and gave Himself for us. I do not make little of gratitude as a constraining motive. But,

judging human nature by what I know it to be, I do not think that God would have entrusted the sanctification of His people to a single motive however strong. Besides, the force of gratitude or the remembrance of a past benefit, is apt to decline as time goes on. . . . Thus it is that antinomianism is the bane attendant on so much of our popular preaching. The so-called forensic theology taken by itself must inevitably degenerate to this. . . . The remedy for these mistakes of doctrine must be sought in a deeper study of the plan of salvation."

It is well that Mr. Heard does not "make little of gratitude as a constraining motive," because among the "preachers" who enforce it must be reckoned such princes in the art as the Apostles Peter, Paul, and John. Gratitude might fail if the boon were either finite in its nature, temporary in its duration, or unconditional in its bestowment. By no evangelical preachers is the free gift so described. Except that by thorough-going Calvinists the last of the three points would be maintained, and this is confessedly their weakness. But does evangelical orthodoxy universally "entrust the sanctification of God's people to a single motive?" In other words, is "forensic theology" everywhere found to degenerate because "taken by itself?" We think not. We know of Christian communities in which the "deeper study of the plan of salvation" has resulted, not in the discovery of Mr. Heard's tripartite theory, which forms no part of it, but in a full recognition of the doctrine of the new birth, as the necessary complement and counterpart to justification by faith. "The application of the atonement as a sanctifying power," says Mr. Heard, "is on this wise. There is in the regenerate pneuma a striving after holiness, as well as a thirst after God." Omitting the word pneuma, there is nothing in this which evangelical teachers have not always proclaimed. The only difference between Mr. Heard and them is a psychological one. His contention is of course that psychological inaccuracy must induce theological error, that regeneration cannot be rightly understood and taught in its practical claims and bearings, unless its original rise in the pneuma be scientifically explained. Why else the objurgations of this chapter? But Mr. Heard did not always think so. He did not think so at the beginning of this book. There he maintained that, their psychological deficiencies notwith-

standing, evangelical divines have elaborated a sound theological system. "The Lord does not give Nicodemus a psychological account of the difference between psyche and pneuma, which Nicodemus in all probability would not have understood, but passes on to a description of the new birth, instead of defining it by itself. It is the same with the majority of our evangelical teachers; they describe the results of the new birth correctly, and well. Newton's *Cardiphonia*, Romaine's *Letters*, Wesley and Toplady's *Sermons* are instances of this." If these evangelical teachers were theologically right, is it likely that they were psychologically wrong?

Mr. Heard maintains that dichotomy involves us in another difficulty, which trichotomy alone can remove, viz., the difficulty that regeneration, however well and carefully described by Newton, Romaine, Wesley, &c., is on their principles a thing impossible. Their teaching involved, notwithstanding all their care and clearness, a logical contradiction. "Evangelical preachers who describe human nature as made up of two parts only, body and soul, and who say, correctly enough, that the soul, as well as the body (!), is desperately wicked, are therefore in this dilemma—how can a good thing come out of an evil? 'Can a leopard change his spots or an Ethiopian his skin?' The psyche or heart of man, the fountain of his natural life, is poisoned and impure; can it send forth out of the same place sweet water and bitter? Hence, from not reserving a *nidus* in human nature, in which the Divine Spirit can descend and purify all from within, these accounts of Christian sanctification are often most lame and inconsistent. At one time they say that the heart is desperately wicked, and remains so, yea, even in the regenerate; while at another, men are said to be led of the Spirit of God, and to walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit. How a heart that is desperately wicked can yet obey godly motions, is as unexplained as how a deaf man can hear or a lame man walk. Let but the distinction between the psyche and pneuma be seen, and all is clear and consistent. The psyche is like the flesh, prone to evil, and remains so, yea, even in the regenerate. But the pneuma or god-like in man is not prone to evil—indeed it cannot sin."

We will not rebut Mr. Heard's dilemma by propounding another: How can a clean thing become an unclean? If



we did, he might find some difficulty in accounting for Adam's lapse from what he allows to be a state of innocence, if not of holiness. But, instead of this, let us ask whether we are in a dilemma at all. If any evangelical teacher were to state that the same act of the soul is at one and the same time pleasing and displeasing to God, this would be to enunciate a contradiction. But the difficulty put by Mr. Heard is not this. The difficulty is—and he expresses it in terms taken from Scripture—as to the possibility of such a change in the motive-principles of the soul that from unclean it becomes clean in God's sight. And further, as to the possibility of such a change being gradual and progressive, so that it may be true that the heart is in one sense desperately wicked and in another led of the Spirit of God. Now as to the possibility of change both he and we are at one. The chief difference between us is as to its commencement and its consummation. He denies that the impurity ever was, or that the purity ever can become in this life, complete. He reserves a nidus of good in the god-like pneuma on which the Divine Spirit may work, and a nidus of evil in the carnal psyche which defies His attempts at renovation. But he admits the possibility of change. He likens it to the process of petrification, in which, "for every particle of wood washed away by the dropping well, another particle of stone is deposited in its place." This analogy is all against him. Does petrification require a "nidus" of stone in the wood as a foundation for its first operations? So with the soul's renewal. Our Lord does not say that the flesh has from the beginning a nidus of spirit, and that the spirit retains to the end a nidus of flesh. But the conversion of flesh into spirit He does most emphatically declare.

If then evangelical teachers are in a dilemma, Mr. Heard shares the situation, so far as concerns the possibility of change from evil to good. It is only as to the coexistence of the two that he shows to any advantage, and yet even here the advantage is not all on his side. How can the heart be desperately wicked and yet led of the Spirit of God? Now, we might reply that Scripture and experience both affirm it, and we might decline all further explanation. But this would be deemed unphilosophical. Let us hear Mr. Heard. "The pneuma," he says, "is god-like and not prone to evil; the psyche is

like the flesh, prone to evil, and remains so, yea, even in the regenerate." But if both pneuma and psyche are found in one and the same man, and that man be alike responsible for the good and for the evil, what have we gained by introducing this complexity into his internal constitution? Does the responsibility of the Christian cease because it is his psyche only that is defiled? If so, the responsibility of the sinner ceases, and with greater reason, because his pneuma is undeveloped. If it does not cease, we must still say of the man's will or ego, in which both psyche and pneuma unite, that it is inclined partly to good and partly to evil. This Mr. Heard himself admits, thus showing that his yea is not always yea, nor his nay always nay.

We have assumed throughout this reasoning that the pneuma is indeed god-like, and not prone to evil. But our readers know how plainly Mr. Heard has asserted the contrary. He does so again in a foot-note at this very place: "When we say that the spirit cannot sin, we are far from overlooking the possibility of the spirit becoming devil-possessed." Suppose it does become "devil-possessed," where will the nidus of good be then? This case however is now for the first time identified with the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost—and so made wholly exceptional—although previously described as a condition into which our first parent may have sunk. "It is true of the majority that the tendency of their pneuma is to God [compare p. 126 of our present number], but they are unable to break the chains of evil habit with which they are tied and bound, till the Holy Spirit brings deliverance." Our author will have to show how the pneuma, whose tendency toward good is so impotent, can without miracle be preserved from lapsing into a tendency toward evil, before we shall be able to discover in it a nidus of good. The Holy Spirit—an external agency—is after all resorted to for the explanation of the great change, which all must admit to be rather a supernatural transformation than a mere psychological development. And in this Divine agency, seldom wholly withdrawn from the hearts of men, we have that very nidus which Mr. Heard so severely blames divines for not maintaining and himself so feebly and inconsistently defends. Perhaps "nimbus" would be a better word than "nidus" to express our meaning,—a light shining into darkness which as yet comprehends it not. At any rate, if

evangelical teachers fail to reserve "a nidus in human nature in which the Divine Spirit can descend and purify all from within," their defence must be that the Scriptures fail too. To provide the nidus of Mr. Heard's imaginings would be to incur the condemnation of the men who "add to" those words which declare our utter unrighteousness and ungodliness of heart.

Moreover, when we consider the mode of the Divine Spirit's approach to the human, we shall see that Mr. Heard's hypothesis is encumbered with difficulties. The descent of the Spirit into the pneuma implies—notwithstanding the interpretation of Gen. ii. 7—His previous absence from it. How then, does He approach? The pneuma, be it remembered, is only the organ of our consciousness of God. Prior to regeneration the psyche is the centre of our being, and includes the whole range of our natural powers, that is, our intelligence, affections and will. How then, we repeat, does the Spirit approach the pneuma? Does He or does He not approach it through the medium of the intelligence, affections and will? The answer must be that He does, and that not occasionally and arbitrarily, but constantly and necessarily. Never yet has the Divine gained possession of the human but through the presentation of some truth to the intelligence, of some good to the affections, and of some motive to the will. Such has ever been the nature, and such, we may add, has ever been the order, of the Holy Spirit's operations on the heart. Whatever of supernatural there may have been in the light that has enlightened the understanding, in the life that has quickened the energies, in the love that has warmed the affections, the powers of the world to come have always respected the laws of our natural constitution. But this natural constitution is, on the hypothesis, embraced within the domain of the psyche. And the psyche is "poisoned and impure." It contains no nidus of good. How then can the Holy Spirit make use of it in His advances to the spirit within? How is it that those advances are not universally rejected, and the way into the inner citadel effectually barred? The principle of a nidus falls to the ground, and with it another of the supports of trichotomy. And the ground is cleared by the removal. For it must be obvious from the above that there is no spirit in man distinct—in any such sense as we have been considering—from the soul which the Holy

Spirit immediately addresses. It is in essence the same soul, that is to say the same spirit, which is conscious alike of mundane and supramundane verities, of earthly and heavenly good, of natural and supernatural influences.

The next chapter, on "The Natural Immortality of the Psyche," in which the author criticises the metaphysical, ontological and teleological arguments for a future existence, we may pass over. Those arguments are regarded, rightly perhaps, as presages rather than proofs. In the following chapter the doctrine of trichotomy is professedly applied to "discover the principle of final rewards and punishments." The application is as follows: "As there are three natures in man, so there are three degrees of sin. It seems to deepen in malignity as it rises from sins of the flesh to sins of temper and intellect, reaching at last to devilish sins." And the conclusion is that "there must be three different degrees of misery corresponding to these three degrees of wickedness. The earthly, the psychical, the devilish, are all punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, but may it not be with few stripes in one case and with many stripes in the other?" The doctrine of degrees in punishment is perfectly in accordance with Scripture, but not so the apportionment of these degrees to the so-called "three degrees of sin." These three degrees are not themselves established. It is a new thing to treat sins of the flesh as if they were but the small dust in the balance compared with sins of temper and intellect. It is a new thing to divide mankind into three classes of transgressors, according to the faculty they abuse, as if there were no secret chain running through the vices as strong though not as pure as that which binds the virtues together. It is a new thing to assert that the order of development is necessarily and always from the flesh to the soul, and from the soul to the spirit. What of those vices which partake of all three characteristics? Has the author forgotten the keen insight of the poet who placed Belial and Moloch side by side in Pandemonium—"lust hard by hate"? Or has he never read that scathing condemnation of sensuality by one who was no doubt depicting personal experience—

"But oh! it hardens a' within  
And petrifies the feeling."

But the best confutation of Mr. Heard is, as usual,

supplied by himself. "Man, as far as we know at present, is as incapable of pure thoughts [pure thought ?] as he is of pure animalism. Even the sensualist idealises his indulgences, lest he should turn from them in utter disgust and loathing." How inseparable, then, must be carnal and psychical sin !

How the principle of trichotomy applies in the following instance, it is hard to see : "With good Dr. Watts we may suppose that the souls of little children may be annihilated." Small comfort this to bereaved parents who for so many ages have been pouring into their wounds the balm of that good hope through grace, held out to them even from the dimness of a "carnal dispensation" by another sweet singer of Israel—"I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me." The hope which such an utterance is calculated to inspire, the author ruthlessly dashes down by the statement that the meaning of this passage is "equivocal."

The next chapter is entitled, "Of the Intermediate State." Trichotomy is the true key to the mysteries of Hades. "On the grounds of the common dichotomy of man into body and soul, we do not see how we could differ with those who hold that the intermediate state is one of entire unconsciousness." We have searched the chapter in vain for arguments tending to make good this position. The argument from physiology is adduced, which goes to show the dependence of the mind upon its physical organ. But, whether good for anything or good for nothing, this inference tells with just as much force against the tripartite, as against the bipartite theory. Of course, the answer is that "the Scriptures do not assume that man ceases to exist the instant that his brain has ceased to act. There are many passages which assert the contrary." So there are, but they do not rest the assertion on the threefold nature of man.

In the absence of much explicit Scripture teaching, we must see what light may be thrown upon the intermediate state by a skilful use of the tinder, flint and steel of the trichotomy. "We have seen that it is conceivable that any two of these forms of consciousness could exist without the presence and co-operation of the remaining third ; the first and second without the third ; or the second and third without the first. As two chords in music will make a harmony, but not less than two, so either the animal and

rational, or the rational and spiritual, will combine to sustain what we call life or consciousness in man. The loss of one will deprive him of part of his powers, and this is the first death. It is an instance of the first death when Adam transgressed, and, in consequence, the spirit or God-consciousness, died in man, leaving only the animal and rational life remaining. In this sense we are born into the world, dead in one sense though alive in a lower sense. Conversely, we can understand that though the body dies, yet, if the union of spirit and soul is still undissolved, there is ground for supposing that consciousness will survive this first death. We have only another instance, though a reverse one, of the first death, in the suspension of the animal life, which is the lowest of the three essential elements of human nature. The second death is, we suppose, when the capability of receiving spiritual life is at an end, and when there shall be no more place found for repentance. In that case, which Scripture speaks of as following, not as preceding the day of the general judgment, the final state of the lost will be sealed for ever. On this distinction, then, between the first and second death, we ground our views of the nature of the intermediate state. Man, in passing out of the body, becomes unclothed, but does not, therefore, pass away into entire insensibility. On the contrary, by being deprived of sense-consciousness, he is thrown in on himself, and so, during the intermediate state, attains to a higher consciousness than before of things unseen and eternal. Self-consciousness, and God-consciousness, the one the function of the pure reason, and the other of the spirit, are now exercised in a greater degree than ever." In this world, "the spirit's life is but a feeble one at best. The body must clearly die if the spirit would live."

To begin at the beginning of this long quotation, we may observe that the three natures have now become merely three forms of consciousness. For the purposes of this chapter the three organs, body, soul and spirit, are distinguished only by the three functions which they severally exercise. And it is said that the first and second together, or the second and third together, may by their union maintain a certain sort of life, while the withdrawal of the remaining member of this trinity would constitute a certain kind of death. Now we have to ask, is it not conceivable that both separations—both forms of the first death—might

take effect together? Why not? An unregenerate man living in the flesh is spiritually dead, "dead in one sense; though alive in a lower sense." Suppose him then to pass out of this world unchanged: this will be "only another instance, though a reverse one, of the first death." The whole drift of the chapter goes to show that this is possible, for the object of it is to prove the usefulness of the intermediate state, as affording the unregenerate another chance of being quickened unto the life eternal. The body may be dead and the spirit dead, and yet the soul may live the life of self-consciousness. It is unfortunate that Mr. Heard has disqualified himself for maintaining this opinion. In an earlier chapter he has said that "man is made up of three parts which we can ideally distinguish. But this does not imply that we can actually divide them, much less that any one of the three natures in one person can maintain an existence apart from the other two. Body without soul or spirit becomes a corpse, and, as such, is quickly resolved into its ultimate atoms. Soul, again, without spirit or body would pass into the universal soul or reason." Thus the existence of the soul without body or pneuma, which is virtually asserted in the later chapter, is as strenuously denied in the earlier.

There is of course an easy explanation at hand. It is that the pneuma in the unregenerate is not really dead, but dormant. But if the pneuma be only dormant, why speak of it as dead? Why class the loss of the pneuma and the loss of the animal existence together as two forms of the first death? In our last quotation Mr. Heard says we can "ideally distinguish" but not "actually divide" the three parts. Is not the severance of soul and body an instance of actual division? It is only between soul and spirit that such separation is impossible. And this being so, to put spiritual death and bodily death together as two forms of the same phenomenon, is to identify things in their nature as distinct as an "actual division" and an "ideal distinction." This double application of the term first death, and its consequent contrast with the second, are both of them arbitrary and unscriptural.

We need not dwell on the supposed uses of the intermediate state. They are said to be, for the regenerate, a perfecting of their sanctification necessarily unfinished in time through the distractions of sense. For the unregenerate, the offering of an opportunity in more suitable

circumstances of attaining the salvation they here despised. The difficulties of this position are insuperable. The intense earnestness of Scriptural admonitions to the ungodly is left unexplained. The grace and the providence of God are placed in conflict. Grace could redeem men from their iniquities, if Providence had otherwise determined the bounds of their habitations. The pneuma would have ruled the psyche but for the tyranny of the flesh. Again, an extension of probation for the ungodly into the next world implies an equal extension of it for the godly. Thus the added hope is counterbalanced by the added peril. Then, if a second probation be admitted, why not a third? If a third, why not a fourth, and so on *ad infinitum*? Probation must either be finite or infinite. If infinite, it is no longer probation: if finite, it will always be liable to the objection that a further prolongation might secure additional results.

Again, it is said that the soul, freed from its fleshly encumbrances and preoccupations, would be more at liberty to attend to the things that make for its peace. But without the quickening of the pneuma—a supernatural and not a natural process—such employment would be as unwelcome as ever. And the opportunity offered for pneumatological development would in all probability be turned to the account of “psychical sin.” Farther, the opportunities afforded by the intermediate state would be continually abridged in duration as the world’s history approached its close. And those whose hap it might be to be born in the last of the latter days would thus forego the second probation. The righteous who may be living when the last trumpet sounds—a class distinctly recognised by St. Paul—will miss the progressive development of the intermediate state: how then shall they be caught up to meet the Lord in the air? The wicked will in like manner lose the advantages enjoyed by their predecessors: where will be the justice of their fate? But indeed, so far as concerns the righteous, Mr. Heard himself shows that this protracted period is unnecessary. For to be absent from the body is to be present with the Lord. And, Mr. Heard tells us, “One moment of the presence of Christ will do more to ripen our character than years of self-discipline here on earth.” Finally, if, as stated in one of the above quotations, “the body must die if the spirit would live,” it follows that salvation in this life is not merely imperfect, but im-



possible. In the midst of this pernicious speculation about the mysteries of futurity the author quotes a text which, duly pondered, would have prevented his indulging in it. "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God."

The chapter on "The Resurrection-Body" contains a good deal more of speculation, not so dangerous perhaps as that of the preceding chapter, because unconnected with practice, but equally fruitless. The conjecture that the organs of our nutritive life will be discarded and the excito-motor system retained, is not without some countenance in Scripture. But Bichat's generalisation, which distinguishes the former as single and the latter as duplex, should not have been accepted as "correct in the main." Besides other important organs, the lungs may be mentioned as exceptions to the rule. To our minds the interest of the speculation as to the organs of nutrition and those of the excito-motor class, is connected rather with this world than the next. "As we might expect, the control of the will is more completely over the latter than over the former. . . . It is because our control of the excito-motor system is not as strict as it ought to be, in consequence of the will being depraved by the Fall, that our nutritive system suffers from indulgences which are not called for by the wants of nature." What is the argument grounded on this? By the author the present practical lesson is very feebly urged, and the hope of a purity undefiled by the rebellion of the appetites and passions is postponed to a state in which appetites and passions no longer exist. "This is the discipline of life which teaches us the necessity of controlling our wills and appetites. But in a higher state of being, in which there shall be no unruly wills and affections, it is supposable that the excito-motor system may then be restored to us without those lower nutritive organs, which are like a dead weight at present to keep us in bounds, and to warn us against indulging our passions." So a double dishonour is done to the government of God. Our salvation in the present life is not complete, because the grace of God cannot enable us to master our appetites. And our safety in the next depends not on the maturity and perfection of our spiritual nature, but on the absence of temptations arising from the flesh. How much more glory would redound to the Author of salvation

were the possibility insisted on of a subjection in this life of the flesh to the spirit, and so of the fulfilment of the Apostle's prayer for the blamelessness of the Church throughout spirit, soul, and body.

Mr. Heard is careful to impress upon his readers that the dichotomist cannot hold the true doctrine of a resurrection-body. But the assertion remains without shadow of proof, and is, as we think, contradicted by the facts of the case. As far as we know, Mr. Heard's view of the resurrection-body does not differ from that held by the generality of divines. It is very rare to meet with the crude theory of an exact numerical identity between the particles of the body laid in the grave and those of the body which awakes in the morning of the resurrection. A substantial identity meets every necessity of Scriptural teaching, and multitudes maintain it who never knew that without the tripartite theory they could not consistently do so. The analogy of the chrysalis changed into the butterfly, as the larva is changed into the chrysalis, is one that had occurred to the minds of men long before our author paralleled these three conditions to "the natural body, the disembodied soul, and the spiritual body in man." Only to common apprehension the middle place of the three is more fitly occupied by the disensouled body than by the disembodied soul. But speculation of this kind also is sufficiently rebuked by a text quoted in this volume, "It doth not yet appear what we shall be."

We have now travelled over most of the ground occupied by Mr. Heard in the exposition of his theory. Into the summary with which the book concludes we cannot fully enter. If we did, it could only be to summarise our own objections. But one point we must dwell upon. Under the second head of the summary we have the following: "We have seen that out of the union of three natures in one person there result two tendencies, called in Scripture the flesh and the spirit. Soul or self-consciousness, as the union-point between spirit and body, was created free to choose to which of these two opposite poles it would be attracted. This equilibrium between flesh and spirit is the state of innocence in which Adam was created and which he lost by the Fall." By the "two tendencies" does the author mean tendencies to good and evil, right and wrong? And does he mean that the tendency to good is in the spirit, and the tendency to evil in the flesh? No doubt

he does. The Scriptures likewise admit the distinction between good and evil, and sometimes signalise the distinction as that between spirit and flesh. But we deny that in thus signalising this distinction the Scriptures intend to locate the tendency to good in the spirit, and the tendency to evil in the flesh viewed as synonymous with sense-consciousness. Their use of the opposed terms to denote these opposite tendencies is theological, not psychological. Were it otherwise, the Scriptures would sanction the doctrine of the essential sinfulness of matter which has wrought so much mischief in the world, and which pervades the teaching of our author.

Perhaps it may be asked what the alternative is, and whether the doctrine of an opposition between good and evil, apart from any connection with matter or sense, does not necessitate the hypothesis of two eternal spiritual Beings representative of the two tendencies respectively. We are not aware that such an hypothesis is necessary. Our conceptions of good are derived undoubtedly from a Supreme Being in whom they are realised to a degree that surpasses all finite understanding. To us His enjoined will is identical with right. There is no need of another will identical with wrong to make wrong conceivable to us. The conception is already involved in the limitations prescribed to us by the Divine will. To disregard those limitations is to pursue evil. And though evil may not have the same kind of unity in it which, as the will of the Supreme, we find in righteousness, yet that there is an underlying unity in it is proved by the affinity that subsists among the vices. Evil may be undefinable, but so also, apart from its reference to the Divine will, is good. Undefinable and inconceivable are two different things. The same moral consciousness that apprehends good teaches us also to apprehend evil. And this we may do without being able to analyse them into elements more simple than themselves. However this may be, it must be admitted that sin and righteousness are the same principles in us as in the angels. Now, if the tendency to evil be only a natural tendency to earthly things in the flesh which has to do with them, what is the tendency to evil as manifested in the fallen angels? No one attributes their fall to the prevalence of carnal over spiritual desires. Again, if the tendency to good be the natural tendency of

the spirit, how can there be either in angels or men such a thing as pneumatical sin? Mr. Heard has told us of three degrees of sin, carnal, psychical, and pneumatical. Since there are two tendencies in man, toward good and toward evil, must we also believe in pneumatical, psychical, and carnal righteousness?

It seems unfair to combat one theory without proposing another in its stead. We will therefore devote our remaining space to the consideration of a doctrine which we deem adequate to the explanation of Scripture teaching on the subject. We must premise that the barest outline is all that our limits will allow. To sum up in one sentence, we believe in a true dichotomy of man into a material part and an immaterial part, either of which may subsist without the other; and we also believe that the immaterial part, though simple and uncompounded in its essence, manifests its energies in the forms of sense-consciousness, self-consciousness, and consciousness of the supernatural, corresponding to the relationships it sustains to objects in the outer, the inner, and the unseen worlds. This statement obviously requires some exposition. In the course of it we shall be found to agree with some propositions defended by Mr. Heard. Indeed, it cannot be otherwise. For he has sometimes maintained propositions diametrically opposed, one or other of which must be chosen if any opinion at all is expressed. We only wish we could agree with him at every point, so much do we admire the spirit in which most of the book is written.

Our first position is tolerably clear. As regards his relations to matter and mind, man is not a complex but a compound being. However true it may be that matter is modified in its arrangements by the spirit that vivifies it, or that spirit is circumscribed in some sort by the body it inhabits, we must hold that matter in man is still matter, and mind in man is still mind. A *tertium quid* is impossible. And the two, being thus distinct, are separable. Separated from the soul, the body ceases to be the soul's organ; but however affected by the change, each retains its distinctive characteristics. Thus we agree with the dichotomy of Scripture and of the schools. We must say that Mr. Heard misrepresents that doctrine. He speaks as if those who regard man as made up of body and soul denied all spiritual relationships. "Suppose man a bipartite nature only of body and soul, appetite and

intellect," &c. (p. 179). Here he speaks of the soul as comprehending nothing but intellect, and of the appetite as located in the body.

We must pass on to our second point, and here our last observation will help us. The immaterial part in man has three forms of consciousness. Sense-consciousness belongs to it as much as the other two: its seat is, not in matter, but in mind. This Mr. Heard overlooks. He speaks of spirit, soul and body as if they were identical with the three forms of consciousness. We do not deny that there are passages in Scripture in which, where the body is spoken of, sense-consciousness is meant. Thus we should interpret 1 Thess. v. 23 as referring to the sanctification of man in his three relationships. In what other way can the body be sanctified, in what other way can it become the temple of the Holy Ghost, than by the man's relations to his body being under the perfect control of a regenerate will? No doubt the body itself as a rule becomes the healthier for such subjection, but not always. No doubt also it becomes a more tractable instrument, as the man progresses in purity; and when the purifying process is complete, the lust of the flesh ceases to trouble and defile. But the sanctification even of the body belongs to the immaterial part in man.

Let the principle we have enunciated—a dichotomy between the material and the immaterial, and in the latter a threefold consciousness which is not trichotomy—be applied to Scripture. Our position is that—omitting for the present those passages in which they are used metaphorically for the sinful or the regenerate state—Scripture frequently employs two terms to denote two separable essences, and sometimes employs three terms to denote the threefold consciousness of one of them. We have illustrated the latter already from 1 Thess. v. 23. The former is exemplified in numerous instances. In them the terms spirit and soul are used interchangeably to express the immaterial, and body and flesh to express the material part. The following pairs of antitheses may easily be verified. Between them they make up the whole man. Soul and body, Matt. x. 28. Soul and flesh, Acts ii. 31. Spirit and body, Jas. ii. 26, 1 Cor. v. 3. Spirit and flesh, Matt. xxvi. 41, Mark xiv. 38, Col. ii. 5, 1 Cor. v. 5. Again, for the identity in the sense now being considered of soul and spirit, see Luke i. 46, 47. Passages

in which soul alone stands for the immaterial part are Rom. ii. 9, Heb. vi. 19, x. 39, James v. 20, 2 Pet. ii. 8. Passages in which soul stands for the personality, surely including the immaterial, Acts ii. 41—43, iii. 23 (quoted from the Old Testament), xxvii. 37, Rom. ii. 9, xiii. 1, 1 Pet. iii. 20, Rev. xvi. 3. Passages in which spirit alone stands for the immaterial part, Luke viii. 55, xxiii. 46, xxiv. 37—39, Acts vii. 59, xxiii. 8, 9, 1 Cor. ii. 11. In John xii. 27, Christ's soul is troubled: in xiii. 21, He is troubled in spirit. In the garden, where He endured His deepest anguish, it is His soul that is exceeding sorrowful, Matt. xxvi. 38, Mark xiv. 34. On another occasion He rejoices in spirit, Luke x. 21. Another case in which soul is used in a deeper sense than spirit is Matt. xi. 29, "Ye shall find rest unto your souls," as compared with 2 Cor. ii. 13, "I had no rest in my spirit."

We have quoted a variety of passages in which soul and spirit are used interchangeably for the incorporeal essence in contrast with the body or flesh. Let us now consider those in which soul and spirit are contrasted with each other. They are very few. One has been mentioned, and an interpretation offered. Another is Heb. iv. 12. Whatever be the meaning of the "dividing asunder of soul and spirit," it cannot be that which Mr. Heard puts upon it, viz., the making known to men the fact that they possess a spirit. Nor is it that other meaning which he suggests by an afterthought, "penetration, not dissection." If it mean a discovery made to men at all, it must be a discovery that enables them to distinguish between those internal motions which their own spirits receive from the Divine and those internal motions which are of a purely natural origin. Thus the distinction between the consciousness of self and that of the supernatural is maintained.

The remaining passages on which Mr. Heard relies for the establishment of his theory are those in which, not the nouns *psyche* and *pneuma*, but the adjectives formed from them, are employed. Before proceeding to consider them, we may observe that these adjectives are here employed, as the nouns frequently are, to denote human nature as sinful or renewed. This use we have above characterised as a metaphorical one, and we think we are warranted in doing so. We maintain that the change brought about in regeneration is not organic, but functional. The converted man has no more organs, and no less than the unconverted

man. The difference between them is a difference not in the possession of energies but in the direction of them. True, this change is not self-wrought. The Divine Spirit effects it, and effects it through the pneuma, which needs and receives His purifying influence as well as the soul and the sense. They are all renewed together, though not perfectly, and it may be not all in the same degree in the same man, and much less in different men.

But now comes the question of theological terminology. By what terms is the unregenerate man to be distinguished from the regenerate? And in the regenerate by what terms is the lingering tendency to evil to be distinguished from the prevailing tendency to good? The answer is easy. Since the pneuma is the proper organ of Divine relations, although once defiled it gives its name to the nature as renewed. In like manner, the adjective formed from it gives its name to the regenerate man by way of distinction from the unregenerate. The term like the thing it denotes, is washed from its filthiness, and consecrated to the service of God. On the other hand, since the unregenerate man is occupied mainly with the sphere of self and sense, it follows that the term flesh and the adjectives formed both from soul and flesh are employed, in a corresponding manner, to denote the unregenerate man and the sinful tendency in the regenerate man. Thus our Lord says, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh," *i.e.* sinful, and "that which is born of the Spirit is spirit," *i.e.* pure. More frequently no doubt the term Spirit denotes the renewing Agent than the renewed subject. But flesh is often used in the senses indicated. For the unregenerate, "they that are in the flesh cannot please God; but ye are not in the flesh" (Rom. viii. 8, 9). "Now the works of the flesh are manifest" (Gal. v. 19). "He that soweth to his flesh" (vi. 8). For the evil tendency in the regenerate, "the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh" (Gal. v. 17). "With the flesh the law of sin" (Rom. vii. 45). "If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die" (Rom. viii. 13).

The same opposition will be found between spiritual, *i.e.* pneumatical, on the one hand, and both carnal and psychical (A.V. natural) on the other. It is worthy of note that the very opposition expressed in Rom. vii. 14 by spiritual and carnal, is expressed in 1 Cor. ii. by spiritual

and psychical or natural. And in 1 Cor. iii. St. Paul says, "And I brethren could not speak unto you as unto spiritual but as unto carnal," using the lowest term for those who nevertheless were "babes in Christ," not because they were not indeed spiritual, but because the carnal had so prevailed among them that they scarcely deserved the name. In James iii. 15 we have the defilement of fallen man in each of his three relationships very strongly marked. "This wisdom descendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual [margin, or natural, i.e. psychical], devilish." This is spoken of the wisdom of fallen human nature as such, and not of any exceptional wickedness. It shows that the pneuma itself may be defiled. In Jude 19 scoffers are said to be "sensual," or psychical, "not having the spirit," i.e. absorbed in the pursuits of self, and not having the regenerate spirit.

There only remains the contrast between natural and spiritual in 1 Cor. xv. After what we have said this can present no difficulty. The antithesis which St. Paul draws out between Christ and Adam, as the one a "living soul" and the other a "quickening spirit," rests quite as much on the contrast between living and life-giving, as between soul and spirit. And let us remember that in the contrast between natural and spiritual which follows, the reference is to material organisms and not to psychological states. Adam's body was earthly and psychical, not because he had not a spirit or was not pure, but because he was to be a denizen of this lower world. The spiritual body will be a fit vehicle for inhabitants of the unseen world. Adam could not have secured for his descendants the glorified spiritual body, even if he had abode in the truth: but this for His spiritual seed Christ can and does.

There are yet many points which it would be interesting to discuss. Among them may be mentioned the connexion of intelligence, feeling and will with the three forms of consciousness respectively; the meaning of the term heart in Scripture, which Mr. Heard appears to have overlooked, and which we believe to be the true nexus of spirit, soul and sense, lying back behind all conscious manifestations and constituting the real self or ego, which God alone knows and those to whom His Spirit reveals it; the relations of ancient philosophers and mediæval doctors to our theological creeds; the influence both of the schools of philosophy and of the creeds of the Church on the minds



of men, and whether it is so cramping as Mr. Heard would have us believe; the question whether the pneuma be not the organ of fellowship among individual members of the Church—a fellowship truly supernatural—as well as between the Church and its Head; the reason why Christ is nowhere spoken of as having a conscience, and whether it be that in Him the pneuma was fully developed, or not rather because He was exempt from probation; and, finally, the bearing of Mr. Heard's doctrine on theology in general. As to theology, it is certain that the teachers of conditional immortality have known how to make use of his theory, and so have the sacramentarians (see Blunt's *Dictionary*, under the head of "Spirit"). And as for the Evangelical teachers whose tenets he embraces and whose slowness of heart he deplures, it is plain that, if they adopt his tripartite theory, they must henceforth change their note, and, instead of calling men to repentance, must cry, "Develop your pneumata."

For a truly profound analysis of Biblical psychology, see the second volume at the head of this paper. We are sorry we cannot give our readers some idea of its contents, although, as we have not borrowed from it, so neither can we express an unqualified approval of its teachings. It is a small book, and one which those interested in the subject may easily procure for themselves.

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- ART. VI.—1. *Instrução Pastoral sobre o Protestantismo. Dirigida aos seus Diocesanos pelo Bispo do Porto, D. Americo.* Porto. 1878. ["Pastoral Instruction concerning Protestantism. Addressed to his Diocesans by the Bishop of Porto, DON AMERICO."]
2. *Resposta que á Instrução Pastoral do Excmo Bispo do Porto, D. Americo, dá o Padre Guilherme Dias.* Porto. 1879. ["Answer given to the Pastoral Instruction of His Excellency the Bishop of Porto, Don Americo." By FATHER WILLIAM DIAS.]

THE general adoption of the principle of religious liberty as an essential element of constitutional government by European States, not excepting those which, but a few years ago, were subject to absolute government, and where absolutism was made yet more oppressive by intimate league with the Papacy and its priesthood, is the grandest and most hopeful sign of our time. Among the emancipated, or half-emancipated countries is the little kingdom of Portugal, whose inhabitants for nearly four centuries were spared from those excesses of intolerance which, in the provinces now included in France and Spain, took the forms of crusade and inquisition. Here, when elsewhere friendless, Jews and New Christians found strong protectors in the State against their relentless destroyers in the Church, until the civil power was overwhelmed by the persevering hate of the ecclesiastical, and the decease of King Manoel, with the accession of John III., marked the beginning of an era of oppression which has but recently expired. Here it was that Saaavedra, the amateur Inquisitor General and mock Nuncio of Portugal, by favour of the childish ignorance of king, courtiers, and bishops, enacted his original romance, and did penance for it in the galleys. Here the first reformers of the sixteenth century encountered fiercest opposition from King John III. and his new inquisitors. Here the remaining Jews and New Christians were consumed in flames. Here began the propagandist labours of Ignatius of Loyola, Francisco Xavier, the whole scheme of Jesuits' missions was concerted, and the most famous missionaries in South America, India, and Abyssinia went out hence. Nowhere did they

burn Englishmen and Scotchmen more zealously than in the chief towns of Portugal. English commerce, to which this little nation owes so much, and is at this moment so much indebted, yielded numerous victims. Here were the horrible spectacles of inquisition made yet more horrible, more fiend-like in brutality, than even in Spain; and now, strange to tell, the last penal statutes, which contain the severest penalties on account of religion, are not yet repealed, although, by a happy contempt of law on the part of a more enlightened government, they are laid aside as a dead letter, and what is even more, a recent act of the Cortes, which was to come into effect on the first day of this present year, to provide Protestants with legal marriage, relieves their children henceforth from the brand of illegitimacy, and, in fact, repeals that article of the Penal Code of 1852, which says, "Every Portuguese who, professing the religion of the kingdom, shall fail in respect of the same religion, by apostatising, or renouncing it publicly, shall be condemned to the loss of his political rights."

All this invests with no common interest the two pamphlets before us. A few years ago, very few indeed, an English gentleman, born in this country, and having an important business as merchant in the Porto [Oporto], and possessing a factory on the other side the Douro, had, by good example and occasional readings of the Portuguese Bible to a few of his workmen, communicated to their mind some knowledge of Bible truth. For this, under that law, he was prosecuted. At the trial he was treated with cruel indignity; the judge, another Jeffrey, added to much insolence towards himself a charge to the jury, bidding them not to be altogether governed by the *facts* that might come before them, but remember that they were Catholics, and do their duty. They did their duty, certainly, in that peculiar capacity. They promptly declared Mr. Cassels guilty, and he was forthwith sentenced to six months' imprisonment, with costs, of course. But he appealed to a higher court, and there intelligence, humanity, and justice, prevailed for him. He was declared innocent, and, with the spirit of a Christian man, persevered all the more in efforts to do good, and, amidst the respect and gratulation of Portuguese of the present generation, became almost imperceptibly the founder of Protestant congregations. The first Protestant communion for Portuguese was held in his own drawing-room, and the sacrament administered in the Portuguese language by the late Angel

Herreros de Mora, a man of historic name in Spain, once a prisoner of the tribunal of the faith in a dungeon in Madrid, but at that time officiating in Lisbon, a reformed minister, under the express recognition of the Portuguese Government, emerging, as it then was, from darkness towards light. De Mora is gone to his rest, leaving blessed memories behind him. His once persecuted friend is rejoicing in the steady and peaceful growth of a tree of the Lord's right hand planting, in his native city.

More might be said, but perhaps these few notes may be accepted as a fit introduction to our account of the Bishop's *Pastoral Instruction concerning Protestantism*, intended as a check to its progress, and the answer it has drawn forth—publications which make us aware of the happy change from times when dissentients from Romanism were imprisoned, or banished, or tormented to death by cruel punishments, or roasted to death over slow fires, or entombed alive within brick walls. Within so short a time has it come to pass that the Bishop of the diocese, and one of the Wesleyan ministers, can freely carry on a controversy through the Press, and, on the side usually so intemperate, would evidently desire to avoid discreditable personal vituperations, but finds a few hard words indispensable just now.

Now, first, the Bishop. He begins his Pastoral in these words: "There be some that trouble you, and would pervert the Gospel of Christ. But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other Gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed" (Gal i. 7, 8). The quotation is neatly followed by a few expository sentences, closing with another verse from St. Paul, dilated beyond the original for the occasion: "I will very gladly give what is mine, and I would give myself for your souls, although, while I am loving you more, I be loved less" (2 Cor. xii. 15). He puts his flock on their guard against the false prophets in sheep's clothing that come to devour them, and then unfolds his grief:

"Yes, my dear diocesans, now we may not dissemble. Protestantism has come in among us, and one of its sects, protected by the complicity of some, favoured by the ignorance or indifference of many, and under the shadow of the natural tolerance of others, goes on little by little, and, with hand concealed, sows its errors in this land which, until to-day, was virgin soil. We, less happy than our predecessors (in the bishopric), cannot now, as they could, count as many diocesans, children of the Catholic Church, as there

are sheep in our folds; and it pleases God to try us, and permit the incessant labours of the diocese of Porto to aggravate the moral tribulation of seeing that the invidious and unwearied adversary comes robbing us already of a great number of the faithful, some led away without meaning any ill, others stolen, God knows by what means! . . . .”

The means are all well known, as is evident from the pamphlets that are open before us, and certainly the hand is not concealed.

“A most staunch Catholic, first of all by birth from Portuguese parents; then by the education they and our masters gave us; lastly, and chiefly, by the grace of God, who called us and raised us to His own priesthood; ours is the affliction of the Church for the children who renounce it, as also is our detestation of the heresy which robs us of them. The Church bewails, there is no doubt, the blindness of those who, impelled by passion, or seduced by the attractions of the world, forget her precepts; she bears with the profane sacrilege of that which she holds to be most sacred; she suffers, perhaps she is resigned that some ingrate absents himself for many years from her altars; but, however great may be their wickedness, she does not lose the hope of some day embracing such as children, inasmuch as they have not yet disowned her as their mother, by passing away to take some sect for stepmother. If, however, in contradiction to her doctrine, another sect arises to proudly contradict her truths, attack her belief, and corrupt the sacred deposit of the Faith which she received from the Son of God, there are then no terms to be kept, and in the heart that has a will to wound her, it is her very life that has to be defended. She marks the error, and because the salvation of the people is in question, a supreme law of society, whatever may be the cost, imprints on this error the stigma of heresy, for a maternal warning of the submissive children, or perpetual condemnation of the rebellious, clasping to her bosom those who remain faithful, prosecutes as ever the mission she has received from Jesus Christ; teaches them to observe all that He commands, and rears aloft, yet higher, her standard as the Church ONLY, HOLY, CATHOLIC, AND APOSTOLIC.

“And let us not think that in this unity of all spirits through belief in the same doctrine, with participation in the same sacraments and obedience to the same lawful pastors, it is religion only that is concerned—for as much, and much more, too, is the State; and whoever agrees that the children of the same country shall be children also of the same Church, renders to both Church and State a signal service, and this is recognised by the fundamental law of our country when it declares that the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman religion is the religion of the State. For our own part we are not

ignorant that this (statutory) appointment contains as much a concession of privilege in exchange for the peculiar rights (*regalias*) which have been ceded (to the State), as it is yet more a recognition of the right which the Portuguese have that their beliefs be treated with respect; and it no less acknowledges the obligation which the authorities accept to maintain their religion, and cause it to be maintained, and we know that it is with the condition of swearing so to fulfil their duty that the State confers their powers on them."

But this law of 1852, to which we have adverted above, is no longer practicable; for it is the opinion of statesmen, as it is the conviction of all just and reasonable Christian men, that to make the enjoyment of civil rights in Portugal, or in any other country, contingent on the profession of a particular form of religion, is contrary to the spirit, and letter also, of the Christian faith. But *non nobis est componere litem*; that is already settled, and cannot be altered by the repugnance of those who wish to have it otherwise.

"Sometimes the idea passed through our mind that, whether as a citizen, or as an authority legally constituted, it was our duty to call upon the State for the observance of this law; and it would not have been much that it should come at once to the defence of religion, when it had been so often called on to its detriment. Thus, however, this idea passed away; that the feeling only of a prelate might remain, in whose heart should prevail the spirit of the Church; and the Church, ardent as is her desire to preserve all men under obedience to the true Shepherd, desires no other weapon than fervent prayer, nor any other way than persuasion; neither is homage to God and His worship to be other than voluntary and free. This (conclusion) is also strengthened by the weighty consideration that the adversary, entrenching himself behind the presumed bulwark of liberty of belief and the inviolable right of human reason, the employment of such coercion would certainly be hazardous, and that its failure would but encourage him the more. And at last, we must confess it with sincerity, without failing to pray God as a special mercy, for the return of those who had separated themselves, which at this moment more moves us to the hope of preserving from the contagion those who have stood firm to Him, animating them to good will, and enlightening their understanding to repel every insidious attempt."

Here, then, is a candid confession that if legal persecution were practicable it would be tried. And so the Church reluctantly betakes herself to prayer, being no longer able to engage the civil power to employ force on her behalf.

"When an ambassador is received, before he opens the mission which he comes to discharge, it is but just to ask him for the title under which he presents himself, and that he should say whence he comes, who he is, and what he wants. It will certainly not be these new emissaries who have to answer boldly when they have disguised themselves with the ambitious pretence of being God's envoys, and His chosen ministers. Then we will speak for them, and have to tell you what perhaps they will not venture to declare; that they come from a foreign country, are Protestants, and wish to destroy our holy religion. This Portuguese nation is always famed for generous hospitality, and at most times it welcomes foreigners with more open arms than they have found at home, although the payment hitherto received counsels some reserve of that which it is so free in giving. But, perhaps, because formerly they got so cheaply all that we had to give, some of them venture to think that with the same facility we would let go the precious patrimony of our universal and ancient belief, to accept in stead thereof the decrepit doctrines which they praise up as new maxims. So ignorant are they of our language, of our manners and customs, and not less of our genius, our character, and our immovable fidelity.

"These are the Protestants who had their beginning three centuries ago. During the first, in which they encountered opposition, they sowed discord in the nations where they gained an entrance; they spread desolation with intestine wars, until they attained the rank of citizens, a concession sometimes imposed by violence, sometimes extorted by force, never merited by virtue. In the second, when they enjoyed in peace the conquests so badly won, they thought themselves happy in preserving them, thanks to the protection of the rulers who appointed their spiritual chiefs. In the third, it is now a long time since they have had life enough to gain more proselytes by persuasion; they are wasting away little by little, and see with astonishment that souls of most elevated religious sentiment go in search of the truth which they despaired to find among them, until at last they find it in the bosom of the Catholic Church. And it is now that they remember us!

"Portugal, that by virtue of good sense stood firm in Catholic truth, and, aided by the grace of God, always resisted the efforts of error; Portugal, that for the love of her religion went on conquering land from the infidels span by span, and afterwards, wherever her name was carried, never saw it separated from her faith; Portugal, at last, although it may be accounted small among temporal kingdoms, yet now, as ever, is held to be one of the first and most worthy before God and the Church, and this is the land which after all excites them to covet. There are counted by thousands every year in the last half century persons converted to Catholicism in Germany, in England, in the United States of

America, where Protestantism once bore rule proudly; and so it comes to try if it can indemnify itself at our cost, and thinks it a fair reprisal on the Church to steal her faithful Portuguese."

With a few sentences of commonplace concludes the introductory portion of the Pastoral. The Bishop professes "much confidence in God, and in the powerful intercession of the Virgin Mary, especial protectress of the diocese." But he exhorts the people to be diligent in self-defence against Protestant aggression, while he professes much kindness towards the Protestants, and does not withhold good-will from honest dissidents, whom the Catholic Church still claims as her own children. "Finally," says he, "as regards those few unhappy perjurers who have carried away into the enemy's camp the priesthood they received from us, it is not consistent with our faith that we should give any credit to their conviction. The baseness of their motives in such procedure matters not to us. The loss of those deserters gives us no trouble, nor do we envy any one who has got them. They bear within themselves the contempt of their own conscience, and even that of those who have caught them. It only remains for us to pray God to enlighten them for so long as they may live, and beseech Him to use His infinite mercy afterwards."

"Self-respect," says Father Dias, "and obligations inseparable from my position as one of the most humble preachers of the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ in this city, force me to reply to the *Pastoral Instruction* which his Excellency the Bishop of this diocese has addressed to his diocesans concerning Protestantism. Silence on my part might be ill interpreted, and arguments drawn from it that would make me appear pusillanimous, or even seem to be bought over at the last hour. Now there is nothing of the sort. It shall be for this that God will call me to account in His tremendous judgment. Placed in the field of labour where I find myself this day, in the same field on which the Son of God once cast the seed, the duty devolves on me to watch lest the enemy should come and cast tares into the midst of it, and also to warn those who corrupt the sense of Holy Scripture, adapting it to their own particular interest or convenience, in order that the faithful may stand on their guard and be aware of them, as of ravening wolves (John x. 12). This is my duty, and the duty of all who serve in the ranks of the true Church of Jesus Christ. Some may think me forward, if not rash, in venturing to enter into a contest with the most excellent Bishop of this diocese. Not so. The single motive which induces me to write these unassuming pages is nothing more than that I may make a legitimate and just defence. His Excellency intended to fulfil his duty as the spiritual shepherd of this diocese, in address-



ing his diocesans through the Press to guard them against 'the errors of Protestantism,' and I, for my part, fulfil my duty when I avail myself of the same means in order to confute his arguments, and prove the contrary of his assertions by the evidence of the Old and New Testament, and authorities that are above suspicion. As he has flung the gauntlet into the field of discussion, I come to take it up so far as I am able, and so far as I am taught by the Divine Gospel of Jesus. I shall consider myself well rewarded for this labour if I can convince some of the diocesans of my Lord Bishop of the errors of Romanism and the truths of Protestantism, and I am not seeking for renown or glory when I send this little work into the world. Like the Apostle St. Paul, I only glory in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ; and, as he expressed himself in his Second Epistle to the Corinthians (xii. 11), I also confess that I am nothing. Will this work of mine bring me into any trouble hereafter? Will it bring down on me calumny or persecution? Let it come. Let it all come. Unmoved I await the action of all or any ecclesiastical superior power, in the certainty, however, that it will have no power to overcome me, because I can do all through Christ, and can say with St. Paul in the Epistle above cited (xii. 10), 'I take pleasure . . . in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ's sake; for when I am weak, then I am strong.' And now, since it behoves me to do this, may I be permitted to make my profession of Christian faith, and give the reasons of my separation from the Church of Rome.

"Meditating seriously one day on those words of St. Paul to the Corinthians with which his Excellency Don Americo opens the introduction to his *Pastoral Instruction*, and comparing the teaching of that Church with the Gospel of Jesus Christ, I arrived at a profound conviction that in reality some words addressed to the Galatians in another place were very applicable to the Church of Rome, because this Church professes and teaches a Gospel completely different from the Gospel of Christ; and I felt that it was my duty, with the conviction that entirely possessed my mind, to look for a Church where the Gospel of Jesus Christ was taught just as He gave it, and as the Apostle preached it, and not utterly different, as will be proved when we allude to the Supremacy of the Pope, and his Infallibility—the right of the Church of Rome to interpret the Bible; tradition in proof of the truths to be believed; apocryphal, or deuterocanonical books, accepted as inspired; adoration and reverence (*culto*) of images; seven sacraments; justification by works; alienation from the atonement made by Christ; purgatory and indulgences; ecclesiastical celibacy, &c., &c., &c. None of these things which the Church of Rome now professes, not to mention other abuses which she has made her own, are found in the Gospel of Jesus; therefore the Gospel of this Church is perfectly human, and has scarcely anything Divine except the name. Could I, in con-

science, remain any longer in the Church which has departed so far from the way traced out by Jesus, and has followed crooked paths, without bringing condemnation on my soul? Enlightened by the grace of God, who in the study of His holy Word pointed out to me the true way of salvation by means of Jesus, could I shut my eyes to this light? When I turned over the pages of history, which spoke to me of the usuries, the avarice, the licentiousness and dissoluteness of some of those who assumed the title of Vicars of Jesus Christ; could I tear those pages out, and appeal for a retroactive infallibility as the only means of absolution by those chiefs of Romanism? Is it not true that the Roman Church, to borrow a saying of Cardinal Baronius (Sæc. ix.), was changed into the witchcraft of Simon Magus? Can the Roman Church, then, represent the simplicity of Apostolic times? Do churches founded by the Lord's messengers possess masses, purgatory, indulgences, half-idolatrous forms of worship, Popes, St. Peter's patrimony, infallibilism, immaculatism, as the Church of Rome has at this time? Then, and yet again, Rome shall be anything they please, except an orthodox Church. Therefore I came out of her; not only because my conscience so advised me, but because the beloved disciple so called on me to do, in his Book of Revelation (xviii. 4), 'Come out of her, my people.' And what should I do next? Should I leave my brethren to lie still in the bonds which held me fast so many years? Oh, no. I should bring them the light; I should lead them to Christ; I should preach to them His Gospel of love, simple, pure, without fiction, without disguise: this was my duty from the moment when, by the efficacious grace of God, I was made a minister of His Word, and saw that to give this call belonged to Him, and not to men. Then if any one says that I am in error, let him show me that by the Gospel. If he says that I committed a crime, I tell him that I did no more than make use of a right. If he says that I scandalised society by my proceeding, I have to tell him that I gave society an example of courage and abnegation. And if any one says that I am a renegade from the religion of my fathers, I must answer that they are renegades, and that I, in my conscience, did no more than render a tribute of respect to that very religion, by vindicating it from the impostures and falsehoods which men have added to it.

"Besides, I have not abandoned a religion. I have abandoned a sect: a sect that for ages past has lied to the world in the name of Christ. The religion of Christ was never the religion of worldly interests, nor was it made to pander to mean and sordid passions. And now that I have found this true religion which has Christ for foundation and heaven for summit, I will die clinging to His standard; I will fight for Him and with Him; and O that, when this fight is over, I may receive the palm of victory.

"And to the matter before us: I must object, once for all, to the gratuitous assertions of my Lord Don Americo which are made in

the fourth section of his introduction to the *Pastoral Instruction*, concerning the attempts of Protestantism in this country, and to his general idea of it. I see with extreme regret that in this part of the Pastoral, as well as in many other parts, which I shall have occasion to notice as we proceed, his Excellency has only been careful to dilate on certain commonplaces, without remembering to prove what he has written. On that page and half of the work, there is not found a single quotation from the Gospel, nor even the least fact of history. Yet the subject was not one to be treated lightly, and it was exactly in this part of the Pastoral that he should have adduced the greatest number of evident, palpable, concurrent proofs, to confirm whatever he might write concerning the attempt of Protestantism in this country, and his idea of it. Did not good logic and the necessity of the extraordinary circumstances on account of which his Excellency addressed himself to his diocesans require that, when endeavouring to arm them against the ideas of Protestantism, he should tell them, producing proofs, whence it came, what was its mission, and what its objects?

"His Excellency says, and presents the following as a thesis: *The Protestants come from a foreign country, and wish to destroy our holy religion.* The Protestants began in Rome when Rome began to fall away from the true Christian faith. Therefore they are not foreigners, neither did they spring up or take beginning three centuries ago, as he says they did. Neither did the Reformation come first from Luther, as his Excellency pretends. To suppose this is a great mistake, and it is necessary to make a few observations for the information of all such as regard them as innovators."

Here Father Dias quotes Mezcray, and he might have added Bellarmine:

"The Jesuit Mariana, in his *History of Spain*, who says the truth is that many years before Luther the people of Germany were scandalised with abuses and vices consequent on the licentiousness of the clergy. The Council of Trent, in its fourth session, *De Reformationibus* (cap. i.), expresses itself most clearly on the same subject. These authorities, which cannot be suspected, demonstrate, contrary to the Bishop's assertion, that what is now called Protestantism arose many more than three centuries ago. The Culdees in Scotland, for example, knew no other religion than that of the Gospel; they did not acknowledge the doctrine of purgatory, nor transubstantiation, nor celibacy, &c. The Church of Rome, however, unable to tolerate this simplicity, employed coercive measures, dexterously managed, until the Culdees, in the twelfth century, were totally overwhelmed. We then see the Waldenses, of whom Mosheim gives a full account. . . . Protestantism is therefore coetaneous with the Apostles; always, amidst the corrupt Babylon of Popery, there existed pious men of great celebrity, and, better still, religious com-

munities founded by them, that with the firmness of character which the grace of God alone inspires, refused to bend their neck to the yoke of falsehood, and always continued witnesses to the true doctrine against the errors of new Catholicism. My Lord Bishop was therefore very unfortunate in advancing such a proposition, and trying to derive Protestantism from the sixteenth century.

"Now, with regard to the objects of Protestantism, which are fully justified by the proofs already indicated, and are to oppose barriers to the ever increasing invasion of false doctrines in religion; to contend for the purity of Gospel truth, leading men to Jesus, without whom there is no salvation; to encourage and teach them the law of God, directing them to the Holy Scriptures, which is the only foundation and rule of faith; to give the world the primitive Gospel as the only means for the salvation of our souls, and teaching whence only can be formed good fathers, good children, good mothers, and good citizens—in a word, to rear up the Gospel again. See, then, the ends after which Protestantism aims: ends that, humanly speaking, are most noble, and will come to be realised, because this work is not of man, but of God."

After disposing of some local matters which need not be noticed here, Father Dias hastens to conclude his personal defence.

"Two words more, and enough of introduction. If Portugal would take a place in the great company of civilised nations it is necessary that she should shake off the Roman yoke. Only so, by decreasing liberty of worship, will she become eminently great. I know that there are politicians in this country who, wedded to the absurd ideas of the past, have no desire to satisfy this aspiration of modern society, and consider clericalism as a supporter of the throne. I cease not to pray God for them, that, by His grace, He would convert them from such an error. As for the Evangelic Church of Jesus Christ in this country, the *Pastoral Instruction* of the Bishop should not trouble it, nor yet the sermons of his preachers in this city, but only for this reason, that the Gospel of the Son of God is the impregnable citadel within whose walls we abide, and if He is for us, as the Apostle says, who shall be against us? For myself, I am in the midst of life. The hand which this day holds the pen to write this answer to the *Pastoral Instruction* of Don Americo will to-morrow be frozen in the cold of death, and so the tongues of those who now direct the greatest insults against the Gospel will be put to silence, paralysed for ever by the angel of death. Then we and they, Protestants and Romanists, will all appear before the tribunal of the Lord, and I, as in the presence of that dreadful judgment, forgive Senhor Don Americo his blasphemies against the Gospel of Jesus, and I pray to God that He would pardon him for them in His great and infinite mercy."

The Bishop's Pastoral chiefly consists of a commonplace exhibition of the articles of Protestant belief, as usually represented to young men preparing for the priesthood; necessarily partial and imperfect, and therefore on many points untrue. In such form he learned them in his day and teaches them now, as it is expedient they should be reproduced in popular declamation when the "faithful" have to be warned, or when it is thought expedient to excite contempt and aversion in the people. The present Protestant minister, who once learned the same, frames his answers accordingly, so that there is no set argument on either side; but in the rejoinders we find sharp appeals *ad hominem*, which must somewhat disconcert the prelate, who affirms in the full confidence of dignified authority, as one who calculates, as well he may, on the ignorance of his diocesans in general; and a perusal of the two pamphlets shows that the respective authors need, both of them, a larger stock of literature, ecclesiastical and theological, in the vernacular of their country, and that Portugal needs a literature that must in due time arise from the necessities of controversy, and will be demanded by men who begin to study, rather than receive passively, a few dogmatic propositions which they have to accept and promise to believe. In short, more learning must be imported into the country before the clergy will be able to read their own books, even if written but in Latin; while, even now, it is affirmed by those who ought to know the men of Porto, that there is not one of them capable of deciphering a Greek sentence, much less of lecturing on the Greek Testament. And only by an extraordinary effort could an aspiring priest master a study in any branch of ecclesiastical history. Therefore no ecclesiastical controversy can be carried on thoroughly until well-educated men arise, free from the old restrictions upon study, with ability and leisure to read their Bible in the original, and peruse historians in their original texts, and shall find readers trained up in better schools than, so far as we can hear, any yet existing on the Peninsula. Without, therefore, expecting too much, we are quite satisfied with the Bishop that he is sincerely earnest, and deserves credit for doing his best; while the converted priest, struggling for conscience' sake for some years, has honourably passed through such a test as must be utterly unknown to his antagonist.

Taken together, the *Pastoral* and the *Answer* provide the Portuguese with material for entering into most of the

questions which for ever divide Romanism and Protestantism ; but the Bishop was not sagacious in provoking popular discussion. It is at once apparent that there are two antagonistic authorities, the Bible and the Church of Rome. But this Church professes to acknowledge the Divine authority of the Bible, and the recently adopted Apocryphal books and fragments are not of sufficient weight to give much help to Romanism, and people will certainly suspect the honesty of any controversialist who from dislike or fear endeavours to depreciate the sacred volume, and presumes to warn Christians against reading it, or exercising their own judgment in the perusal and interpretation ; using, of course, such helps as Protestants always have at hand. Yet this is what Don Americo has done, while Father Dias relies unreservedly on the authority of holy men of old inspired by the Holy Ghost, and inquirers must decide between the two.

Don Americo thinks that on this occasion it is part of his pastoral duty to associate himself with the supreme pontiffs, Pius VII., Leo XII., Gregory XVI., and Pius IX., who have so energetically censured the so-called Bible Societies, and he puts his diocesans on their guard against the same, forgetting that in the present state of political feeling all over Europe, such a hint as this is quite sufficient to commend the Bible to multitudes who might not otherwise think of reading it. He reminds his people that these societies have their seat or centre in London, the capital of the nation which they had considered as their ancient ally, but whose subjects now come to rob them of their faith. He wonders at the wealth of the British and Foreign Bible Society, and the zeal it employs in the worst of causes, *em pessima causa*, and using the worst of means, *com pessimos meios*. Ignorant or negligent of all the evidence of history, blind to the universal practice of the chief Christian fathers for many centuries, who never appealed to any uninspired writer as a theological authority, but whose quotations in proof are taken from the Canonical Scriptures, with the rarest possible exception, if any, he endeavours to persuade them that the Apostles make no mention of the Bible ! St. Paul, he says, "does not mention the Bible, not even his own Epistles : rather indeed he seems to caution against the imprudent reading of them, which, experience shows, is made use of by malignant and cunning men to lead the faithful into error, and to be carried about with every wind of doctrine ; and that this may not

happen, he informs them that the persons appointed by the Apostles for the work of the ministry in the Church, and they only, were their pastors and doctors." He protests at length against all the operations of the society, condemns Bible-reading as if it were substituted for preaching, and boasts that among the heathen, his own Portuguese, led on by Francisco Xavier, converted millions without requiring for the purpose so much as one single Bible. So far as their own reports go this is true enough. Crowds of heathens would come at the sound of a bell, repeat a sentence which they did not understand, proceeding from the lips of Xavier, or one of his missionaries, and would then stand up in rows to be sprinkled with a few drops of holy water; which little ceremony, on the pronouncing of the baptismal form of words, was considered to be Holy Baptism, but with no teaching, no conversion, no faith, nor any verbal profession, by the millions of heathens now counted as converted to Christianity without either pastors or doctors, and certainly without giving them a single Bible, which might have undeceived the whole of them. How far the inhabitants of Porto may value such mechanical methods of conversion it is not for us to say, but we are credibly informed that the answer to these allegations has drawn forth much applause from the Portuguese in general, and specially from the diocesans of Don Americo. The last section of the Bishop's *Pastoral Instruction* challenges their decision in the terms following:

"Such is the gulf that separates the Catholic Church from Protestantism: One is Divine truth, and has words of eternal life; the other is error, and has words of eternal death. *That* is charity, full of consolations, already in this life. *This* disheartens, drawing after it despair. Protestantism thought it little to deprive the Christian of the protection of the Mother of God, to rob him during life and in the hour of death of the nourishment of the Eucharistic bread [the Bishop ought to know that in the Eucharist we receive both bread and wine, which, in the Church of Rome, the people do not], and the help of extreme unction. It is not even content with refusing confession to the conscience troubled with remorse, and the help of the gifts of the Holy Spirit to youth, and the blessing of Heaven to the newly-married couples, and even of Divine mission to its own ministers. After filling the living with bitterness, it yet remained for it to torment the dead, and rob them of the relief of prayers, and of the suffrages of this world for the souls in Purgatory. Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, Roman religion, holy religion of ourselves

and our fathers, which they, and all the Portuguese, our ancestors, always professed! You it is that have the words of Eternal life. It is you that give us consolations and hopes for the next. It is you that, with our dear diocesans, confess and believe the only truth. In your holy Church we were born, and all we have lived, and in it will we remain immovable until our death!"

To this declamatory close of the *Pastoral Instruction* Father Dias returns the following temperate reply, which we translate, not omitting the various forms of courtesy :

*"Such is the gulf that separates the Catholic Church from Protestantism.* As His Excellency reserves these words for the last section of his *Pastoral Instruction*, it is the prelate, not I, who by a cruel fatality, sums up the critical portion of his writing. Certainly the Roman Church separated herself; and by this fact alone, so clearly and spontaneously expressed by His Most Reverend Excellency, no one should be surprised at the theological aberrations of Romanism, its disciplinary wanderings, and the excesses of power which, in the exercise of authority, have brought down thereon discredit and contempt. If, however, the Lord Bishop of Porto had confined himself to a confession of this separation, and of the schism which characterises it, and deprives it of legitimate communion with true believers in Jesus Christ, no one would have been in the least surprised, inasmuch as it has been made plain enough in what he has written. Protestantism, conscientiously convinced that it maintains the purity and simplicity of the religion of Jesus, does not accuse, much less persecute, those who have departed from the way of the Lord: it pities them indeed, and supplicates Divine Providence for the conversion of sinners like them. But now that the Lord Bishop of Porto sets about glossing our faith and the morality of our religion at his pleasure, founded, as they are, on the word and the death of Jesus and the example of the Apostles, and of so many other illustrious men of Christendom, he imposes on us the duty of replying to so great an error, and such a want of charity as is apparent in his *Pastoral*. So, then, this being understood, if in the answer which I give, and in the endeavours which I make to expose the errors of Romanism, such as His Reverend Excellency enumerates and tries to define, if any phrase or any idea in what I have written be considered less worthy of this purely doctrinal polemic, or less respectful to the elevated sacerdotal character of the Portuguese prelate, I withdraw it at once, as foreign from the impartiality which I desire to observe in this discussion, and opposed to the desire which I have always entertained not to be wanting in due consideration towards His Most Reverend Excellency.



“Differences of faith do not authorise neglect of civil duties ; and even if the official position of His Most Reverend Excellency did not impose on me the obligation to respect him, the consideration due to my own position as the son of parents whose religious belief is still confined and limited unhappily within the sphere of the Roman Church, would determine the freedom of this my sincere and honest declaration. And as His Excellency, in closing his *Pastoral Instruction*, places it under the auspices and protection of the Mother of Jesus, I—who, from Biblical testimonies and after the critical study of the history of Christianity, cannot recognise, much less accept, any other mediation than that of Jesus our Saviour and our Master—to Him, whose unbounded sight reaches the inmost conscience, commit not only the intention of this modest labour, but, above all, I consecrate to Him the most earnest desire which I cherish, to see one day the walls torn down which divide the religious beliefs of mankind ; the truth of doctrine being restored entire, her most holy law safe guarded, and thus, according to the most positive and most salutary of her precepts, all men consecrated in one only faith, one only baptism, and one only Shepherd.”

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ART. VII.—*Der erste Brief Johannis praktisch erklärt von Dr. Richard Rothe. Herausgegeben von Dr. K. Mühlhäusser.* ["Practical Exposition of the First Epistle of St. John."] Willenberg: Koelling. 1878.

THOSE who know anything of Rothe as a profound theologian and an influential Christian speculative philosopher will be prepared to hear that St. John's Epistle had great attraction to his mind, and made a deep impression on his heart. The evidence of this lies in the present volume, which is edited by one of his pupils from the notes of a series of lectures delivered many years ago in Heidelberg. The grammatical and philological criticisms which accompanied them are omitted, as it is supposed that they have been rendered obsolete by a quarter of a century of later investigations. This we think on the whole is to be regretted, as Rothe's occasional discussions of the grammar of the Greek Testament generally, and of certain new terms introduced by Christianity in particular, are always deeply interesting. Moreover, we have observed occasionally on reading the volume that the exposition is at a disadvantage for want of them. However, the result is that we have before us a theological and practical commentary which has intense spiritual interest from beginning to end. In reading it we are not embarrassed and distracted by polemics or refutation of others' views: we have simply the reflection of St. John's deep thoughts from a mind congenial with his own. Some points in the exposition we shall select for observation, chiefly as bearing on the doctrines of sin and the atonement for sin: in continuation, it may be added, of one or two papers of our journal already devoted to the study of this Epistle as the final document of revelation. And, as the work is not likely to be translated, we shall make more copious extracts than otherwise would be desirable. But, before doing so, we cannot resist the temptation to insert a glowing passage from the Editor's Preface, giving his account of the Christianity taught by Rothe to his students, and treasured by them among their most grateful memories:

"Gathering up the impressions which we there received from our teacher, leading us as he did directly to the fresh and living

source of faith, I may say that it was above all things that of the imposing glory, sublimity, and sanctity of Christianity as a new Divine life, which, as it demands our most absolute consecration, so it is alone worthy of what it demands. But the whole richness of life which Christianity has brought proceeds from one centre, from Jesus Christ, who is Himself the Eternal life, and in Whom the glory, holiness, and love of God are manifested. He is for us as well the Object most worthy of love, dedication of the heart to Whom brings the profoundest peace and satisfaction, as also the Holy One who alone has no fellowship with sin, and therefore alone makes free from sin. The greater our Redeemer is to us, the more mighty and true is our own Christian life. In the Divine-human personality of the Redeemer Christianity possesses its ideal glory: it is therefore not only the highest and most perfect revelation of God, but also the highest manifestation of human life for all ages. The world never deduced it from its own resources; but it was implanted into sinful human nature by God Himself. But, while man through Christ finds God again, he at the same time finds himself again, and is placed at the consummation of his own human vocation. The requirements of Christ in themselves lie really in the depths of our human race and origin; but they are also in Him new requirements. The supernatural character of Christendom forms the most decisive contrast to all that is of this world, and demands from us unconditional faith; but this faith is nothing unnatural, it responds to our own true nature, and is demanded by the attraction to truth indwelling in us. The natural life, and the life of regeneration, are sharply distinguished from each other; but the Gospel lays hold of the noblest motives in the natural man, and binds him by its own internal truth and its own irrefragable and uncontradicted purity, loveliness, and beauty. It gives him the confidence and the power for the fulfilment of the Divine law. It opens up the Divine fountain of brotherly love, and places a goal of perfection before every one, which is the most worthy object of the struggle of life. For to aspire after that which is highest, not contented with half measures, is the calling of the Christian. This goal of perfection, far removed from being anything repulsive, has in it the most mighty stimulant to set about Christianity with the most perfect and absolute earnestness. Christ demands no more from us than what is found in our own original destination; but He demands it absolutely; and what He demands He Himself communicates. This new life from God, in which man through the atonement and the impartation of the Spirit is actually separated from sin and has actual fellowship with God, possesses alone a perfect reality and is absolute certainty: everything else is surrendered to transitoriness. But this new life takes up all into itself which man possesses of true spiritual good, while it

sanctifies all that it takes up. The world out of Christ has not life in itself; but the Gospel, with the mind of love, seeks out all the points of contact which universal human sentiment has with it, and which should lead the human spirit to Christ. The rights of personality are defended in all their comprehensiveness by Rothe. With absolute reverence for Scripture, in which the permanent norm of all is found, there is connected in his view a very decided recognition of the independence of the individual believing Christian; its justification, in the presence of the historical development of Christianity; and its demand of a personal experienced faith."

Three points are made prominent here, as illustrated by our Epistle: the new life manifested in Christ; the preparation for it in human nature; and the individual verification of it by personal faith. The first and third are indisputably taught with more fulness by St. John than by any other writer; the intermediate one may be brought into question. That our Epistle lays a strong emphasis on the absolute supernaturalness and direct descent from heaven of the life which is pre-eminently Christian is evident from beginning to end. Nowhere is the gulf between the old life and the new more deep and clear; nowhere, indeed, is it so deep and clear. It is the difference between light and darkness, between Satan and God, between a nature lying in the wicked one and a nature with the Divine infused into it. The process of becoming Christian is hardly touched. Though there are children and young men and fathers, the very lowest stage is so high that it leaves the common life far below. To have once seen and known Christ is to have come out from the transitory world and forsaken sin for ever. From that moment perfection is the object ever to be kept in view: a perfection which, however relative in some respects, is absolute as to the supremacy of the new nature of love and the extinction of sin. The exhortations to avoid sin, and renounce the world, and cultivate brotherly love, show that the Apostle contemplates the possibility of an imperfect religion; but he writes as if those who need such exhortations are not as yet really Christians at all. Indeed, his high ideal of the Christian life, which is however not an ideal but a reality, is one of the main embarrassments of the expositor. There is a world in Satan, and a Church in God: a middle term, or an intermediate state, is hardly within the Apostle's sphere of thought. Hence, it is not to this Epistle that we should go for evidence that Christianity appeals to

the instincts of human nature, however true that may be. Nowhere does it speak with any respect of the vestiges of good left by the Fall, or preserved by the universal influence of the Spirit. Its doctrine is that of regeneration pure and simple rather than of renewal: for the latter we must go to St. Paul. But Rothe is undoubtedly right in laying so much stress on its teaching as to the self-evidencing witness of interior truth. All Christians have, and every Christian has the unction from the Holy One, and appears not to need any external teaching, or any external preservation, from error. Taking this Epistle alone, and supposing it to be the only exponent of Christianity, there is no doubt that we should have a theory of the religious life which would seem at least to conflict at many points with the facts of the Christian experience.

This, however, only shows the great importance of studying every document of Christianity in the light of all the rest. The New Testament is one organic whole, and no writer alone gives the full and finished exhibition of truth as truth is in Jesus. St. John evidently was reserved to crown the edifice, and to put the final touches on every doctrine; but he presupposes familiarity with all that has gone before. His perpetual reference to what his readers already had heard, the assumption everywhere of an actual knowledge on their part, which gives the Epistle one of its formulas, proves that. The mistake of many expositors is to forget this. It is not enough that they bring the Epistle into comparison with the Gospel, and even regard it as its supplement, if they omit to remember that every line was written and must be read with the entire New Testament open for collation. Then we understand how it is that many aspects of the atonement, both objective and subjective, are left out; that justification by faith is untouched; that the Church, with all its array of doctrine, and ethics, and the sacrament, finds no place; that its eschatology is so limited in its range. Its lines have almost everywhere reached the point of perfection; but the intermediate course is sometimes pretermitted. But on this we need not now enlarge.

Rothe's exposition of the Introduction or Prologue of the Epistle is exceedingly impressive. He views it with the eye of a philosopher, of a German philosopher; and, however strange it may at first appear to find St. John made an exponent of what in modern times is called Ontology, it is not possible to doubt the substantial truth of the following

extract, or to be insensible to its sublimity. There is little in the transcendental philosophy of modern times as to the relation between being and phenomena which the Gnostic speculations of the end of the last century did not make familiar to Christian thinkers. St. John was the Apostle of profound contemplation as well as of love; and we have no objection whatever to find him made the father of the true philosophy which reconciles Idealism and Realism. For this reason we give the passage in full. But also for another: It will be found that Rothe lays great stress upon the reality of the manifestation of God in the flesh, and in such a way as to commit himself, one would think, to a high principle that draws after it many irresistible conclusions; such, for instance, as the reality and abiding continuance of the phenomenal world in which the Eternal life appeared; the essential impossibility of sin in Him; and the indestructibility He gave to the human nature He assumed. But we shall see that the high principle is not at all points consistently maintained.

“The thought of a primal, original Being, which has its ground in itself, is indeed the most abstract conception which the human consciousness generally can reach; but it is one that lies infinitely near, which no one can avoid or pass by who throws an observing glance into himself or around himself. For that which falls directly under our sensuous perception shows itself to him who is in any sense reflective to be in itself not true. The whole material world taken in and for itself must to the tranquil understanding, as well as to the clear feeling of the soul, appear as nothing in itself, which does not truly deserve the name of being. But this thought, of being surrounded by pure nothingness, is intolerable to the mind not entirely unreflecting; it must beget the longing to find somewhere a being which experience may lay hold on that did not first become, but is self-existent and primitive, and which may become a sure foundation. And this primal Being, eternally grounded in itself, the Apostle has found. He triumphantly appeals to his hearers: he knows of a Being which, withdrawn from all transitoriness, is the ground of all merely passing and perishing existence. The idealism of Christianity comes here in all its strength into prominence. The idea that all mere sensible existence is not true Being, that the material is only the appearance of something else which lies behind it, is inseparable from Christian devotion. Hence, in this point of view, philosophy, especially that of Fichte, is a good preliminary school of Christianity. Such a true Being is sought, longed for, hoped for most assuredly by every human consciousness; but

found, it can be only in as far as it manifests itself to us and enters sensibly into this sensible world. And that this has taken place is what the Apostle knows and announces. It has taken place in Christ. In Christ he has seen a Being who incontrovertibly approved Himself as not belonging to *this* world, not having His origin and His root in sensible things, but as being eternal Existence. The personal manifestation of the Redeemer made upon him this immediate impression; and therefore he can regard Him as no other than the manifestation of God Himself. But at the same time he learned to know this manifestation of God in the flesh in the methods of sensible experience of a reality; for he was an eyewitness of it, heard it, saw it, beheld it, touched it. These words give prominence to a perfect empirical experience concerning this Being, eternal and absolutely real in itself: certainly in opposition to the Docetism of his time; but this Docetism is always rising in the midst of Christianity, as is seen in the attempts to discriminate between the so-called historical and the so-called ideal Christ. The human-sensible appearance of Jesus in its entire humanisation brought to the Apostle's contemplation in this Christ the eternal primal Being and source of all being."

The ideal Christ of modern fiction is, as Rothe hints, a reproduction of Docetism which takes away the essence of Christianity. The incarnate Jesus was really a being of flesh and blood, as He was the Eternal Son of God. In His one person we must not separate the Divine from the human. But it is equally important that we should remember to give the Divine in all things the pre-eminence; and it belongs to that pre-eminence that the revelation should be always and everywhere, in the humbled as in the exalted estate, the revelation of God. It is not said, however true it may be in a certain sense, that the true humanity was manifested in Christ, that the flesh was manifest in God; but that God was manifest in the flesh. Whatever the redemption of mankind required to be suffered and done must be regarded as suffered and done by God, using a human bodily organisation. The exigency of atonement demanded suffering, and temptation in the sense of inscrutable trial; but the personal God is the never-failing subject of every predicate and agent of every act and object of every infliction. It makes an immense difference to all our views of Christianity whether we give or give not the eternal Divine personality in all things its essential and necessary pre-eminence. Generally speaking, there are two starting points in the consideration of Jesus. The one ascends from His humanity to His Divinity; regards Him as

perfectly man in all the essentials of humanity, including its liability to temptation and sin, its law of probation, with the Divinity sustaining Him in the process and crowning it with eternal honour. This view carries with it from beginning to end a certain undefinable but most real dishonour to the Son of God: the Docetism affects His Divinity and makes that unreal, while vainly and needlessly aiming to rescue His humanity from Docetic perversion. Needless, we say; for it is not essential to human nature to be liable to sin, and to be in a state of probation; still less is it essential to human nature in this world to have the seed of passive evil within. The other view descends with the Beloved Son from heaven, and throws around all His manifestation the glory of the God-head, so far as it regards its eternal sanctity and sinlessness. It involves difficulties, no doubt; for the Christ of redemption is the mystery of God pre-eminently. But it avoids what is far worse than difficulty, the unimaginable thought that the Son of God incarnate is on probation; must take His trial for life or death, is set for His own fall or rising again, and has to succeed in an experiment in which man, without God incarnate in him, failed. We might have expected, after the extract just given, that our expositor would take the latter view of the real, historical Christ. But we shall see in his doctrine of the atonement, which is otherwise of great value, especially as coming from him, that he does not.

The Epistle soon comes to that doctrine, which is essential to the manifestation of Christ. And there is something almost startling in the emphasis with which it speaks of the "blood of Jesus, His Son," at the very threshold. Rothe does full justice to the full significance of this word. He shows clearly that the blood of Jesus is a definition of the death of Christ, but distinctly as atoning death, and that as a sacrificial death of expiation. Of the death of Christ simply (without the close definition of sacrificial atonement) this expression is never used in the New Testament. But he thinks that we need not on that account limit this cleansing exclusively to the propitiatory cleansing which takes away guilt; the idea that the expiation and forgiveness of sin in its very nature effects actual cleansing from it by sanctification is included in the term here, as almost everywhere (Rev. vii. 14; Acts xv. 9). He adduces verse 9 as making this very prominent. But he does not enter into the vexed question as to the specific efficacy of the blood of atonement in purifying the nature from evil. It is well known that there are three



views on this subject. Some maintain that the cleansing is only another word for remission: viewing it levitically as removing the stain of sin, and leaving the extirpation of evil to the Holy Spirit. Others regard it as meaning the removal of sin from the nature, but only as a subsequent fruit of the atonement. And others again think that the blood refers to the mission of Christ's life, in His blood, into the soul. To us there seems strong reason for adopting the first view, with certain modifications that have been dwelt upon elsewhere. As the author does not raise the discussion we shall not do so; but pass on to his striking exposition of the nature of the atonement, which the student of theology must read with more than ordinary care, if not suspicion.

"The mystery of the expiation of sin through the sacrificial death of Christ consists generally in this, that God through Christ has effected the actual removal of the contradiction between these two propositions: first, that God in virtue of His holiness cannot enter into a friendly relation with the creature, so long as he is actually sinful; and, secondly, that the actual removal of sin is not possible saving as far as God has previously entered into that friendly relation through forgiveness of the sin. Only in this way can also the need of sinful man, in relation to God, be actually satisfied. It is equally important to him that God's holiness be kept inviolate as that he should receive God's grace. A grace which should cast a shade on the Divine holiness would take away just as much from man. For to desire that God should be indulgent to his sin would be unholy: we have only an idol, if we have not a God of pure *holiness*. God can have no relation with the sinner; for the Divine consciousness is absolutely negative towards sin, and it is the same with the Divine act as manifested in His righteousness. The Deity can stand towards guilt only in the attitude of wrath. The common notion is that God as respects sin merely leaves it unpunished. But He must actually take it away. By the punishment of the sinner the sin is not done away; but the Divine holiness must extend to the removal of the evil. Hence the Church rightly declares that justification is the fundamental condition of sanctification. So long as God is angry with us we must flee from Him. If therefore in the sinner sin is to be actually abolished, the relation of amity between God and the sinner must by all means be re-established: God must forgive the sinner his sin before its actual destruction in him. This is certainly an antinomy; but the ground of it and the key to its solution are already given in the fact of redemption itself. Such a case is imaginable by us only by considering that God receives an unambiguous pledge that by His preceding pardon of the sin the real removal of it would be

wrought as an effect on the sinner. In such a case God, without impeachment of His holiness, would forgive the sin; indeed He must do so then, in virtue of His holiness and righteousness itself. For otherwise He would pass by the means at His disposal for the actual abolition of the sin. To bring this about has been the problem of all that men call expiation, which among all nations has been aimed at. Only in the New Testament and through Christ has it been actually realised. . . . In Christ there is given to God the sure pledge that, to those who believe in Him, His preliminary forgiveness of our sin is its actual removal. It is forgiven in Christ, inasmuch as in Him the power dwells actually to take away sin in mankind. Only so far as He has this power is He a Redeemer generally; and by this, that in Christ this power is actually present in humanity, is there the possibility of forgiveness on the part of God. On this side the Redeemer is the *Surety* for mankind as over against God. Only, when the individual man is concerned, this suretyship is not yet sufficient. The Redeemer possesses this power for the individual only on the condition that he is actually in a moral personal relation with Himself. And this takes place through faith: by faith we receive that forgiveness of sins. And in him who enters into living fellowship with Christ by faith, the crisis of the forgiveness of sins is at the same time the crisis when the actual abolition of sin begins, which then continually goes on. On the basis of this reality of a Redeemer, and our fellowship with Him, God forgives sin and calls into existence a process of continuous destruction of sin. But now, if Christ is actually thus the Redeemer, in what relation to this does His accomplished *atonement* stand? He became the Redeemer through His own act, not in a natural manner, but by means of His own religious-moral development. He prepared Himself to be a Redeemer, and earned for Himself this power of redemption. It is this which the expiation accomplished by Him includes and involves. His death is the main element in this development, and that definitely His sacrificial death. This is indeed not the only element in His work of expiation, but it is nevertheless the decisive one."

If this exhaustive passage is read in the light of the last sentence, it will become clear that, with all its noble truth, there is mixed an error which a sound theology of the atonement must repudiate. The theory—if it may be so called—seems to be this, that the expiation of sin has been effected by Christ in His entire manifestation as a holy Representative of the human race who unites in Himself two things: the endurance of the penalty of sin in His passion, and the rooting out of sin in the discipline of His holy life. In other words, He presents Himself to the God of holiness in a

human nature which has at once endured its punishment and recovered its purity. There lies the virtue of His propitiation for the whole world; the justice of God sees in Him the race of Adam restored; the Pledge on the one hand that sin is not unpunished or the law dishonoured when the sinner is forgiven, and the Pledge on the other that the forgiven sinner shall hereafter be fully sanctified. This objective expiation renders it possible that the holy God should receive back again the family of Adam; and every one who is united to Christ by living faith receives the atonement. Thus stated, and going no further than this, the doctrine is in our judgment unexceptionable. It is unsatisfactory indeed in its careful avoidance of the fundamental idea of substitutionary suffering in the sacrificial death. But it is otherwise strictly true. It distinguishes rightly between the atonement once offered for all, and for all available, and the same atonement applied to the believer. It gives faith its right place, and renders impossible the gratuitous fiction that the Redeemer has taken the place of the elect in satisfying the law for them both as a condemning sentence and a requirement of holiness. It does justice to the eternal truth that there can be no expiation of sin, or cancelling of its penalty, which does not provide for the future holiness of the sinner. But its error lies in this, that the self-sanctification of Jesus in the whole of His voluntary obedience earned for Him as the conqueror of sin the right to deliver believers: that in fact His expiatory passion was a suffering victory over sin inhering in the nature He assumed, which only culminated on the cross. It might seem on a superficial glance that the true relation between the active and the passive righteousness of Christ is here very nearly expressed; for it cannot be gainsaid that the Redeemer at once paid the penalty of sin in Himself, and in Himself negated sin by a perfect holiness. But there is a vast difference between the presentation of a perfectly holy humanity enduring the sentence of the law vicariously for a world of transgressors and the sacrificial offering of a Redeemer who had first vanquished sin in Himself. This latter notion may be disguised in many ways; it may be stated cloudily, as in the passage above; it may support itself by passages of Scripture vaguely expounded; but in no form can it be made consistent with the Scriptural doctrine that all through His manifestation the Saviour of mankind was no other than the Eternal and

Beloved and Spotless Son of God, in whom is no sin, as St. John tells us with reference to this very subject. But another extract will make this plainer :

"Now in what sense is the Redeemer the propitiation in regard to our sins? In this respect, that He, specially in the consummation or *perfecting* of His own moral development (Heb. ii. 10, v. 8, 9), was exactly adapted to be the effective causality of an actual perfect removal of sin in humanity. For only under *this* condition can God, without detriment to His holiness, enter into a positive fellowship with the sinner (forgiving, that is, his sin): that is, if there is a full guarantee of the removal of his sin. The guarantee of this is a Redeemer (Heb. vii. 23); that is, a Person perfectly qualified to effect the destruction of sin through the faith which is the absolute condition of pardon and means of vital fellowship with Christ. Through this, therefore, that the Redeemer perfectly sanctified Himself, is He the sufficient power for the effectual destruction of sin in the world. John expressly points to the fact that our trust in Christ, even in reference to our continual sins, rests upon the assurance of an accomplished propitiation. Faith in the forgiveness of sins cannot be devoid of religious-moral peril if it is not bound up with faith in expiation."

Here it is obvious that the expiation of Christ has its virtue in His own personal sanctification. He thus qualified Himself to be our Deliverer, because our faith unites us to One in whose power and after whose example we also may vanquish sin. But in no passage is the Redeemer's sanctification said to be His cleansing Himself from the spot of the race. It is true that "both He that sanctifieth and they that are in process of sanctification are all of one;" but if that unity were a unity of the process, what meaning would the sequel have, "He is not ashamed to call them brethren?" It is true that He was "made perfect by suffering" as a Redeemer; but where is it said, or hinted, or implied, that He was made morally perfect? "In Him is no sin:" this unlimited is refers not to a state of consummation which He has reached, but is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. The simple fact is, that the habitual conventional use of the term sanctification to signify an internal process of deliverance from sin, and that exclusively, is fruitful in theological error. But its greatest offence is here. St. John refutes every such notion by telling us that we have in heaven an advocate "Who is the Propitiation for our sins:" according to the doctrine we condemn it should have been "He was

the Propitiation;" for that doctrine makes the victory over sin of the very essence of expiation. It is the doctrine of the New Testament, however, that the Eternal was *sent* as the propitiation before He took flesh at all, that it was in His blood He *became* the propitiation, and that in His Divine-human righteousness He *is* the propitiation to the end. But Rothe reads this passage otherwise. He sees the grandeur of the truth that St. John rises above every former representation when he says that the Righteous Jesus in His own Person is the propitiation; but he forgets that the same Jesus had been on the cross, and was there set forth as the propitiatory in His blood through faith.

"John gives now an explanation in *what sense* Christians have in the righteous Jesus Christ an intercessor with God. It is so far as He Himself is the propitiation for their sins, and thus makes them pardonable. There is a plain emphasis on the 'Who is Himself:' He in His own person. John brings it into prominence that here, in Christ, the Advocate and the means of expiation on which the intercession is grounded concur in one: not as in the Old Testament (to which there is manifest allusion, as to a typical institute), where the interceding high priest and the means of expiation (the sin-offering) were different. Christ is Himself the Propitiation. 'To expiate' means, in Scriptural language, to effect the *moral* possibility of a fellowship of God with anything sinful: that is the possibility that, *notwithstanding His holiness*, and without disparaging it, He can forgive the sinner his sins, and admit him again to His fellowship (so also in chap. iv. 10). Thus expiation is here the means through which there is the (moral) possibility of a positive fellowship with sinners, and of the turning away of the Divine wrath. . . . But 'propitiation' is not simply 'expiatory offering.' In the word 'propitiation,' in our passage, there is no express reference to the death of Christ, that is, as a sin-offering, like that of Rom. iii. 25. For it is here the Redeemer Himself, the whole Jesus Christ, not merely one act of His (such as His death) which is exhibited as the propitiation in respect of sins."

For ourselves, we rest assured that the exalted Saviour is the propitiation in heaven because the virtue of His atoning death has followed Him thither, or gone with Him; and that the progressive sanctification of our nature is not the result of our union with His process of victory over sin, but of our union with His Divine-human life through His Spirit. Our fellowship with his sufferings is indeed an essential element in our purification; but it is not in any sense, as

Rothe would have it, and many like him, a fellowship with His expiatory sufferings. The distinction is broad and clear throughout the New Testament. We are never said to be abolishing our sins as He did. He is never said to have set us an example of interior wrestling with evil. His atoning suffering was in a sphere altogether His own and unshared. In accomplishing redemption He presented a sacrifice of perfect submission under pressure that no words can describe, but which the infinite might of the Son of God incarnate allowed no possibility of sin to mar. When He triumphantly said, "I have overcome the world," He did not add, "Overcome it as I have overcome:" not in the manner that He overcame do we overcome; only in His Divine strength. We rise through faith in Him to a victory over sin which He never had to achieve. He atoned for it in His death alone; by a vicarious death which would not have been vicarious if He had condemned His own sin in the reality and not in the likeness of sinful flesh.

We now pass from the expiation of sin by Christ to the question of its perfect destruction in the believer: the second of the three salient points concerning sin in this Epistle. The following words are of very great importance, as touching a subject on which the Christian consciousness always needs to be stimulated, and needs it especially in our own day. The true conception of sin lies at the foundation of all sacred views as to the atonement, and the infinite solemnity of probation, and the issues to which it leads. A low estimate of sin is really at the basis of most of the errors that have prevalence among us.

"To the *Christian* sin and death are in and for themselves interchangeable ideas. Sin is to him the opposite of life; its natural and necessary effect is death. The *natural* view of sin always regards it pre-eminently as weakness, as something which indeed ought to be otherwise than it is, but cannot really be otherwise, and even in its consequences is not further perilous. The Christian cannot think of the true life of man save as being in fellowship with God; but sin utterly excludes this. The natural man regards life not first of all in the relation of man to God, but predominantly in its relation to himself and the world around him. Therefore he can think of that which he calls life, without internal contradiction, as necessarily affected with sin. But, while the Christian deals with sin in an incomparably more solemn and earnest manner, the natural man on the other hand thinks of it in a much more hypochondriacal manner: he regards it as some-

thing absolutely unconquerable. He regards anything like a real release from it, even as from its guilt, as a fanatical hope. He thinks himself in some way of necessity encumbered and endowed with evil. The Christian, on the contrary, has the firm assurance that he can be altogether healed of it, and that absolutely and for ever. With the sin that still remains in himself he certainly does not deal lightly; but yet he knows that this his sin is not a sin unto death, that the sin of the truly converted should not be matter of despair to him, and that the power of the new life which is revealed in him through Christ will finally swallow it up for ever. By the side therefore of his deep anxiety against sin there runs consequently a confident joy. It does not in his consciousness sever him from his Father. Even with reference to this he can pray to God, and ask of Him its forgiveness as well as the abolition of its power."

Here there seems to be a noble protest against two errors: that of the undervaluation of sin as remaining in the regenerate nature, and that of a despondent submission to it as a necessity in the present life. But when we examine the words carefully they give a view of indwelling sin that cannot be accepted. The ground of the Christian's confidence, as touching the remainder of sin in his nature, is not the assurance that in the present life it shall be utterly destroyed, but that it will be taken away hereafter. Meanwhile, he has the consciousness that whatever of evil remains in him cannot alienate the favour of God. And why is this? Because he knows that it is not a sin unto death, but venial sin, or sin of infirmity, which is not reckoned to the true personality of the regenerate. Rothe's interpretation of the passages which again and again declare that the regenerate cannot sin is simply this, that the seed of God, the good Spirit, is in him, and is therefore the acting subject of his new being. The impossibility of which he here speaks is obviously an internal and moral one. The regenerate cannot sin "with his own proper and true personality," and therefore what sin is in him cannot be sin in the proper and full sense of the word; it is only the overpowering of his true personality by the power of evil, and only, therefore, sin of infirmity. That this doctrine has been perverted Rothe admits. "Because the proper personality of the regenerate cannot sin, it has been supposed that sin touches him not in his individual life, but is something alien to him. But John does not speak his word for this Satanic spiritualism; for wherever there is indifference to sin there can be no regeneration. The toleration

of sin as not being our own is really the love of it. Wherever the sin is other than a sin of infirmity our regeneration is only a seeming one." This is a hard doctrine, and as dangerous as it is hard. For where is the line to be drawn between sin of infirmity and the sin of deliberation? The expression here used, and often employed by those who take this view, that of "being overpowered" by evil, robs the Apostle's glorious word of its strength. Its meaning, then, becomes simply this, that no sin is inconsistent with regeneration against which the better self remonstrates; in which case all true conviction of sin would be regeneration. That is the experience of the seventh chapter of the Romans, but not that of the eighth. The true personality is behind both the new man and the old, and is responsible for the deeds done in the body, whether they be good or evil. It is a bold thing to say, but it is perfectly true, that the personality of the regenerate is not the Holy Spirit but the renewed man: we receive the Spirit as the Spirit of life, and have Him as ours. The Holy Ghost does not possess us, but we possess Him, in regeneration. There is, indeed, a later stage, of which this exposition knows nothing, when the order may be said to be reversed: when sin is utterly destroyed, and the crucified flesh has ceased to live, then indeed we are "filled with the fulness of God." But till then, as St. Paul teaches us, we are only "strengthened with might by the Spirit poured into the inner man."

In connection with the words following the reference to the sin unto death, "We know that whosoever is born of God sinneth not," Rothe gives another and an indefensible and misleading view. The commentary on ver. 18 we must give entire, as it involves points of critical importance.

"After John has shown in ver. 17 that certainly there are in the life of Christians sins not unto death, which may be the object of Christian intercession, he now calls attention to the fact that, when he spoke of intercession for sinning fellow-Christians, he *could* not have thought of intercession in reference to sins unto death generally, because such sins could not occur in the Christian (the brother of ver. 16) as one born of God. But he does not actually say that in his assertion above he could not have thought of these sins; he only lays down the principle from which that follows, namely, that the Christian in such a manner cannot possibly sin. This, however, he does affirm, as his own clear and certain consciousness and that of all true Christians, by an express '*we know.*' The '*not sinning*' must, that is, in strict conformity with the usual Johannæan phraseology (ch. iii. 6—9), be taken in its pregnant and absolute sense, precisely as the '*sinning unto*



death.' For that the Christian can generally no more sin John could not have intended to say; for he expressly asserts the direct opposite of this in chapter i. 5—8, ii. 1. Nor does he say it in chapter iii. 6—9, passages which are in strict harmony with ours. In these also he denies that the Christian can sin, on the same ground as that given here, because he is born of God, that is, of his regeneration. The psychological reason why the Christian cannot, in the manner referred to, sin, is given in the words: he that is born of God *keepeth himself*, holds himself in that wakefulness and care through which in regard to him temptation to sin cannot find entrance, so that Satan toucheth him not: he cannot seduce him to sin, because he can find on him nothing to lay hold on. For the presupposition and condition of temptation on the part of Satan is the own lust in a man (Jas. i. 14, 15)."

Here we have the doctrine that the regenerate can never fall from grace, can never commit the sin which is unto death, in what seems to us plain contradiction of the Apostle's word, that a brother sinning unto death is not to be prayed for with confidence. But, leaving that question at present, let us mark the strange inconsistency into which this profound thinker falls. St. John is made to say that "he who is born of God sinneth not unto death; he may be impressed into sin, and need an advocate, and shall surely be forgiven if he confess his sins. Meanwhile, he does not sin at all; for he keepeth himself, and Satan finds no point of attack. Yet not so; for there is in him, as regenerate, no concupiscence that temptation may court, and with which or in which it may engender sin." This is said to be the psychological reason of regenerate sinlessness; but it is utterly unscriptural and at all points inconsistent. When the Apostle says, "If any man sin," does he mean "If any man suffer sin in that part of him which is not himself, then that part must confess and be forgiven?" But this is not the Apostle's teaching: "if we confess." Nor is it St. James's teaching in the passage quoted: the lust which conceives sin is the man's "own lust," though it belongs to his body of sin not yet destroyed.

As to the impossibility of sin in the regenerate, expositors have always differed according to their views of the nature of the Christian redemption. The classification of these several hypotheses furnishes a deeply interesting theological study. There are two which have held most sway: one which makes regenerate sinlessness an actual present fact, but then it is the sinlessness of the better self within the sinning man; the other which makes it not a reality, but an ideal, ever floating

before the Christian consciousness, but never to be realised in the present life. There is a measure of truth in both these, but neither of them satisfies St. John's meaning, and they must both be discarded before we can arrive at a satisfactory solution. That solution seems to be simply this, that the Apostle describes a present fact of holy experience, which, every time he asserts it, he himself most clearly explains.

The first above alluded to is that held by Rothe, though in his own peculiar fashion. The variety of applications and uses to which this hypothesis is made subservient sufficiently refutes it. Some say, as our expositor here, that it is really the Spirit of Christ in the regenerate who cannot sin, which of course is true; but the Spirit of Christ in the regenerate man is not the regenerate man himself, but, as the Apostle Paul says, *the Spirit in his own mind*. He may lust against that Spirit, and surely that lusting against the Spirit is treated by the Apostle as sin, and, if not, it is supposed that it may lead to sin, which therefore denies that it is impossible for the regenerate to sin. That cannot be, therefore, St. John's meaning. He cannot signify that no amount of internal remissness and yielding to temptation tarnishes the sinlessness of the man in whom Christ has been found. This would be the most refined and therefore the worst Antinomianism. From this, of course, our pure-minded expositor, like multitudes who, on other grounds, maintain the same theory, shrinks. Hence his most unskilful and unsatisfactory reservation, that the regenerate does not sin unto death: surely the sin which is saved from its last and eternal consequences is nevertheless sin. Hence his fluttering about the perilous notion that the regenerate only suffers sin but does not commit it. It is obvious that the danger which he himself deprecates is such, that we cannot suppose the ethical teaching of the New Testament to afford it any the least encouragement. In fact, some of the worst Antinomian developments of the Brethren of the Free Spirit and the fanatical Antinomians of modern times sprang from precisely this principle.

The second is apparently similar, but really very different. It represents St. John as holding up an ideal estate to which the Christian should aspire, after by regeneration he has become capable of elevating his mind to it. He is actually a sinner, and if he thinks he is or may be free from sin he deceives himself; but the thought of the glorious purpose of his regeneration should animate him to cheerful endeavours to avoid sin, trusting to the virtue of the atonement to cleanse

him from the sin he must commit, and to the power of the Spirit finally to deliver him from every trace of his evil. Of course there is in this, as in the former, some measure of truth; otherwise it could not be held by so many earnest expositors. A Christian man may evermore rejoice in thinking of the perfection which is before him and above him in the future, guaranteed to him by the holiness of his Lord and the power of His Spirit, which also has been reached by the spirits of the just made perfect. This ideal is the light and glory of the Christian life, and a vigorous Christian pursuit of holiness cannot exist without it. A man may measure his present imperfect self with the sacred self made perfect, and derive from the comparison a strong incentive. He may impute to himself, as if it were present, an entire redemption, and reckon himself dead unto sin; even as God Himself imputes to us, in the foreknowledge and intention of His grace, our finished sanctity, and waits in forbearance until His end is attained. But the most cursory examination of St. John's words puts to flight this solution of the difficulty in his Epistle. Nothing is or can be more practical than his allusion to the unsinning character of the regenerate. He makes it the plain distinction between believers and unbelievers, between those who are of God and those who are of the devil. It might as well be said that he is describing the ideal of the sinner when he describes him as doing unrighteousness, as that he is describing the ideal of the saint when he describes him as doing righteousness.

A third interpretation, closely allied to the two former, lays the emphasis on the perfect participle: "he that is fully and entirely born of God sinneth not," whereas he who has only been, in the aorist, begotten of God may, until his regeneration is perfected, or regarding it as imperfect, still sin. The link between this and the two former interpretations is found in this, that all three appeal to the experience of St. Paul in the seventh chapter of the Romans. There, says the first theory, the Apostle is describing his better self struggling against his worse self; and disavowing the sin this worse self commits. It is hardly necessary to say that this cannot be true. The "wretched man" who cries out for deliverance cannot be as yet regenerate; every sentence he uses shows that he is in bondage to sin, and the only distinction he draws between his better and worse self is between the "mind" convinced of the Divine claims and of its own sinfulness, and the flesh that renders that conviction

impotent until a higher grace shall come. Then, says the second theory, St. Paul is depicting the common estate of the Christian man, sinning yet hating his sins, and comforting his heart with the thought of the perfect law which his whole being delights in after the inner man, and longs to realise. But it is enough to say that the Apostle makes no allusion whatever to the spirit of regeneration as giving him his high ideal: the utmost he says is that his rational mind approves of holiness. Moreover, the ideal that irradiates the prison-house of a man in bondage and sold under sin is not the ideal set before us in the New Testament of our sitting in heavenly places in unity with Christ. The same may be said as to the third theory. The Apostle never once speaks in that chapter of his being begotten or born of God and awaiting a more full regeneration. He has not "the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus," and without that there is no new birth from above. It is not true that Rom. vii. describes an imperfect regeneration, made perfect in Rom. viii. The struggle of the regenerate life is in Gal. v., where it is no longer the *vous* or mind that wrestles with the flesh, but the "Spirit" of the mind, or the Holy Ghost, which is a very different matter. For the rest, there is a measure of truth in this last hypothesis, as there is in the other two. There is a perfected regeneration as there is a perfected righteousness and a perfected sanctification provided for in the scheme of the Gospel; though of that perfected regeneration St. John does not specifically treat. It cannot be sustained that he lays so much stress on the perfect participle, as if he meant to indicate by it that the regenerate is one who has been born and is perfectly born of God; for in ch. xxix. he says quite generally, and in the same perfect tense, that every one who has been born of God "doeth righteousness," which is much more indefinite than not sinning at all. There is, we repeat, such an estate as perfected regeneration as distinguished from an imperfect. It is wrong to link the idea of Christian perfection only to sanctification. There is a relative perfection of the justified state, when in love the whole law is said to be fulfilled, and the righteousness of the law is so accomplished that it is satisfied in the evangelical obedience of the saint united to Christ and filled with His Spirit of obedience. There is a relative perfection of the sanctified state, when the whole man is purified from indwelling sin and filled with consecrating love. And there is a relative perfection of the regenerate state, conformed to the

image of the Son : relative only, because the adoption waits for the redemption of the body, and the likeness to the Son to which we are predestinated is to be found in the saint as a whole, in body and soul and spirit. A devout and earnest Christian may combine the three theories in his habitual thought as he is born of God. He may mourn over and disavow and hate and renounce the remainder of sin which is alien to his new nature, while, alas, it is still his ; he may cherish the blessed ideal of perfect likeness to Christ, and be transformed into that likeness while he beholds it in adoring contemplation ; and he may make it his constant endeavour to bring his sonship to perfection by keeping the flesh with its affection and lusts crucified with Christ, and yielding himself up to the full power of the quickening Spirit. But St. John in this Epistle does not, in conclusion, distinguish formally between an inchoate and a finished regeneration.

It is not our purpose to present any detailed exposition of our own. Suffice to say, that there are two things necessary for the clear apprehension of what the Apostle means when he so unequivocally declares the impossibility of sin in the believer : first, we have to mark the explanation he himself gives in each case ; and, secondly, we must make that meaning consistent with what he elsewhere says.

The declaration in question is made twice ; and each time in connection with the relation of sin both to God and to Satan. In the former of the two instances, the Apostle's true object is to mark the absolute contrariety between the children of God and the children of the devil : it is the outgrowth of the nature of the latter to sin, it is the essential characteristic of the former not to sin. He does not say that "he that is born of Satan must sin," because it is not true of Satan that his seed is any sinful man : "whosoever doeth not righteous is not of God" is the exquisite change in the sentence ; and this turn of the phrase sufficiently explains St. John's meaning in the case of those in whom the seed of God, the Holy Spirit of the new life, abideth. Their characteristic is that they are turned from sin to holiness. There is a moral impossibility of their sinning ; it is contrary to their new nature to do iniquity : there is no physical, metaphysical, or absolute impossibility of their sinning again. This latter the Apostle could not mean ; and it is idle to force a sense upon the word "cannot" which contradicts his own testimony, that of the whole of Scripture, and that of universal Christian experience. "How can I

do this thing and sin against God" said one, in the very spirit and the very letter of St. John's word; another saint of God did that thing, was chastised, and regained God's favour. This passage is altogether positive: it declares the eternal contrariety between the regenerate and the unregenerate life. The other passage is more negative. "He that is begotten of God keepeth himself, and that wicked one toucheth him not." Again we have the birth of God, and the watchful wicked one. But it is most obvious that the inability to sin is still only a moral one; for it is implied that, unless the regenerate keeps himself, the wicked one may touch him to his hurt. Neither of the passages gives any sanction to the idea of an absolute impossibility of sinning.

But the expression is very strong; and certainly implies that the life of the Christian may be spent without sin. He who doubts this has not entered into the spirit of the Apostle's teaching. To this we shall return presently. Meanwhile, it is important to observe that this must have been part of his meaning: if he had not included this, there were many phrases that might have been used to express the moral impossibility of sinning. Intending only to signify this, the Apostle nevertheless adopted the most absolute terms; and that he did so makes it very plain that he deemed it possible that a believer should lead a life without sin. How then is this reconciled with his teaching that the truth is not in us if we say that we have no sin?

One method adopts a compromise, to the effect that, while original sin evermore remains in the Christian, he does not sin so long as he abides in Christ, or so long as the seed of God, the Divine word or promise, remains actively in him, appropriated by faith. But we cannot consent to either of these suppositions. St. John makes no distinction between original and actual sin: the sin that he supposes to be in the Christian is a sin to be confessed as sins committed, "if we confess our sins." And, with regard to the other assertion, it is dangerous to speak of our not sinning only while the Word of God abideth in us, or we abide in it or Him. This is a favourite solution with many in our own day. But it altogether misses the point of St. John's assertion, that the seed of God abideth in us: that seed is not the Word, but the Holy Spirit as the indwelling principle of a new life, and we cannot suppose that He takes His departure on the commission of every sin. This would contradict our Lord's word

that he that is washed needeth only to wash his feet. Surely every lapse through surprise or infirmity does not defeat regeneration : the Holy Spirit may be easily grieved, and His influences easily lowered or quenched, but He is not easily driven from the soul as the Spirit of regeneration. It has a very specious sound that the regenerate cannot sin while his faith is active and his union with Christ intimately felt ; but that when his spiritual eye is obscured, and his faith grows languid, he is shorn of his strength, and may fall into sin. However true that may be, it does not touch St. John's assertion. He simply says that the regenerate cannot be a sinner ; and that if he sins, or his character is sinful, he has neither seen nor known Christ. The interpretation we refer to says that, having seen and known Christ, he may cease to see Him and know Him as often as he commits sin. This notion makes the being in Christ and out of Christ too precarious a matter ; a matter liable to constant fluctuation. Certainly, the Apostle declares, however hard his saying may be, that he who can sin has never seen or known Christ at all. This is true on the more limited theory of impossibility we adopt ; but on that theory alone.

As to the other point, St. John's assurance that we all sin, there seems to be a very general consent among interpreters in understanding this to mean that the annihilation of sin in the regenerate nature is not to be expected in the present life. But a high and generous estimate of the provision of the Gospel and the power of the Spirit must hesitate before such an interpretation. Those who believe that the body of sin may be not only crucified, but destroyed or abolished, must reconcile their doctrine with this clear expression of St. John. And how can they do this ? There are three possible methods, which we can now only indicate.

One is to regard the Apostle as interpreting his own earlier words by his later : " if we say that we have not sinned." Strange as it may seem, there were seducers who taught in those days that the spirit in man, being a portion of the Divine essence, could not really sin ; that what was called sin was merely the consequence of alliance with matter and the phenomenal world ; and that the redemption of Christ had for its aim rather the deliverance of the soul from the fetters of material nature than from the penalty and pollution that the Gospel was thought to connect with the idea of sin. Such resources have been found in every age. Wherever the Pantheistic or the Dualistic theory of the universe reigns it

more or less infects all thinking. The Pantheist, and all who are swayed, consciously or unconsciously, by the Panthesistic conception, thinks that sin is at worst a great unreality, a phenomenal something that cannot be explained, which will be lost in a greater good. To all such thinkers the Gospel would say: "If we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." And the same language would it use to the Gnostics, such as those against whom the Apostle is quietly warning the Church from beginning to end: "If you say that you have no sin, but only the accident of sense, which God may pity in you and from which He will rescue you; if you say that you have not sinned, that the evil you have known and felt has never been your personal guilt but only your mischance, then you show that the fundamentals of the truth are wanting, and that your whole being is a delusion and a lie." There is much to recommend such a view of the Apostle's words. It justifies the extreme vehemence of the language just referred to; and, further, explains the fact that there were, that there could have been, any people in the congregation who needed to be reminded that they *had sinned* in the past. Surely this kind of remembrancer implied something abnormal, something with which we nowadays are not familiar, something that helps us to understand the extreme urgency with which the Apostle presses a fact that might seem to be the very first fundamental of Christian knowledge. It is customary with the commentators to argue that the Apostle is evidently writing to regenerate Christians, already in the light, and therefore that he explicitly teaches that in every Christian, at all times, and to the end, there must be sin. But it is plain that this argument may be carried too far. At any rate it may be urged with too much confidence. The Apostle invites his readers into a fellowship with God which some of them evidently have not. He supposes that some of them may deny that they had ever sinned. And what is to hinder us from assuming that the two sentences refer to the same utter falsehood, inconsistent with the first elements of Christian truth?

If there were no other method of saving the doctrine of St. John from the perversion that he teaches the necessary indwelling of sin in the Christian, we should unhesitatingly adopt this one. There are those, however, who prefer to think that the Apostle speaks in a general and indeterminate manner of the fact that sin remains in the regenerate, with-



out, as yet at least, saying anything about the sanctifying possibility of the future. Just as St. Paul says, that the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, this internal warfare being a general fact, before he goes on to speak of the crucifixion of that flesh unto death, so St. John is supposed to lay down a general principle only, which afterwards will be subjected to its limitation. Certainly, he very soon declares that the blood of Jesus cleanses from all sin, from all that is called sin; he expressly says that his Lord's will is that we "sin not;" and the close of his Epistle represents the love of God as perfected in our nature, even to the extinction and suppression of all fear in the judgment. And, if there were no other method of saving the Apostle's doctrine from the appearance of inconsistency, we should at once adopt this one.

Still we cannot but think that this declaration agrees with the whole of Scripture, in forbidding mortal man from ever saying while he lives upon earth that he has no sin. And no statement of Christian doctrine can be correct that would encourage any one to use such language. Every instinct of the new nature recoils from such an utterance. Even if through the omnipotent power of Divine grace the soul can truthfully avow that, keeping itself and kept by God, it is living an unsinning life, it can never say that it is sinless, or without sin: that it has no sin. The most sanctified spirit, that from which is expelled the very principle of sin, nevertheless inherits the result of the past, and is compassed about with infirmities which, though they are not reckoned as guilt in the merciful imputation of heaven, nevertheless make the Spirit mourn. But, not to dwell upon this, the more general fact remains that every man is and will ever be the inheritor of his past, and call himself a sinner to the end: certainly to the end of life, and if not in eternity only because the definitive judgment shall have fixed an eternal gulf between his glorified being and his former sinful self. "Of whom I am chief," was St. Paul's testimony when he had finished his course and was ready to be offered a spotless sacrifice. This is in our judgment the best commentary on St. John's words. The saint never forgets the sinner, always retains the spirit and language of confession, and, to speak paradoxically, appropriates his sin and sinfulness more and more tenaciously in proportion as it ceases to be his character.

But those who insist with such vehemence that sin must as a principle exist in every Christian, and plead this word of the Apostle for their doctrine, are unjust to other sayings of

his which must have their rights. Not to speak of the "not sinning" and "cannot sin," which have been discussed already, it is enough to point to the triple reiteration of the truth that in the believer obeying the commandments, renouncing himself for his brethren, and dwelling in God, the love of God has its perfected operation. We have no space to examine the passages closely and in order, but it will be found by the student of the Epistle that such is the threefold gradation of the Apostle's assurance. And the last is the most forcible, for it literally speaks of our love being perfected towards God as His is perfected in us, of our being on earth what Christ is in heaven, and of the last vestige of fear being expelled from the nature. Surely there should be some tolerance shown towards those who take these words in their clear fulness of meaning and give them a large acceptance. No artifice of exposition can avail to soften them down or explain them away. There they stand on the last page of the Bible: a rebuke to all doubt and fear, and an encouragement to the loftiest hopes which the Spirit of holiness can excite in the believing heart. The Son of God was manifested not only to bear sin, but to bear it away; "and in Him is no sin." What can these words mean but that the purpose of His first manifestation is to make us like Himself now in purity, even as the purpose of His final manifestation will be to make us like Himself in glory? The final sayings of the Word of God on this subject are the best wine reserved for the last.

But here comes in the idealist scheme to contradict the blessed realism of these truths. Those who deny that the Apostle is setting up an ideal when he speaks of the regenerate impossibility of sinning, nevertheless themselves resort to it when they treat of the express promises of a finished holiness. Rothe is an eminent instance of this. Nothing can surpass his confidence in denying the ideal theory when it suits him to do so. The regenerate man in his view is the Spirit of God in man who cannot sin. But when that same Spirit proclaims that the righteous man is he who doeth righteousness "even as He is righteous," Rothe gives full swing in his turn to the ideal theory, but in a singular way contradicts himself in doing so.

"The exhortation to deny righteousness is repeated in the form of a warning; against deceivers who would persuade them that moral laxity was reconcilable with Christianity. . . . How does that false principle contradict their own salvation? It has a sweet sound, but it is a sweet poison, a most perilous deception,

... only he who doeth righteousness is righteous even as Christ is. Tolerance towards sin is absolutely excluded from Christianity, which requires such a righteousness as is consistent with the new power given in Christ through grace. Christ demands this righteousness in its utmost severity, as we find it in Christ Himself. If the world lays down the principle that a perfectly pure and entire morality is not possible for man, the whole Christian system protests against that most urgently. He who would measure his morality according to a lower standard has thereby fallen into that lax principle. Only when we place the requirement high is it possible to work out with love and zeal our sanctification; while the ordinary so-called human righteousness of conduct can never exhaust such zeal."

This is a typical passage, as showing the confusion into which those must fall who will bring down the standard of the possible actual life of the believer. Here there is a strange, unphilosophical, and certainly unscriptural distinction between the requirement of Christianity as an ideal and its practical requirement. What can that standard be to which we are not to be conformed? Christ's righteousness is plainly revealed, especially as the perfect love to man that utterly renounced self. Is that standard to be reached only in another world, where self-renunciation will have lost its opportunity for ever? Can anything be plainer than that we are required to be as our Master even now, amidst all the blessed occasions of love and self-denial? What He is we are to become. He is without sin, by the infinite necessity of His personal Godhead; we are to become such by the infinite power of His Spirit, imprinting His example on our hearts and His holiness on our lives. But the thought of perfected love still hovers over us. Let us see how Rothe deals with that. We shall find that he has missed the entire conception, and wandered hopelessly from the point.

"Fear hath torment: it is from the self which lies at the root of all fear that this torment flows, which all experience shows to be bound up with this fear. The state of fear is more painful than the experience of the evil feared. This anxiety is however quite inseparable from the position of self-regard. He who is limited in his little I to himself, separating himself from the great world around him in enmity, not devoting himself to it, but maintaining himself against it and repelling its influences, undertakes a work the delusion of which he must find out. The disproportion of his own power against the boundless power of this world must fall upon his own soul as a fearful trial. In this

isolation of his being, surrounded by powers which he has made his enemies, his life can be only one of unbroken tribulation and fear. On the contrary, love is blessedness; for it stands in profound peace with the collective world around. As it lives in friendship with all, all things co-operate with it; everything subserves its interest, and it subserves the interest of all. It exists in the midst of a fulness of life, which streams on it from every side. It finds satisfaction for every need, while selfishness is wounded in its impotence. In such blessedness as this of love that torment cannot be thought of which is inseparable from fear.

“But indeed this perfect love is not yet given to us. In the measure in which we still mourn over the pressures of our life we are far from being perfected in love. It is profitable to measure the degree of our love by this standard. We often think that the feeling of disquiet in life is a sign of advanced religious sentiment; it is rather a proof of the weakness of our love. Thereby John shows us the only way which surely leads to the goal. We must learn to love, and labour for the continual perfection of our love. This universal experience confirms. There is no truly loving heart that can be unhappy; and no truly happy soul that does not love. Thus love is the one properly beatifying good of our human existence. We forget too easily that the measure of our happiness can only be the measure of our love; and that we must not only in general learn to love, but that our loving only then gives us blessedness and peace when we fix our thoughts upon the perfecting of love in us. Only pure and perfect love makes purely and perfectly blessed; and about this we too seldom concern ourselves. Therefore among men there is so little steadfast faith in the principle that there is no other blessedness than this. There are only a few truly happy men.”

There is much beauty in these utterances of Christian philosophy. But they do not touch the essential principle that the love of God perfected within us destroys the sin that causes all uneasiness in the heart. Its highest achievement is, not to harmonise us with the nature of things and the course of Providence, but with the nature of God Himself, who is love. It makes us, or may make us, its object is to make us, what Christ is, who is the living manifestation of eternal love and eternal life. And the transformation of the Christian character through the ascendancy of this most mighty principle is not deferred to another world. Every word indicates that its triumphs are in time and amidst the scenes of this world: not reserved for eternity as the destroyer of sin, nor postponed to the hour of death, but displayed in

this scene of human probation. Our commentator tells us that "this perfect love is not yet given to us," and his proof is that we still feel the world's pressure and disquiet in the present life. But St. John says the exact reverse, using terms as nearly as possible the direct contradictories of his expositor's. The love of God is perfected in us, and our love perfected towards Him. The fear is gone, and perfected joy and confidence have taken its place. Surely the text and the commentary are in plain antagonism here. To the commentator it is an ideal Christians must aspire to: given as a standard by which they are to measure their deficiencies. He frankly admits his despair, for himself and others, of ever reaching it in this life. St. John, on the contrary, speaks of an experience attainable and attained. It is true that he does not, in so many words, say that the supremacy of love destroys the principle of sin, but it is scarcely possible to doubt that this is his meaning. What Rothe erroneously assigns to the new nature in the Christian, the absence of the lust which might conceive and bring forth sin, we may venture to think that the Apostle sets before us as the aim of a mature Christian life. Desire in man for physical gratification is not sin in itself; but the carnal mind infused into the desire makes it sin and also the fuel of sin. But, unless we greatly mistake the plain sense of St. John's words, he regards it as the perfect operation and last triumph of the Divine love within us that the carnal mind should be abolished. All fear is cast out; but if the mind still retained any the least bias towards evil there would be cause for fear. With his peculiar phraseology St. John could not more plainly teach this doctrine. It is an interesting subject of speculation to ask how he would have expressed himself in this Epistle if he had been moving in St. Paul's vocabulary. He must have spoken of the flesh as mortified and dead, its affections and lusts having passed away before the world that fed them; of the old man as put off, renounced, and abolished; of the law of sin in the members having ceased its operation; and of the carnal mind being rooted out of the nature. Instead of all this he speaks in the beginning of his Epistle of our being cleansed from all sin, in the middle of it of our purifying ourselves even as He is pure, and at the end of a perfect love which negatively casts out fear and positively makes us as He is. The advocates of the doctrine that sin must inhere in our religious constitution so long as we remain on earth may contend against this doctrine, and bring forward many

plausible arguments against it, but they ought not to be amazed that we should hold it with this Epistle in our hands and in our hearts.

After all, there is no more cogent testimony in favour of this deeper and grander view than the whole strain of the Epistle as to the nature of the eternal life already imparted to the Christian in vital union with his Lord. On this subject Rothe strikes a good keynote, though his variations on it are far from satisfactory.

"In order to place it in all the clearer light how the Christian man has in Christ, through the prayer of faith to Him, an actual spring of everlasting life, John adds that, in virtue of this prayer, he not only draws that life for himself, but even communicates it to his sinning brother, who by sinning is wounded in his true life, for his healing: communicates it, that is, by the power of his intercession for him with the Redeemer. Even for the brother he can obtain life from the Saviour. This is the most evident possible argument of the greatness of the power which the prayer of the believing Christian to his Lord possesses. A *commandment* to intercede for the brethren (which, however, is an apostolical precept, 1 Tim. ii. 1—4; Jas. v. 14—20, and elsewhere) it is by no means John's purpose to give. But, assuming the case that a Christian sees his brother Christian (the brother here can only thus be understood) sin, and thus spiritually sicken, he takes it for granted as quite his natural course (to make this prominent he writes, 'his own brother') to repair to Christ in intercession for him. And thereby, he adds, he will give him life; that is, because by his intercession he obtains that the grace which heals his sin is applied to him by the Redeemer. '*He shall give him life:*' to regard God or the Redeemer as the subject here would not only be a syntactical harshness, but would weaken the stringency of the thought in this passage, which simply lies in this, that *the Christian* by means of his prayer to the Redeemer can even give life to others. That John says simply, 'he shall give life,' is because the whole context dwells upon the fact that faith in the Redeemer secures life, that is, the true eternal life."

There is nothing more grand and inspiring in all the Bible than the view given by St. John of the transfusion of the eternal life which is in Christ, and was manifested in the flesh, into the nature of the Christian man. He becomes, in St. Paul's words, one spirit with Christ: and that fellowship must have for its issue the expulsion of death and darkness in every form. This is the sublime close of all Scriptural testimonies to Christian experience: justification, adoption, regeneration, sanctification, with their fruits of love and joy and

peace, all rise into and are glorified in the idea of a community of eternal life with Christ. And in the impressive representation which Rothe here worthily descants upon, the same principle of eternal life in Christ gives a new character to sin: not, indeed, an absolutely new character is given to it, but its essential character is in this Epistle more deeply than anywhere else stamped upon it. Sin is death unto death. Of its final issue we shall speak presently; meanwhile, St. John here says by implication that every transgression in the Christian is an invasion of his eternal life: not a suspension of it exactly, nor a suppression of it, but an imperilling of it, and a limitation of its energy. It is very remarkable that St. John does not say, as St. James does at the close of his Epistle, that the sin of the offending brother will be forgiven him, but that "he shall give him life:" shall give to him and as it were restore to him his eternal life. And, finally, what can be more glorious than the Apostle's tribute to the unity between the life of Christ and His living member: he gives by his intercession the life which the Saviour gives by His Spirit.

But what is the "sin unto death"? It is obvious that the Apostle lays much stress on this restriction, as he proceeds to dilate upon it with special reference to intercession. The "sin unto death," whatever it means, is certainly a sin that must issue in one way: there can be no life obtained for that. Our expositor insists that the restriction must not be connected with the "seeing" the brother sin, as if the two kinds of sins were externally distinguishable. "Not unto death" is united with "sin" alone: "if his sinning is not unto death." The condition is not one of the asking, but of the granting the request of life. Certainly there is some truth in this. It cannot be supposed that any mortal upon earth should infallibly mark the presence in any other of the unpardonable sin. But if the expressions are carefully examined, they will be found to indicate something approaching this. The spirit of antichrist has occupied a large place in the Apostle's thought and description: and with reference to that he had said that the believer, having the unction of the Holy One abounding in him, knoweth all things, and can discern the evidence of a total rejection of the incarnate Christ. That this rejection will be final and absolute he cannot know; but he may see that it is at present confirmed, and must feel that for that sin committed by that sinner he cannot pray. The sinner and his sin must be left with God. We feel that the

Apostle would pray for it if he could, and would encourage us to pray for it if he could, but that there is an express interdict on this subject. Whether the sin may be consummated before the end comes, and the last breath of the Spirit's influence withdrawn from the soul before the soul draws its last breath, is left undetermined here, and, as we think, everywhere else in Scripture. But we must give our expositor's note.

"What the sin unto death is must appear to him who is content with John's answer obvious enough. It is that which, as the result of *impœnitentia finalis* (that is, a stiffnecked and consummate impenitence)—but one lasting until the consummation of the kingdom of Christ—has for its results death, that is, the (gradual) annihilation of the individual (Jas. i. 15), called elsewhere the second death; while the sin of him who receives the healing of redemption through grace does not issue in this death, and does not exclude the healed sinner from eternal life. But this sin unto death may appear outwardly in the most manifold forms; yea, in the present life, it is generally speaking never truly consummated. There is nothing so very mysterious in the sin unto death, as exegetes suppose; and so must reject the many definitions of it which have been attempted."

We are quite of the commentator's mind as to the general question here. There is by no means so much difficulty in the matter as St. John leaves it, especially if we connect his words with other express passages of Scripture. The Apostle leaves this awful truth without any further comment of his own. He speaks of it as of one that he must leave to the decision and the judgment of God: he implies that all will perfectly well understand that for it and for its forgiveness there can be no intercessory prayer. Yet with the most exquisite wisdom of charity he abstains from positively interdicting prayer for it, though no less than that can be his meaning. But it is certainly unaccountable that so accurate a critic and so close a thinker as Rothe should allow himself to import into the passage a meaning which is not there, and cannot be forced upon it, namely, that the sin unto death is a sin which has its gradual issue in the final extinction of the being. In general our expositor is very tenacious as to the right of Scripture to explain itself. Nothing is more repugnant to him than the habit of imposing a dogmatic meaning upon isolated passages, especially when that dogmatic meaning is of great importance. Yet here he deliberately sins against his own canon. There is not the shadow of ground for asserting that St. John ever connects



life and death with the notion of mere continuance in being and ceasing to exist. The man either has eternal life or he has not eternal life: in either case he is supposed to exist; and that which has been manifested as eternal life is a possession the absence of which is already death, and not called eternal death only because the charity of the Gospel abstains from the word while there is hope of its reversal. And what shall we say of the argument from the words of St. James? It is precisely of the same character as the forced and reckless exposition of that Apostle's reference to the absence of concupiscence in the regenerate. Here he is made to say that the conceiving lust bringeth forth sin; and that sin, when it has run its course, finishes with extinction. Surely such an interpretation of the word "finished" is contradicted by every instance of its use in the New Testament: it never connotes the end of anything save in the sense of its consummation. Can we suppose the Apostle to have meant that annihilation is the natural result of sin? This is contrary to the entire tenor of Scripture, which makes death the penalty inflicted on sin: not merely as its natural result, but as something superadded. There is no psychology within or without the Scripture which tolerates the notion that anything in sin tends of itself to the dissolution of the substance of the soul. According to Rothe's idea the end of every sinful creature in the universe must be annihilation in virtue of the destructive character of sin itself. But the history of iniquity, as read in the light of the present world, gives no sanction to the thought of any such disintegrating quality of evil. What we know of Satan and his angels tends the other way. And we may be very sure that whatever the penalty of transgression may be, it will be inflicted from without upon a nature fitted, as the Scripture says, for this destruction.

This reminds us of another passage of the volume in which the same doctrine is furtively introduced, with the same unhappy disregard of the inviolability of Scripture. It is introduced in connection with an exposition which we had not marked for comment; but it seems desirable to insert it here. The text is, "He that doeth the will of God abideth for ever;" and the exposition, apart from the closing words of it, is deeply interesting.

"In contrast with that internal vanity of human life which is directed to the world, John makes prominent the blessedness of the life which is directed to God and the performance of His will. The

majority of men think that man can have no greater reality in his aims than when they are pointed to sensible things. Piety is in common estimation pure ideology, at which the sound human understanding must only laugh. John, on the other hand, lays down the only rational idea. If there is to be anything solid in this world there must be a God; all else, taken in itself, is only phenomenon and appearance. And if the life of an individual man is to obtain any reality and solidity, it must hang upon that which is the only pure, Real Being; it must enter into fellowship with Him, and ever more perfectly resign itself to be an instrument of His will. This doing of the will of God is, in a literal sense, the only proper food of the soul of man, through which his sensuous and transitory life is transubstantiated into an eternal one. This we should then particularly lay to heart, when it becomes hard to us to do the will of God. For, the reality of our being is conditioned by this; and the question is of being or not being. . . . The abiding in eternity is made dependent on the energetic spirit which is devoted in active obedience to the Divine will. John regards the thought of eternal life, of an existence which is imperishable, and uninvaded by any power of time, as one that must impel them to the love of God and a perfect transformation of their course of life. That this great idea has so very little practical influence is one of the most lamentable facts in Christendom. Further, it is to be observed that, according to John, he who doeth not the will of God has no permanent existence in eternity."

But St. John does not say that. If such a thought had been in his mind he would have declared it, as his manner is, unambiguously. All he says is that the phenomenal world, with its vanities feeding the lusts of men, and the lusts themselves as fed by these vanities, is passing away, and will disappear. Substantial life in God, that which alone deserves the name of life, will be the heritage of those who do His will. That those who do not His will shall pass away with the phenomenal world, neither St. John nor any other writer in Scripture asserts. On the contrary, our Lord makes it most emphatic that the souls of all men survive the present state of things; and that He will create new heavens and a new earth, from which sinners shall be excluded: their doom being to be shut out from a new phenomenal universe which shall be both phenomenal and eternal. Hence, and this is the point of our objection to Rothe's view, eternal life and phenomena as such are never in Scripture made antithetical terms. In other words, created nature is not opposed to eternal life; nor eternal life opposed to created nature. That they are regarded as such

is the deep fallacy of all the speculation in this volume. If life in Christ is to be made the exact antithesis of created existence, then it must annihilate, of course, all sinners and all sin with the rest of the creation. But where then would place be found for that part of the saved multitude which is created and material? The issue of this notion is simply Pantheistic. And, if it is to be entertained, the entire Bible must be reconstructed. But to return to our extract. Assuredly, the fearful doctrine of the gradual annihilation of the sinner is not taught by St. John; and it is a most rash misuse of exposition to deduce it from his words. In the present possession of eternal life the Christian is warned against the love of the world, lest he should lose the inestimable blessing he already has. If he, the present possessor of eternal life, performs the will of God, he will abide an eternally living soul in God. If not, he will abide without his eternal life. Such passages as these must be taken to mean what they say, and not forced to yield deductions inconsistent with the rest of Scripture, otherwise great is the havoc that must result. For instance, St. Paul would be made to teach, in Cor. xv., that there is no resurrection of the wicked, in direct contradiction to his own words elsewhere and our Lord's testimony everywhere. St. Peter and some passages of the Apocalypse would be made to teach that the earth would disappear for ever; whereas other Scriptures affirm that the phenomenal world of man will be created anew.

But it is good to turn to a passage which we can entirely approve. It is one that has a peculiar force in these days of Comparative Religion, when the name of Jesus is placed as one among many given under heaven.

"We read here how highly the Apostle rates that which we call Christianity. It is to him the possession of an eternal life given directly by God; and by no means merely a moral illuminism. It is not merely doctrine or hope, not the compendium of new ethical motives and impulses, but a whole and perfect life, a life in itself eternal, which consequently is independent of the condition of our present sensible existence, which is not touched by the decease of our sensuous natural organism. It has its eternal ground in itself, because it is spiritual life. It is eternal life, which we did not beget in ourselves: it is given to us of God. In connection with this, it is absolutely bound up with Jesus the Son of God as its source; with the person of the Redeemer Himself: it is not the result of any particular teaching influence

coming from Him. It can be received and enjoyed by receiving the Lord Himself: Christianity is no other than an actual bond of life between us and Christ; and a Christendom sundered from Him there cannot be. We cannot do Him a worse service than when we bring down His religion from this its high elevation, in order, as we suppose, to accommodate it to the understanding of men; than when we place it in the category of other religions independent of Him. For, in that case, it must submit to the destiny of all *mere* religions; that is, it must decline and disappear after it has done its work, and has guided the consciousness of the generation beyond its own standpoint. To this eternal life of Christianity the Christian must be born again; and this takes place, not through any idealism of the human spirit, but through faith in the historical Individual Christ. Here is the point where high idealism and realism surely meet and are inseparably united.

"It is most certainly true that God has given us eternal life, and that He has given it specifically and exclusively in His Son. We cannot have fellowship with Christ, and not immediately have at the same time life. The Apostles were the first to make this experience: uniting themselves trustfully to Jesus, they experienced at once in their inmost souls a transformation which made their former life appear as death, and their present as actual and imperishable life. This fact is evermore repeating itself in us when we place ourselves in believing contact with Christ; and this itself would constrain us to recognise in Him a living source of eternal life, such as can be in none but God alone. A perfectly absolute objective severance and determination of the conflict between Christianity and the unbelieving world will not take place until the end of human history. By holding fast to Him humanity will actually be born again to everlasting life."

If space allowed, we should have selected a few passages bearing on Christian apologetics, which Rothe handles in a masterly way. One or two extracts we must give, as they meet the difficulties of many around us, but in the form of aphorisms:—"Men easily believe only that which they wish to believe. There is something humbling in this for us. God and Divine things are objects unwished by our hearts; on the other hand, worldly things are desirable: the former repel us, and the latter attract; we have no interest to be assured of God, but find our account in a certain obscurity with regard to Divine things; a God who is only the object of probable conjecture is more desirable than a God who is the object of absolute confidence." "In spite of the clear revelation of the Divine in us, we nevertheless complain of

the want of evidence in God's revelation of Himself. This is unreasonable. God could not evidence Himself more clearly without abolishing our inmost nature. A revelation of the Supreme which would constrain us in a sensible way to acknowledge Him is in itself impossible. We ought not to expect a plainer manifestation of God; but rejoice that we are now so constituted as to be able to believe in a revelation which does not enforce our assent. We shall, indeed, some time have sensible evidence, but then that free faith will be no more possible which becomes the nobility of our human nature. We then only believe when we can no longer withhold faith. John, on the contrary, starts from the pre-supposition that the testimony of God is greater than any other testimony. In the contest between Divine and human testimony he gives precedence in strength to the former." "It is to be carefully observed that St. John expressly carries up all the testimonies of God to His testimony concerning Christ. He sees in the revelation in Christ the substance of all Divine revelation. If any man would allow validity to the natural and even the earlier historical revelation of God, but not to those given in Jesus the Son of God, he has not yet true faith." "No tranquil observer can deny that the course of human things, under the guidance of God, has brought infinitely near to man the faith in Jesus as the Christ. If the whole history of our race does not issue in this, to bring men to acknowledgment of Christ as its Redeemer, at least all has been ordered as if that were to be the case. If it is not the will of God that we should believe in Jesus, He has led men into a fearful temptation. Striving to keep in view a pure idea of God, we cannot but ascribe to Him nevertheless such a design."

These are but specimens of the high tone assumed by this apologist for Christianity. His notion is that all the facts of our own nature, all the consciousness of history, all the phenomena of the Saviour's life, and all the effects of it in the history of the Church, make it impossible to retain the belief in God, without superadding the belief in Jesus as the Son of God. Every one knows that this Epistle closes with what seems to be a most glorious and absolute tribute to Jesus as the true God and eternal life. Every one knows also that many believing commentators suppose that the "true God and eternal life" refers not to the Son but to the Father. Rothe has most elaborately and most satisfactorily proved that the tribute is expressly offered to the Son. "In His Son

Jesus Christ" gives the nearer definition of one being in the True Being, the concrete form of it: in that we are *in* His Son Jesus Christ, and have fellowship with Him. That by reason of our being in the Son we are actually in Him that is true; the True Being is, of course, only possible so far as the Son is Himself this essentially True Being. Accordingly St. John establishes this most decidedly in the words that follow: "This is the true God and eternal life," words which are substantially the reason assigned for what had just been said. The only natural and obvious reference, the only one that does no violence to the language, of the "This" is not to God, but to the subject immediately preceding "His Son Jesus Christ." This precisely harmonises with the whole context, and the deep thought it unfolds. The subject is everywhere, from verse 11 onwards, that the Redeemer is, and that in Him is, eternal life. This idea is in the highest degree Johannæan. It is the foundation of St. John's religious consciousness that the being of the Redeemer is in the fullest sense Divine; that there is for us no other being of God than that in Him; and, moreover, that His being is the true, imperishable existence, eternal life itself: whence it follows that fellowship with Him is the essential possession of eternal life. Eternal life is, therefore, an appropriate predicate of the Redeemer.

The last words of the Epistle, which are in a certain sense the last words of revelation, are the exhortation to keep ourselves from idols. The exhortation springs naturally from the thought of verse 20, that the Redeemer is the true God and eternal life. For the idea of the true God immediately suggests that of its opposite, the false gods or idols. Every departure from Christ to any other, be he or it whatever it may, is simply and purely idolatry. And this is the solemn thought that is delivered as a final warning to his readers and to all men for ever. Faith in the Redeemer has been the theme throughout the chapter; and it could have had no more appropriate conclusion than this. Rothe thinks that St. John had a more determinate view of the contrast between the Redeemer as the true God and the idols; inasmuch, that is, as in opposition to the *images* of the false gods, the Redeemer as the true *Image* of the invisible God is the true object of adoration. While the idolatry against which St. John warns is in a wider sense (as in Eph. v. 5; Col. iii. 5) to be understood of all that is inconsistent with faith in the Saviour and perilous to that

faith, yet we must not include the thought of the possibility of relapse into the idolatry proper of heathenism; the danger of such apostasy, in the midst of so many domestic and social temptations to it, being imminent in the case of weak Christians in that day. The political persecutions that were coming, and the studied attempts soon made to blend all religions in one absolute gnosis, increased that danger. We may close with our author's noble words :

“ In this is contained the sublimest doxology which John could upraise to Christ. Everything falls under the category of idolatry which means apostasy from the Redeemer. Christ is that holy Image, that revelation of God given by God Himself, through the religious acknowledgment and reverence of whom alone true devotion is possible, or any piety that unites us with the true God. That adoration of the Redeemer, therefore, which is often regarded as an invasion of the prerogative of the One God, John exhibits as rather the only cultus which is well pleasing to the Supreme: Jesus Christ alone reveals God truly, and that for all men universally. And this He does notwithstanding His servant-form. He who seeth Him with the Father; he who denies the Father in Him does not know the Father at all. This manifestation in the middle of human history is strictly and properly the polestar, keeping which in view we find all things adjusted in their right place. To fasten the gaze of our inner man always and unvaryingly on Him, and at the same time to receive into ourselves the lineaments of His manifestation more and more purely and distinctly, is the great art on which the wisdom of Christian life rests: it is the source of all that which we call the true simplicity of that life.”

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# LITERARY NOTICES.

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## I. THEOLOGICAL.

### JANET'S FINAL CAUSES.

*Final Causes.* By Paul Janet, Member of the Institute, Professor at the Faculté des Lettres of Paris. Translated from the French by William Affleck, B.D. With Preface by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1878.

TREATISES on teleology have generally assumed one or the other of two characters. Their authors have either, as in the cases of Paley and Derham, confined themselves chiefly to the elaboration of instances of design; or, as in the cases of Kant and, in a less degree, of Lesage, they have devoted their attention to the criticism of the doctrine. Of these two classes of books there can be little doubt as to the relative value. The former multiplies illustrations and phenomena, the mere multiplication of which beyond a certain point is unnecessary and in very small measure helpful to the conclusion. Whereas the latter determines the limitations of the argument, its intrinsic worth, and its inviolability by opposed hypotheses, and imparts all that confidence which results from the knowledge of precisely how far one's position is invulnerable. M. Janet's treatise belongs to the second of these classes, and is by far the ablest in its sphere. It appeared, in the original French edition, in 1876, and has been greeted by an ever-increasing circle of readers with not undeserved applause. Six months ago the French correspondent of one of the most influential newspapers described its publication as "certainly an event in science." If for "science" be substituted "philosophy"—according to a distinction insisted upon by Bacon, the forgetfulness of which has wrought too much mischief in modern speculation to be observed without protest—that description will be readily accepted by the candid, whether their own views agree or disagree with those of M. Janet.

The general question of finality divides itself into two parts,



of which the object of the first is to show that finality is a law of nature, whilst the second has to determine the first cause of finality. To discuss such problems satisfactorily, several qualifications are necessary. Without an accurate acquaintance with the principles, history, and tendencies alike of mechanical and of biological science, the materialistic position could hardly either be fully understood or hopefully assailed; and without much speculative facility and an intimate knowledge of the course of modern metaphysics, the doctrine of an intelligent First Cause could scarcely be recovered from the hands of those who have denied and tried to destroy it. M. Janet was known from his previous publications to possess all these qualifications, and he has certainly shown himself in the present case to deserve to be esteemed as the worthiest champion of Spiritualism against all its foes, of whatever school. In a preface, written specially for this English edition, he thus describes the difference between his own work and that of his predecessors upon the same side. "At the present day the mere adding of facts to facts no longer suffices to prove the existence of a design in nature. . . . The real difficulty is in the interpretation of these facts; the question is regarding the principle itself. This principle I have endeavoured to criticise. I have sought its foundations, authority, limits, and signification, by confronting it with the data and the conditions of modern science, as well as with the doctrines of the boldest and most recent metaphysics. If my book has any interest, it is in having set forth the problem in all its complexity, under all its aspects, without dissembling any difficulty, and in presenting all the interpretations. Apart from every conclusion, I think I can present it to philosophers of all schools as a complete treatise on the subject. Considered in this point of view, it will at least have, in default of other merit, that of utility." There can be no doubt as to the utility of the book. No other furnishes such effectual weapons against one of the most dangerous forms of modern unbelief. It is remarkable for its fairness in dealing with objections and difficulties, which are as far as possible stated in the very words of those by whom they have been urged. Whilst it is not an absolutely "complete treatise," the region of morality being left almost untouched, it has the merit of being relatively complete—more comprehensive than any previous work upon the subject, purely philosophical in spirit and in form, and lucid and intelligible as only a Frenchman who was at home in his subject could make it.

There are several notable features in M. Janet's contribution to this question. The majority perhaps of his predecessors treat finality as an *à priori* and necessary principle, on a level in that respect with the more general principle of causality. M. Janet, on the contrary, argues from the fact that there are a great number

of phenomena which do not suggest in any manner the idea of an end, whilst the idea of effect is universal, and maintains that finality is not a first principle, but "a law of nature, obtained by observation and induction." "Just as (he writes) the naturalists admit general laws, which are, as they say, rather *tendencies* than strict laws (for they are always more or less mixed with exceptions)—the law of economy, the law of division of labour, the law of connection, the law of correlation: so there is a law of finality which appears to embrace all the preceding laws, a tendency to finality, a tendency evident in organised beings, and which we suppose by analogy in those that are not." The whole of the first book is devoted to the maintenance and illustration of these points. Starting from the principle "that when a complex combination of heterogeneous phenomena is found to agree with the possibility of a future act, which was not contained beforehand in any of these phenomena in particular, this agreement can be comprehended by the human mind only by a kind of pre-existence, in an ideal form, of the future act itself, which transforms it from a result into an end," he examines the process of analogy by which that principle, known to be true in the case of our own industry, is inferred also of the industry of other men, of the instincts and functions and organic formations of animals, and last of all of the industry of nature generally. Having thus shown that the given phenomena are sufficiently explained by the doctrine of finality, he demonstrates the insufficiency of every other interpretation. The mechanical hypothesis is excluded upon the threefold ground—that it violates all the laws of analogical reasoning by forcing us to call in question even the existence of intelligence in other men; that it violates also all the laws of science, by compelling us to acknowledge an absolute hiatus between the phenomena of nature and the intelligence of man; and that it leads ultimately to a contradiction, because it is arrested at last in the presence of the human intelligence and constrained to recognise finality there. The theory of evolution, as applied to organised forms, is proved, on the one hand, to be not irreconcilable with the doctrine of natural finality, and, on the other, to be inexplicable without it. For that theory "either expresses nothing else than the gradation of organic beings, rising by degrees or intervals to less or more perfect forms,—and in this sense the theory, which is that of Leibnitz and Ch. Bonnet, contains nothing opposed to the doctrine of final causes, but even on the contrary naturally appeals to it: or else the theory of evolution is only the theory of chance under a more learned name,—it expresses the successive gropings attempted by nature, until favourable circumstances brought about such a throw of the dice as is called an organisation made to live; and, thus understood, it falls under the objections which such an hypothesis has at all

times raised." The first book is completed by a chapter which deals with all difficulties, from that of Lucretius and the Epicureans down to the most modern confusion of the final cause with the supernatural by Positivists, and the latest plea of naturalists that some organs are rudimentary and some adaptations apparently hurtful. Obviously the great value of this first part of the treatise consists in the absolute certainty with which step by step the argument advances, the thoroughness with which objections are met and removed, and the ever-increasing firmness and solidity of the foundations upon which the doctrine is made to rest. There is no evasion of difficulty. The inner citadel is surrounded by a wall, so skilfully built that there is left no possibility of breach.

If possible, M. Janet's second book is even more valuable than the first, inasmuch as its object is to maintain the physico-theological proof of the existence of God against the assaults of those who have denounced it. Necessarily the statement of that proof is no sooner completed than Kant's twofold limitation of it comes into view. And here the philosophical subtlety and boldness of M. Janet appear conspicuous. Other masters of eclectic spiritualism, MM. V. Cousin and Emile Saisset, for example, have accepted Kant's criticism, and recurred to other proofs to complete the demonstration beyond the point to which the doctrine of finality confessedly carried it. M. Janet, on the contrary, not only finds a clear *ignoratio elenchi* in the criticism he is engaged in repelling, but also shows that the two sides of that criticism contradict and destroy one another, whilst the gradual decay of Polytheism and Manicheism, in proportion as humanity has become more enlightened, testifies against it. Next the hypotheses of immanent and of unconscious finality in Schelling, Hegel, Fortlage, and the whole school of German Pantheism, are grappled with. And the entire argument is summed up thus: "It is combination—that is to say, the rencounter of a very great number of heterogeneous elements in a single and determinate effect—that is the decisive reason of finality. The agreement and proportion existing between such a rencounter and such an effect would be a mere coincidence (that is, an effect without a cause) if the effect to be reached were not itself the cause of the combination. Mechanism, in explaining the production of each effect by its own cause, does not explain the production of an effect by the rencounter and agreement of causes. It is thus condemned . . . to explain the universe by the fortuitous, i.e., by chance. Fortunate rencounters, favourable circumstances, unforeseen coincidences, must be multiplied without end, and continually increase in number, as the universe passes from one degree to another, from one order of phenomena to another. Is it sought to explain this faculty of combination which nature

possesses, and which is like that of the industrious animals and the innate art of instinct, by an analogous cause,—i.e., by a sort of instinct,—nature proceeding to its end, like the animal itself, without knowing and without willing it, by an innate tendency? In admitting such an hypothesis, we should do nothing but state the very fact of combination, while assigning it to some unknown cause, called instinct, by analogy, but which would tell nothing more than the fact to be explained, viz., that nature goes towards ends. The only way in which we can conceive an end is to view it as a pre-determined effect. But how can an effect be pre-determined except so far as it is designed beforehand, and pre-conceived in the efficient cause called to produce it? And can this preconception or predestination be for us anything but the idea of the effect? And, in fine, what can an idea be but an intellectual act, present to a mind in consciousness? Take away consciousness from an intellectual act, and what will remain but an empty, dead concept, a potential concept? Take away this concept itself from the efficient cause, and what will remain but an indeterminate tendency, which nothing will lead towards one effect rather than another? Take away even this tendency, and what will remain? Nothing—at least, nothing that can serve to connect the present with the future; nothing that can explain the rencounter of causes with the effect. This rencounter being the problem to be solved, even the hypothesis of tendency establishes a certain intermediary between cause and effect; the hypothesis of the concept adds to it a new intermediary; the conscious concept, such is the third degree, such is the true link of cause and effect. There the range of our vision stops; beyond begins the region of the Unknowable, which the Gnostics admirably called the Abyss and Silence. We too keenly feel the limits of our reason to make our own conceptions the measure of the Absolute Being; but we have too much confidence in His veracity and goodness not to believe that human conceptions have a legitimate and necessary relation to things as they are in themselves. . . . Such a hypothesis (the highest that the human mind can form regarding the Supreme Cause of the universe) may well be but an approximation to the truth, and a human representation of the Divine nature; but although inadequate to its object, it does not follow that it is unfaithful to it. It is its projection into a finite consciousness, its translation into the language of men, which is all that philosophy can demand" (pp. 441, 442).

A chapter on the "Supreme End of Nature,"—which M. Janet makes to be, not God Himself, since that would argue some original imperfection in God, nor man, since that would argue that the end was not adequate to the cause, nor *à fortiori* the creatures inferior to man, but morality,—naturally completes the treatise. Several appendices follow, in the first and most im-

portant of which the problem of induction is discussed. The Scotch solution by the doctrine of the stability of the laws of nature is rejected on the ground that that doctrine is itself a consequence of induction, which is regarded as reducible to the two propositions, that "every constant coincidence of phenomena has its reason of being," and that "a given cause (considered in the same point of view and in the same circumstances) always produces the same effect that has once been given."

It remains only to add that Mr. Affleck has accomplished his very difficult task of translation with great success. Except in two respects, an entirely inordinate attachment to the personal use of the verb "behave," and such a confusion of the auxiliaries "would" and "should" as amounts practically to the exclusion of the latter from the language, a purist could find but little fault. In an imperfect world it is perhaps vain to hope for a translation without blemish; and we are grateful to Mr. Affleck for his correct, fluent, easy rendering of a work which in less skilful hands would have suffered much.

#### PHILIPPI ON ROMANS. VOL. I.

*Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans.* By Friedrich Adolph Philippi, Doctor and Ordinary Professor at Rostock. Translated from the Third Improved and Enlarged Edition. By the Rev. J. S. Banks, Manchester. In Two Volumes. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1878.

THIS volume of 421 pages extends to the seventeenth verse of the eighth chapter. It is worthy to rank high among the many excellent foreign works, for access to which English readers are indebted to the enterprising ability of the Messrs. Clark. Nor must the scholarly translator go unthanked, who, while faithfully discharging the duties of a Wesleyan minister, finds time thus to enrich our Biblical literature. In an exposition of words and phrases, fulness of knowledge, keenness of perception, and soundness of judgment are more to be desired and expected than elegant flow of diction. Good commentaries are generally abrupt in style, as the most fluent are often the most shallow. It is but just praise to say the work before us belongs to the former class. In his lucid introduction, our author shows that the Roman Church, consisting of Jews and Gentiles, was probably formed by believers soon after returning from the Pentecostal baptism at Jerusalem. The Romish tradition of its founding by St. Peter is properly treated as a "fable," because, *inter alia*, it conflicts with Paul's principle of not building on another man's foundation. This portion of Holy Scripture needed

no lengthy defence of its authenticity or canonicity, which, from the first, have been almost undisputed. Philippi sees good reasons for concluding that, according to the subscription, the epistle was written from Corinth about A.D. 58, or 59, and sent by the hands of Phebe, on her "casual journey" to the imperial city, some while prior to the Apostle's first visit. "The epistle was to be a substitute for Paul's personal preaching in Rome (comp. i. 15). Hence it contains, as no other does, a systematic doctrinal exposition of the specially Pauline gospel. . . . The didactic Roman epistle stands in a similar relation to the polemic Galatian epistle, as the Ephesian to the Colossian epistle." (Intro. p. 10.) An interesting *excursus* of twenty-two pages on the Protevangelium, (Gen. iii. 15) first published in 1855, is interjected at the end of the fourth chapter, proceeding on the maxim of Augustine, "The New Testament is enclosed in the Old, the Old is disclosed in the New."

Our commentator's method is rigidly critical, abounding in Greek and Latin quotations, but seldom done into English. The work is evidently addressed to the learned, though even they would have found it a great convenience had the Greek text been placed at the head of the page, as in most of our English commentaries. Few will be able to read it thoroughly without very frequent reference to the Greek Testament.

The theology is refreshingly evangelical, following the general lines of Augustine and Luther, yet at times differing from both, and always evincing vigour and independence of thought. On the doctrine of sin, vicarious atonement, justification by faith, the relation of justification to sanctification, the proper Divine Sonship of our Lord, and everlasting punishments and rewards, rationalism receives no quarter, and by the maintenance of positive Gospel truth is made to appear alien to Holy Scripture. On some subordinate matters, such as the *spirituality* of the Israelites, whether Jews or Gentiles believing, who stand as the beneficiary heirs of the blessings promised to the seed of Abraham, Philippi's sound interpretation agreeably contrasts with much of the wild talk we hear about superseding this dispensation of the Spirit by a sort of restored Jewish theocracy. The morbid sentimentalism, too, of much modern teaching may find its rebuke in such clear notes as this:—"ὀργὴ θεοῦ (Rom. i. 18). Just as little as ἀγάπη is *manifestation* of love, is ὀργή *manifestation* of wrath, as *metonymia causæ pro effectu* = κόλασις, τιμωρία. Rather does ὀργή denote an inner antagonism of the divine nature itself, the inwardly energetic antagonism and repellent force of its holiness in relation to human sin; which divine affection, without doubt, finds its expression in the infliction of punishment" (p. 44).

The excellence of the work as a whole, however, must not blind us to questionable positions necessary or incidental to the theo-

logical school to which the writer belongs. To say, for instance, that "the work of atonement and justification conditioned thereby, as the *τερέλαστρον* of the Lord on the cross testifies (John xix. 30), is finished with the death of the Atoner" (p. 204), may mean that justification by virtue of the atonement passed *at that time* upon the *race*, in relation to its guilt incurred by Adam, and not immediately after the perpetration of the sin; but that sense would deprive the pre-ordained atonement of efficacy for pardon in pre-Christian ages (see Rom. v. 18). Or it may mean that the relation of justification to the atonement was fixed at the period of the Lord's death; but that would conflict equally with the truth; seeing the same relation held from the beginning. Or it may mean that all who should be justified subsequently to the death of the Cross, as individual believers, were individually justified at the hour of that death; but that would disagree with the fact that sinners, according to Scripture, are not personally justified until they believe (see *e.g.* Acts xvi. 31; Rom. iii. 30; iv. 24). Neither does *τερέλαστρον* imply any of these meanings.

On the righteousness which came "*upon all men* unto justification of life" (Rom. v. 18), Philippi says, "that by *πάντες ἄνθρωποι* are only meant all that believe," and thus he ignores the deliverance of the race as such, by the last Adam, from the guilt incurred by the first Adam; a justification, which by no means involves as he seems to think, the final "universal restoration" of all men. This limitation mutilates the apt and striking antithesis between the condemnation of all men through the offence of one, and the justification of all men through the righteousness of one; so leaving the condemnation of all to be balanced by the justification of a part, and that without anything in the passage to require or warrant the limitation. To quote 1 Cor. xv. 22, in support of this one-sided contraction is only to spoil the same antithesis in one more text; for the "all" made alive in Christ are the same "all" as died in Adam.

Philippi rightly says, in reference to "*where*" (Rom. v. 20), "In the same sphere in which sin increased, grace abounded beyond measure"; but wrongly adds, "this sphere is no other than the nation of Israel placed under the law." The scope and connection of the passage seem to require that we understand the sphere to be as wide as human nature.

As little can we agree with our erudite author when he attributes the inward conflict between good and evil set forth in Rom. vii. to the *regenerate* state of the apostle and other believers. No argument is adduced sufficient to overthrow the reference of the conflict to the struggles of an unregenerate soul awakened by the word and spirit of God to a sense of the evil of his sin, as in the penitents David (Ps. li.), the jailer (Acts xvi.), Saul himself (Acts viii.), and many others, whose entrance into the peace of

believing has been preceded by futile and painful endeavours to fulfil the law. The "all manner of concupiscence," the being "dead," "sold under sin," doing what he hated, captivity to the law of sin, the presence, power, and activity of sin, and the extreme wretchedness by which the state is characterised, correspond to the experiences of the penitent sinner better than to those of men enjoying the purity and tranquility of the new birth. Notwithstanding comparison with Gal. v. 17, the passage will not help the Calvinistic view. The text in Galatians points out, in the abstract, the opposition of "the flesh," showing how powerless Christian disciples would be if they became subject to its dominion. But surely, considering what "the works of the flesh" are as mentioned in verses 19-21, we are not to suppose believers are so subject.

Again, after well indicating the distinction between the witness of God's Spirit, and of our own to adoption (Rom. viii. 16), Philippi falls somewhat short of the whole truth when he observes, "But the latter (Spirit of God) witnesses this not by an immediate assurance, but by means of the general word of promise which He applies to the particular individual in whom He dwells" (p. 419). This is to lose sight of the distinction just made; for it resolves the witness of the Spirit into a process of reasoning to a conclusion from the promises as the premisses, or else it identifies it with ascertaining the truth of a fact previously existent; whereas the witness of the Spirit, as distinguished from that of our own spirit, is a direct testimony to the fact of our adoption.

Philippi clings to the imputation of Christ's righteousness to believers; which implies an exchange of places between Christ and them, that is, Christ takes their place in sin, and they His in righteousness. But He nowhere in Scripture finds a basis for the dogma. Indeed, while Adam's sin was imputed to the whole species, and the sin of the species imputed to Christ, and faith is counted for righteousness; neither in the Old Testament or the New is the righteousness of Christ ever imputed to believers. Of this our author appears to be well aware; for on Rom. iv. 6, he says "we must not, with the older exegetes, supply *Χριστοῦ*, by which course we should get the doctrine of the *justitia Christi imputata* in a directly scriptural expression" (p. 117.) He can reach the doctrine only "by a natural consequence" as he thinks "from the Pauline order of thought." And yet he reiterates it as if it were expressly revealed. On the contrary, we deem it an incongruous addition to the Pauline doctrine. By that righteousness of Christ in which He made atonement we are saved. And at page 279 Philippi says the *δικαίωμα* of Christ "is the death of Christ upon which the Apostle has hitherto exclusively based our reconciliation and justification." Our justification is



thus *based* upon the righteousness of Christ: the *benefit* of His righteous death is imparted to us: we are saved *for the sake* of Christ, because He became our substitute. But that is very different from the righteousness of Christ "imparted to us by way of gift" (p. 272), or "imputation of the righteousness of Christ" (p. 281). The more correct expression "justification *depending* on Christ's righteousness" (p. 269) is inconsistent with the words on the same page referring to the same gift as "*consisting* in the imputation of the righteousness of Christ in justification." An admissible sense may be put on the the words, "'faith is reckoned as righteousness,' seeing that this is done by grace for the sake of Christ's righteousness"; but it is simply a *petitio principii* to take this "as equivalent to the proposition: 'Christ's righteousness is reckoned to the believer as righteousness'" (p. 172). To Calvinistic theologians there is a charm in the supposed parallel between the imputation of our sin to Christ, and of His righteousness to us; whereas the true parallel is between the imputation of the first Adam's sin to us, and of our sin to the last Adam. In Rom. v. 15 the gift of God (*χαρισμα*) needs no imputation of Christ's righteousness for its complement as Philippi imagines; for that is found in the *death* of many "through the offence of one." The notion of complete "exchange of places" tends to obscure the simple but real substitution of Christ for us under the penalty of the broken law.

Taken, however, with a grain of Arminian, or more accurately Pauline, salt, the commentary before us, added to the multitude already in existence, is no superfluity, but a valuable acquisition for which earnest students of the Word will be thankful. We have noticed several typographical errors.

## HAGENBACH'S HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION, VOL. I.

*Hagenbach's History of the Reformation in Germany.*

Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1878.

AMONG the dishonourable tactics of the Anglican Romanisers, from the rise of their school under the name of Tractarianism to the full-blown Ritualism of the present day, has been the habit of disparaging the Reformation and calumniating its great leaders. Martin Luther, the most central figure, whom millions of intelligent Christians have delighted to honour, has been aspersed vigorously by Dr. Newman, Mr. Ward, and their party, and on other grounds, even Dr. Mill and Sir W. Hamilton some years ago appeared as assailants; but his vindication by such defendants as Ranke and Hare, has left his reputation much less damaged than that of his opponents. On the maxim, as it might seem, that if plenty of mud be thrown some of it will stick, extravagant

impugners of the virulent type of Dr. Littledale and the *Church Times* persist in vilifying the men to whom, as instruments of Divine Providence, Christendom owes an immense debt of gratitude for the Christian light and liberty enjoyed during the last three centuries. True the calumniators would bestow very little attention on those mighty leaders if it were not that by discrediting them, it is hoped to discredit the Reformation itself, and the vital truths of which it was the embodiment. But even if they could succeed in fastening grave charges upon the teachers, it would not necessarily and logically follow that the doctrines taught were false, and that the changes inaugurated were correspondingly evil. That is a test which no system in the world is less able to bear than that of the Romish and Anglican sacerdotalists. While therefore some are striving to obfuscate the public mind respecting the facts of the wonderful upheaving which distinguishes the sixteenth century from all others, it is satisfactory to Christian believers, as it is a gain to the cause of true Christianity, to see another history of the Reformation written in the popular style of the volume before us, so excellently done into English, and marked by the fulness of knowledge, the carefulness of investigation and statement, and the philosophical insight already known to characterise the works of Professor Hagenbach.

The leading spirits of the Reformation, like the early Methodists, had no premeditated plan, and scarcely a preconception of the extent and shape of their movement. Step by step they entered into the openings of Providence, not knowing whither they were to be led. It is the office of the scientific historian of the Reformation to trace as far as possible the manifold influences at work, and the relation of cause and effect in the successive stages of progress, indicating how the whole, though disjointed and perhaps chaotic in the eyes of its immediate subjects, nevertheless possessed, like nature, the beautiful unity which was derived from the supreme design and control of the Divine mind. Accordingly Dr. Hagenbach presents to the reader's view, not a heap of fortuitous events, but an account showing something of a Divine mastery and order in the transactions of the time, impressively illustrative of our Lord's overruling and gracious presence with His militant Church. Under God many forces converged to produce the Reformation. The Gospel flame, which the middle ages never wholly extinguished, was raised from time to time by the noble testimonies of the Wyckliffs and the Husses. The great work was also aided by the "Humanists" in the latter end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries, who, notwithstanding their tincture of classical paganism, and their scant subjective acquaintance with evangelical truth and grace, did much to expose the fœtid rottenness of the Romish

fabric. There was the reaction of European public opinion against the absurd dogmas which, with many of the priesthood, were but the husk of an ill-concealed infidelity, as well as against the lax morals and hypocritical hierarchism of the time with its infamous traffic in indulgences. Political complications played their part too, sometimes for, and sometimes against the good work. Probably had there been no jealousies or antipathies between the civil powers the reformers might at some crises have experienced a universal proscription. These and similar causes, but especially the revival of learning and the invention of printing, synchronised in the order of Providence with the qualification and call of Luther, Zwingli, and their fellow-workers for that stupendous struggle and victory which through all time must rank as the greatest religious movement yet experienced in Europe since the first propagation of Christianity.

The interest of this volume, which deals with the Reformation in Germany, and German Switzerland, is largely due to the clear portraiture of the principal characters. The brave Reuchlin whose love of sacred knowledge broke through all restraints of custom and prejudice, the chivalrous knight Ulrich Von Hutten, erroneously supposed to be the author of the *Letters of Obscure Men* which so mercilessly scathed the papists, Erasmus whose advanced scholarship was said to lay the egg which Luther hatched, but whose timidity kept him aloof from the Reformation, the godly educationist Jacob Wimpheling, the fiery fanatical Karlstadt, and the wild prophets of Zwickau, Frederick the Wise, Tetzel and Samson, the pope's dealers in indulgences, the learned and clear-sighted Œcolampadius, who, unlike Erasmus, identified himself thoroughly with the good cause, Francis Von Sickingen whose castle at Ebernburg was a refuge for persecuted reformers, and many other friends and foes, are briefly yet graphically sketched. But of course the prominent figures are Luther and Zwingli with their respective companions Melancthon and Leo Juda. Between Luther and Zwingli there were points of striking similarity and contrast. We have a fine specimen of discrimination in our author's comparison of these two foremost men. "In their personalities they have much in common with each other. Vigour, earnestness, courage, sterling worth and decision of character, sincere and hearty piety, challenge our admiration in both. Both are men of their people, loved and honoured by those who approach them without prejudice, hated by the adversaries of light and by time-servers; in both we discern an equal readiness to lay down property and life for the cause of God, the cause of Jesus Christ, in which they perceive the well-being of humanity to be involved. The necessity for the individual I of the natural man to perish, in order that it may attain to true life as a new man in Christ, may be gathered from Luther's preaching: as

well as from Zwingli's; it is proclaimed as by *one* mouth by both these witnesses for the truth. . . . Luther had not *more sensibility* (for understanding and sensibility maintained the most perfect equipoise in Zwingli), but more *imagination*, more *buoyancy* of mind, than the latter. Zwingli, on the other hand, excelled Luther in firmness and security of judgment in individual cases. He was more sober and judicious, and, manifestly, more free from prejudices; and while Luther not seldom bordered on fanaticism, so that there was but a step between his enthusiasm and downright exaggeration, Zwingli always abides within the bounds of moderation. It is, therefore, almost laughable when Luther, in the midst of his fanatical fury of passion, calls honest Zwingli a fanatic,—a man who was so far removed from all fanaticism! It must be that by this name it was intended to designate the idealistic feature of his character (and that, indeed, was obnoxious to the blunt realism of Luther). . . . Both may be regarded as representatives of their respective nations; they issued from the people, and they had perfect command of the language of the people, being never at a loss for the right expression, blunt though that may have been, and bordering on the plebeian. The prevalent quality of the one was a mystical intuition; that of the other strong practical sense. . . . We find in Luther more of the profound investigator, whose attention is directed chiefly to the inner world and its mysteries; in Zwingli, more of the sober thinker, who scans all things with the utmost consideration, and applies all things to practical life and morals in the civil and domestic community. . . . The predominant faculty of Zwingli's mind was reflection; the predominant faculty of Luther's, intuition" (pp. 351-8). It might be due to some of these qualities that Zwingli so far excelled Luther in freeing himself from the mediæval absurdities of the "real presence," though the former, to say the least, seems to have taught less than the truth respecting the covenant character of the Eucharist.

Sir W. Hamilton hinted that the religious and social evils of Germany in this century might have their germs in Luther's teaching. For the most part the charge was refuted by Arch-deacon Hare in his *Vindication of Luther*. Still it would be hazardous to affirm that there was no truth at all in the suggestion. On the subject, for example, of inspiration, in which Germany has receded to such lengths during the last fifty years, Luther appears to have tested the inspiration of a sacred book too much by the standard of his own judgment respecting its doctrinal value. Thus tried, few of the sacred books are safe. Following this rule he disliked the Apocalypse, and called the Epistle of James "an epistle of straw" because it seemed to clash with his views on the subject of justification. But, in justice to this great and devout man, Hare points out from the context that

Luther is giving a *comparative* estimate. After mentioning John's Gospel and first Epistle, the Epistles of Paul, especially Romans, Galatians, and Ephesians, and Peter's first Epistle, Luther's remark is, "These are the books which set Christ before you, and teach you everything necessary and salutary for you to know, even though you were never to see any other book or doctrine. Therefore the Epistle of St. James is an epistle of straw by the side of these; for it has no true evangelical character" (*Vindication of Luther*, p. 216). Moreover, in all editions after 1526 he omitted the objectionable phrase; and *Gaussen* (*Canon of the Holy Scriptures*) says he "afterwards retracted that imprudent saying." Nor must it be forgotten that some opinions were held by Luther which were not much shared by the other Coryphe. It is noteworthy that Hagenbach while mentioning this dislike of Luther to the Epistle, makes no reference to these important qualifications. Indeed, we are not thoroughly satisfied with the view of inspiration attributed to Luther by our author with evident approval, when he says,—“Luther held, as the Christian faith has always held, the Bible to be the work of the *Divine Spirit*. But he did not with scrupulous anxiety strive to hold this spirit captive to the letter. And although, in contradistinction to fanatic enthusiasts, he rated the *written* word of God above all else, he also took it for granted that the Spirit of God bloweth where He listeth; and, in conformity to this belief, he regarded the beautiful songs of the Church, which contributed to his edification, as promptings of the Holy Spirit, they having originated in impulses similar to those which gave birth to the pious songs of the Prophets and the Psalmists” (p. 161). From the notion of inspiration here implied it is not a great step to the modern theory which identifies the genius of Shakespeare with the inspiration of Paul. And it need have been no marvel if the peasants led by Münzer and the fanatical prophets of Zwickau, though condemned by Luther, laid claim to inspiration in defence of their extravagant doctrine and practice.

Taken as a whole, however, the volume is a worthy enrichment of Reformation literature, the voluminous dimensions previously attained notwithstanding. A subject which the Protestant Churches can no more allow to die than British patriotism can become oblivious to its national history, is here treated in one of its most important sections, with a masterly hand. The work, so far as out, is learned and reliable without being tedious, compact yet luminous, and intensely interesting, and leaves in the reader's mind a zest, which anticipates with pleasure the appearance of the second volume.

**STOUGHTON'S RELIGION UNDER QUEEN ANNE AND  
THE GEORGES.**

*Religion in England under Queen Anne and the Georges,  
1702—1800.* By John Stoughton, D.D. Two Vols.  
London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1878.

STUDIES of the eighteenth century are accumulating upon us. Works like those of Lecky and Leslie Stephen deal chiefly with the social, moral and literary aspects of the period. Dr. Stoughton's field is the religious world. We do not think that the result of these fuller investigations will be greatly to modify the received impressions as to the character of the last century. Our knowledge on the subject is methodised and increased, our ideas are made more definite, but the outline remains the same. The more the history is studied, the more evident it will be that the rise of Methodism had as great an influence in the religious sphere in England, as the French Revolution had in the political across the Channel. It is, in fact, the great outstanding event in the period treated of in these volumes. Mr. Lecky has done full justice to this fact from his standpoint. Dr. Stoughton does the same. He says: "Methodism, in all its branches, is a fact in the history of England, which develops into large and still larger dimensions as time rolls on; this must be felt by every impartial historian, whatever may be his own private opinions." Methodists certainly are not likely to depreciate the greatness of the last century.

Dr. Stoughton's field embraces the whole religious life of England in all its forms and manifestations, not any single section or aspect of it. Laymen, like Johnson, Cowper, John Thornton, Raikes, Howard, Wilberforce, are not overlooked. Every church—Anglican, Independent, Baptist, Presbyterian, Wesleyan, Quaker, Moravian, Swedenborgian—together with offshoots such as the Kilhamite movement, receives its due share of attention. The relations of church and dissent, doctrinal controversies, the character of the preaching, worship and literature, the rise of modern missions and religious societies, are brought under review. The volumes throw considerable light on a fact of which not much is generally known—the decline of Presbyterianism in England, or rather its transition into Unitarianism. Let us hope that a like fate does not await the revived Presbyterianism of our own time. The safeguard is that contemporary Presbyterianism is organised into churches, instead of being left to the isolation of independent congregations. It is not very consistent in Unitarian teachers to proclaim their descent from the old Puritans, with whom they have so little in

common. A descent it is. The eighteenth century saw also the extinction of the Nonjurors and the rise of the Evangelical party.

Dr. Stoughton draws his material as well from unpublished as published sources. Scarce manuscripts and tracts in public libraries, local histories, family tradition and reminiscence have supplied many touches. Still these materials would avail little in unskilful hands. We have too many volumes which are the mere dry bones of history, without unity or informing soul. Dr. Stoughton's, of course, are no such hands. He not only paints but frames his pictures, and does one as skilfully as the other. The setting of circumstances and incident is always appropriate and in good taste. The volumes abound in vignettes and English interiors. Their charm consists in the mass of individual portraiture they contain. Many hundreds of writers, preachers, and other are characterised at greater or less length. These portraits impart life and animation to the pages. Familiar names become to us more than names, and many unfamiliar ones receive the honour due but long withheld. These latter will not be the least interesting to readers. We are taken into many corners and byeways and hidden nooks, where good lives were lived, and good work done, away from the dust and tumult of the world's highway. "To what is called the philosophy of history, these volumes make no pretension. . . . To be philosophical is to be polemical, and polemical discussion, properly so called, I have wished to avoid." We have almost too much of the "philosophy of history" in these days. Every little chronicler aspires to the part of Thucydides. It is refreshing to meet with one who is content, like Herodotus, to tell a plain story. Dr. Stoughton is wonderfully impartial, we had almost said neutral. If his pen is stealed with truth, it is also dipped in charity. We doubt whether one of those whom his pages commemorate, orthodox or heterodox, would object to the representations of opinion and character given. Notwithstanding the miscellaneous character of the contents, there is no confusion. The different threads are kept distinct. The volumes are discursive without being rambling.

Dr. Stoughton has elicited some new facts. One of the strong points relied upon by Atterbury in reply to the charge of treason, was that there was no place where conspirators could have met without discovery. He always lived at home, and, when in the Deanery, never stirred out of one room. "It is curious, after the lapse of so many years, that in 1864, a long closet in the Deanery was discovered behind the library fireplace, reached by a rude ladder, and capable of holding eight persons. Here according to a vague tradition before the discovery, secret consultations of the kind alleged might have been held."—Vol I. p. 121, 122.

The last days of Ken, the best of the Nonjurors, were in keeping with his life. "His days at Longleat are amongst the treasured memories of one of England's fairest spots; and his last journeys derive a tender pathos from the singular fact of his carrying his shroud in his portmanteau,—he remarking that it 'might be as soon wanted as any other of his habiliments.' He put it on himself some days before the last; and in holy quietness and peace, his death was as beautiful as his life. Not less beautiful was his burial. He was buried at Frome Selwood 'the nearest parish within his own diocese' to the place where he died, as by his own request 'in the church-yard under the east window of the chancel, just at sun rising, without any manner of pomp or ceremony, besides that of the order for burial in the Liturgy in the Church of England, on the 21st day of March, 1710, anno aetat 78.' Burial at night was the fashion of that age; how much more appropriate was the funeral of this eminent Christian in the early morning?"

As an example of the obscure worthies on whose course Dr. Stoughton succeeds in shedding some light, we may instance Harmer, whose "Observations on Scripture" struck out a new path in Biblical illustration in which many greater men have since followed. For fifty years he pursued his quiet course as Nonconformist minister in the village of Wattisfield, in Sussex. "Within a snug Nonconformist parsonage, not yet pulled down, he collected all the books he could procure bearing on the subject, and wrote to learned friends in every direction, seeking such assistance as they could render. In country lanes, running by pleasant homesteads, one can picture this retired student of the Bible, and of nature as its expository hand-book, taking his daily walk, botanising and musing on Scripture plants, flowers and trees, and trying to find resemblances to them in Suffolk hedgerows and gardens. A few of Mr. Harmer's letters have been published, and they exhibit him as an antiquary, describing coins, and rejoicing in a coronation medal of Charles I., which he had purchased for the sum of one shilling—a fact which may inspire envy in the breasts of modern collectors. His merits as a student do not seem to have been appreciated by his village congregation, nor were his 'Observations' at first duly estimated by some of his friends. 'I thought, sir,' said a lady, 'you would have published a *good* book.'" His flock do not seem to have known that their pastor was an author. For fifty years he addressed a flourishing congregation in a quaint, old-fashioned meeting-house; and fathers, with their sons, daughters, and grandchildren, learned to look up to their learned pastor with respect and love for his personal virtues and the exemplary discharge of his ministrations."

On the other hand, Risdon Darracott, one of Doddridge's



pupils, was an example of a fervent, powerful evangelist. He was settled at Wellington, Somerset, where he repeated Baxter's work at Kidderminster. "He traversed the country round, set up charity schools, promoted the circulation of religious books, and so diffused the power of Christianity, that 'some very profligate and abandoned sinners were deeply struck.'" Sunday ale-houses were empty, Sunday barbers idle, the streets cleared of loiterers. "He died at the age of 42, and his ministry proves, in connection with other instances, that this particular type of ecclesiastical character was not unknown in England during the first half of the eighteenth century."

Samuel Jones, an Oxford man, ejected from a Welsh living, kept an academy at Gloucester. He must have been a great teacher. Bishop Butler, Archbishop Secker, Dr. Samuel Chandler, Jeremiah Jones, author "A New and Full Method of Settling the Canonical Authority of the New Testament," were among the pupils, who studied logic as well as Greek and Latin, Jewish antiquities and Hebrew, the Talmud, Masora and Cabala. "On Wednesdays they read Dionysius's *Periegesis* with notes mostly geographical; and Isocrates and Terence were conned twice a week. The boys rose at five o'clock every morning and always spoke Latin, except when below stairs amongst the family." Jeremiah Jones was minister at Nailsworth in Gloucestershire, and died in 1724 at the early age of thirty-one. His work is still a standard authority on the subject, and had the honour of being printed at a University press. "The good man sleeps amidst the charming Cotswold scenery, in a burial ground called Forest Green, a cleared space in the heart of ancient woods, where Nonconformists in days of persecution had been wont to meet for divine worship."

Dr. Chandler wrote Greek as readily as English. He was minister of a Presbyterian congregation in the Old Jewry. Conversing once with a bishop on the defects of Dissenters, the latter said, "Why, doctor, do you not leave them?" on which Chandler replied, "My lord, I would, if I could find a worthier body of people."

Old John Hearn, the Oxford antiquary, has the following text on his gravestone: "Remember the days of old, consider the years of many generations: ask thy father, and he will shew thee, thy elders, and they will tell thee." George III. told the Countess of Huntingdon of a certain conversation between himself and a church dignitary. The bishop complained of the disturbance which some of Lady Huntingdon's students had made in his diocese. "Make bishops of them, make bishops of them," said the king. "That might be done," replied the bishop, "but, please your majesty, we cannot make a bishop of Lady Huntingdon." "It would be a lucky circumstance if you could," added

the queen, to which the king added, "I wish there was a Lady Huntingdon in every diocese in the kingdom." George the II.'s queen asked the eccentric Mr. Whiston, "What fault do people find with my conduct?" He answered, "The fault they most complain of is your majesty's habit of talking in chapel." She promised amendment, and asked the next fault. "When your majesty has amended this, I'll tell you of the next," was the ingenious reply. The same queen once asked Dr. Pearce, Bishop of Rochester, whether he had read the pamphlets of Dr. Stebbing and Mr. Forster upon the sort of heretics meant by St. Paul in Titus iii. 10, 11. "Yes, madam," replied the doctor, "I have read all the pamphlets written by them on both sides of the question." "Well," said the queen, "which of the two do you think to be in the right?" "I cannot say, madam, which of the two is in the right: but I think that both of them are in the wrong."

The volumes are evidently printed with great care, but every mistake is not excluded. Dr. Priestley's name is sometimes spelt Priestly. On p. 319, Vol. II., Father Berrington of Oscott figures as "Mrs. Berrington." These are printer's errors. Once Dr. Stoughton nods, Vol. I. p. 306, "A Hebrew Bible belonging to Schwartz, with his autograph and the chair in which he was accustomed to sit, are (?) preserved at the office of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel."

#### OOSTERZEE'S PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

##### *Practical Theology; a Manual for Theological Students.*

By Professor J. J. Van Oosterzee, D.D. Translated and adapted to the use of English readers by Maurice J. Evans, B.A., joint translator of Van Oosterzee's "Christian Dogmatics." London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1878.

THIS is certainly the most complete treatise on practical theology or "the science of labour for the kingdom of God" that we know. It comprises both the scientific treatment of the different branches of ministerial work, and the devotional treatment of ministerial life. The spirit which prevades such a book as Baxter's "Reformed Pastor," is combined with the spirit one has a right to look for in any exposition of the sciences which govern the relationships of a congregation and its leader. Nor, in the abundance of the material thus presented, is there any important omission. Ecclesiastical law is rightly relegated to the domain of historic theology; but due place is given to pastoral government and the maintenance of church discipline in the chapter which deals with Poimenics. Apostolics too receives no special section;

there is very little that may justly be comprehended under that title which will not be found in its proper position amidst the functions of the homilete or of the pastor, or in the appendix which is devoted to activities in behalf of those who stand outside the church. The publishers of "The Theological and Philosophical Library" have hitherto been very happy in their choice of text-books, and need be ashamed of nothing they have presented to their subscribers. This, their seventh volume, is in no respect inferior to any of its predecessors, whilst in a comprehensiveness which is not far short of exhaustiveness it surpasses several. No more thorough handbook on the matters which belong to his office and work is accessible in English to the minister or the theological student.

Of very great importance in all treatises of this kind is the author's standpoint. For so different is the conception of the position and work of the minister of the Gospel in the Roman and the Reformed churches, or in the case of individuals in writers of crypto-Catholic and of distinctly Protestant tendencies, that it would perhaps be impossible so to treat of practical theology as to satisfy equally the demands of either side. If the liturgical element in public worship were emphasised above the homiletical element, the Protestant would naturally object; and no less so the crypto-Catholic, were the liturgical element altogether subordinated to the homiletical. The consequence is that almost all ministerial handbooks may be separated into two classes, the boundary between which is very sharp and defined. No one can doubt upon which side of that boundary Dr. Oosterzee stands. From the year 1840, when he first lifted up his voice against the mytho-poetical hypotheses of the Straussian school, he has maintained his reputation as the ablest evangelical divine, "the Lange," of Holland, if less original and fertile than his German friend, not less genial, and more practical and sober. And there is no forgetfulness of his principles, and no diminishment of his abilities in this, his latest work. He is still, as he describes himself, "positive-Christian and also Evangelical-Protestant," concerned most of all about the honour of Christ, and allowing no other ultimate object of preaching than the edification or conversion of men. Indeed, one pre-eminent excellency of his book consists in that—the steady, persistent, dogged way in which he keeps before the reader the fact, that no ministerial work must aim at anything short of the spiritual good of those in connection with whom it is done. If it be allowable to speak of such a thing as the rectification of a minister's motives, when the two ideas of the ministry and of badness of motive are theoretically incompatible, such rectification would of necessity in some degree follow every thoughtful reading of Dr. Oosterzee's pages.

An introduction, devoted to the definition and to the history of the science of practical theology, is followed by a chapter in which the Divine institution of the Gospel ministry is examined and maintained. The work of a minister is readily classified under two heads, according as it is done with reference to the members of his congregation, or on behalf of the population outside the church. The former again subdivides itself into the duties of a pastor to his congregation in its totality, and his duties to its individual members. Homiletics and Liturgics naturally take their place under the former head, Catechetics and Poimenics under the latter, whilst the whole of a pastor's outside work is considered under either Halieutics, "the theory of the extension of Christianity," or Apologetica. And each section claims for itself three distinct types. It opens with a summary of its main propositions in larger print, followed by an exposition and defence of those principles in smaller print, concluded by a paragraph in still smaller print which refers the reader to further literature upon the subject, and reminds him of certain "points of enquiry" to which he may profitably give his attention. It will thus be seen that Dr. Oosterzee's treatment of his theme is both very full and very judicious and clear. Especially suggestive are the appended points of inquiry, as a single instance, taken haphazard, will show. The section devoted to the consideration of the sermon as an element of public worship closes thus:—"Is the preaching to be addressed to the church-going public, or to the Church of the Lord? To what extent can the congregation itself be said to proclaim the salvation in Christ? How far is the relation between preaching and worship susceptible of modification in the interest of both? Discussion of 1 Cor. iv. 1-5." The reader will not find these matters settled in the text of Dr. Oosterzee's book, though he will sufficient hints of the way in which the author would settle them. Dr. Oosterzee's object seems to have been, not to say all that could be said upon his subject (that would be to multiply his pages *ad infinitum*), but to say as much as would suffice to awaken both the attention and the conscience of every pastor into whose hands his book should come.

Amongst the more novel and salient features of the treatise must be mentioned also the very interesting chapters in each division which relate to the history and to the history of the literature of the various parts of Dr. Oosterzee's theme. Other ministerial handbooks are as a rule sadly deficient here. For it is neither caprice nor display which, in the introduction to any scientific investigation, brings its history under review. Not only is the genesis and development and present condition of the science thereby more satisfactorily explained than it can otherwise be, but also abundant safeguards are provided against error and

equally abundant hints for the further prosecution of the study. No homilete will henceforth be able to plead the lack of a text-book as an excuse for the fact that the history of the art of preaching is to him almost a *terra incognita*. In the hundred pages which Dr. Oosterzee gives to supplying that lack, not all indeed is done that needs to be done, but much is well done that has rarely if ever been attempted before. Nor is the quality of our author's contribution to this subject, or of Mr. Evans adaptation (whichever it may be—one principal blemish in the book is the impossibility of distinguishing with certainty the hand of the adapter from that of the author) by any means equal. Germany and Holland, and in a less degree Sweden and France, receive abundant attention from a mind obviously alive both to the faults and to the excellencies of the art of preaching, as it has been practised there. On the other hand the history of the English pulpit is very meagre, and not without some strange blunders, excusable if they are the author's, but which the adaptor should scarcely have allowed to pass without comment or qualification. And whilst thus Dr. Oosterzee deals amply with the theoretical branch of his subject, he omits to notice very few even of its most minute practical details. A minister, troubled by the failure of his week-night services and prayer-meetings, or hesitating as to the best method of retaining the children of his congregation and leading them to personal consecration, will find all such matters discussed, and will rarely fail to profit from our author's counsels. Best of all, the tone of the book is never doubtful. There is no section given up to the consideration of "unction," but at the same time there is no section in which unction is not considered. The homilete is never allowed to forget that his sermons will of necessity fail unless they give forth the clear and powerful echo of the testimony of salvation, and aim directly at the spiritual up-building of his congregation. The pastor must be faithful to God and to himself, is the central proposition of the theory of poimenics. The supreme rule of liturgics is, "no day without special secret prayer, without definite reading and reflection on Holy Scripture, without an inner laving in the refreshing and invigorating well-springs of a higher life." It is the same from beginning to end of these six hundred pages. Dr. Oosterzee has surpassed all his predecessors in that particular, that personal religion with him is not one, or the most desirable qualification, but the indispensable condition and *sine quâ non* of ministerial life. The ultimate aim of all practical theology is the fulfilment of the prayer in John xvii. 21. Practical theology is the science of the labour of those only who are *ministri a Deo facti in Ecclesiâ constituti*.

## FORBES'S PREDESTINATION AND FREEWILL.

*Predestination and Freewill, and the Westminster Confession of Faith.* By John Forbes, D.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

SOME years ago, Dr. Forbes, a minister of the Scotch Established Church, and now Professor of Oriental Languages at the University of Aberdeen, published a Commentary on Romans, containing, among many other good things, a very able dissertation on Predestination and Freewill. This dissertation, revised and enlarged, he has now republished in a separate volume. His professed object is to "relieve the tender consciences of those who fear that, by giving their signature to the *Westminster Confession*, they commit themselves to the obnoxious doctrines charged against Calvinism," by showing that the Confession does not "render it impossible to hold, what Scripture so plainly teaches, the boundless and impartial love, to every one of His creatures without reserve, of the great Father of all, 'who will have all men to be saved,' and is 'not willing that any should perish,' but that *all* should come to repentance," and that it does not limit salvation to a few arbitrarily elected and predestined by Him."

To speak generally, Dr. Forbes seems to us to be successful in his attempt to prove that the Westminster Confession does not absolutely exclude these great truths. He shows that it does not teach, as he admits that Calvin and Edwards taught, that the difference between the lost and saved originates entirely in God, and not at all in them. To the objection, "that the defence now offered of the Westminster Confession is not in accordance with the historical interpretation of that document, as determined both by the well-known sentiments of its authors, and by the general current of opinion ever since," he cleverly replies, that "no public and authoritative document is to be interpreted as enjoining anything further than what it distinctly states;" and that "the very forbearance to give distinct expression to these sentiments, shows that the authors of the Confession did not deem it expedient to enforce them" (p. 51). We are thankful to find, by the more careful study of the Westminster Confession, to which Dr. Forbes's book prompted us, that this venerable standard of the Presbyterian Churches is much less removed from the truth as we hold it than we formerly thought. And, for the pleasure of this discovery, we thank Dr. Forbes.

At the same time we must say that there are one or two stray expressions which Dr. Forbes does not explain satisfactorily, and that both he and the Confession differ from us in holding the unconditional perseverance of believers. This difference does not surprise us. For the doctrine in question, although it is, as we

think, plainly contradicted in Scripture, is not contradicted by our inner moral consciousness, and is therefore not likely to arouse the scruples which prompted Dr. Forbes to write.

So far, then, the book is successful. But it is also successful in a point much more important than this. It is one of the ablest refutations we have seen of the doctrine of Irresistible Grace, and of the concurrent doctrine of a Limited Atonement. In reference to Predestination and Election, Dr. Forbes's position is precisely our own. He says, "It is an alarming truth, the force of which we ought to be most cautious in weakening, that by the very nature of our constitution as freewill beings, God has given us the awful power to resist, if obstinately so inclined, the utmost striving of His Spirit with our spirit, and bring upon ourselves that state of spiritual insensibility and hardness which is called in Scripture 'the sin against the Holy Ghost,' 'which cannot be forgiven, neither in this world, neither in the world to come.'" "With every one God's Spirit is striving, from the first moment of moral consciousness, to recover him, or more correctly, to induce him to give his consent to his recovery from that state of corruption in which all are involved. This is what Christ has procured for every individual of Adam's race by His great work of redemption." But Dr. Forbes has done more than refute error. He has bravely attempted a task which nearly all the refutations of Calvinism evade, viz., to expound the great truths which the New Testament teaching about Predestination and Election was designed to set forth. This task he has attempted; and, in our view, with complete success. "Predestination assumes its true place as a blessed truth, assuring the believer that all his sin, and weakness, and dangers, have been fully anticipated and provided for, and every step in his onward progress pre-arranged and ensured, so that no unforeseen obstacle or enemy can arise, to make him come short of his eternal reward. What more delightful or consolatory truth could be imagined than that which creates the assurance that, amidst the seemingly fortuitous medley of good and evil which besets our path here below, all things are under the perfect regulation and control of a Heavenly Father, and that not the slightest occurrence can take place, even through the wayward wills of the wicked, that has not been foreseen and had its place adjusted beforehand, in the perfect plan of Him who overrules all things to work out His own great and glorious purposes, for the highest possible good of all!"

The work before us contains also a most able discussion and refutation of the practical fatalism taught in Edwards's famous treatise on the Will, and now revived in another form by Mill and Bain. This revival, outside the Church, of errors formerly taught within it, and the use of them as instruments of attack against Christianity, give to the matter of predestination a new

and great importance. Indeed, the old battle must be fought again, not now with men who proclaim Irresistible Grace, but with the worshippers of a blind, impersonal, irresistible Force. It is therefore all-important to show that "Necessity" has no support in Scripture. And, as affording splendid proof of this, we warmly commend to all thoughtful Christians Dr. Forbes's able dissertation on Predestination and Freewill. He who wishes for great intellectual gain at a small cost, cannot do better than buy this book, which costs only half-a-crown, and study it from beginning to end.

One remarkable omission we must note. Dr. Forbes seems to be utterly unconscious of the fact that, against the errors he so conclusively refutes, Arminius and the Remonstrants protested nearly three centuries ago. Indeed, it seems to us, that to every word about Predestination in the five Remonstrant Articles Dr. Forbes would joyfully subscribe. Nor does he betray any consciousness whatever that this protest has been kept up in this country and America by the unvarying testimony of the Methodist churches. He speaks twice of "Arminian and Pelagian error," but he does not refer to a single passage in proof that Arminius, and the Methodists, who are his modern representatives, teach the doctrines Dr. Forbes so ably refutes. Perhaps, however, the omission is intentional and wise. The book would probably have been less acceptable to Presbyterians, if it had come as an avowed defence of the teaching of Arminius. Dr. Forbes is ready to acknowledge "the error into which Calvin fell, of attributing reprobation solely and simply to the will of God." And, if he will erase the word "Arminian" we will join him in accepting heartily "the cardinal doctrine of Calvin's system, which he has so conclusively established in opposition to all [Arminian and] Pelagian error, that the salvation of the redeemed originates wholly with God, and is all, from first to last, solely the work of God's free sovereign will and grace, in their election, calling, conversion, renewal, and final sanctification, 'without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions or causes moving Him thereunto'" (p. 53). And we are ready to admit that Arminians generally have omitted from their teaching an important side of Scripture truth. They have done so because it has been grossly caricatured by others, and because the pressure of evangelical work has left them no leisure to unravel its intricacies.



## VAUGHAN'S SERMONS BEFORE THE UNIVERSITIES.

*My Son, Give Me Thine Heart.* Sermons preached before the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, 1876—8. By C. J. Vaughan, D.D., Master of the Temple, and Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. London: Macmillan and Co. 1878.

THESE sermons must not be judged by the ordinary sermon standard; they were delivered in the University pulpits of Oxford and Cambridge by a "select preacher." This circumstance should be remembered in estimating their appropriateness and worth. The practice of appointing eminent ministers of the Established Church to preach occasionally at the national seats of learning is of more than local interest. No doubt the religious thought of the more serious young men of our country, who belong to the highest social grade, is in some degree influenced by "University Sermons." It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that those who contribute so much to the religious instruction of candidates for the highest positions in Church and State should be well qualified for their responsible task. There are few preachers so entitled to confidence, or who would be so readily trusted by men of every shade of opinion for this special work, as the Master of the Temple. Dr. Vaughan belongs to no party; he is an eminent Biblical scholar; he has a high reputation for personal excellence and for orthodoxy; his cast of mind is far too practical to allow him to indulge in speculations "which minister questions, rather than godly edifying which is in faith." Moreover, he has had large experience in dealing with young men; he understands their dangers, he sympathises with their aspirations; he is eminently judicious and genial, and is therefore a safe and popular counsellor. Indeed, we know of no man who comes nearer to our beau ideal of what a university preacher should be. Let us see how far his work is worthy of our conception of himself. The volume before us contains eight sermons, very varied as to subjects and as to mode of treatment, but all bearing the impress of the gifted author's individuality. Those who think dogmatic theology essential to every sermon will not be satisfied with these; but the preacher would probably have defeated his purpose if he had tried to please such critics. However we may regret it, theological preaching is not popular in many congregations. Even those composed of young men of culture are no exception. Something that bears directly upon the improvement of personal character, or that relates to daily conduct, is usually more welcome.

In these sermons there is very much to arrest the attention of

educated young men; they are essentially modern; there is nothing mechanical about their construction, nor is there anything commonplace either in the matter or in the language. There is abundant evidence of ripe scholarship, but no parade of learning; there is just enough careful criticism to delight the soul of an enthusiastic student of the Greek Testament. Originality and freshness appear on every page. The language is chaste and happily chosen; throughout, there is a singular combination of strength and beauty.

The preacher's aim is evidently to influence the practice rather than the opinions of his audience. "Burning questions" are not touched. He neither attacks heresies nor launches new theories. The common failings of young men are indicated with delicacy and tenderness, and yet with rigorous fidelity. Indolence, self-indulgence, scepticism, conceit, are keenly rebuked, and the opposite virtues presented in an attractive light. The book abounds with discriminating analyses of character, and is pervaded with lofty moral tone and intense religious earnestness.

Our author is for the most part topical rather than textual. Hence he comes before us more as an essayist than an exegete. This is to be regretted, considering his fame as an expositor of Scripture. There are two examples of allegorising, which sometimes tempts preachers to take unwarrantable liberties with the text, and which, in the hands of incompetent men, is often far-fetched and fanciful. These evils, however, are avoided in this case, and this method of treatment is managed with admirable skill and excellent effect. "The sympathy of God a necessity of man," is the title of one sermon of this class which fairly illustrates many of the best qualities in the volume. The text is taken from the narrative of Christ stilling the tempest, and consists of the pathetic appeal, "Master, carest thou not that we perish?" A brief quotation will show how the preacher applies this passage. "Miracle and parable are but differences of name in many places of the Gospels, and it is so here. That crossing, that storm, that sleep, that awakening, all were typical; real as facts, significant as emblems. They have all been acted again and again in human lives, in spiritual histories. Redemption itself is just that—a world's misery, a world's sense of neglect, a Divine sleep, a Divine awakening—the times of that ignorance God winked at: at last He interposed for deliverance, rebuked the wind and the sea, and would have all men everywhere to be saved."

The first sermon is in some respects the most striking. The title is, "Scorn, a breach of the sixth commandment," and the text, "Whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." A few words will indicate the scope of this powerful discourse. "Not to destroy but to fulfil, was the office of Christ

towards the law and the prophets. Not to demolish, but to fill; not to take down the fabric of the old, but to bring into it the presence which shall occupy each chamber with a life at once Divine and most human—this is the legislation of Jesus Christ, and the text is one of its most beautiful and characteristic examples. He comes to rescue this commandment, the sixth of the decalogue, from the literalism of the Scribe, from the fantasticality of the Pharisee, and to lift it into the spirituality—the thoroughness, that is, and the practicalness—of the new, the Gospel life." The preacher goes on to show how the feeling which prompts one to say to his brother, "Thou fool!" has in it the germ which, when fully developed, becomes murder. He sets forth most forcibly the tendency of scorn to crush and kill every noble sentiment, to destroy every intellectual and spiritual aspiration.

The last sermon in the series, on "The Proper Attitude for Religious Inquiry," is most timely, and strongly tempts quotation and comment.

Dr. Vaughan has certainly helped to sustain the high reputation of the English pulpit. While such sermons are heard by the most distinguished congregations of the land, there is no danger that preaching will ever cease to be a great spiritual power in our midst.

We are sorry to add one word of adverse criticism, but fidelity requires it. The first thing we have to find fault with is the least important, and that is the title of the book. We are at a loss to know on what principle it has been chosen. Any other would have been just as appropriate as the one selected. We expected to find one sermon or more from the text, "My son, give me thine heart," but there is nothing akin to it in the volume, and we should have preferred the omission of that passage from the title.

In one respect these sermons, admirable as they are, are seriously defective. We shall perhaps be considered narrow and old-fashioned when we complain that the way of salvation is nowhere clearly set forth. It is true that it is seldom found in published "University Sermons," but that only makes the matter worse. God's way of saving men, stated as Dr. Vaughan must surely be able to state it, might have led many a thoughtless undergraduate to reflection and immediate religious decision. That there should be no answer to the question, "What must I do to be saved?" in a series of sermons preached to a congregation of persons of every variety of character, is deeply to be regretted. We have referred to this point for the sake of expressing our sorrow that the clergy of the Established Church, generally, should assume that all their hearers are already converted. No doubt it is the theory of the Church that all baptised persons

are of necessity something more than nominal Christians, and in our judgment that is one of the most vital defects of the Church as by law established.

We are compelled to refer to another matter scarcely less important. We never suspected the Master of the Temple, of sacerdotal proclivities, and therefore were not prepared for anything savouring of sympathy with the doctrine of priestly absolution. Here, however, is a passage which looks uncommonly like it: "If you are in trouble and cannot find comfort; if you have postponed or intermitted communion because of some weight lying upon your life; or if in the approach of death you feel something burdening your soul, and are afraid lest you should be about to stand before God with a lie in your right hand; then ask the human help of one whose office it is to guide, whose experience it is to sympathise; open your grief to him, receive his counsel; and then, if you feel that it would be comforting to have the promise brought home, to have the 'ye' of the universal turned for once into the 'thou' of the particular, ask him to stand over you and speak to you personally the reassuring word, Son, be of good cheer; thy sins are forgiven thee." There is no Scripture authority for putting words into the lips of any man which it is the prerogative of the Holy Ghost alone to pronounce, and we deeply regret that Dr. Vaughan has lent the sanction of his deservedly high reputation to the support of a most pretentious and perilous dogma. In these days, not a word should be said to strengthen the position of the Anti-Protestant party in the Church of England.

#### AN EIRENICON OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

*An Eirenicon of the Eighteenth Century; Proposal for Catholic Communion.* By a Minister of the Church of England. New Edition, with Introduction, Notes and Appendices. Edited by H. N. Oxenham, M.A. London: Rivingtons. 1879.

THE motive of the last-century essay, here republished, is very simple. The anonymous author undertakes to show that there is nothing in the doctrines, practices, and history of the Papal Church which ought to prevent reunion between it and the Anglican Church. When we say that in the course of two hundred pages the whole ground of controversy is gone over, it will be at once apparent that the treatment is of the most general, not to say cursory, character. Many of the brief chapters, indeed, are composed of mere assertions, without attempt at proof. The different charges against the Roman Church are brought up, and to each one the answer is returned—Not guilty, or not proven. All is made to turn on the distinction between matters of faith and

opinion, what must and what merely may be believed. The method of reconciliation is one with which by this time we have grown pretty familiar, namely, to take the minimum on one side and the maximum on the other, and to show that there is but a step between the two. The result is decidedly unsatisfactory, because the two parties thus approximated are in no sense representative. A minimum Catholic would be a very poor one. In fact, his views would be far less extreme than those implied in the maximum on the other side. These laboured attempts to show how little may be meant by the doctrines of one system or another seem to us mere baits. We know well enough that there is a great deal more behind. That Mr. Oxenham should republish this essay is not surprising. Its whole drift is to justify the Church to which he belongs. Laying aside the essay, we may notice one or two points in the editor's introduction in which is given an account of the various efforts after reunion from the Stuart days to the establishment of the A.P.U.C. in 1857.

The only kind of union which Mr. Oxenham recognises is a corporate one. He has no idea of a union of charity and mutual recognition. The latter we believe may exist without the former, and certainly must precede it. We are far from saying that all existing divisions are wise or necessary. On the contrary, we have no doubt that many of them might cease with advantage. But, after we have got rid of superfluous divisions, there might still be outward separation along with the recognition of common truth and faith and goodness. In point of fact, we believe there is more of such recognition already than is often suspected. Does any one doubt that all churches bearing the Christian name hold the cardinal verities of the faith, that all such churches have been and are enriched by saintly lives, that they are all channels of Divine blessing? In study and devotion do we not take all that is good, wherever we find it? We would suggest to the editor that nothing tends more to hinder the growth of such inner spiritual unity than such language as occurs here and there in the present introduction. He says of the theology of the Cranmer school that it was "as little respectable as their lives." "The Elizabethan bishops, as a rule, and with some notable exceptions, were only less disreputable in their conduct, and not one whit more respectable theologians than their predecessors under Edward." He writes of "Foxe's exploded mendacities." Such strong language reminds us of Dr. Newman's saying about the olive-branch and catapult. Mr. Oxenham's introduction is meant to be the first, but it looks very much like the second. And this from a liberal moderate Catholic, who reprobates the violence of Jesuits and Ultramontanes! "If they do these things in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?"

Perhaps it may sound strange to our editor, but to us it seems

that the great obstacle to unity is his own church. But for its abuses in faith and practice there had been no Reformation or "schism of the sixteenth century," just as if the English Church had been all that it should have been in the last century there had been no Methodism. At the present moment there is no Church so distinctively controversial and proselytising as the Roman Catholic Church. To what are all its efforts directed but to the gaining of adherents from other communions? It is strangely inconsistent, therefore, for the editor to remind us so often that our differences from each other are trifles in comparison with our differences from Atheism and Materialism. Surely this cannot be the view of the authorities of the writer's own church.

Again, how can corporate reunion be brought about save by mutual concession and compromise? But is it not precisely this that the Papacy utterly repudiates? Has it any other word than "submission"?

In seeking for evidences of the decline and disintegration of Protestantism, Mr. Oxenham is satisfied with very little, and exaggerates most trifling circumstances. He says: "Protestantism, as a dogmatic and religious system, has had its day; three centuries have sufficed to elicit and exhaust its inherent capabilities in that line; it has been weighed in the balance of history and found wanting." That may be a superficial outsider's view. It cannot be the view of one who knows Protestantism from within—its learning, its institutions, its powerful hold on the intellect and heart of millions. What is the sort of evidence on which so sweeping a judgment is based? Such facts as the existence of indifference and scepticism in Germany, and the lapse of English Presbyterian congregations into Unitarianism. The attendants on public worship in Berlin is said to be about 30,000. The author of *German Home Life* states that men never think of attending church. This is precisely what we are constantly hearing and reading of Roman Catholic cities on the Continent. If German rationalism is the inevitable sequence of Protestantism, what of the infidelity of France and Italy? Who taught Voltaire and Comte and Renan and St. Beuve? The editor brings forward as a witness a youth, with whom he conversed some twenty years ago, whose competence may be gauged by the fact that he held belief in God to be a note of the High Church. After quoting some statistics from *Whitaker's Almanack* respecting the divisions of Methodism, he alleges as a further evidence of decline that "several Wesleyan ministers have sought ordination from the present Bishop of Lincoln, Dr. Wordsworth." One is irresistibly led to attach just as much significance to the other proofs adduced as to this. Mr. Oxenham exaggerates the importance of mere incidents, and treats exceptional phenomena as typical. Thus,

Irvingism, an abnormal excrescence, becomes to him a "striking testimony" to the necessity of unity.

One portion of the republished essay puts the editor in a dilemma. The first subject dealt with by the anonymous writer, as the one "which abounds with the greatest difficulties," is the infallible power of the Pope. The question is settled as it was always settled up to the eve of the Vatican Council, by denying that the dogma is an article of the faith. The judgment of twelve Catholic Universities and fifty-seven theologians of different countries in Europe is quoted in proof of this conclusion. The point is a perplexing one for the editor. All that he can do is "to offer a few suggestions in arrest of any premature and peremptory judgment." The first suggestion is that "the facts mentioned by our author, and others like them, remain equally facts, which cannot lose their significance whatever may have occurred since." Quite so; the reply that the dogma in question is merely a private opinion held good for former days, but it holds good no longer. This argument for reunion no longer exists. And who knows that the same change may not come over all the other questions which are explained away in similar terms? "In the next place the Vatican Council is not dissolved, but suspended, and must some day reassemble; and until it is over, no one has a right to say what shape its decrees will ultimately assume as a whole." We suppose the meaning to be that the definition solemnly decreed and promulgated may be modified or reversed. We doubt whether any man living believes such a thing to be probable or possible. "And meanwhile the particular definition to which exception is so framed that it has already received many and most divergent interpretations from divines of unimpeached orthodoxy, without any sign of a disposition on the part of authority to arbitrate between them." It is the first time we ever found ambiguity claimed as a merit in the definition of a Papal Council. We thought that formal definitions were intended to remove ambiguity, which was left to be the special mark of Protestantism and private judgment. We doubt whether Cardinal Manning would endorse the explanation, or rather the special pleading. The "Eirenicon of the Eighteenth Century" has utterly broken down on an essential point. The edge is taken off its reply. And who knows that the replies on all the other questions will not be upset by other decisions of the Vatican Council, for it "is not dissolved, but suspended, and must some day reassemble; and until it is over no one has a right to say what shape its decrees will ultimately assume as a whole"?

## CURTISS'S LEVITICAL PRIESTS.

*The Levitical Priests. A Contribution to the Criticism of the Pentateuch.* By S. J. Curtiss, Ph.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

THE author of the present volume sets himself to refute one of the many theories started by the ingenuity of German rationalism for the purpose of discrediting the genuineness and authority of the Pentateuch. The particular theory examined may be briefly stated thus: "Deuteronomy supposes all the tribe of Levi to be alike eligible to the priesthood, while Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers restrict the priestly office to the sons of Aaron. The former represents the more ancient, original condition,—the latter is an innovation and did not emerge till after the return from exile, Ezra being most probably the author. Ezekiel is the connecting link between the two periods." This is the theory to which Dr. Curtiss devotes a searching investigation.

The first argument for the priority of Deuteronomy is drawn from certain passages in the book itself. The passages are only three in number (x. 9, xviii. 1—8, xxxii. 8—11), are couched in general terms, and are susceptible of an explanation just as much in harmony with the old belief as with the new hypothesis. The latter in fact is an inference from a particular construction put upon the words. The different terms and ideas are minutely examined by the author, and shown by no means to bear out the theory built upon them. The following are the results of the author's arguments on this point. "(1.) These references are so incomplete as to demand the existence of as full a code as is contained in the middle books of the Pentateuch. (2.) There is no radical contradiction between the brief notices of the Levitical priests and the more complete regulations concerning them in the preceding books. (3.) Apparent contradictions are due to the oratorical, prophetic, and popular character of Deuteronomy as distinguished from the more minute and strictly legal statements of the middle books of the Pentateuch. Deuteronomy is emphatically the people's book; Exodus—Numbers, the code of the priests. The popular form in Deuteronomy is later than the technically so-called priestly legislation, and naturally follows it."

Not only has Ezekiel been interposed between Deuteronomy and the priestly legislation, but he has been supposed by some to be the author of Lev. xvii.—xxvi. The reason assigned for this opinion is nothing more than the fact of priestly terms occurring in his writings. But this may just as well be explained by the other fact that Ezekiel was a priest and of course would be familiar with the legislation relating to the office. Jeremiah uses similar expressions. "It is often the case that a writer is in-



sensibly moulded by some author, so that, without intending it, he borrows the style, and even the modes of expression of his favourite author." "Fancy some German or Dutch professor trying to prove that Kuenen wrote Professor Smith's article on the Bible in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, because of an unconscious similarity in some of Professor Smith's thoughts and expressions to those of Professor Kuenen in his work on the *Religion of Israel*, and you have an example of the length to which such criticisms can go."

The rationalist critics accept the historical character of the books of Samuel and Kings, because those books seem to make for their theory, while, for the opposite reason, they describe the Chronicles as fictitious and interpolated. The former books are supposed to be against the genuineness of the priestly legislation, because they say very little on the subject. But this at best is an argument from silence, and therefore inconclusive. For the comparatively rare references to the subject, as our author shows, it is a sufficient reason that the matter did not fall in with the purpose of the writer. The critics "demand of a narrative which was never intended to trace the sacerdotal fortunes, and which merely mentions them incidentally where they are essential, the same explicitness as in the priestly portions of the Pentateuch." In point of fact, references do occur, but these are set aside as interpolations, for no other reason than that they do not accord with an arbitrary theory. Of one such reference Colenso says: "It has manifestly been inserted by some priestly writer who could not endure that the people should 'ask counsel of Jehovah' except through the intervention of a 'priest the son of Aaron.'" The attacks on the credibility of the Chronicles are well met.

It has been alleged that the teaching of the prophets is opposed to that of the law and anterior to it. By a detailed examination of the prophetic writings from Joel to Malachi, Dr. Curtiss shows that all that the prophets condemn is the perversion and abuse of sacrifice and ritual, and pertinently observes that prophecy supposes the law to be already in existence. "Their denunciations of idolatry after the exile would have been as ill-timed as the appearance of abolitionists in America after the extinction of slavery." It is to this disappearance of idolatry, not to the rise of sacerdotalism, that the cessation of the spirit of prophecy was due.

The argument for the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and against Ezra being the author is ably summarised. In truth, all the presumption and evidence tell for the former position. It is a singular critical perversity which seeks to transform a mere reformer or restorer into an author or founder. We have no doubt that if Ezra had been the legislator and Moses the reformer,

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the love of contradiction which forms the very soul of rationalism, would have maintained the present orthodox position.

### FROM A QUIET PLACE.

*From a Quiet Place; some Discourses.* By the Author of "The Recreations of a Country Parson." London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1879.

TWENTY-THREE sermons in A. K. H. B.'s peculiar style—a style in which he stands alone in the present generation. Readers of current literature are familiar with the light, graceful essays in the monthlies about everything in general and nothing in particular, which yet are so pleasant to read. The hand would be recognised without the four initials. We are reminded of nothing so much as of the essayists of the Addison school, from which the author of the present volume might be a survival. In this very positive, matter-of-fact generation a writer of this class is far from unwelcome. It is useless to desire more solidity and strength. We might as well expect the lily to supply the perfume of the rose. We can only take a writer of such marked characteristics as he is, and be thankful for what he gives us.

The present volume is fully equal to A. K. H. B.'s average in style and thought. We note the same fondness for treating uncommon aspects of common topics. This is indicated in such titles as, "The Love of Money the Root of all Good," "The Privilege of Repentance," "Our Worst Enemies," a sermon to volunteers from the text, "A Man's Foes shall be they of his own Household." There are also thoroughly characteristic and excellent essays on topics like "Getting On," the lesson of which is the rather cynical one that however you try to get on, the result is in the hands of chance or Providence, "The best Friend," "The Natural Tendency to Congenial Society," "Thankfulness and Hope." We confess that the best discourses to us are those which answer most nearly to the idea of a sermon, such as those on Christmas-day, "The Peace of God," "With Him all Things," "Natural Indications of God's Hatred of Sin," "The Desire of all Nations." The first sermon, "The Reckoning," Eccles. xi. 9, is quite characteristic. The idea running through it is that every success, every station in life, has its drawbacks. He instances in graphic touches the domestic life with its cares and trials, the single life with its loneliness and want of sympathy. "Take this line in life or that: choose this profession or that: live in town or country: live in this land or that, in this place or that: choose society or solitude, this kind of society or that: work like a slave at college, or idle your time away: choose this religious communion or that other; you will find that many troubles will come of

your choice ; and if you be hasty, and forget that there are reasons for and reasons against every choice that man can make, you will probably repent your choice. There are few thoughtful men in this world, I believe, who have reached middle age or are going down the hill, who have not their moments of bitter repentance for having made nearly every material choice in life they ever have made ; and of firm persuasion that in some other walk of life,—amid other scenes, and other surroundings, and other people—they would have been rightly placed, and far happier, and more useful. In some cases it may in truth be so. But in far more it is a vain imagination. Another choice would have eventuated in its own troubles. It is the condition of our unsatisfying being here. There is but one place where all will be right with us, and that is far away. Let not words be multiplied : the outcome and upshot of the whole is clear. There is but one choice we can make, and be sure we shall never repent. It is the choice of Christ, the choice of life and good in Him. The day may come when you will look back with shame upon many a resolution which seemed wise when you made it ; but you may enter into judgment with this, and it will stand the test. There is but the one rest for the soul : Christ. There is but the one satisfying portion of the soul : Christ. There is but the one home of the soul : Christ. Make that choice : and, as for every other choice you make, you will have to enter into judgment for it. But this will abide the trial of that great day.

The one jarring note in the sermons, as in most of A. K. H. B.'s writings, is the constant girding at Presbyterian ways and customs. He reminds us at p. 22, "that there is nothing so ridiculous as a Scotchman "lifting up a testimony," and yet he himself is constantly "lifting up a testimony" against the customs of his friends and neighbours. We suppose that residence among the bleak "severities of Presbytery" has been the drawback in his own lot. But wisdom would surely have suggested the lesson of accommodation to circumstances, not to say that charity requires appreciation of the virtues as well as condemnation of the faults of one's neighbours. We note at least half a dozen such testimonies in the present volume. The reason why they seem unjust to us is that they are accompanied by no reference to the reasons from which the incriminated practices arose, or to the undoubted excellencies of Presbyterianism as a whole.

#### BROOKE'S FIGHT OF FAITH.

*The Fight of Faith.* Sermons Preached on Various Occasions.  
By the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke, M.A. Second Edition.  
One Volume. H. S. King and Co. 1877.

THIS volume is a striking instance of the strength and weakness

of that section of the Church of England to which its distinguished author belongs. For gentle and tender sympathy with man and all that is human ; for fearless exposure of the meanness and folly of society ; and for sternly faithful preaching of righteousness, these sermons are abundantly worthy the reputation of the biographer of F. W. Robertson. But in their characteristic departures from that line of teaching which under St. Paul, Luther, Wesley, and others has been most powerful in swaying men and turning them to God, the sermons err, in our judgment, both by what they teach, and by what they fail to teach.

This volume has grave deficiencies, and to our thinking fundamental errors. We complain of the use, in a loose and misleading manner, of terms to which a rich and definite spiritual meaning is attached ; as, for instance, in the fine sermon on National Worldliness, where Mr. Brooke speaks of love of country and devotion to a lofty national ideal as "spiritual worship." In this case we object both to the adjective and the substantive, especially to the latter. Again, on p. 185 we are told that to believe that God in His calm, unreprouched, sovereign love is determined to make us His own "is salvation." Antinomians of all ages have believed that, but they certainly had not "salvation" while living in sin. Universalism and its kindred and necessary dogma of Fatalism are implicitly or explicitly taught in many places, *e.g.*, p. 78 : "It is in vain that we try to escape from God. No one can escape. There shall not be one soul of man that ever lived left at last wandering on the mountains . . . all will be folded in the fields of heaven." So again, p. 91, "If we wander away from Him He must seek us, and we must be found of Him. The *must* consists in this—that if we were lost, a part of Infinite Being would be missing for ever, which is an absurdity." And these statements are the more to be regretted as they occur in the midst of much that is true and very necessary to be said about our proper individuality and personal relation to God. There is apparent too in this volume what appears to us to be a radical misconception of the person of Christ, and of the nature of sin ; as, for instance, "It was as one of us that Christ said, 'I and my Father are one,'" p. 293. If this were true there is not a saying relating to the true and proper divinity of Christ which could not be uttered of every Christian. If so, we are all Divine as He was, or He is all human as we are. So on page 69, from lax and defective views of sin we drift into a sort of sentimental self-pity. Sin is a sad accident, and instead of suffering for it we should be treated pitifully and very indulgently. "Lord of love, let me sleep a little . . . and then when I awake punish me and give me trials as much as Thou wilt. But first be kind to me, for I have been lost in a far country, and the way to find Thee has been long." If that be the prodigal we suppose he took his own

journey into that "far country." Certainly the Bible says so in the parable, and in many other ways as well.

Very briefly we have referred to the characteristic errors of the teaching of this volume—errors too which belong to the whole of the Broad School to which their author belongs. We hasten to say how rich the sermons are in a zealous preaching of the law of morality, which those who hold a more evangelical theology would do well to copy. There is abundant evidence too of a wider sympathy than the pulpit is wont to show with the everyday life of those who listen to its ministrations. The plea for love of country in the sermon on National Worldliness is a noble one, part of a noble sermon.

The volume is rich too in a fine vindication of God's possession of all that is in Beauty and Truth and Art. Nature is made or shown to be His interpreter of our spiritual nature in so many of its moods, and in its dim foreshadowings of truths which lie all around and within us.

The style is that of sober, earnest thought, fitly embodied in clear pure English; there are few figures and no rhetoric, but every now and again the author rises into a chaste eloquence. We know of nothing more beautiful in their way than the sermons on Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter, especially those on the first and last.

In leaving this volume were we asked what is the great lack of these sermons, we should say motive power. Healthy moral teaching there is, true indignation at meanness and vice; much to make us ashamed, but little to lift us up. There is seemingly a persistent effort to exclude the *burden* of sin, and the *burden* of the Cross. Greek beauty with Christian morality is apparently Mr. Brooke's ideal. He cannot make his fellow sinful man realise it, we venture to say, without the sublime motive which fills the soul as it rises from the cross of a crucified Saviour, saying, "He loved me and gave *Himself* for me."

#### RIGG'S CHURCHMANSHIP OF JOHN WESLEY.

*The Churchmanship of John Wesley, and the Relations of Wesleyan Methodism to the Church of England.* By James H. Rigg, D.D. London: Wesleyan Conference Office.

THE respected President of the Conference has rendered good service by this timely and able essay. Nothing is more common with Anglican disputants than to plead the High-Church opinions of Wesley, and charge Wesleyans with unfaithfulness to his teachings in this respect. A complete answer, which can only be gathered from a review of Wesley's whole life and writings, is

not always at hand. Such an answer is supplied in the present treatise. Dr. Rigg shows clearly how much, or how little, there is in the allegation. Wesley's ecclesiastical views followed, and were largely determined by, his personal religious faith. The year of his conversion, 1738, forms a sharp dividing line between the two positions held by Wesley in both relations. Just as before that period, instead of accepting the righteousness of faith, he sought to establish a righteousness of his own, so also he held high views as to priestly powers and sacramental efficacy. When he abandoned the one set of views, he abandoned the other. With what fairness can Wesley's opinions in the former period be taken as typical of the man? He was then groping his way to settled conclusions. By his own testimony he was an unconverted man. He passed through a variety of phases, ritualistic, ascetic, and mystic. Nothing, as it seems to us, can be more disingenuous than to transfer views which belong to this immature state, views which Wesley subsequently renounced, and with which his whole subsequent career was inconsistent—to the second period, and represent them as Wesley's final opinions. Our answer is short. "The Wesley of the period before 1738 is not our founder. With him we have nothing in common; to him we owe no allegiance." Nay, we do not differ more widely from him than Wesley differed from himself. The action of modern Wesleyans is not more diametrically opposed to the views of Wesley in his first stage than was Wesley's whole career in the second and greater stage, when he became the founder of Methodism. Nothing is more certain than that, if Wesley had remained at the first standpoint, he could not have become the originator of the Wesleyan system. Even in the earlier period he was by no means the pronounced High-Churchman that would satisfy modern Anglicanism. As Dr. Rigg shows, he was much more mystic than ritualistic, and mysticism and ritualism are mutually exclusive. In Georgia he refused the Lord's Supper to a Moravian pastor, because the latter had not been canonically baptised. He says of this act afterwards, "Can any one carry High-Church zeal higher than this? And how well have I since been beaten with mine own staff!" Dr. Rigg says:—"He did not even in Oxford believe in any such doctrine as that of the supernatural bodily presence of the Lord Jesus in the consecrated elements, as now taught by advanced High-Churchmen."

As to the second period, which really represents the Wesley of history and of Methodism, dispute is out of the question. Dr. Rigg accumulates the evidence of word and act in proof "that he very soon and once for all discarded the 'fable,' as he called it, of 'apostolical succession,' and that he presently gave up all that is now understood to belong to the system, whether theological or ecclesiastical, of High Church Anglo-Catholicism." It is also

clearly shown how Wesleyanism is the logical and necessary outcome of Wesley's own teaching and acts, and High-Churchmen ought not to object to a process of development. It would have been strange if Wesley had not leaned strongly to the church of his baptism and ordination. But by what right can those who have no such personal grounds of obedience and attachment be held bound to follow him in these purely personal inclinations?

We have little hope that Dr. Rigg's essay will prevent a repetition of the charges alluded to. The argument is too handy to be easily relinquished. But at least those who use it will be left without any excuse of ignorance. Only a few months ago we read a letter in a newspaper, in which a clergyman charged the Wesleyan authorities with mutilating Wesley's works. Dr. Rigg notices this old charge in a note on p. 120, characterising it as "altogether untrue." Those who accuse Wesleyan Methodists of unfaithfulness to Wesley's teaching might just as well accuse the early Christians of unfaithfulness to the teaching of Paul the Pharisee before the Damascus journey, or modern Roman Catholics of unfaithfulness to the teaching of Newman the Anglican before the year 1845.

#### UNSWORTH'S AGGRESSIVE CHRISTIANITY, &c.

*The Aggressive Character of Christianity.* By the Rev. W. Unsworth. London: Wesleyan Conference Office.

*The Evangelistic Baptism Indispensable to the Church for the Conversion of the World.* By the Rev. James Gall. London: Gall and Inglis.

THESE two works are similar in subject, one dealing with general truths, the other with a particular application of the truths. Mr. Unsworth first of all illustrates the universal design of Christianity in contrast with previous dispensations, then discusses the opposition to be expected from various sources, states the grounds of his faith in the ultimate triumph of the Gospel, enumerates the qualifications requisite in church-workers, details the various means to be employed, exposes the sin of indifference in vigorous terms, and describes the reward of faithful service, both in the present and future. From this it will be seen that the plan of the book is very comprehensive. The subject is undoubtedly important, the different heads are well worked out, both language and thought are alike clear and vigorous. Mr. Unsworth has something to say and knows how to say it. If anything, some of the statements are almost too bold and unqualified. "Cain deliberately and intelligently rejected the

atonement of Christ, while Abel received it with strong and sincere faith." What more could be said of any one in Christian days? We hope it is not correct that immoral periodicals "are doing more to corrupt the morals of the rising generation than all other institutions are doing to save and bless the youth of our country." Among other means of religious aggression Mr. Unsworth earnestly recommends advertising, which he considers would be a most effectual way of letting our light shine,—a very original application of a familiar text. The whole work is very practical and earnest, and cannot fail to do good.

Mr. Gall advocates a definite scheme of religious aggression. It is that of congregational missions, the congregation to bear the expense of building and plant, the workers to be all voluntary, and the methods to include education and every means of social reform. Mr. Gall objects on principle to paid evangelistic labour. He would restrict paid labour to the regular pastorate. We think that the same reason by which he justifies it in this latter case, its necessity for efficiency, would very often apply with equal force to the former. With a great deal that Mr. Gall says about the need of personal service, and the employment of the whole Church in evangelistic labour we cordially agree. But we regret that in the service of a pet theory he should undertake a crusade against all existing organisations. He maintains on the ground of Scripture teaching and precedent that all evangelistic effort is meant to be carried on by gratuitous agency alone, and that all existing home and foreign missions are working on a false basis. The title of the book is somewhat awkward, but by "evangelistic baptism" is meant a baptism by the Holy Spirit for evangelistic work. This, the author holds, was the distinctive blessing of Pentecost. We have no space for criticism. We are with the author in the constructive portion of his book, against him in the rest. He argues elaborately that Scripture nowhere requires "systematic liberality" from Christians. He claims, not a tenth, but *all* a Christian's possessions for God's service. But if it is impossible to obtain even a tenth from Christians generally, what hope is there that the larger demand will be successful? We doubt also whether on account of the great amount of ignorance and sin existing, it is right to speak of present modes of church-work as having failed. Probably similar results would have followed upon any system. There is a curious sentence on p. 95, "Paul, being a Roman, could of course speak Latin." The conclusion does not follow from the premiss. Many pure Greeks and others were Roman citizens.



## HODGSON'S MEMOIR OF REV. F. HODGSON, B.D.

*Memoir of the Rev. Francis Hodgson, B.D., Scholar, Poet, and Divine.* By his Son, the Rev. James T. Hodgson, M.A. Two Vols. Macmillan. 1878.

THIS is an interesting and valuable biography in a double sense. It will be valued for its presentation of a singularly attractive life, and it will be a book of reference for the side lights it throws upon the character and history of some who were the friends of Provost Hodgson, and whose lives and works form a permanent part of English literature.

There should be a correspondence between the style of a biography and its subject. The tone, so to speak, must neither be very much higher nor very much lower than the life it describes, else it ceases to be a biography, and becomes a treatise or a homily. That correspondence is found in the volumes before us. Kindly, modest, the work of a Christian and a gentleman, the book is a fitting memorial of one who did his duty with unassuming dignity and quiet zeal. Those who go to the Memoir, as to the lives of Macleod, or Kingsley, or Guthrie, will be disappointed; it is the record of a quiet man quietly told, and therefore not without its charm.

Francis Hodgson, its subject, was Assistant Master at Eton, Fellow of King's College, Rector of Bakewell, Archdeacon of Derby, and Provost of Eton; the acquaintance of Tom Moore, and of most of the leading literary men of his time; and an intimate friend of Lord Byron's. He was a scholar without pedantry, a keen critic without a trace of bitterness, and a reformer of abuses, at once sagacious, resolute, and temperate. This Memoir of his life will be eagerly read, as another and much-needed contribution to the history of Byron, a contribution, too, from one singularly fitted to make it. From the time of Hodgson's residence at Cambridge, as Fellow and Tutor of King's in 1808, until the death of Byron in 1824, the friendship between them was intimate and constant. Much information is given in letters respecting the character and tastes of Byron; information which, on the whole, despite the kindly charity of our biographer, does not heighten one's conception of the wayward egotistic poet, who fills so large a place in the history of genius. The summing up of the causes which led to the separation of Lord Byron and his wife (vol. ii., p. 57—64), strikes us as eminently just and discriminating. And as for the reference to the poet's life, we can all adopt the words in vol. ii., p. 155; "The lovely woods and waters which surround this picturesque and beautiful abbey (Newstead) seem to blend their voices in pathetic harmony, and to breathe a peaceful requiem which fancy wafts onward to the

church where, in quiet and obscurity, lie the mortal remains of him whose youth and beauty, and genius and goodness, whose crimes, and follies, and misfortunes, alike await the final judgment of that Omnipotent Creator whose essential attribute is love."

No small part of the value attaching to these volumes will accrue from the information afforded concerning the piety, the goodness, and the sweetness of Byron's sister, Mrs. Leigh. This, too, is a contribution greatly needed.

It is curious and amusing to observe in these volumes the manner in which gentlemen in the beginning of the present century were wont to communicate their thoughts in verse; Francis Hodgson was no mean adept at this, but his son, the biographer, seems to lament that this is not now the practice. We question whether the decadence of that species of our national poetry is worth lamenting over, if our fathers were like the gentleman mentioned in the second volume, p. 181, who made "women" rhyme to "chimney," and when this was objected to, exclaimed, with a poet's ardour, "What do you say to 'nimble'?"

We commend these informing and most interesting volumes to our readers.

#### STANFORD'S SYMBOLS OF CHRIST.

*Symbols of Christ.* By Charles Stanford, D.D. Author of "The Plant of Grace," "Central Truths," etc. A New Edition. London: The Religious Tract Society.

A REPRINT of a well-known and deservedly favourite book. Poetry, genius, spiritual strength and sweetness are all found in its pages. The twelve discourses are surprisingly even. There is nothing to skip, nothing that would not bear quotation. The author's own quotations are most apt and choice; he has evidently drunk deeply from the Puritan writers, but, while borrowing their solid, marrowy thoughts, he clothes these thoughts in a style as rich and fascinating as natural taste and diligent culture can produce. Among the causes which make evangelical doctrine distasteful to the educated classes, John Foster enumerates the illiterate way in which it is sometimes set forth. Not, we add, that mental feebleness is never to be found in other quarters. The present volume, like many others, proves that gifts and culture are perfectly compatible with evangelical faith. The subjects are—"The Royal Priest of Salem," "Shiloh," "The Angel in the Burning Bush," "Captain of the Lord's Host," "The Shepherd of Souls," "The Teacher of the Weary," "The Refiner watching the Crucible," "The Healer," "The Master of Life," "The Wings of the Shekinah," "The Advocate in the Court of Mercy," "The Awakener." It is evident from the titles how the

Lord Jesus Christ is the Alpha and Omega of the book, as He is of the author's faith. Less for the style than the sentiment we quote the following: "The centre of union is not a crotchet, but Christ. Not to the chair of Saint Peter, not to the banner of an establishment, not to the shibboleth of a sect, but 'to Him shall the gathering of the people be.' By bringing us nearer to Himself He seeks to bring us nearer to each other. Near the father, the child is near the other children who are gathered round the father's knee; and if I am near Christ, I am near to any other man who is near Christ. The same hope fires us, the same life circulates in us both, and if you touch Him you touch me. There may be endless diversities of thought, profession, and observance prevailing amongst those who from all nations are gathering round Christ. Let them prevail. What is circumstantial will not disturb what is essential. In grace, as in nature, what is various may be harmonious, what is manifold may be one; many branches, one tree; many stones, one temple; many gems, one crown; many tribes, one commonwealth. The great principle of union is union with Christ; the great secret of mutual nearness is nearness to the Fountain of our common life. When we gather to Him we gather to each other. He is gathering the people to Himself that, by a process most simple, natural, and necessary in its working, He may bring the scattered members of His family together, and hush its distractions into rest."

#### COX'S EXPOSITOR'S NOTE-BOOK.

*An Expositor's Note-Book; or, Brief Essays on Obscure or Misread Scriptures.* By Samuel Cox. Fifth Edition. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1879.

WE only need to endorse the approval expressed by the public of this useful book. The supplementary title accurately describes its character. Mr. Cox takes for the most part difficult or misunderstood passages, and does his best to bring out their true meaning and lessons. Even where his interpretation fails to satisfy, it removes some of the darkness and supplies hints and material for the right interpretation. His spirit is somewhat iconoclastic. He seems sometimes to take pleasure in exposing a misinterpretation which has taken hold of the popular fancy, as in the case of Joseph's coat, which was not a coat "of many colours," but a long coat or tunic reaching to the wrists and ankles. This was a sign of nobility, while the short coat betokened plebeian position and work. The "coat of many colours" came from Luther's version, which so greatly influenced the Authorised Version. Many of the essays show considerable ingenuity and supply the results of much curious

reading. One temptation Mr. Cox always avoids. We mean the temptation to read modern ideas and habits into ancient history. We have all heard or read of illustrations of Old Testament characters, which the most elementary feelings of reverence might well have forbidden. But even apart from this consideration, such representations are untrue to fact. To make patriarchs and prophets speak like modern Christians is to ignore all that is distinctive in their character and to misunderstand their mission and work. Mr. Cox is never in danger on this score.

#### BARCLAY'S SERMONS.

*Sermons by Robert Barclay*, Author of "The Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the Commonwealth." With a Brief Memoir. Edited by his Widow. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

ALL who have read that interesting work, *The Inner Life*, &c., will be glad to know something of the author who revealed to them a new world. Before the publication of the work the history and inner life of the Friends were as much an unknown country to outsiders as Africa was to the rest of the world before the discoveries of Livingstone. Mr. Barclay's researches flooded the scene with light. It was evident from the work that the sympathies of the writer extended far beyond the denomination to which he belonged by name and hereditary tradition, and these memorials confirm the impression. We do not know, but we should suppose that it would have been hard to detect the Friend in Mr. Barclay. The Memoir, written we presume by his widow, is far more distinctively Quaker than anything in Mr. Barclay's personality. We confess it somewhat jars on our unaccustomed ears to find in a memoir the subject spoken of as "R. B." or "Robert Barclay." Mr. Barclay was evidently a loveable character, distinguished by all that is best in the Quaker spirit without any of its narrowness or littleness. His letters written during foreign travel are brimful of geniality. He died at the early age of forty-three, killed apparently by overwork. Had he lived, he might have succeeded in carrying into effect some of the measures which he so earnestly advocated as essential to the prosperity of his communion. His sermons are the earnest, practical addresses which we might expect from an educated Christian man in daily contact with the duties and temptations of business life.

#### COOK'S LIGHT AND LIFE.

*Light and Life.* By the Rev. George Cook, D.D.  
Borgue: William Blackwood and Sons.

IN object and matter this volume is unexceptionable. The author

contends against that view of a religious life which makes it consist simply in exterior acts and professions, and looks upon salvation as something to be received hereafter. On the contrary, he insists that salvation is an inward and present experience ; he also connects all spiritual life with Christ, its source. We wish we could say as much that is good of the style of the sermons ; but we could not truthfully describe it as clear, terse, or forcible. The sentences are burdened by limiting, qualifying clauses to such an extent that it is often difficult to trace the course of thought. For instance : " Let us, then, as a salutary exercise, endeavour to make some farther application of the above illustrated, and surely reasonable, because alone possible, guiding principle of a true discipleship to the Lord Jesus." We should find it hard to construe the following : " These remarkable words suggest a matter, than which there is hardly, if anything, more worthy of notice in the record," &c. It may be etymologically correct, but it is not usual, to speak of persons as " obvious " to contempt and ridicule. The author says that he can advance no claim either to originality or popularity. Certainly the matter, though good, is not original, and the style cannot be called popular.

#### PONTON'S FREEDOM OF THE TRUTH.

*The Freedom of the Truth.* By Mungo Ponton, F.R.S.E.  
London : Longmans, Green and Co.

THIRTEEN brief chapters on such related topics as the Spirit and Means of Religious and Philosophical Inquiry, Modes of Inquiry, and Reasoning, well thought out and carefully expressed. The author advocates at once a rational science and rational faith, and believes that it is only an irrational science and irrational faith that are in direct contradiction. We can sincerely commend both the positions laid down and the arguments by which they are defended. " Evolution is sometimes spoken of as if it were ' a true cause '—the prime origin of all organic phenomena ; whereas, taken in its legitimate sense, evolution is simply a mode of procedure, and involves the idea of some agent pursuing that mode. The truth is, the human mind cannot rid itself of the idea of an agent as the primary cause of all phenomena, though sometimes it has recourse to the personification of nature to supply the void."

## II. MISCELLANEOUS.

## SOME RECENT BOOKS OF VERSE.

- Legends of the Morrow.* By Thomas Gordon Hake, Author of "Parables and Tales," "New Symbols," &c. London: Chatto and Windus. 1879.
- Songs of a Wayfarer.* By F. Wyville Home. London: Pickering and Co. 1878.
- A Book of Miscellaneous Lyrics.* By Joseph Skipsey, Author of "Annie Lee," "Two Hazel Eyes," "Meg Goldlocks," "My Merry Bird," "The Fairies' Adieu," and other Ditties. Bedlington: Printed for the Author by George Richardson. 1878.
- The Victories of Love.* By Coventry Patmore. Fourth Edition. London: George Bell and Sons. 1878.
- The Unknown Eros.* By Coventry Patmore. I.—XLVI. London: George Bell and Sons. 1878.

DR. HAKE'S *Legends of the Morrow* is certainly one of the most remarkable volumes of poetry published of late. It is genuine poetry and of no ordinary kind; full of thought and fine feeling, ranging somewhere midway between the fields which Blake and Wordsworth worked in, and yet being distinctly individual. It is a finer book than could have been securely anticipated from the promise of *Madeline with other Poems and Parables*, which Dr. Hake published in 1871; because, noteworthy as that volume was, those who were most interested in it discerned a laxity of method and want of finish which it was not reasonable to expect to be remedied entirely, seeing that Dr. Hake had published a volume of *Poetic Lucubrations* as long ago as 1828, and might well be supposed to have reached an age at which men seldom work at the perfecting of style. Nevertheless, the volume of *Parables and Tales*, issued in 1872, with illustrations by Mr. Arthur Hughes, and the volume entitled *New Symbols*, published in 1876, successively gave evidence that Dr. Hake as a poet had learned from the unwearying medical profession a good lesson of craftsmanship, and had kept a watchful eye on the minutiae of execution. The result of this watchfulness and anxiety to perfect his work in detail was visible in the enhanced clearness of his expression and in increased metrical and verbal finish, as well as in a more sparing

use of the quaint and homely imagery which, in the truly admirable poem "*Old Souls to Mend*," was almost alarming in its attractiveness—alarming, that is to say, lest the poet should presume upon his success and carry the quaint and homely element too far. He has not done so. There is scarcely a trace of quaintness in *Legends of the Morrow*; and the style is unexceptionably finished.

The subject matter of the book is pre-eminently serious, as in all Dr. Hake's recent books; and the treatment is pre-eminently artistic,—artistic in the best sense, for the style is not overwrought, and does not show, till compared with that of the previous books, what labour has been given to it. It is not in any sense a dramatic line of art,—not even narrative in any strict sense; but a number of spiritual situations are made the basis of that mode of work which may best be called the contemplative. "*The Palmist*," "*The Soul-Painter*," and "*The Lost Future*" are the three most important poems in the book; and these are wrought out with so much care in the order of parts and such complete reticence of detail that neither extract nor description can give the least idea of their scope and bodily form. "*The Lost Future*," as a poem depicting the ruin of a life through one act done in the face of conscience and religion, is in its kind a masterpiece; and there is nothing in the language with which it can be usefully compared. A fourth considerable poem is called "*New Souls*," and deals hardly by modern sceptical ideas of man's spiritual destiny, connecting itself by subject, title, and treatment with "*Old Souls to Mend*." A comparatively short poem entitled "*The Inscrutable*" depicts in a wonderful manner a power which some psychologists hold the human spirit capable of exercising—the power of influencing another will in sleep. A lover, whose lady is held apart from him by her father, dreams of telling her to stab her father and put his hand around the hilt of the weapon to simulate suicide: she does it in her sleep; and as the youth wakes aghast at the horror of the dream, she comes to him wailing that she has dreamt this also, and that her father lies dead with his fingers round his sword's hilt. This poem is too long to extract, too closely-knit to break; and we must be content to quote entire, as an example of Dr. Hake's mode of work and thought, a small piece entitled

#### FLOWERS ON THE BANK.

##### I.

"Flowers on the bank, we pass and call them gay;  
 The primroses throw pictures to the mind,  
 The buttercups lag dazzlingly behind.  
 And daisy-friends we spy, but do not say  
 A word of joy; thoughts of them follow not,  
 And soon are they forgot.

## II.

"What care we for wild flowers except their name?  
 Bright maidens at the sight in rapture start,  
 Which, as our smiles say, comes not from the heart.  
 Flowers dance not, sing not, all their ways are tame;  
 They love not, neither love in us inspire;  
 Nor blush when we admire.

## III.

"Yet stay, the fingers of that panting child  
 Have culled for us the choice ones—many a gem—  
 Have set their lovely colours stem to stem.  
 In her fond hands they are not tame or wild,  
 Nestled in fringy fern so changed appears  
 The little gift she bears!

## IV.

"She gives herself, and she can dance and sing,  
 And she can love inspire and blush at praise,  
 The flowers are part of her, have caught her ways.  
 She gives herself who gives so sweet a thing,  
 And she is gone, with other thoughts than ours  
 Gathering fresh love and flowers."

We may perhaps flatter the taste of posterity too far; but we should have little hesitation in predicting that this poem will find its way into many an anthology of the future.

*Songs of a Wayfarer* is the first book of a young man, Mr. F. Wyville Home, for whom, while we are in the mood of prediction, we should be inclined to foretell a notable future. There is great delicacy of feeling and a most ardent love of poetry evident throughout the volume; and if Mr. Home's years have not brought him the rich freight of thought and knowledge of the human spirit that Dr. Hake's have, that is not the fault of his will or of his talents. It is probable that contact with the world, and, if he has the good fortune to find it, contact with undefiled nature will bring him mental experiences worth imparting: if so, he will unquestionably know how to impart them, and will not be able to resist the impulse to do so. Meantime this book of *Songs of a Wayfarer* should be welcomed for what it contains as well as what it promises. Too much, perhaps, of over-acute love-poetry, with its unreasonable longings and despondencies; but this is almost certainly incidental to a first book, and is not likely to be repeated in a second. Also the versified story from Boccaccio, "Salvestra and Girolamo," which is really well managed, and written in a graceful stanza, may be regarded as a kind of 'prentice work; but if Mr. Home means to persist in versifying Decameronian tales, it might be well to choose those that have more of novelty for English verse-readers than that of "Salvestra and Girolamo," which has been rendered more than once in English verse, and notably in an anonymous book called *Stories from*



*Boccaccio.* We may presume that our readers know the story, which is a very touching one, and may quote without context the dedicatory stanza at the close :

Mortals, this is a song in land of Death ;  
 For who among you steppeth forth and saith  
   A gracious word for Life, that all their days  
   Held pitilessly heart from heart these twain ?  
 Will ye not rather lift your voice to praise  
   The abettor Death, who helped them past their pain,  
 Saying, " Whom Love hath joined, let Life not sever,"  
 And bound them each the other's, and for ever ?

This does not quite represent the self-imposed difficulty of metrical execution ; for the stanza, throughout the poem, opens and closes with a couplet wherein the rhyme is disyllabic, the central quatrain being composed with single rhymes. The effect of this arrangement is very agreeable ; but, in our tongue, not easy to sustain in a serious or pathetic poem. Difficulties of craftsmanship, however, do not stagger Mr. Home ; and the most salient quality of the whole book is that the work is conscientiously done. One reads it through without finding any evidence of haste or disinclination to do the best for the verse that the artist can ; and when the volume is closed the cause of regret that strikes most forcibly is the little that one carries away of thought or new experience. The following sonnet is a fair sample of the more thoughtful and less impulsive side of the book :

#### VASTNESS.

The terror and the enchantment of the sea  
 Allure me and affray me where I stand ;  
 The Sea, whose fierce white arms enclasp the land,  
 Whose foam-flakes fly like white birds wide and free ;  
 Whose anger shakes the sheer cliff under me,  
   Whose laughter wreaths the dimples in the sand,  
 Who guards the tender shells within her hand,  
 Who shatters the leviathan ships that flee.  
 I come back when from out the East is crept  
   Starred night ; and strive in spirit to conceive  
   While o'er my head the greater planets roll,  
 The power that moves those myriad worlds, each swept,  
   Maybe, by vaster seas than Earth can have ;  
 There is not room within mine awe-struck soul.

It is easy to see that this has been very carefully worked out, however real the feeling at its root ; and the almost unnatural self-retention of the last line suggests that something much more ardent in expression has been sacrificed in the chiselling process. Whether this be so or not, it is certain that from some cause the sonnet fails to be as impressive as it should ; and this is not unfrequently the case in poems of Mr. Home's that are excellent up to a certain point. The mood is almost always poetic, the method of work always honest ; but, whether from immaturity

of imagination, or from want of knowledge of life, the texture is too often thin.

The transition from Mr. Home to Mr. Joseph Skipsey is very abrupt—a transition from extreme culture to rough-and-ready old-fashioned verse-making by a self-educated pitman. We use the term old-fashioned in no unpleasant sense, but as indicating that the tricks and embellishments incident to the ultra-executive school of modern verse are not a part of Mr. Skipsey's poetic creed. This vigorous singer indeed owes but little of the effect produced upon his readers to the executive side of poetic art. He is a strong-hearted and, one would say, strong-headed man, whose education has been wrung from the hard hand of circumstance, under most unfavourable conditions ;—indeed, he says in his preface that he is wholly self-taught, having entered the coal-pit "to help to earn his bread while yet a mere child, and when the sum total of his learning consisted in his ability to read his A B C, or, at most, his A B, ab, card." That his gift of song is innate, and not the result of education, we should judge not only from the statement that he began to make verses "while he was yet a child, behind his trap-door," a door connected with the ventilation of the mine, but also from the superiority of his verse to his prose. His thoughts, which are often very fine, seem to flow naturally in measures sometimes very primitive, never very exacting, but generally well-handled from the metrical point of view ; and while the sentences are often by no means syntactical, a thing not easily tolerable in prose, they are seldom unrhymical ; so that, looking at the circumstances, one feels but little disposed to exact the uttermost requirement of syntax or any other part of grammar. Sometimes, however, a fine thought or image seems to be marred by want of clear utterance. The two following stanzas, for example, though in a certain sense admirably graphic, lose some of their force by a seeming inability to grasp the fine image of the groping giant in its entirety :

"Alas ! the woe the high of heart,  
Seem pre-ordained to undergo ;  
While proud ambition hides the smart,  
And smiles delude the world below.

"The anguish, like a Samson blind,  
Gropes on in darkness, till at length  
It grasps the pillars of the mind,  
And dies a victim to its strength."

The fault here is that the death of anguish involves the ruin of the mind in such a way that it is inappropriate to call anguish a victim. It is not perfectly clear whether the poet means to depict mind triumphant over anguish, or mind and anguish dying together, in strict accordance with the historic basis of the figure. If the latter, the expression is better than the thought ; if the

former, the thought is better than the expression. All the best poems in the volume are those which deal with the larger aspects of the inner life of man. Some of the homely youth and maiden love-poems, such as "Rosa Rea" and "The Seaton Terrace Lass," are capital in their kind, spontaneous, virile, and yet not even bordering on the coarse; but the best work usually accompanies the best thoughts in the higher class of poems, such as "Man—What is he?" "The Seer," "The Mystic Lyre," "Arachne," and others of like scope. In the following stanzas, descriptive of some of the "Seer's" characteristics, Mr. Skipsey appears in his highest and best mood:

- "Unlike the crowd who never dare look inward,  
Lest they a hideous spectre there should meet;  
Would point to secret longings prompting sinward,  
He looks within and finds a solace sweet.
- "There in a conscience pure he sees a charmer,  
A harper from whose harp such tones are hurl'd;  
They act as mighty spells, as tested armour,  
To shield him from the malice of the world."
- "Go on brave heart," he hears an anthem chanted,  
The distant echoes of that harp's weird tones;  
"Go on—to thee a richer dower is granted,  
Than that which gilds a hundred monarchs' thrones.
- "Thou mayst be thrust aside and scorned and taunted,  
As being a lunatic, a knave, or fool;  
Thou hast within thy inner being planted  
A power that yet shall put the world to school.
- "Thou mayst be destined here to tribulation;  
Thy every pang shall prove a key by which  
Thou shalt unlock some safe of the Creation,  
And with its precious stores thy mind enrich.
- Illumined by that sun for ever burning,  
Deep in the centre of the inner spheres;  
Thou shalt be gifted with the gift of learning,  
What lieth hidden from thy mortal peers.
- "In every planet in the midnight heaven,—  
In every hue doth in the rainbow blend;  
Shalt thou perceive a lore and meaning, given  
To very few on earth to comprehend.
- "The very flower upon the meadow blowing,—  
The very weed down trampled on the road;  
Shall be to thee a priceless casquet, glowing  
With glories hinting of the light of God."

This is better sustained than is usual in the poems of this volume; and more even in tone and worth than other stanzas of the same poem. Thus, after the close of the "inner voice" portion, we have two stanzas in conclusion, of which, in point of execution, one is as poor as the other is fine; and there is a corresponding disparity in the value of the sentiment which the two stanzas express:

"And this enableth the true seer ever  
 To triumph tho' he falleth, and to pray  
 That theirs like his may be a potion, never,  
 Who plot and plan to take his life away.

"Ah ! to the last his words and deeds are sweeter  
 Than is the lark's song in the cloud above ;  
 And rare the bard could find befitting metre,  
 To hymn the love we owe this child of Love !" — (P. 9.)

Mr. Skipsey's volume is one which ought to find many readers, and it is so far removed from the superficial that any friend which it once makes it will surely keep.

Our not very difficult prognostication \* that the fastidious poet of domestic love intended to restore to separate existence the last two books of *The Angel in the House* is fulfilled in the publication of a third volume of the uniform edition of his poems. This, the fourth edition of *The Victories of Love* includes in one volume what were originally two, *Faithful for Ever*, issued in 1860, and *The Victories of Love*, issued in 1868. There is in this single volume, as in the former two, nothing external to connect the beautiful series of letters in octosyllabic couplets with *The Angel in the House* ; although, among the many changes of structure and detail, there is nothing to dissociate the letters from the differently planned and executed *Betrothal* and *Espousals*, now arrogating to themselves the title of *The Angel in the House*. The most decided improvement in general plan to be found in the new edition of the *Victories* is the transfer of the Wedding Sermon to the end of the book, where it comes much more appropriately than in its original station between the final flippancy of Lady Clitheroe and the concluding letter of Felix Vaughan to Honoria. To this change is annexed a minor one ; a beautiful passage which used to stand near the close of one of Mrs. Graham's letters to Frederick, now ends the Wedding Sermon and the whole book. Letter XI. of the first book of the *Victories* (formerly *Faithful for Ever*) now wants the closing lines :

"Your love was wild, but none the less  
 Praise be to love, whose wild excess  
 Reveals the honour and the height  
 Of life, and the supreme delight  
 In store for all but him who lies  
 Content in mediocrities !  
 Many men cannot love ; more yet  
 Cannot love such as they can get.  
 To wed with one less loved may be  
 Part of Divine expediency."

Of these the most important now stand slightly modified in the sermon-close, thus :

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\* *London Quarterly Review*, October, 1878, p. 222.

"Then was that nought,  
That trance of joy beyond all thought,  
The vision, in one, of womanhood?  
Nay, for all women holding good,  
Should marriage such a prologue want,  
'Twere sordid and most ignorant  
Profanity; but having this  
'Tis honour now, and future bliss;  
For where is he that, knowing the height  
And depth of ascertain'd delight,  
Inhumanly henceforward lies  
Content with mediocrities!"—(P. 256.)

The sermon formerly ended at the word *bliss*. There are many minor changes; but it seems to argue a strange defect of ear in a poet so exquisitely sensitive as Mr. Patmore, that in all the fortunes of this book it has not had the good hap to get certain lax and evil rhymes done away with: *self* seems still to be the only rhyme Mr. Patmore condescends to find for *gulf*; and *done* is still considered a good enough rhyme for *Vaughan*. It is also a matter to wonder at that Mr. Patmore should not have cared to take the opportunity of removing so clear a case of borrowed thought as the couplet—

"The daisies coming out at dawn,  
In constellations on the lawn!"—(P. 117)

which reproduces an often-quoted passage from Shelley,—

"Daisies, those pearled Arcturi of the earth,  
The constellated flower that never sets;"

a passage, too, on each line of which there is a charming sonnet in Wade's *Mundi et Cordis Carmina*.

When we reviewed the first edition of *The Unknown Eros*, &c., the collection was confined to thirty-one odes, and two poems afterwards transferred to another volume. Mr. Patmore has since issued a second edition consisting of forty-six odes, sixteen of which do not appear in the first edition, for the original thirty-first ode disappears, and the new matter of this volume begins with Ode XXXI., page 127. Why these sixteen odes were not issued as a second volume, it is hard to see: Mr. Patmore's admirers could then have added them to their collection without being obliged to have two copies of Odes I. to XXX.; but worse, than this, there is an edition of *The Unknown Eros* just issued consisting of fifty-two odes; and those who want to add the six to their collection cannot do so without securing Mr. Patmore's poetical works in four volumes; for the third edition of *The Unknown Eros* is Vol IV. of these works, and is not sold separately from the other three. Of the sixteen odes forming the new portion of the volume now before us, we may say that they add considerably to the beauty and variety of the book. There are three in the form of dialogues, "Eros and Psyche," "De Natura

Deorum," and "Psyche's Discontent," which are peculiarly subtle and delicate. Ode XXXVI., "Winter," reminds us, in regard to crispness of execution, of a small poem similarly named which first appeared in *The Germ*; but the present poem is far more thoughtful. Of the pallor on winter's face the poet says :

"It is not death, but plenitude of peace;  
And the dim cloud that does the world enfold  
Hath less the characters of dark and cold  
Than warmth and light asleep;  
And correspondent breathing seems to keep  
With the infant harvest, breathing soft below  
Its eider coverlet of snow.  
Nor is in field or garden anything  
But, duly look'd into, contains serene  
The substance of things hoped for, in the Spring,  
And evidence of Summer not yet seen."

We cannot find among these new odes any one possessing the universal power of appeal evinced in the exquisite No. XI., "The Toys," wherein the subject is wholly within the comprehension even of uncultured readers; but for the more cultured class, those that we have particularised will be a prize. They exercise, it is true, the thinking powers, to some extent; but thoughtful verse should, in the nature of things, do this; and Mr. Patmore does not number among his eccentricities that of wilful obscurity.

#### MACPHERSON'S MEMOIRS OF MRS. JAMESON.

*Memoirs of the Life of Anna Jameson.* Author of "Sacred and Legendary Art," &c. By her Niece, Geraldine Macpherson. London: Longmans. 1878.

Most of us have read that chapter of Miss Martineau's *Autobiography* in which she speaks, not genially, of the various men and women of note who had been her contemporaries. It is a curious chapter in many ways. It reminds one most, perhaps, of the kind of conversation that passes so freely in some literary circles—how A. has irretrievably damaged himself by a certain article, and B. can talk of nothing but his own works, and C. was so deficient in tact as to be seen chatting with a celebrated critic the day after his poem appeared, and D., E., and F. have each their smallnesses and peculiarities;—and that it should remind one of conversation of this kind is not perhaps flattering to a chapter in a grave work written for the enlightenment of posterity. However that may be, among the many passages in the chapter that have an unkindly and inharmonious ring, and carry no conviction whatever, is the following, which we quote because, as Mrs. Macpherson tells us, it indirectly suggested this book :

"The circumstances of women render the vanity of literary women well-nigh unavoidable, when the literary pursuit and pro-

duction are of a light kind: and the mischief (serious enough) may end with the deterioration of the individual. Lady Morgan, and Lady Davy, and Mrs. Jameson may make women blush, and men smile and be insolent; and their gross and palpable vanities may help to lower the position and discredit the pursuits of other women, while starving out their natural powers," etc.\*

It is not, perhaps, to be wondered at that words like these should have rankled in the heart of one who had stood to Mrs. Jameson almost in the relation of a daughter. Mrs. Macpherson states, "with frankness," that one of the "strongest motives for her work" is to show, by a simple record of her aunt's life, that the impression conveyed by Miss Martineau is not only "unjust," but "uncharacteristic." We may add that in such passages, and notably in that which relates to Lord Macaulay, Miss Martineau, sitting in judgment, seems to us to condemn herself rather than the prisoners at her bar. Be that as it may, it is not a little surprising that these *Memoirs of Mrs. Jameson*, due, in so great a degree, to a feeling of natural indignation, should be written in such perfect taste and temper. Mrs. Macpherson is now dead. Her story, as told by Mrs. Oliphant in a "postscript" to the "preface," is one of great pathos and beauty—the story, not happily a singular one, of brave womanly self-devotedness, of a life that passes "not unmarked of God." And as death robs praise of all suspicion of fulsomeness, though, alas, in a degree also of its pleasure, we may say quite freely that this book is evidently the production of a cultivated English gentlewoman, who uses her pen ably, and with perfect rectitude of judgment and feeling. An English lady—there can be no higher praise. And now let us turn to Mrs. Jameson's life.

Anna Brownell Murphy was born in Dublin in 1794. Her father, a miniature painter of some note, left Ireland when she was about four years old, and thenceforth pursued his art in various parts of England. The child was clever, imaginative, self-reliant. There is a pretty story told of a wild plan of escape in which she acted as ringleader. We quote it, notwithstanding its length:

"With the parents often out of reach, and the sway of their representative not much beloved by her little subjects, accidents of a thrilling character were apt to happen. Here is one which remains dimly—in its confusion of baby excitement, discomfiture,

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\* It is amusing to contrast Mrs. Jameson's report of Miss Martineau—written, however, it must be premised, in a private letter, and not at all for publication. "Harriet looking fat and portly, and handsomer than I ever saw her—less plain, perhaps, were the more proper word. But she looks so full of radiant self-complacency that I gazed with admiring astonishment. Gifted, dauntless woman, who has doubt about nothing, and, as people say, belief in nothing; but that I don't believe. Her translation of Comte's philosophy is to appear to-morrow."

daring, and distress—in the mind of the last survivor (a sister). By age alike and by nature, Anna was the leader of the little troop of girls, and evidently exercised her power with the charming absoluteness of unquestioned and beneficent despotism. . . . The little girls were left alone for two or three days under the charge of the people of the house in which they lived. These temporary guardians interfered to prevent some delightful composition of mud-pies on which the younger children had set their hearts, and the wail that followed the prohibition came to the ears of the elder sister,—a visionary princess of less than nine summers—who, fired by the wrongs of the babies, and probably urged on by some private injuries of her own, and a longing for the softer sway of their mother, whom all their lives the sisters idolised, immediately conceived a plan of escape. To Anna, as to most other imaginative children, life was *tout simple*; she had not a moment's hesitation in proposing the easy plan that would set all right. It was clear the tyranny of a landlady was not to be endured. With what flutterings of heart must the bold project have been listened to! But what Anna said was sacred to the little sisters, and not to be contested. She unfolded her plan after binding them all to secrecy, and the four little conspirators drew close together in breathless awe and excitement. This plan—what could be more natural and easy?—was, that they should all start instantly that very evening, to join their father and mother in Scotland. It would be the easiest thing in the world, if once they could get away safely. They must be sure and eat all the bread and butter they possibly could at tea, and stow away in the front and pockets of their frocks whatever amount of slices could be secretly abstracted from the plates; then, each provided with a tiny bundle containing a change for Sunday (it chanced to be Saturday, and the clean things had just come from the wash and were not yet put away; and it did not occur, even to the head conspirator, that the change might be made with less inconvenience before they went), they would start on their journey. . . . All went as smoothly as possible, no suspicions were roused, and the little girls stole softly from the house, the nine year old leader, with her heavier burden, encouraging the others till their faltering footsteps broke into a run, and they hurried, one after another, down the village street. But the unusual appearance of the party soon attracted attention, and first one, and then another, 'wondered' to see 'the little Murphys running off by themselves.' Some gossip more energetic than the rest took it upon herself to give the alarm; and, greatly to Anna's chagrin and disappointment, they were pursued and captured before meeting with a single adventure, save that one of the little bundles fell into a ditch, and, when fished out again by herculean efforts, one of Camilla's little red shoes proved, alas, to have been lost for ever."



We shall not linger over the life of this adventurous maiden, or follow its forward course very closely. Let the following brief sketch suffice. Her father's art seems never to have achieved great pecuniary success. At an early age she fell in love with Mr. Jameson, whom she afterwards married. But the course of love did not at first run smooth,—nor afterwards, alas—and she went abroad, through France and Italy; as a governess. It was while on this tour that she wrote, entirely for her own private amusement, the notes and memoranda that were afterwards published, as her first book—the *Diary of an Ennuyée*. In 1825 she married. The marriage was not happy, and, perhaps fortunately, childless. On either side there was no wrong—no hindrance to concord, beyond that which is perhaps the most irremediable—absolute incompatibility of taste and temper. Into the relative rights and wrongs of such a case it is almost always idle to enter. Nor shall we attempt it; merely remarking—and the remark is general rather than particular—that in the history of matrimonial disputes, the literary husband or wife has usually a rather unfair advantage. In 1829, Mr. Jameson obtained an appointment as puisne judge in Dominica, whither his wife did not accompany him; and then a legal appointment in Canada. Here she joined him for some months in 1836. But, except during this period and the short interval of his previous sojourn in England between the two appointments, her life was practically that of a literary spinster, or widow, with its own pursuits, interests, pleasures, and friendships. She travelled much in Germany and Italy, wrote many books—of which the *Sacred and Legendary Art*, *Legends of the Madonna*, and *Legends of the Monastic Orders*, are the chiefest and best—devoted much time and thought—being an example herein to the newer dilettante school of æsthetic writers—to social questions—was the mainstay and chief support of her father, mother, and sisters—and finally died, full of honour, in March, 1860. There is a fine sculptured head of her, by Gibson, who was her friend, at the South Kensington Museum. The face is massive and powerful. Of her friendships there is one respecting which it may not be amiss to say a word. She was most intimately, devotedly attached for many years to Lady Byron, and the light thrown by their relations on the character of the latter is full of interest. Here, as wherever else one catches a glimpse of her, Lady Byron shows herself a woman of strong, implacable,\* unyielding will, of strong if narrow understanding, of abundant charities and imperfect sympathy, of a conscience whose rectitude was untempered by humour or the faculty of entering into the position of others—a woman, in short, whose very qualities

\* When asked, after their first interview, what was the chief impression her new acquaintance had made upon her, Mrs. Jameson replied at once, "implacability."

rendered her unfit to be the wife of Lord Byron. The love that for years had bound her to Mrs. Jameson—a love, the shattering of which was as a death-blow to the latter—broke, because Mrs. Jameson had been guilty of some want of confidence, real or imaginary, respecting some circumstance affecting a member of Lady Byron's family.

There would be an interesting chapter to write on Mrs. Jameson's position in the history of English art criticism. We shall not attempt it now. She belongs to the school of critics, for whom any work of art is a poetical theme, a motive of inspiration. We quote the following, not so much for the purpose of illustrating this, as of showing how entirely gratuitous is the assumption that Blake was unknown and unappreciated till within the last few years:

"The most original, and in truth the only new and original version of the Scripture idea of angels which I have met with is that of William Blake, a poet painter, somewhat mad—as we are told, if, indeed, his madness were not rather the telescope of truth—a sort of poetical clairvoyance bringing the unearthly nearer to him than to others. His adoring angels float rather than fly, and with their half-liquid draperies seem to dissolve into light and love; and his rejoicing angels—behold them—sending up their voices with the morning stars that, singing in their glory, move."

#### LIFE AND LETTERS OF SYDNEY DOBELL.

*The Life and Letters of Sydney Dobell.* Edited by E. J. With Steel Portrait and Photographic Illustrations. In Two Volumes. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1878.

SYDNEY DOBELL will probably in the future divide with Mr. P. J. Bailey the credit of standing at the head of that group of poetic writers known as the Spasmodic School; and although Dobell, like the rest of the world of contemporary poets, has produced no poem so full of fine thoughts and the elements of poetry as *Festus*, his works show a greater variety, and his career, prematurely terminated, a greater vigour and earnestness than those of Mr. Bailey so far, and than those of any other poet of the group nicknamed spasmodic. We know nothing of the life of Mr. Bailey as yet; for he still lives and periodically remodels *Festus*,—nothing of the life of Stanyan Bigg; and the life of Alexander Smith is by no means striking. Dobell's life, on the other hand, is full of interest even apart from his being the excellent poet he was. Never was man more completely in earnest in everything he did; and but seldom is it shown to us of a poet that he is more thoroughly imbued with the love of righteousness than Sydney Dobell was, from his boyhood upwards.

The book now before us is the third substantial memorial of him that has issued from the press since his much deplored death in 1874; and it is the memorial which tells us most about the man. As a poet he is of course best appreciated through the collected edition of his poetical works edited by Professor Nichol; as a politician and man of letters, we may judge him through the complementary volume of *Thoughts on Art, Philosophy, and Religion*, superintended by the same hand; and now the interesting memoir affixed to the *Poetical Works* is rather supplemented than superseded by the two goodly volumes of *Life and Letters* edited by "E. J.," who, however, states in a prefatory note that "the initials on the title-page are those of the writer of the narrative portion of the book, by whom, also, the letters, &c., have been collected and arranged; but the work has, to a great extent, been 'edited' by more competent hands." Whether this work also owes its finishing touches to Professor Nichol, we are not in a position to say; but it seems more than likely. The labour has been well performed; and though the bulk and extent of the volumes will but too probably prevent their wholesome influence from spreading as far as could be wished, they will be dear not only to the increasing class who love to make a special study of the mind poetic in all its phases, but also to the larger class of readers whose interest lies in biographical art whether the subject be a poet or not.

The trite saying, that this is a world of compensations, though by no means a safe generality, applies with some truth to the case of Dobell. It can hardly be regarded as compensating *him* for his sufferings and premature death that such ample materials for a biography have survived, and such loving and productive labour has been brought to bear thereon, so promptly as to have got before the world, within four years of his death, the five volumes containing his poetical works, posthumous essays and fragments, life and letters. And yet those who love his poetry and cherish his memory may see in his early death a diminution of the chances which these records and the persons best qualified to deal with them had of dropping out of the way. But no one can read this most interesting life without feeling that the world sustained a great loss in the cancelling of those twenty years which might have been expected to be added to the fifty which Sydney Dobell passed on earth. Laymen of the fervently religious habit of thought which characterises Sydney Dobell are not common in the present age; and when to that habit of thought is added such a keen intellect as he possessed, and such fine poetic powers, the world's loss in him is not easy to measure. We seem to discern in this very fervency, and in the preternatural energy of mind disclosed in the early part of his life, the primary cause of his early death. His wiser father records in his

journal misgivings on the subject of the passion contracted for Miss Fordham, who became Sydney's wife when he was but twenty years old; and when we note that at this very time (*et. 17*) he was somewhat arduously occupied in his father's business, and was following his education with vigour and assiduity, we may well believe that a man's passion of desperate earnestness, complicated by painful convictions of the erroneousness of the religious views of the beloved one, would go far to undermine the boy's constitution and produce those years of failing health and that deplorable curtailment of a noble and productive life.

As a chapter in the literary history of the nineteenth century this *Life of Sydney Dobell* has a strong and varied interest. His correspondents were many and distinguished; and, notwithstanding the rigour with which, in his early days, he acted upon a tenet of the small sect to which he belonged, that it was wrong to associate with those of a different way of thinking, his views widened as he gained experience, and he formed literary friendships with men and women of varied views and attainments. The record of these correspondences and friendships becomes peculiarly interesting in the second volume; and it is regretworthy that, so far as utility to the future historian is concerned, this record is impaired by the omission of names which one can hardly see good reasons for omitting. Indeed, in one case, the omission is not effectual,—the case of a "young poet" with whom Dobell came in contact, whose name, scrupulously kept out of the text, is easily discovered through a poem with which it is connected. This "young poet" was Mr. Arthur O'Shaughnessy, by whom the poem in question is acknowledged.

There is one point that calls for special commendation,—the liberality of rejection which has been brought to bear upon the materials. These seem to have been so extensive that, beyond a doubt, much of intrinsic interest has been rejected; but with a residuum so sufficient both in varied quality and in quantity as the two volumes before us contain, it is impossible to do otherwise than commend the editorial judgment which has been content to leave in slumber not only large masses of letters and journals, but also a vast amount of juvenile poetic work, including much that might of itself be worthy of preservation.

THE  
LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1879.

ART. I.—*Clark's Foreign Theological Library.* Edinburgh.

MORE than twenty years ago the opening volumes of this series were noticed in our columns. It is not too much to say that the promise of the commencement has been more than fulfilled since. Year after year has brought to the subscribers a succession of Biblical expositions and illustrations, many of which will take their place among the classics of the exegete and preacher. The series has steadily improved, both in the solid value of the works translated, and in the merits of the translation. We know of no other series of works in recent days which has rendered more effective service to students of the sacred volume, or exerted a deeper influence on British theological thought. An intimation given some time ago that there was some probability of the series coming to an end, awakened in a wide circle equal surprise and regret; surprise, because as yet only specimens from a rich mine have been given; regret, because a gap would be left which there is nothing else to fill up. The wide domain of German theological literature, so long the carefully-guarded preserve of the professor and leisured student, has been thrown open to the busy pastor and preacher. It is true that a knowledge of German is becoming a more common acquisition; but the form of German writers on theology is often as repulsive as their matter is good, and this circumstance alone will always act as a bar to extensive study of the originals. Most even of those who possess a competent acquaintance with the mysteries of a peculiar terminology will prefer a translation, where it can be had. The present series

satisfies every reasonable expectation. Judgment by comparison is not unfair, and this mode of judgment is available in the present instance. An attempt is being made to naturalise on English soil the leading works of the rationalist school. Although the Edinburgh series is not mentioned by name, it is the one meant when the prospectus of the new series claims for itself that it is "of a more independent character, and less biassed by dogmatical prepossessions." We question the claim altogether. The anti-dogmatical prepossessions, at least, are as pronounced as possible. But putting out of view the difference in the matter, no one who compares the two series in outward respects, will say that the new is better. The price is higher, the amount of matter given far less, the typography inferior, and the translation certainly not better. As to the first point, a recent critic in the *Spectator* says of the Edinburgh series, "It is really surprising that books which must often present a very difficult task to the translator, should be put within the reach of students of theology at so very reasonable a price." We would add that the introduction of so much that is deleterious renders a continuous supply of the antidote all the more necessary.

A special excellence of German Biblical exegesis is that it occupies itself so much with the Old Testament, which in England, as formerly in Germany, had fallen into the background. The work done by Ezra of old for the law has been repeated for the whole of the ancient covenant during the last generation. The change brought about almost amounts to a new revelation. Into every nook and corner of Jewish history and faith floods of light have been thrown. The mutual interpenetration of the two parts of Holy Writ is understood as it never was before. The New is seen to be rooted in the Old, the Old to come to perfect flower and fruit in the New. A thorough knowledge of the Old carries with it inevitably a better knowledge of the New Testament. Another point of excellence is that German exegetes of the highest class everywhere expound the original text. The study of Hebrew, and of Oriental languages generally, has long occupied a foremost place in German universities. Ewald, Gesenius, Fürst, are simply the highest names in a numerous school. The student of their works insensibly acquires the habit of referring his thoughts and judgments to the original text.

It is also acknowledged on all hands in Germany that

investigation of the original text and subject-matter of Scripture, under all aspects, lies at the very basis of exposition of Scripture. To that in the last resort every question is brought back. This is true of the most extreme of the destructive critics. Even these, however arbitrary and fanciful the principles upon which they proceed, profess to make grammar and history their guides. Indeed, the only permanent service which rationalism has rendered to the cause of truth, is the thoroughness of its grammatical and historical criticism. We may observe, by the way, that scholars of the orthodox school have always done more justice to their opponents than they themselves have received. Hengstenberg and Delitzsch often acknowledge the merits of Ewald, Hupfeld, Hitzig, in terms which it is impossible to imagine the latter using of Hengstenberg and Delitzsch. However, the prerogative of the original text is maintained as earnestly by orthodox as by rationalist. The Hebrew scholarship of men like Hävernick, Hengstenberg, Keil, Delitzsch, is beyond cavil. On this field they hold their own with the best. The difference between our modern expositors and the English expositors of two centuries ago is, that the former deal with the letter, the latter with the spirit of Scripture. As spiritual, edifying expositors, the writers of the Puritan period are unrivalled, but few of them take the original text as the basis of their comments. Lightfoot, whose works are far from being obsolete, is almost the only one who anticipates the peculiar merit of modern exposition. He would have been thoroughly at home among the Ewalds, Keils, and Hengstenbergs of to-day. This could be said of very few of Lightfoot's contemporaries.

In illustration of the prominence given to the Old Testament we wish especially to refer to the commentary upon it by Keil and Delitzsch, just completed in twenty-five volumes. It is characteristic of German exhaustiveness that this voluminous exposition is styled in the original an *Exegetical Handbook*. Although written as a reply to the rationalist Handbook of Hitzig and others, the amount of polemical matter in it is inconsiderable, Keil's *Exposition of Chronicles*, in which this element was most prominent, having been replaced by a work of Bertheau's. Dr. Keil is a typical German commentator, eminent for learning, sobriety, and sound judgment. To these qualifications Dr. Delitzsch adds special acquaintance with the lore of

the Talmud and Jewish commentators, a feature which gives a specially Jewish flavour to his expository writings. The abundant illustrations he is able to bring on questions of lexical interpretation from Arabic and other languages cognate to the Hebrew are of the greatest value. His Hebrew translation of the New Testament has just appeared in a second edition. By habitual conversance with Hebrew writers he has become thoroughly saturated with their spirit, and his pages are often touched with the richness of Oriental fancy. The division of labour is admirably suited to the respective gifts of the expositors. Dr. Keil takes as his field the historical and prophetical books, Dr. Delitzsch the poetical books. The only exception is that the latter also expounds Isaiah, who is a poet in substance if not in form.

Descending to particulars, we may refer, in the first place, to the Commentary on Job. For Dr. Delitzsch this book is an inspired drama of the age of Solomon, dealing with that old problem—the meaning and design of the afflictions of the righteous. On this view, it would have to be classed with Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. We cannot say that the author has dealt satisfactorily with the arguments against the dramatic and for the historical character of the book. There is here no question of inspiration or revelation. On these points Professor Delitzsch is thoroughly sound. The arguments for the historical view are well stated in the article on Job in Smith's Dictionary, and we have never seen any adequate reply to them. If the writer had lived in the days of the fully-developed Jewish law and ritual, it is difficult to believe that this fact would not have betrayed itself in incidental allusion or phrase, as is the case in Ecclesiastes. We could not, indeed, considering the subject of the book, expect any direct reference, but indirectly at least the individuality of the writer must have looked through his work. The reply is that the writer threw himself back, by sheer force of imagination, into the pre-legal period. If it were so, the book would form an exception to the rest of Scripture. There is nothing more certainly established by modern criticism than that in the writers of Scripture, alongside the Divine, the human is allowed full play. Apart from this point, the exposition has every element of excellence. The main problem of the book is seen to receive a many-sided solution. The sufferings of the righteous are disciplinary and preparatory to a



higher state of prosperity. But above all in the history of Job is rehearsed the world-wide and world-long conflict between good and evil, which culminated in the cross of Calvary. In this relation the appearance of the personal Tempter at the opening of the book is very significant. Our thoughts are inevitably carried forward to another conflict and another triumph. The book of Job is thus an earlier Gospel, the ancient sufferer is a type of the Divine Sufferer, the issue is a prophecy of a wider issue to be realised in the fulness of time. Delitzsch says well: "The Church has always recognised in the passion of Job a type of the passion of Jesus Christ. James (v. 11) even compares the patience of Job and the issue of the Lord's sufferings. And according to this indication, it was the custom, after the second century, to read the Book of Job in the churches during Passion-week. The final solution of the problem which this marvellous book sets forth is then this: the suffering of the righteous in its deepest cause is the conflict of the seed of the woman with the seed of the serpent, which ends in the head of the serpent being trampled under foot; it is the type or copy of the suffering of Christ, the Holy God, who has Himself borne our sins, and in the constancy of His reconciling love has withstood, even to the final overthrow, the assault of wrath, and of the angel of wrath. The real contents of the book of Job is the mystery of the cross; the cross on Golgotha is the solution of the enigma of every cross; and the book of Job is a prophecy of this final solution."

The three volumes on the Psalms represent an immense advance upon Hengstenberg, and along with Perowne's excellent commentary supply all that an English expositor needs. Professor Delitzsch is thoroughly at home in his exposition of the structure of Hebrew poetry, and the whole work has evidently been a labour of love. The Introduction treats of such subjects as the History of Psalm Composition, the Strophe System of the Psalms, Temple Music and Psalmody, History of the Exposition, Preliminary Theological Considerations. The history of the exposition of the Psalms is traced with particular care. At the head of all expositors stands the Lord Himself who, "both before and after His resurrection, unfolded the meaning of the Psalms from His own life and its vicissitudes." After the Lord the Apostles, and after the Apostles the Fathers, among whom Augustine and Chrysostom shine pre-eminent.

The mediæval Church produced nothing of special mark on the Psalms. "When, however, a new light dawned upon the Church through the Reformation—the light of a grammatical and deeply spiritual understanding of Scripture, represented in Germany by Reuchlin, and in France by Vatablus—then the rose-garden of the Psalter began to breathe forth its perfumes as with the renewed freshness of a May day; and, born again from the Psalter, German hymns resounded from the shores of the Baltic to the foot of the Alps with all the fervour of a newly quickened first-love." Among the most modern expositors Hupfeld is commended for his "grammatical thoroughness;" Hitzig for "stimulating originality;" Ewald for "a special gift for perceiving the emotions and throbbings of the heart, and entering into the changes of feeling."

"The much-abused commentary of Hengstenberg opened a new track, inasmuch as it primarily set the exposition of Psalms in its right relation to the Church once more, and was not confined to the historico-grammatical function of exposition." In any history of exposition written by Delitzsch the Jewish interpreters are sure to receive their due. Rashi of Troyes († 1105), Aben-Ezra of Toledo († 1167), Kimchi of Narbonne († 1250), are fitly commemorated,—the second "independent and genial," the latter "less original of the two, but gifted with a keener appreciation of that which is simple and natural, and of all the Jewish expositors he is the pre-eminently grammatico-historical interpreter." Dr. Delitzsch does not overlook the parallel between the five-fold division of the Psalms and that of the law. In one we have a Pentateuch of devotion, in the other of founding and legislation. The principle of division is shown to be that of homogeneity of matter. Profoundly interesting is the discussion of the relation of the Psalms to Messianic prophecy, legal sacrifices, New Testament doctrine and morality. In the section on temple music we are told that "antiphonal song ought to alternate, not according to the verses, as at the present day in the Romish and English Church, but according to the two members of the verse."

Equally thorough and serviceable is the exposition of Isaiah. Delitzsch's remarks on the spirit of the destructive criticism are severe but just. "Wilful contempt of external testimony and frivolity in the treatment of historical data, have been from the very first the fundamental evils apparent in the manner in which modern critics have

handled the questions relating to Isaiah. These critics approach everything that is traditional with the presumption that it is false; and whoever would make a scientific impression upon them must first of all declare right fearlessly his absolute superiority to the authority of tradition." The vindication of the unity of the book, in opposition to those who trace a new hand from ch. xl., is full and conclusive, although the author refers to a still fuller vindication in the elaborate commentary of Drechsler. The latter is a work of considerable eminence in Germany. Delitzsch, who helped to complete it, characterises it thus: "Its peculiar excellency is not to be found in the exposition of single sentences, which is unsatisfactory, on account of the comminuting, glossatorial style of its exegesis, and, although diligent and thorough enough, is unequal and by no means productive, more especially from a grammatical point of view; but in the spiritual and spirited grasp of the whole, the deep insight which it exhibits into the character and ideas of the prophet and of prophecy, its vigorous penetration into the very heart of the plan and substance of the whole book." However, Delitzsch's own work, no doubt, contains the pith of Drechsler's without its defects. Every high-class commentary has its culminating point. In the present work this is to be found in the expositor of ch. liii.—that "golden *passional* of the Old Testament evangelist." Here the prophet and his expositor alike reach their highest level. Thought and language rise with the grandeur of the theme. Which of the innumerable passion-sermons in existence will compare for a moment with Isaiah's? It is an epistle to the Hebrews in epitome. "It looks as if it had been written beneath the cross upon Golgotha. It is the unravelling of Ps. xxii. and Ps. cx. It forms the outer centre of this wonderful book of consolation (ch. xl.—lxvi.), and is the most central, the deepest, and the loftiest thing that the Old Testament prophecy, outstripping itself, has achieved."

Of the volumes contributed by Professor Keil to this Old Testament handbook it will be enough to notice those on Ezekiel and Daniel, both of which are masterly monographs. The former should be compared with the commentaries of Fairbairn and Hengstenberg on the same mysterious book. Keil founds himself more completely on the original text than Fairbairn, although the latter gives as a substitute a new translation with notes. The difference in point of com-

pleteness is indicated by the fact that the exposition of the grand temple-vision in chs. xl.—xlvi. fills two-thirds of Keil's second volume, while in Fairbairn's it is limited to seventy pages: here Keil is at his best. Both oppose the millenarian interpretation. On some points, Fairbairn's exposition seems preferable to Keil's. Thus, the latter regards the cherubim in the first chapter as representing living realities in the angelic world, while the former looks upon them as "ideal combinations," a far more likely supposition. Keil is right in contending against the rationalist critics that Ezekiel's imagery is borrowed, not from Assyria and Babylon, but from the Jewish temple. The fact that Ezekiel was a priest, and therefore familiar with temple symbols, confirms this view. There are decisive differences between Ezekiel's figures and those pictured in Assyrian and Babylonian remains, while the features in common might just as well be borrowed from the Jewish ritual. On the cherubim Hengstenberg's essay in his commentary should be compared.

The Commentary on Ezekiel has a worthy companion in that on Daniel. Keil is less minutely polemical than Pusey, and therefore more useful to the ordinary student. The Introduction supplies an adequate answer to the objections against the genuineness of the book drawn from its position in the Canon, from the supposed silence respecting the book in the other writings, and from alleged internal anachronisms, improbabilities and errors. The argument on the first two points is thus summed up: "Its place in the Canon among the *Kethubim* corresponds with the place which Daniel occupied in the kingdom of God under the Old Testament; the alleged want of references to the book and its prophecies in Zechariah and in the Book of Jesus Sirach is, when closely examined, not really the case: not only Jesus Sirach and Zechariah knew and understood the prophecies of Daniel, but even Ezekiel names Daniel as a bright pattern of righteousness and wisdom." On the latter point, the author is not content with repelling attacks, but carries the war into the enemy's camp. The whole argument is very able. The language and contents of the book are shown to be totally inconsistent with the theory of its origin in the Maccabean period. We are compelled to break a lance with the translator, who in general has done his work excellently. He says in his preface, "The severely critical

and exegetical nature of the work precludes any attempt at elegance of style. The translator's aim has simply been to introduce the English student to Dr. Keil's own modes of thought and forms of expression." We have no fault to find with such an aim, though it is not the highest. But even such a canon requires a translator to be intelligible. On p. 48 we read of prophecies "covering themselves" (*decken sich*) with the historical facts. We doubt whether any one, ignorant of German, will discover the meaning of so un-English an idiom.

Even with the *Speaker's Commentary* in view, we should still in preference recommend Keil and Delitzsch to the student. Along with Keil's admirable *Introduction to the Old Testament*, it forms a complete exposition of the letter of the Old Covenant, and does the highest honour to its authors. Keil and Delitzsch on the Old Testament, and Meyer on the New, together form a commentary on the Bible which, for the purposes of the preacher and expositor, it will be hard to surpass. The series on the Old Testament is offered by the publishers at subscription price.

We pass from Biblical comment to the kindred field of Biblical theology, which is represented by two noble works, Schmid's *New Testament Theology*, and Oehler's *Theology of the Old Testament*. First, as to the translation. The translation of Schmid is admirable in every respect. Not so that of Oehler. The second volume is rendered fairly, but the style of the first is bald and clumsy to the last degree. "Churchly dogmatic" (p. 38) is a barbarism. "The creation and *maintenance* of the world" is at least an unusual phrase. The following is a fine specimen of the barely literal: "Then time, which with the Godhead founded Rome, mixed fortune and virtue, that, taking from both what was their own, it might set up for all men a holy hearth, an abiding stay and foundation, an anchor for things driven about midst storm and waves. Thus in the Roman Empire the weightiest matters have found stability and security, everything is in order, and has entered on an immovable orbit of government." This instance is clear in comparison with many that might be quoted. Oehler deserved as good a translator as Schmid was fortunate enough to find. His work is truly a masterpiece, and here and there displays an insight which borders upon genius. The field is a wide one, the details to be mastered are intricate, but he grasps and handles the whole with the utmost ease. The work embraces

two parts, Mosaism and Prophetism, which, as is well known, represent two stages of Jewish doctrine, partly successive and partly contemporaneous: contemporaneous, inasmuch as the germs of Prophetism were embedded in the Mosaic law, and the Mosaic law continued in the age of the prophets; successive, inasmuch as Prophetism in its full development and flower is subsequent to the establishment of the Mosaic system. It is impossible to give an adequate idea of the wealth of thought and matter contained in the author's investigations into early Jewish beliefs respecting God, the world, man, sin, sacrifice, worship. The fact of gradual development in revelation is here strikingly illustrated. We are able to trace every doctrine, from its lowest root to its topmost branch. In his interpretation of the ritual of sacrifice, Professor Oehler rejects the notion of *vicaria pœna*. But here the emphasis, we imagine, is to be laid on *pœna*. We do not gather that Oehler rejects the idea of substitution. He says (i. 417), "God has put the soul of the clean and guiltless animal which is presented to Him in the blood of the offering, in the place of the impure and sinful soul of the offerer, and this pure soul, coming between the offerer and the Holy God, lets Him see at His altar a pure life, through which the impure life of the offerer is covered." The author lays stress on the idea of the soul offered "covering" the soul-offering. But this is a simple adherence to the etymology of the original word, which, though it may be the basis, cannot be the final expression of a doctrinal idea. Professor Oehler also very justly points out that the Mosaic law provided no sacrifice for wilful, presumptuous sins. "He who has malevolently committed trespass against the covenant God and His laws falls without mercy under the Divine punitive justice; but on this account there is no more sacrifice for him. The Mosaic cultus is a Divine ordinance of grace for the congregation, which, though it does indeed sin in its weakness, yet seeks the Divine countenance." All the expiatory sacrifices were for sins of ignorance and infirmity alone. If it were any use to find fault with the form of a book, which in the case of a posthumous work like this is unalterable, we should be disposed to criticise the form of the present work. Professor Oehler adopted the practice—which is such a favourite with German authors, but which does not commend itself to English minds—of throwing the bulk of the matter into numerous long notes, which are

appended to a brief text. The fusion of the two elements would have been a great improvement. Enough references to German literature would still have been left to form a body of valuable notes. *Sed aliter diis visum est.* After every deduction on points of form, Oehler's work remains one of the best in the entire series.

Schmid's treatise is unexceptionable. The fascinating subject of which it treats has scarcely received any notice in England. The aim of Biblical Theology is to draw out the doctrinal teaching of Scripture in systematic form, apart from all dogmatic developments. It lays bare the fundamental strata of revealed truth previous to all human accretions. We get back to the original substance of truth, to which all creeds and churches profess ultimately to appeal. It is obvious that the danger to which the Biblical theologian is exposed is that of reading later ideas into the original record, and perhaps it is impossible for any one entirely to avoid this error. We believe that Dr. Schmid succeeds in this respect as well as any one is ever likely to do. His work consists of two parts—the first dealing with the teaching of Jesus, the other with that of the Apostles; to each part is prefixed a brief account of the historical circumstances of the period treated of. Then follows a description of the doctrinal teaching under the head of each doctrine or subject. The order followed in the second part is most natural. The first form of Apostolic teaching, as standing nearest to Judaism, is that of James and Peter. The second form, in which the development of New Testament doctrine, and indeed Old Testament as well, reaches its crown, is that of Paul and John. The discussion supplies a demonstration not only of the process of development within the circle of revelation, but also of the essential unity of revelation in all its parts. All the discrepancies which have ever been alleged against Scripture are superficial, while the unity is in its very essence and substance. The Pauline theology, as it has been called, is already contained in germ in the teaching of Christ, while the teaching of Christ desiderates the exposition of Paul, just as the Old Testament does the New. "I have many things to say unto you;" and Christ did say them by the pen of His Apostles.

In Winer's *Confessions of Christendom*, with its precise definitions and rigid formulæ, we have a perfect contrast to the simplicity of Biblical Theology. Symbolism, or the

History of Creeds, has a considerable literature in Germany. Winer's treatise is the most suitable text-book, because of the judicial impartiality by which it is marked. It is as free from the passion of controversy as a digest of laws. The judgment of the student is thus less likely to be deflected from the straight line by bias, either to the right hand or left. At the same time, Winer does not cover the entire field. The great creeds of the early Church are not noticed. The sole object is to set in clear relief the doctrinal differences of modern Christendom, and this is done in a most thorough way. Whether as a text-book for college teaching or private study, we can conceive no better manual than this. Whoever will master its contents, and especially follow out the suggestions in the Introduction, will become no mean proficient in comparative theology. To complete the survey, a work like Hahn's *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubenslehren der alten Kirche*, which has recently appeared in a second edition, is necessary. The various introductory labours of the editor will be found to add greatly to the value of Winer's treatise. He observes as follows:—"To set forth in order, and with absolute impartiality, the endless variations of Christian [thought, through the entire process of the *loci communes* of theology, in all their dogmatic comprehensiveness and subtlety, is a task for which very few men could be found competent. Many have taken it in hand; but, before proceeding far, have been overpowered by their honest prepossessions, and surrendered themselves to the *genius loci* of their own confession. But Winer has held the scales with an even and untremulous hand. He has done justice to every side of every question; the copious extracts from the standards are left to speak for themselves; while innumerable points of less importance, both in dogma and its history, are thrown into the notes and observations." It was a clever move on the part of the Roman Catholics to translate Möhler's specious volume on *Symbolism*. The editor of Winer says that the work is "a subtle though clear apology for Tridentine doctrine. What Bossuet attempts in an oratorical and unsatisfactory, because unreal, manner, in his *Variations of Protestantism*, Möhler essays to establish in a calm and scientific manner." We might demur to the latter part of the description, but perhaps the manner is as calm and scientific as is usual in this particular controversy. The editor speaks afterwards of Möhler's fallacies.



However, the translation no doubt answered its purpose, and it is a pity that no translation has appeared of such replies as those of Hase and Baur.

The important department of Dogmatic Theology is represented in the series by a single work, Martensen's *Dogmatics*. Shedd's *History of Doctrines* is published by the Messrs. Clark outside the series, and is an original work of the author. Martensen's volume is rather a general discussion of the main doctrines than a minute survey of the entire field. The extreme originality and independence of view, which constitutes its excellence for the student, prevents its serving as a map of the entire domain of dogmatics. The defect, no doubt, of German works on the subject is the polemical tone which prevails in them; but this is an element which we must accept and make the best of. We might go through the alphabet in an enumeration of the authors in this field—Baumgarten-Crusius, Beck, Ebrard, Gass, Hase, Kahnis, Lipsius (whose handbook has just appeared in a second edition), and so on. Hagenbach's treatise is promised in the Edinburgh series. It was published by the Messrs. Clark, in 1846; but the new edition is to be taken from a recent edition of the original, and to contain "large additions from various sources." German treatises, such as Harnack's and Zezschwitz's, on Practical Theology, inclusive of the theory of preaching and pastoral work, are very full. This interesting field is still untouched by translation, as is, also, formal Apologetics.

The department of ethics is represented by two works, Martensen's *Christian Ethics* and Harless's *System of Christian Ethics*. To name the author of the first work is to characterise it as full of original, stimulating thought. Originality and vigour seem indeed to belong to the fibre of the Danish mind, if we are to judge by Martensen and another author to whom Martensen refers—Kierkegaard, who appears to be a sort of theological Carlyle. Martensen's volume merely represents the first part of the original, the part dealing with the general principles and ideas of ethics. It is true that in this respect Harless forms a supplement to Martensen, discussing as he does in detail the several departments of the subject. But in reality no author can be regarded as a supplement to another. Though the material is the same, it takes different shapes in different hands. The outline which Martensen at the close of his

volume sketches for the second part, is identical in the main with the divisions of Harless. The former says: "Special ethics remains, then, to be treated under these principal divisions: 1. Life under the law and sin; 2. Life in imitation of Christ; 3. The moral life of society and the kingdom of God." Harless's divisions are—1. The blessing of salvation, including the natural state of man and life under the law; 2. The possession of salvation; 3. The preservation of salvation. But full and able as Harless's mode of treatment is, Martensen's has a value of its own. The form adopted by Harless is the same as in Oehler, a brief text and long notes.

Hengstenberg's is a name that often occurs in the series, but not oftener than is due to the merit of his works. As the leader in the revival of orthodox faith, Hengstenberg was the mark of boundless abuse; but he never shrank or quailed in contending "earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints." The wonderful success which crowned his lifelong struggle is no doubt the true cause of the bitter disparagement and scorn still heaped upon his name in some quarters. Abuse in such a cause and from such persons is the highest honour. To the defenders of saving truth, if to any, Christ's words apply in all their force: "Blessed are ye when men shall revile you . . . for My sake." Oehler, quite as competent a judge as any on the other side, speaks in a very different tone. "Hengstenberg retains the merit of having been the first to revive in Germany a strong religious and theological interest in the Old Testament." To say that some of his works need now to be supplemented is only to say that the world has not stood still. Canon Perowne speaks of the "laboured dulness" of his Commentary on the Psalms, but here the author suffers for the "dulness" of the translator. We ask our readers to judge of Hengstenberg, not by this work, but by his *Christology of the Old Testament*—a worthy supplement to Pye Smith's *Scripture Testimony to the Messiah*—and his monographs on Ezekiel, Ecclesiastes, and St. John. The special feature of the last work is the care with which it traces the threads of connection between the Gospel and the Old Testament. The idea may be pushed a little too far in certain details, but it is a true one, and is worked out by Hengstenberg as by no one else. A very full and just estimate of Hengstenberg's character and influence may be found in the Introduction to the

second volume of his posthumous work, *The Kingdom of God under the Old Testament*.

A very different, and in many respects contrasted, character is that of Tholuck, whose Commentaries on St. John and the Sermon on the Mount have a place in the series. Tholuck occupied an altogether different standpoint from that of Hengstenberg. The former essayed to strike out a middle course between dogma and lax belief, while the latter was ever a sturdy Lutheran. The charm of Tholuck's genial, mystic temperament was resistless, and his power over the young immense. His best works have all run through edition upon edition in Germany, and no one who reads them can wonder at their influence. A learning as solid and multifarious as Hengstenberg's is blended with the grace of poetry. The ineffaceable stamp of genius is visible everywhere. Philippi is somewhat harsh when he describes Tholuck as a "misty, vacillating mediation-divine," though the charge may be substantially true. It was not in Tholuck to be a dogmatic theologian. Sharply cut precision was alien to his nature. We would fain believe that his chief influence has been exerted in producing faith, though perhaps imperfect, where it did not exist, than in disturbing faith where it was strong. The two works of Tholuck in the Edinburgh series are worthy of the author's fame and the subject, and at the same time free from all doubtful elements.

The present age is an age of monographs, and Germany is their favoured home. There they originated, and there they have come to perfection. Every great character or epoch or institution has its monograph or monographs containing an exhaustive study of the subject. The application of this system, which is only another form of the division of labour, to the interpretation of Scripture has had the best results. The time is long since past when we were content to receive a Commentary on the whole of Scripture from a single hand. There is not a Commentary of this class which has not its weak and strong parts. If Dr. Clark is at his best in the Gospels, in the Prophets he is at his weakest, and no wonder, when his memoirs tell us that the exposition of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel was written in six weeks. Even if this statement only applies to the simple writing after careful preparation, the time is short enough. By division of labour, when properly carried out, we obtain equal strength in all the parts.

All our best modern Commentaries are of this composite character,—The Speaker's, Jamieson, Brown, and Faussett's, the *Critical Commentary* on the New Testament by Blackley and Hawes, Schaff's, Ellicott's. The last name reminds us that Bishop Ellicott was the first to introduce expository monographs into England, by his peerless Commentaries on the Epistles, never, alas, to be completed. Lightfoot followed in the same track. Will he follow also in the last respect and from the same cause? Eadie, in a somewhat different line, deserves respectful mention. The present series of translations contains four noble monographs—Delitzsch, on the Hebrews; Godet, on Luke; Godet, on John; Luthardt, on John. Of the first we only need say that it is quite equal to the other works of the author, which we have already sufficiently characterised. Dr. Delitzsch's, minute acquaintance with everything Jewish admirably qualifies him to expound the great Jewish epistle. To German thoroughness and learning Godet adds the French facility of clear and graceful exposition. His Commentaries are an almost perfect example of the continuous, as opposed to what Delitzsch calls the "glossatorial" style of exposition, so that they are books to read as well as consult. Mark the unity which Godet traces through the Gospel. First, the Narratives of the Infancy, in seven parts (i. 5—ii. 52); secondly, the Advent of the Messiah, in four narratives (iii. 1—iv. 13); thirdly, the Ministry of Jesus in Galilee, in four cycles (iv. 14—ix. 50); fourthly, the Journey from Galilee to Jerusalem, in three cycles (ix. 51—xix. 27); fifthly, the Sojourn at Jerusalem (xix. 28—xxi. 38); sixthly, the Passion, in three cycles (xxii. and xxiii.); seventhly, the Resurrection and Ascension (xxiv.). This exposition, so firmly knit together, is embedded between an introduction, which discusses fully the usual questions, and ample dissertations on the general characteristics and composition of the Gospel, its sources and relations to the Synoptics, and the beginning of the Christian Church. The advantage of this division of the matter usually included in Prolegomena is that the conclusions advocated in the *Postlegomena* are supported by the whole weight of the intermediate exposition. The discussion in the latter part, on the relations and origin of the Synoptics, is particularly interesting. After criticising the most recent theories of Weizsäcker, Holtzmann and Weiss, Professor Godet proposes his own,

which is substantially that of Alford, but put with French grace and vivacity. We seem to see the Gospels gradually crystallising round certain fixed points. The independence and distinctiveness of the Evangelists are well brought out. But Godet's masterpiece is his Commentary on St. John's Gospel in three volumes, which has been translated into German as well. The only fault, if any, is that the author seems to have aimed at saying everything that can be said. Notes like those on pp. 137, 140, and 295 of vol. i., are unworthy of a place in such a commentary on such a Gospel. But these are mere spots in the sun. The grammatical criticism, theological exposition, and discussions of critical problems are all of the highest order. In addition, there is the flowing diction which is so seldom present in similar works on the other side of the Rhine. Of all the great commentaries on this glorious Gospel, we doubt whether there is one superior to Godet's. To all who are compelled to confine themselves to a single exposition we should confidently recommend it. Take the following as a specimen of argument and style. Professor Godet is replying to the objection that the character of Christ's teaching in the Synoptics is altogether different from that given in St. John. The dilemma put is: "A choice must be made: if Jesus has spoken as Matthew represents, He cannot have spoken as John describes." "Now," says M. Renan, "between these two authorities no critic has hesitated, nor will hesitate." After dwelling on numerous points of coincidence, Professor Godet continues: "Criticism has so frequently made use of the comparison between the discrepancy which we are considering, and that which the Socrates of Xenophon and of Plato present, that we cannot refrain from likewise devoting some lines to that interesting subject. The analogy between the two facts is very remarkable. It is from Xenophon's narrative that we become acquainted with the varied, practical, and popular side of the teaching of Socrates; it is by means of Plato that we get a glimpse of the lofty speculative background which constitutes the basis, unknown to the common herd, of those dialogues full of animation and originality which Xenophon has preserved to us. Without the theory of ideas, concerning which the latter is silent, Socrates would never have attained to that firm attitude, that sovereign deportment, which Xenophon himself makes us admire in his master. And if the history of philosophy

first flowed to the side of the Socrates of Xenophon, and regarded that of Plato as a speaking-trumpet, selected by the latter to set forth his favourite theory, it has changed its mind at the present day. Schleiermacher, Brandis, Ritter, recognise that the close connection which unites the school of Plato with the philosophy of Socrates would be inexplicable if the teaching of the latter had not comprised profounder speculative elements than anything which Xenophon has transmitted to us. It is in like manner, on this condition only, that we can account for the complete revolution wrought by Socrates on the progress of Greek thought. Thus science comprehends that the two pictures are equally legitimate, and seeks for a synthesis which will reunite them, and reproduce the image of the true and complete Socrates. Who would not be struck by the analogy between that historical phenomenon and the one which we are considering? As we have seen, the Jesus of the Synoptics is likewise an insoluble enigma if we do not admit, as lying at the foundation of Christ's consciousness, that sublime background of the feeling of an eternal existence, of a Divine pre-existence, which, from the period of His baptism, became the basis of His earthly activity, and which has been clearly disclosed to us only by John. The influence of Christ on the religious life of mankind is only intelligible on such a condition. If there was in the Greek sage the wherewithal to furnish two such different portraits, and yet one and both of them relatively true, how should it surprise us to see a similar result produced with respect to Him who possessed an infinitely superior richness of life and thought, and who, if He had lived in the Greek world, could have said: 'Here is a greater than Socrates!' " A pithy saying is quoted from Wolff: "In John, Jesus is *constantly* that which in the Synoptics He is only during some remarkable hours."

With Godet's Commentary should be compared Luthardt's, also in three volumes. The Introduction, of course, goes over the same ground as Godet's, but it is not without excellent features of its own. We may refer to the exceedingly minute and elaborate discussion of the language and style of the Gospel. The peculiarities of construction and idiom are well illustrated. These are such as—a fondness for repeating words and phrases; brief, abrupt sentences in the Hebrew rather than the Greek style; abundance of

antithesis and contrast. Still more interesting is the illustration of the Evangelist's fondness for sketching typical characters, which stand out from the canvas in life-like outline and colour—Thomas, Nathanael, Philip, Andrew, Peter, the beloved disciple, the mother of Jesus, Mary Magdalene, the two sisters at Bethany, the Samaritan woman, Nicodemus, Caiaphas, Pilate, Judas. All the preliminary matter is discussed with even greater thoroughness in the author's excellent volume, *St. John, the Author of the First Gospel*, issued independently of the series. The Bibliography at the close of the latter volume of the works published on the origin of the fourth Gospel fills eighty pages. It is compiled by the translator, Dr. Gregory, a few of whose comments are not in the best taste. Indeed, the flavour of the translation is rather American than English, though we do not impute this as a fault. Both Godet and Luthardt regard chap. xxi. as an appendix added by John subsequently, holding chap. xx. 30, 31, to be the real close of the book. We may add that the printing of the final  $\varsigma$  as  $\sigma$  throughout Luthardt's volumes has far from a pleasing effect to English eyes.

Other works, like Bleek's *Introduction to the New Testament*, we must pass by. Stier's volumes, and Christlieb's *Modern Doubt*, are too well known to need description. Among the new announcements is Kriebeg on the *Atonement, considered in the Light of Christian Consciousness*—a work which in opposition to Ritschl has made a deep impression in Germany. There is every promise that the series will continue to deserve the high place which it has won in theological literature. Every minister who uses it will find his range of thought sensibly enlarged. No richer mine of material for pulpit exposition and teaching exists.

Every one who considers the subject must be struck by the contrast between English and Continental theological literature. It would be impossible in this country to find a market for such works as are constantly pouring from the press in Germany and even in France. No one there who has anything which he considers worth publishing has any hesitation in sending it forth. Of course a great deal of the literature is ephemeral, but a fair proportion lives. He would be a daring publisher who in this country should adventure such a thesaurus as Herzog's *Encyclopædia*, which is now appearing in a second edition. In France it is not uncommon to find not only modern reprints of the Fathers,

but also modern translations of the Fathers *in extenso*. It is evident that the theology-reading public is far greater on the Continent than with us. The ministers alone form a considerable constituency, and these have undergone a far more thorough and systematic training in theology than is common in this country. Theology occupies a very subordinate place in the curriculum of universities among us, compared with its position in Germany. There it is much more on a level with the other branches of academical training. The field is regularly mapped out, and professors are assigned to the several departments. The chairs of theology and its related subjects rank with those of classics and science. Oriental philology is thoroughly taught.

All this points to the much more complete training of the ministry in Germany. Scotland is the only part of Great Britain which approaches Germany in this respect. All honour to the national tradition which has always reckoned scholarship and learning among the essential requisites of the Christian teacher. No question is more important in its bearing on the future of Christianity than that of the training of the ministry. If no one would be allowed to practise in medicine or law without the credentials of adequate qualifications, far less should this be possible in the cure of souls. If it is lawful to learn from an enemy, we may be admonished by the practice of the Romish Church. However narrow and exclusive the training of its priests, they are, at least, well versed in the technicalities of their calling. Until lately, the English Church was the most backward in this respect. Well drilled in the classics or mathematics, its ministers were left to pick up theological knowledge as best they could. Strenuous efforts are now being made by the establishment of colleges like King's, Highbury, Litchfield, Chichester, Cuddesdon, and Lampeter to supply the deficiency. Nonconformists have excelled the English Church on this point. Their deficiency, owing to scanty means, has rather been in breadth and depth of general knowledge. Nonconformist candidates for the pulpit have always been trained, more or less completely, in the outlines of theology. Let the churches perfect their systems of ministerial training. Nothing will repay culture more generously than this field.

Still, let it never be forgotten that all that colleges can do is to supply the instruments, sketch the outline, indicate the methods of theological study. The programme given



in these preliminary years must be worked out and filled up by assiduous, lifelong research and study. The student, when he leaves college, has mastered the grammar of his special science. He has next to apply the rules put into his hands to one department after another. He is in the position of the art or science student, whose course of training in studio and laboratory is completed. His next business is to do work of his own. It would be a good sign if English theology were constantly producing works like those given in the series now under notice, many of which issue, not from professors' studies, but from quiet parsonages. More exhaustive and elaborate works still are perforce left untranslated. We do not of course forget or undervalue what is done in Great Britain in this field. The different lectureships and individual scholars are rendering good service. But the total outcome is not large in comparison. The great lack is a public interested in theological questions, and nothing will tend to create this more effectually than a thorough training of ministerial candidates in Biblical and theological science. To all these purposes the series of German translations has made—may it long continue to make—no insignificant contribution.

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- ART. II.—1.** *Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Egypte pendant les Campagnes du Général Bonaparte.* Par VIVANT DENON. A Paris: Didot, Aux. 1802.
- 2.** *Monuments de l'Egypte et de la Nubie, d'après les dessins exécutés sur les lieux sous la direction de CHAMPOLLION, le jeune, et les descriptions autographes qu'il en a rédigées, publiées sous les auspices de M. GUIZOT et de M. THIERS, Ministres de l'Instruction publique et de l'Intérieur, par une Commission spéciale.* A Paris: Firmin Didot. 1845.
- 3.** *Egypt's Place in Universal History.* An Historical Investigation. In Five Books. By CHRISTIAN C. J. BUNSEN. Translated by Charles Cotterell. London: 1859.
- 4.** *Voyages de M. de Thevenot, tant en Europe qu'en Asie et en Afrique.* A Paris: chez CHAS. ANGOT, au Lyon d'or. 1689.
- 5.** *Up the Nile and Home Again.* A Handbook for Travellers and a Travel Book for the Library. By F. W. FAIRHOLT, F.S.A. With One Hundred Illustrations from Original Sketches by the Author. London: Chapman and Hall. 1862.
- 6.** *A Thousand Miles up the Nile.* By AMELIA B. EDWARDS, Author of "Barbara's History," &c. Upwards of Seventy Wood Engravings by G. Pearson, after Finished Drawings on the spot by the Author. Longmans. 1877.
- 7.** *Album du Musée de Boulaq, comprenant quarante planches, photographiées par MM. DÉLIÉ et BÉCHARD. Avec un Texte explicatif rédigé AUGUSTE MARIETTE-BEY.* Le Caire. Mourès et C<sup>ie</sup>. 1871.
- 8.** *Voyage dans la Haute-Egypte. Explication de quatre-vingts-trois Vues photographiées d'après les monuments antiques compris entre Caire et la première Cataracte.* Par AUGUSTE MARIETTE-BEY. Tome 1<sup>er</sup>. Caire: Mourès. Paris: Goupil. 1878.
- 9.** *Egypt from the Earliest Times to B.C. 300.* Christian Knowledge Society. 1876.
- 10.** *Egypt and the Pentateuch.* An Address to the Members of the Open-Air Mission, by W. R. COOPER, F.R.S.A.,

&c., Assistant-Secretary of the Society of Biblical Archaeology. Bagster. 1875.

11. *The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians.* By SIR GARDNER WILKINSON, D.C.L., &c. A New Edition, Revised and Corrected by Samuel Birch, LL.D., D.C.L., Keeper of the Egyptian and Oriental Antiquities in the British Museum. Murray. 1878.

THE subject which we have undertaken is far too vast to be treated of in all its bearings in a single paper. The interpretation of hieroglyphics alone, and the latest results obtained in this way in the field of history and mythology, are enough to fill our whole space. Much must be wholly left out, much more can only be glanced at. We shall aim at being suggestive—at pointing out lines of research for those who may care to investigate a subject which follows naturally from that of Cyprus, so lately treated of in these pages. The interest of Egypt is manifold. To the traveller its ruins will always come with the freshness of a revelation. Every one who has been there assures us of this; no previous getting-up of the subject detracts from the delight of seeing the things themselves. You may study every print, from the coloured plates in Denon to the newest autotype; but none the less will what you see at Ghizeh, and Edfoe, and Abou-Sembal (Belzoni's Ipsambul) strike you with awe when you really get there. This is not so with man's works elsewhere; it is not so even in Switzerland, where we sometimes think we have seen a view before, so often has it been brought before us in picture or engraving. No pictures could ever make you fancy you had seen the Sphinx or the colossal Rameses before.

To the English politician Egypt is, perhaps, what he cares most about in the Eastern question. Even if Constantinople was in the hands of a hostile Power, we need care but little provided Egypt, the high road to India, remained open. We have lately been told that India does not pay; that it is not only bankrupt itself, but is ruining us by forcing us to keep up an army and navy far beyond our means; but be this as it may, we are not likely to think of giving India up, inasmuch as to do so would at once consign us to the position of a third-rate Power. We cannot vie in Europe with the masters of colossal armies; if we give up India we shall have to confess ourselves no match for them, not in Europe only but in the world. Egypt, too,

has a peculiar political interest from the way in which France and England are there drawn together. Our joint ownership of the canal, and the co-operation of Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert in managing the Khedive's finances, are a pledge of that friendship which is the best hope for the future of Europe. That England and France should heartily co-operate in managing Egypt on just and honest principles is something to delight the philanthropist. A war like that in Zululand is always matter of intense regret for those who think most seriously of England's honour. In such a case we never go to war with clean hands; we are always urged on by colonists eager for "a little blood-letting," anxious "to read the restless savage a severe lesson," or we are drawn into hostilities through some wretched frontier squabble; while in a peaceful struggle with the combined greed and wastefulness of the rulers, the knavery and insolence of the low Europeans, the chicane of the consular courts, the degradation of the *fellaheen*, and all the other evils so graphically pictured by M. About in *Ahmed Le Fella*, we should have the whole world with us and our consciences to boot. Troublesome freebooters though they are, the Zulus are undoubtedly patriots, and Ceteywayo is a patriot king, and his wish to prevent our spreading further in South Africa is intelligible enough; he fears for his people the fate of the Bushmen. But were we or the French to annex Egypt to-morrow, we should offend no patriotism. The little Turkish colony would go, and the rest of the inhabitants would simply acquiesce in another of those changes of masters which have been their lot for ages. Egyptian patriotism died when Psammetichus the Second was crushed by the power of Darius Ochus; or, if revived under Alexander the Great, it was finally stifled during the long life in death of the later Ptolemies. Cleopatra, the last Egyptian patriot, made patriotism thenceforth impossible for her countrymen.

The religious interest of Egypt is fully as great as the political. If the land is the link between Europe and the East, the religion is the link between heathenism and that religion whence our own is derived. To trace analogies between the Jewish cult and the Egyptian, to speculate on the influence of the Egyptians on the Jewish mind in matters of religion, has been, for some critics, a labour of love. They have had to confess that the connection is rather in the way of contrast than of resemblance. On the face of

it the Egyptian religion says more than any other about the after life and the condition of the soul therein. The Pentateuch says so little on the subject that its silence favours the argument of Bishop Warburton's *Divine legation of Moses*. This silence (says one school of Egyptologists) was a reaction against the excessive "other-worldliness" of the Egyptians. It was not that the Jews knew nothing about an after state; they deliberately put aside theories which they had found compatible with lust, and cruelty, and oppression.

However this may be, the connection between the two religions offers matter for deep thought. Dr. Watts, long ago, pointed out that the shape of the cherubim had some resemblance to that of the god Apis. Solomon's temple, too, in its general plan, was not unlike an Egyptian temple; its holy of holies, at the back of the several courts, answering to the position of the Egyptian sanctuary. *The Tale of Two Brothers*, again, translated by Mr. Le Page Renouf, in the second volume of *Records of the Past*, when stripped of its mythological additions and adornments, strikingly reminds us of that of Joseph. To this subject, however, we will return by-and-by; one word more about another of the deeply interesting aspects of Egyptology. Who were the Egyptians? We have a more minute record of their daily lives than any other ancient nation has left. Where we can but doubtfully guess about the ways and doings of Greeks and Romans, how the Egyptians passed their lives is as clear to us as vivid painting could make it. Yet who they were who thus lived and acted, of whose modes of worship, of treating their dead, of tilling their land, of working handicrafts, of taking their pleasure, we know every detail, is a mystery. Certainly they were not negroes; yet the shape of the foot and of the calf of the leg, as well as the fulness of the lips, bespeak negro affinities. The strange mixture, too, of the solemn and the ludicrous, of the grandest symbolism and the most grovelling fetishism, leads to the conclusion that there was in them a strong tinge of negro, to which this lower element is due. The colour need be no difficulty; not all so-called negroes are black; the "Amazulu," figured in Pritchard, has just the Egyptian tint as given in the monuments. But what was the other race which, while impressing its culture on the primitive inhabitants of the Nile valley, yielded, as superior races have so often done, to the

debasement influence of the primitive religion? The onions and cats and crocodiles are the fetishes or totems of the primitive nomes, and these lived on to the last, side by side with the grand myth of Osiris-Horus, or the conflict of good and evil. They live on still in the quaint superstitions which cling to Egyptian Mohammedanism, the serpent of Sheik Hareede, for instance, just as the tinge of negro still survives in and gives individuality to the comely Copt. Who were these incomers? Children of Ham, kinsmen of the Canaanites, the genealogy in Genesis says; but then there is the doubt whether that genealogy was meant to be ethnical or confined to certain families. Some have traced affinities between the Egyptian civilisation and that of the old Hindoos with its castes, and have thought the matter settled because a few ignorant sepoy, brought in to help in dislodging the French, "did *poojah*" to a sculptured cow at Denderah. Others have compared the pyramids of the Nile valley with those of Mexico, forgetting that the former were undoubtedly tombs and nothing else, while the latter were plateaus on which sacrifices were performed. From this supposed connection they have been led to imagine a primitive reddish-brown race, whose chief seat was the submerged continent where now rolls the Pacific Ocean. The island groups scattered over that ocean were its mountain tops; Easter Island, with its quaint, colossal idols, one of its mountain shrines; the Polynesians the poor remnant of its least cultured inhabitants. Dreams of this kind, however, are as unprofitable as the speculations of Dr. Piazzzi Smith, who has found in the great pyramid a compendium of weights and measures and astronomical facts enshrined there by the antediluvians for the teaching of all after time. Wherever the old civilisers of Egypt came from, undoubtedly Egypt held the same position with regard to the rest of Africa that Mexico did to North and Peru to South America, and that China holds to the vast and wide-spread Tartar family. In each we see the highest development of one particular race with or without foreign admixture. Miss Edwards talks of the strikingly un-Egyptian features of the colossal Rameses at Abou-Sembal; but the gods with whom in the frescoes that mighty conqueror is associated have, when they are human-headed, the usual round-faced, full-lipped type. We believe that in all these cases of exceptional culture there was a mixture; everywhere the mixed races have done most in the world; even

in our country it has been noticed that the borderland of Celt and Englishman, from Devon and Somerset up to the Tay, has produced far more than its share of famous names.

Into the bearing of all that has been discovered about early Egypt on the question of the antiquity of man we will not attempt to enter. Mr. Wallace, in a very remarkable essay on the subject, asserts that there seems no progress in Egyptian art; the earliest work is the best; the great pyramid, in which the constructive power of this wonderful people culminates, belongs to almost the remotest period of which we have any sculptured records. On this assumption, the correctness of which we think is disputed by most Egyptologists, some of whom even find a flint age in Egypt, he bases his theory of successive ebbs and flows of civilisation; the great pyramid marked the full tide of Egyptian culture, the ebb began soon after. Old Egyptian chronology will probably never be more than approximately settled. The old Egyptians wrote no history; what history we have is evolved from incidental notices in sepulchral inscriptions, in records of treaties, of conquests, &c., collated with the very conflicting lists of Herodotus and Manetho. But much has been done; how much may be judged by comparing with Mr. Stuart Poole's papers in the *Contemporary* a jaunty article in the *Edinburgh Review* (July, 1862), which, under cover of a notice of Sir G. C. Lewis's *Astronomy of the Ancients*, pokes a good deal of clumsy fun at Baron Bunsen's great book. We may at once admit that Bunsen was, like Niebuhr, given to rash speculation. His convenient way of explaining successive dynasties as contemporaneous in different parts of the country has been discredited; and few will now support his wild statement that the Egyptians emigrated into the Nile valley 13,000 years ago, more than 2,000 years after "that formation and deposit of Sinism in which we discern the earliest polarisation of religious consciousness, which issued in the formation of pure agglutinative speech." Bunsen holds that before the first glacial period with its accompanying deluge Egypt had been peopled; hence in her traditions there is no record of a flood. He thinks that Osirism began with the earliest settlement of the land, while animal worship was not introduced till Menes, in 3624 B.C.,\*

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\* The uncertainty of Menes' date follows from the absence of certain time-notes in all the monuments. "He was only eight centuries before the earliest dated monuments," say some; but to provisionally fix these dates even the

united all the nomes into one government. But Bunsen's mistakes were the result of building a vast superstructure on a very insufficient foundation. The whole subject is now much better understood. Champollion has been justified in regarding the modern Coptic as in the main the same language as the old Egyptian; and, despite the sneers which only sixteen years ago were levelled at the Egyptologists, Dr. Birch's new edition of Sir Gardner Wilkinson and Mr. Stuart Poole's essays, and the whole series of books in Messrs. Bagster's list, show that a good deal of certainty has been attained.

Our summary of early Egyptian history shall be very brief. Menes every one assumes to be an historical character, the founder of Memphis, the first merely human king (says Herodotus) of a land that had long been ruled by gods and demigods.

The date of Menes is uncertain; but we form a notion of it when we remember that he was the first king of the first dynasty, the Pharaoh who made Joseph his prime minister having been the last of the seventeenth. The pyramids of Ghizeh were built by kings of the fourth dynasty; of the fifth we learn from the hieroglyphics that conquests were carried on in Nubia and mines worked in Sinai. Then, from the sixth to the end of the tenth dynasty Egyptian history is a blank. It would seem as if the Delta had been all this time under a foreign yoke, for we find the eleventh dynasty reigning not at Abydos or Memphis, but at Thebes and far up to the southward at Elephantine. Abraham came to Egypt during the thirteenth dynasty. The seventeenth was that of the famous Hyksos, or shepherd kings, the silence of Herodotus concerning whom has caused so much controversy. Who were they, and what was their relation to the Jews? Kalmucks say some, connected with those Scythians of whose early invasions of Syria Herodotus speaks. Shemites say others; and the favour accorded to Joseph by one of them is a confirmation of this view. While they ruled the Delta a native dynasty was reigning at Thebes, which by-and-by became powerful enough to dispossess the foreigners. Then began that oppression of the Jews which in the Bible is connected with the arising of another king "who knew not Joseph." The kings of this eighteenth dynasty raised Egypt to a

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average lives of the Apis-bulls buried at Memphis have to be reckoned. Boeckh dates Menes, B.C. 5702; Bunsen, B.C. 3624.



wonderful pitch of glory, which was continued under the nineteenth, during which come Moses and the Exodus. And it is a remarkable confirmation of Scripture that Pithom and Rameses, built by Rameses II., are stated in the inscriptions to have been largely built by Jewish labour.

With the twenty-second dynasty we get the first really certain date in Egyptian history—the taking of Jerusalem by the first king of that dynasty, called Shishak in the Scripture, B.C. 970. Necho, of the twenty-sixth dynasty, is famous amongst other things for having sent an expedition round the Cape of Good Hope; the very reason which Herodotus gives for his disbelieving the account—that at midday they saw the sun to the north instead of to the south of them—proving that at least they got below the Line. Before this dynasty was over, Egypt was conquered by Cambyzes; but native dynasties still held out in corners of the land, till at last Nectanebo II. was driven off beyond the first Cataract, and the thirtieth dynasty came to an end. By-and-by with the Ptolemies began a new national life; and it was then that those temples were built which have been most fruitful in explanations of the Egyptian creed. Denderah, begun by Cleopatra, finished by Tiberius: the inscription on its portico says that it was built for the welfare of the new Augustus, son of “the god Augustus;” Philae, whose inscriptions tell mostly of Ptolemy Physcon, or the fat; Edfou, buried almost to the roof in drifted sand when Roberts and Bartlett made their sketches, but since cleared not only of sand, but of the Arab huts and rubbish which had gathered round it—it is in such places that the Egyptologist learns most about the religious thought of the old dwellers by the Nile. The earliest tomb- and temple-pictures are almost wholly scenes from everyday life; very little about the after world in them. The solemnity comes out later, just as the beautiful myths are posterior to the dry interminable ritual, like that of which the *Book of the Dead* consists. Students, then, are now being recommended to study these later temples, if they would grasp the spirit of old Egyptian mythology. We suppose there is no fear lest Greek, or at any rate some form of Aryan or Semitic thought might by that time have modified Egyptian ideas. Edfou, for instance, which is one of the grandest of the Nile temples, dates only from Ptolemy Philometor (about 170 B.C.), considerably before whose time the Septuagint

had been translated. Nothing in history is more curious than this Ptolemaic revival. At Denderah is an authentic likeness of Cleopatra wearing the head-dress of Hathor, the Egyptian Venus, the plumed and winged globe.\* That it is a portrait may be judged from the fact that Cæsarion, her son by Cæsar, who is also figured on the temple wall, "has an unmistakable Roman nose." Everywhere the Ptolemies seem to have entered thoroughly into the feelings of their subjects; and it is sad to think that a dynasty which began so well and lasted so long should have ended in disgraceful decrepitude.

Those who have studied the wonderful collection of Egyptian remains in our Museum must have noticed the change in the decoration of the mummy-wrappings which is seen in those belonging to the Græco-Egyptian period. Instead of the mere hard colouring, which does not attempt to disguise the fact that life is gone, these more modern mummies sometimes have faces painted with what we call artistic feeling; now and then the artist is not satisfied to lay his colours on the bandagings, he paints a portrait on a little wooden panel. The change is remarkable, and may lead us to suspect that where Greek art had made way Greek thought and Greek allegorising would not have failed to penetrate.

The Romans despised the Egyptians, while, at the same time, the need of keeping Egypt, their great granary, at peace led them to be very tender of their feelings. Meanwhile Christianity, introduced (tradition says) by Simon Zelotes, spread in two ways, becoming at Alexandria a great intellectual power and itself being profoundly modified by the neo-Platonism with which it there came into collision, and also filling the Thebaid with that vast army of ascetics of whose austerities we have a record in the life of St. Anthony.† Those interested in Alexandrian theology will in Kingsley's *Hypatia* find a lively, if somewhat idealised, picture of the state of things in that city. More than two centuries intervened between the official annihilation

\* She is figured in Mr. Fairholt's book, p.243, by no means a perfect Grecian, still less an Egyptian beauty. He says "the face is infinitely superior to that upon her coins, which is absolutely ugly."

† The old hermits won reverence by their mode of life. It is sadly otherwise with their modern representatives, the Coptic monks. Ourzon (*Monasteries of the Levant*) speaks of their "swimming like Newfoundland dogs after the tourists' boat," and boarding it stark naked, to the disgust of the Arabs, "whose previous contempt (adds Mr. Fairholt) is heightened by this cynical indecency."

of the old religion by Theodosius and the establishment by Phocas of the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff in opposition to the claims of Antioch and Alexandria to independence and equality.

A generation after this (A.D. 640) followed the Saracen conquest. This was largely helped by sectarian treason. The Monophysites, or Jacobite Church—they who “confounded (says the Athanasian Creed) the persons”—hastened to pay tribute to the caliph, repaired roads and bridges, supplied provisions and intelligence to the invaders. Memphis was taken; Alexandria, open to the sea, and continually succoured by Heraclius, held out for fourteen months. At last it fell, and Caliph Omar's general, Amron, was able to announce that he had captured “the great city of the West, with its 4,000 palaces, 4,000 baths, 400 theatres, 12,000 food-shops, and 40,000 tributary Jews.”

Of the destruction of the great library every schoolboy has heard; but few reflect that what was destroyed by the Mussulman fanatic was by no means the same collection which had been begun by Ptolemy Philadelphus and enriched with the books amassed by the kings of Pergamus. More than half the original library was burnt during the attack on Julius Cæsar; the rest was destroyed along with the Serapeum, in which the books had been stored, by bishop Theophilus, uncle of Cyril, when Theodosius was suppressing heathenism. Orosius, twenty years after, saw the shelves empty—(quoted by Gibbon, chap. xxviii., *nos vidimus armaria librorum quibus direptis exinanita ea a nostris hominibus nostris temporibus memorant*). It may be presumed, therefore, that this act of bigotry, which may be compared with the destruction by the Crusaders of the library of Tripoli and the burning by Cardinal Ximenes in the great square of Grenada of 80,000 Arabic MSS., did not inflict on posterity so great a loss as many have imagined. We shall not attempt to follow the disputes of Abaissdes and Ommiades, or the way in which Egypt became an independent Mussulman state in 868, and how Memphis was totally destroyed, and the new city, Cairo, *el Kahireh*, the victorious, made the seat of a caliphate. For a brief space Mostansir reunited Cairo and Bagdad, the two caliphates; but they were speedily sundered, and the Egyptian caliphs lasted on till, in 1171, Saladin again put an end to the independence of Egypt.

Then came the Ayoubite sultans, the last of whom,

Almohadan, was put to death by his Mameluke militia at the very time (1250) when St. Louis was a prisoner in the hands of the Mohammedans. Thus began the line of Mameluke sultans, one of whom, Bibars, drove out the Moguls who had conquered Bagdad, and in 1263 completed the destruction of the Christian power in the Levant.

The Mameluke militia, that strangely-selected body into which born Jews and Mohammedans were inadmissible, went on choosing sultans from among themselves, till in 1517 the Grand Turk Selim conquered Egypt, and hung the last Mameluke prince on one of the gates of Cairo. Thenceforth Egypt was covered with the pall of Turkish oppression, and fell into that state of living death which has long been the fate of so many of the fairest and richest parts of the old world.

Not that the connection which completed the ruin of Egypt did the Porte much good; the allegiance was little more than nominal, the Mamelukes ruling pretty much as they pleased, no matter what the Pasha might wish. Here, however, as elsewhere, Turkish rule effectually put the country out of the commonwealth of nations. More even than other Turkish provinces, Egypt at the beginning of the century was an unknown land. We—most of whom have welcomed friends back from a trip up to the first Cataract, or at any rate have heard all about Cairo and the pyramids from sons or brothers or sisters who stopped on their way to or from India—can hardly realise that to the grandfathers of all of us, and the fathers of many of us, Egypt was a sealed country. People went to the Holy Land, they went to Greece, a very few even went to Lesser Asia; but the kingdom of the Pharaohs was out of their range.

Of course a few eccentric travellers made their way into it, like Sandys, early in the seventeenth century, and Thomas Coryate, a few years earlier still. Coryate was an oddity who, when he got back from his first wanderings, hung up his shoes in the church of his native village of Odcombe. His *Eastern Travels*—they extended through Persia as far as Surat, where he died—we have not been able to come upon. If they are as curious as the *Cruditities Hastily Gobbled Up in Five Months' Travels in Europe*, or as *Coryate's Crank*, or his *Colewort Twice Sodd*, they are well worth reading. Sandys' book, published in 1615, can more readily be got at. He was a poet—translated *Ovid's Metamorphoses*, and paraphrased the Psalms; but the gap which sunders

him from the modern world becomes manifest when we remember that he was son of that Cambridge vice-chancellor, afterwards Archbishop of York, who was imprisoned in Mary's reign for having preached a sermon in favour of Lady Jane Grey. His style may be judged of from the following account of Pompey's Pillar. After speaking of "Pharaoh's Needle" (as he calls it), and another lying by, and, like it, half buried in "rubbidge," he says, "They tell a fable how that one of the Ptolemies erected the same in the farthest extent of the haven, to defend the citie from naval incursions; having placed a magical glasse of steele on the top, of virtue, if uncovered, to set on fire such ships as sailed by. But, subverted by enemies, the glasse lost that power, who in this place erected the column."\*

In contrast with the wonder-loving Sandys is the matter-of-fact Thevenot (he who brought coffee into France), who visited Egypt in 1655, but got no further than Cairo, turning aside across the desert to Suez and Sinai. Thevenot notes the grandeur of the walls of Alexandria, rebuilt since Amrou levelled them, and the number of porphyry and granite pillars which are scattered about the town, and the ruins of Cleopatra's palace, and the multitudes of what he calls "charms," or medals, of cornelian, agate, emerald, &c., beautifully engraved all over, which are found among the ruins after a shower of rain. "These the Moors sell to the Franks for a mere trifle; at least they did so till lately, but now the Franks, bidding against each other, have somewhat raised the price." But what puzzles him is the engraving; it is so good that he can scarcely help believing the ancients had some secret for softening the stones so as to render them more manageable with the graver. Neither can he imagine how a stone like Pompey's Pillar could ever have been raised into its place; he is almost disposed to give in to the opinion that it was, like scagliola, manufactured on the spot. As for all these great blocks having been brought from far up the river, that seems to him quite out of the question. He finds Egypt wonderfully cheap—it is now one of the dearest countries in the world,—and the food he pronounces excellent. The Nile was infested with corsairs (as he calls them), to drive off whom he kept a light burn-

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\* Sandys, quoted by Fairholt. Now that the Needle adorns our Thames Embankment, it is curious to read Fairholt's estimate: "Neither of them would be worth the trouble of removal to England: the expense might better be incurred on some antique elsewhere."

ing all night in his boat; indeed, his general estimate of the natives is not flattering: "L'on peut dire assurément que l'Egypte est un paradis terrestre, mais qu'il est habité par les diables, tant parceque les Habitans sont fort basanez, que parcequ'ils sont fort vicieux et gens à tuer en homme pour un sou." At Cairo he rides round (the Egyptian donkeys were an institution in his day), and also walks, putting a bean in his pocket every hundred paces, his grand object being to prove that this "grande ville remplie de canaille" is not so big as Paris. He notes the multitude of mosques,—23,000 said the legend, and the vastness of the castle, a city in itself, but falling to ruin "because the Turks never repair anything;" and then he goes to the pyramids, taking measurements and comparing them with those of Father Elzear the Capuchin, who visited them in 1652, and getting a strong man to throw from the top of the biggest pyramid a stone which falls on the twelfth step, whence he concludes that it is impossible to throw beyond the base. The inside passages he finds almost choked with sand, so that he has to crawl on all four; but when he comes again a few days after the sand is nearly all gone, "for the Bacha had sent some people to see what it was that (pouvoit obliger) could induce the Franks to go in, for no one but a Frank ever thinks of going in." In spite of stifling air, to which (unlike Belzoni), he finds he gets used after a while, he pushes on to the chamber containing the empty sarcophagus, "the stone of which is very beautiful when polished, that is why many people break bits off it to be made into seals, but you must have a good arm and a good hammer to get even a chip from it." The well of which Belzoni makes so much seems to our Frenchman too dangerous a place for him to go down. "Father Elzear went down; he was probably the first who ever made the descent; and he says there is nothing to see. So as I saw there was a good deal of risk I stayed at the top. A Scotch gentleman who was with me had himself let down, and *was* nearly killed in coming up by the fall of a loose stone which missed his head, but knocked the candle out of his hand."

The remarkable thing is that Thevenot, in sight of such wonders, never rises above his matter-of-fact. The love of the marvellous was certainly developed in his day; it had not to wait, like the fondness for wild scenery, for the dawn of a new era; but the men of the Middle Ages (and Thevenot's

spirit is in this quite mediæval) marvelled in a different style from what we do; a juggler's trick struck them more than the pylones of Luxor or the mighty pyramids themselves. Enthusiastic description, too, had not yet been invented; prose was prose, and not the unmetred poetry in which "Eothen," or Dean Stanley, or a crowd of meaner writers, depict such scenes. Thevenot holds it for certain that the big pyramid was made for that Pharaoh who was drowned in the Red Sea; and he sums up with the very commonplace remark, "Verily, these pyramids are wonders of those Egyptian kings, who were in building the foremost men of their day, and without offence to any one I may say that there is no prince on the earth who could raise buildings like them."

The Sphinx\* has generally roused the enthusiasm of travellers. Who does not remember Kinglake's glorious piece of writing:—"Laugh and mock as you will at the worship of stone idols, but mark ye this, ye breakers of images, that in one regard the stone idol bears awful semblance of Deity, unchangeableness in the midst of change, the same seeming will and intent for ever and ever inexorable. Upon ancient dynasties of Ethiopian and Egyptian kings, upon Greek and Roman, upon Arab and Ottoman conquerors, upon Napoleon dreaming of an Eastern Empire, upon battle and pestilence, upon the ceaseless misery of the Egyptian race, upon keen-eyed travellers—Herodotus yesterday and Warburton to-day—upon all and more, this unworldly Sphinx has watched like a Providence." But all Thevenot's anxiety is to know whether there is or is not a hole in its head. He tries to throw grappling-irons over it, but fails. Some Venetians, however, who managed to work themselves up, told him that there was a hole, growing narrower and narrower, and reaching the level of the breast. Into this he supposes a man got over night, with the help of a ladder, when the Sphinx was to give out its oracles; and so the monster which so impresses even the wild Arabs that they call it "the father of fear," becomes for him part of the machinery of a puppet-show.

Very possibly, however, Thevenot in this comes nearer than do our modern gushing writers to the old Egyptian spirit. Every one has noticed the strange juxtaposition in Egypt of the sublime and the ridiculous. The Egyptians

\* Most of us know that the Sphinx is older than the Ghizeh pyramids. It was repaired by Cheops, and is named on his tablet.

lived merry lives ; Herodotus tells of their revels on the river ; the wonderfully perfect wooden statue now in the Boulaq Museum (figured in Mariette) has its fat face full of fun ; yet in their worship they so strangely mix sublimity and childishness, so unhesitatingly place the solemn form of Osiris close to the colossal cats of Bubastis, that it is quite possible the Sphinx may have been used in some religious conjuring comparable with what went on at our own Rood of Bexley.

At Sakkara Thevenot goes down a mummy-pit, and grumbles very much because "the master of the mummies" broke his word and took him down a pit that had been opened before. "Beware of these Moors (he says) ; *"comme ils croient que les Francs sont toujours bien fournis, quand ils tiennent quelqu'un ils en tirent tout ce qu'ils peuvent."* "So visit the pits well armed and with a good party, and have a good resolute Janissary ; but still, don't go so far as to strike them ; if you do you'll have the whole village about you." The reason why the Moors will never open a fresh pit except they are alone, is that they are sure of finding idols and such like, and *"lorsque ces canailles trouvent quelque chose ils le gardent pour le venir vendre à la ville aux Francs."* The picture of the pit with the Frenchman unwrapping a leg broken off from one of the mummies, another unbroken mummy lying at their feet, gives an excellent idea of the scene, and is, we imagine, the earliest pictorial attempt of the kind. Matter-of-fact here also, Thevenot is chiefly struck with the splendid bandaging—"over 1,000 ells, and so cleverly arranged that several surgeons have confessed to me that nobody nowadays could come near it." The sand, he thinks, has helped to keep the bodies so perfect, just as in the desert dogs and camels are dried up and preserved. "However, the *mummy* which is brought over to Christendom to be used in medicine is not the dried carcasses of the desert, but the produce of the Egyptian pits." He takes care to bring away with him some hands, and he tells us that he elsewhere obtained two whole mummies and a whole lot of idols and other curios. Some people have tried to persuade him that these things are not real antiques, but are manufactured by the Moors, just as our "flint-jack" made to order the implements of the palæolithic age ; but that could not be, says triumphant matter-of-fact, for, let alone their being far too idle, they sell them for less than what



they're made of would cost. One thing strikes him; all the old Egyptian burying-places are outside their towns; "it's only the Christians who seem to have no dread of contagion, and bury their dead in the midst of the living."

The insect pests of Egypt, now one of the severest drawbacks on the pleasure of travelling there, were in full force in Thevenot's day. Speaking of the monastery of St. George, in old Cairo, he says:—"Il est tellement plein de puces que d'abord qu'on y a mis un pié il en est tout couvert, et comme elles sont fort maigres, elles ne tardent guère à monter plus haut."

Unable to understand the grandeur of the monuments, he is naturally on the look-out for puerile legends, such as that which asserts that the sycamore near the so-called spring of the Virgin opened when she and her Son were passing by. The holy family went inside, and thus found a refuge from enemies who were closely pursuing them. When the danger was over, the tree reopened and the cavity remained in the same state till 1656, when half the tree was broken away. His strangest story is that on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday in Holy Week, Greek style, the dead rise in the graveyard outside Cairo, "not," as he explains, "that they walk about the burial-place, but that their bones come out of the ground during those three days and then go down again." Turks and Moors, he says, believe this, just as firmly as Copts and Greeks; indeed the bones of a Turkish sheik are amongst those which rise. "I went (says he) and saw several skulls and other bones lying about, which everybody assured me had just come out. I wanted to see them come out before my eyes, but found that the proper plan was to look another way; and then, when you have turned back you see bones where no bones were before. I tried to explain that it was clear the bones were scattered overnight by the santons; but I had to leave off for fear of being maltreated. They were determined to believe in their own fashion."

He visits the Nilometer, of which he gives a fancy sketch with a Corinthian capital and a vase on the top, and notes how on St. Peter's Eve criers, who take their cue from a man specially appointed by the Bacha, go through all Cairo proclaiming how high the river has risen. Of wells he is sure the whole land contains only two, that of the Virgin Mary aforesaid, and a very deep well, which by means of an endless chain of buckets supplies the citadel of Cairo

This he calls Joseph's well, and says that it is supposed to communicate in one direction with the great pyramid, in the other with Suez and the Red Sea! Egg-hatching has gone on in Egypt from time immemorial; he happens to be there at the right season for seeing the whole process. "Some tell us (he says) that it can only be done in Egypt, but the Grand Duke of Florence brought over some men from Cairo who succeeded just as well as if they had been at home. They tell me it has also been done in Poland; indeed I think it can be done anywhere if an even temperature is carefully kept up." Here is a remark which shows that matter-of-fact and common sense go together: "Some very dainty folks say that the chickens are not so good as those hatched under a hen, but there is very little difference, or rather none at all, except in imagination; and, anyhow, it is a great thing to come so close in imitating nature."

So far Thevenot, who without going further than Cairo joins a caravan and travels across to Suez and Sinai, seeing the usual wonders of the desert, *e.g.* hot sand-winds which fill his mouth, and ruin two pasties which were wrapped in a napkin at the bottom of his trunk, hunting ostriches, and above all, keeping on excellent terms with his fellow-travellers. The following might be taken to heart by many a traveller in modern times: "Durant tout ce voyage nous fûmes toujours fort gais, et je prenois grand plaisir à entendre les Arabes qui nous contoient leur vie, les mettant de tems en tems en humeur par des interrogations que je leur faisois."

The modern way of looking at Egypt, as a land of mystery where may perchance be found the solution of some of life's problems, dates from Volney. He writes of it as an old Greek might, for the old Greek feeling in regard to these things was much more akin to our own than that of the Middle Ages. Volney, of course, tries to strike at Christianity through the mythology of Egypt. For him Isis and Horus are the Virgin and Child, and Osiris the god who, in his contest with evil, dies and comes to life again, is the original of our Christ. Nay, the resemblance is carried further; for, just as St. Paul says, "We are changed into His likeness from glory to glory," so the soul, in the engraved and pictured lore of the sepulchres, becomes Osiris himself when it has got freed from all earthly taint.

To us, however, Volney's political influence is more important than his attacks on our religion; for to him, we

believe, was mainly owing the French expedition of 1798.\* In 1787 Volney had published his *Travels in Egypt and Syria*; and in 1794 he was made a professor in the new University of France. No doubt Bonaparte counted on the old connection between France and Egypt—how the foremost of French crusaders, saint as well as king, had looked on it as the key of the whole East, but Volney was just the kind of writer to take hold of Bonaparte's mind. His grandiose style, his crude, startling ideas, harmonised exactly with the First Consul's tone of thought. He would go to Egypt; and, more successful than St. Louis, he would make that his basis for driving the English out of India. He would cut through the Isthmus of Suez, and turn the course of trade into its old channel. Like another Cæsar he would astonish the *pékins* of Paris with "commentaries" from an unknown world, and then, like that same Cæsar, he would use the fame and power that he had won in Egypt in subduing his own country.

That Napoleon's expedition got safely to Alexandria is one of history's marvels. Lanfrey points out that, heavily laden as it was with men and stores, ten English ships would have sufficed to destroy it. However, it did land, and Bonaparte's order of the day impressed on his men the duty of being "as tolerant to mosques as they had been to convents and synagogues." "The Roman legions," he reminded them, "protected all religions." He himself professed to be half a Mohammedan, and one of his generals, Menou, turned Mohammedan altogether. He had come (he said) to deliver Egypt from the tyranny of the Mamelukes; and this tyranny was so grinding that in any other country he would have been hailed with delight; but the Egyptians had been bond-slaves too long to think of striking a blow for freedom; they simply looked on, and the Turks saw through his clumsy attempts to play the Mussulman. His success in the field was wonderfully rapid. "In five days," he says, in the despatch which tries to explain away the disaster of Aboukir, "I was master of Egypt; and it was only when Fortune saw that all her favours were useless that she gave our fleet to its fate." Bonaparte failed to hold Egypt; but he had opened it up to the modern world. His *savants* were employed not only in finding out all about modern Egypt and its resources—how

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\* Leibnitz had tried to induce Louis XIV. to seize Egypt and make peace in Europe. But it is certain Bonaparte had never seen Leibnitz's pamphlet.

to grow the vine, what to use instead of hops in making the beer for which, like Zululand, the country was once famous, but in studying its geology, and, above all, its ancient monuments. Bonaparte's expedition gave the impulse to Champollion, the father of Egyptology; and of this expedition the scientific historian is Vaillant Denon.

It is delightful to look into such a book as Denon's *Travels*. The enthusiasm of the man, the grandiose style, the way in which in his dedication he compares Bonaparte to Sesostris and Mendes, take us back to that wonderful time when so much seemed possible to the combined army of warlike philosophers and philosophic warriors. We can understand how men like Denon must have gnashed their teeth at what he calls "the fatal mistake of Aboukir." Had the French admiral kept out of the way of the English fleet, Egypt would, he thinks, have certainly become a French colony, a counterpoise to the excessive amount of territory monopolised by one selfish nation. The beauty of the two volumes adds immensely to the pleasure of reading them. The French have always excelled other nations in their *éditions de luxe*; and Denon is a splendid example of the best style of French work; type, paper, illustrations, all are good. The illustrations, by the way, belong to modern as well as to ancient Egypt. Their omissions are a measure of the increase of our knowledge about the country. Denderah (Tintyra Denon calls it, as he calls Anubis Chenubis, &c.) is there, looking much as it does in the latest book of travels; so is Luxor (Louqsor), so is the Sphinx. All that he saw, Denon describes accurately enough; but he could not describe what was not yet discovered, and his mistakes are often ludicrous. Thus the Great Zodiac at Denderah is used to prove the vast antiquity of man, and therefore the falsehood of the Bible records. To the French *savants* this Denderah zodiac appeared to be almost as old as the pyramids; we now know that the whole temple is among the most modern in Egypt.

The French have the credit, however, of opening up Egypt to modern research (Bruce, Burckhardt, and Belzoni followed Denon); and they have always managed to keep foremost among Egyptologists. If their first *savants* did foolish things in Egypt, they certainly were outdone by Lepsius, who actually engraved on the great pyramid eleven lines of hieroglyphics in honour of King William of Prussia and Queen Victoria of England—an anachronism as

ridiculous (says Lord Nugent) "as if one added a line to the *Iliad* in commemoration of Waterloo." And here we will add a word of advice in case this should be read by any intending visitor to Egypt: "Don't imitate the disgraceful custom of scrawling or cutting your name on the monuments." It is strange that what in Europe is considered a mark of the lowest vulgar is in Egypt indulged in by those who, from the fact of their travelling there, must be people of some wealth and station. They have not the excuse of belonging to the poor and ignorant classes, and besides, the mischief they often do is irreparable. Mr. Fairholt says "they have done more injury to these ancient monuments within the last thirty years than has been done to them by the action of time or the ignorance of Arab and Turk during three thousand." Educated Europeans surely ought not to need to be taught respect for monuments which are "a sacred bequest from the past."

The French books on Egypt certainly show that they have spared no pains nor expense in the work. Without attempting to settle the relative merits of Dr. Young and Champollion, and Gliddon,\* we must remember that Young has left no successor comparable with M. de Rougé, and that, great as is the industry and care shown in the old edition of Wilkinson, his work, and even the folio of Roberts, looks almost insignificant beside the really grand French volumes named in our list of books. To these we may add—*Description de l'Egypte, ou Recueil des Observations et des Recherches qui ont été faites en Egypte pendant l'Expédition de l'armée française: publié par les ordres de S. M. l'Empereur Napoleon le grand*, 1809. Of course no one would go to this work for instruction in Egyptology; the student will get more out of Dr. Birch's little book than out of all these splendid volumes. We call attention to it both as a literary curiosity and also to show how persistent the French have been in justifying their claim to be the foremost Egyptologists. The preface to the volumes on antiquities is in the magnificent style of the First Empire. It tells us how the great man at whose bidding this work was put together had brought "peace and prosperity to France and

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\* Gliddon was an American, self-taught. His *Chapters on Early Egyptian History* are curious. His hieroglyph for America is as follows: "An asp, a mace, an eagle, a ram, an infant, a consecrated head (typifying a civilised region), and the tau, or *crux ansata*, signifying eternity." We may well be thankful that the old Egyptians adopted a less complex system.

confusion to her foes, and put an end to civil discord," and it is careful to note how *La Fortune la derobe aux flottes ennemies*. The work is a grand sample of line engraving and hand colouring. One is amused at the get-up of the French *savants*, as unlike that of the "Mossoo" of nowadays. A curly-headed gentleman with whiskers and big trousers and a sabre by his side is seated sketching the Sphinx.

The book which stands second on our list stands of course on a different footing; it is the patient work of a scholar with fuller lights and more facilities for working than were possible for Bonaparte's *savants*. To the Denderah zodiac aforesaid Champollion assigns its right chronological place. It is figured in vol. iv. The Beni Hassan tomb-pictures are reproduced, with their complete picture of everyday life—the wrestlers, male and female, the girls at ball-play, the soldiers, the inhabitants of the farmyard, the monkeys and other wild creatures in the woods, the Nile boats carrying long-haired singers, the women gathering flowers from plants trained on trellis-work. Well may Dean Stanley (*Sinai and Palestine*) remark of these tomb-pictures: "It is curious how gay and agile these ancient people could be who in their architecture and graver sculptures appear so solemn, and immovable. Except a doubtful figure of Osiris in one, and a mummy on a barge in another, there is nothing of death or judgment or sorrow." These paintings belong to the twelfth dynasty, i.e., they date from nearly 3000 years B.C. They stand in a fine position, hollowed out of the hardest stratum of the limestone cliff. Their name is that of a plundering Arab tribe which once lived close by, but was exterminated by Ibrahim Pasha. It is so strange to find here the so-called Doric column in that perfect proportion in which it appears afterwards used in the Parthenon. These Doric pillars are coloured to imitate red granite. The roof of the finest tomb, painted in panel, has an exceedingly modern look. In every chamber are wells leading to "mummy pits;" for, as M. Mariette points out, there are three parts to every Egyptian tomb—the building above ground (here replaced by a cave-chamber); the well or *conduit en pente douce*, containing nothing and filled in as soon as the burial was over, and leading to the real tomb, which in the oldest examples contains absolutely nothing

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\* The granite, which the Egyptians thought imperishable, and brought from such a distance, has borne the weather far worse than their other building materials.

but the mummy. The life, thus vividly and minutely figured seems\* to Mr. Grant Duff (whose lecture on Egypt reprinted in the recent volume of his Essays, gives as much information as many large volumes) to have been curiously like that of China. He notices the exquisite view from these mountain-tombs over "the narrow ribbon of green which makes the whole land of Egypt." It is curious that, though the tombs were visited by early travellers, *e.g.*, Norden and, we think, Pococke, they say not a word about the marvellous paintings, but are interested in them solely because they had been "grottoes of holy hermits."

Of course Champollion's book figures the victories of Rameses, all the great battles, the reproduction of which on the walls of one of the British Museum rooms is, next to the entire reproduction of an underground cave-chamber in the Berlin Museum, the most successful attempt to put Egypt before the eyes of the masses. We note the two rows of royal figures at Thebes those on one side with the mitre, those on the other with the corn-measure, showing that he was king both of Upper and Lower Egypt. This repetition of the same colossal figure is supposed to denote the omnipresence of the person represented. Dean Stanley is worth quoting on this point (*Sinai and Palestine*, Introd. p. 1.):—"Kehama, victorious over gods and men, is the image which most nearly answers to these colossal kings; and this multiplication of the same statue, not one Rameses but four, not one Amenophis but eighteen, is exactly Kehama entering the eight gates of Padalon by eight roads at once."

While looking through Champollion, the student should, if possible, compare it with the great Italian work—*I Monumenti dell'Egitto e dela Nubia, designati dalla spedizione scientifico-litteraria toscana in Egitto dal dottore Ippolito Rossellini*, published at Pisa in the first quarter of the present century. While the elder Champollion was working at his grammar, Rossellini was compiling a dictionary and making the drawings and "squeezes" here so beautifully reproduced. Lepsius, too, should be looked into. It is a very voluminous work in many folios, *Denkmaehler aus Egypten und Ethiopien*, collected by the expedition

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\* Of the fulness of detail in these tomb-pictures, a notion may be formed from the fact that Brugsch-Bey (*On the Geography of Egypt*) has constructed from the processions of offerings sent from the subject provinces a sort of map of Canaan 250 years before Moses.

sent out in 1842-5 by Frederick William IV. Lepsius, in his first volume, like Denon and our own Roberts, gives a number of coloured landscapes. His twelfth volume he devotes to demotic Greek and parian inscriptions. Roberts's book should also be taken up by those who wish to see what England has done artistically for ancient Egypt. It is of very different calibre from Champollion or the others, with which (except in size) Wilkinson should rather be put in comparison. And we fancy that Louis Philippe, to whom it is dedicated, must have felt that he whose people had just put forth Champollion might have been spared the infliction of an inferior work. The dedication speaks of "that enlightened country of which you, Sire, are the patriot-king," and then, with questionable taste, the prefatory history sneers at "the affected enthusiasm with which Denon's *savants* clapped their hands at Carnac before they had time to see the details of it." One statement in this preface we leave to our readers: "Zenobia held Egypt for a time, as a Ptolemy." The title is: "*Egypt and Nubia, from Drawings made on the spot by D. Roberts, R.A., with descriptions by W. Brockledon, F.R.S. Lithographed by Louis Haghe. Moon, 1846.*"

If in these works of a past generation the French stand undoubtedly first (Champollion is far grander than Wilkinson—he is for the public library, the latter for the study), they even more certainly hold the pre-eminence now that photography has given us new means of copying and the more scientific study of the old language assures us of greater certainty in interpreting the old monuments. M. Mariette—Mariette-Bey, as he is styled, since through love of Egyptian art and a desire to understand and to explain it he became a naturalised Egyptian—has undoubtedly done more for Egyptian antiquities than any living man. We have able Germans working in the same field. Brugsch-Bey, of whose *History of Egypt under the Pharaohs* a translation was published last year, is a valuable and trustworthy writer. Duemichen, not content with the old and often inaccurate copies, is painfully transcribing all the inscriptions, and has already published since 1867 a whole series of *Altägyptische Tempelinschriften*. Then we have among ourselves Dr. Birch, Mr. Sayce, Mr. C. W. Goodwin, Mr. Stuart Poole, and, above all, Professors Chabas and Maspero, whose history is perhaps on the whole the best we can recommend to those who only want a summary.



But what makes M. Mariette's books so specially interesting is his enthusiasm. He never despairs of his adopted country; above all, he determines that Egyptian antiquities shall henceforth belong to Egypt. Of course he does not wholly succeed: white men will break the law in dealing with Egyptians as with Turks; they consider this the privilege of their superior civilisation. Miss Edwards found that in one winter one agent in Alexandria had (illegally) passed through the custom-house fifteen mummies; and she gives an instance of the reckless waste still going on: "M. bought a mummy and a papyrus, and was fairly cheated. A week after he drowned the mummy because the smell was unpleasant."

No doubt there are mummies enough to supply the world. When we think of the contents of the crocodile-caves of Manfaloot—seven or eight miles of cave already explored, all crammed with mummied crocodiles, varying from a few inches to twenty feet long, we feel that there is no fear of the supply becoming exhausted. At the same time, unique monuments, like the Rosetta stone in our Museum and the Paris stone from the great hall at Carnac, ought to be in the country to which they belong. Our own feeling is that, of statues like those brought over by Belzoni, which make the Egyptian rooms of the British Museum the richest in the world, it is better for foreign nations to have merely casts. How effective these may be is seen at Berlin, and was shown on a larger scale in the Egyptian court of the Crystal Palace. It seems unnatural that the Boulaq Museum should have no colossal figures "because all those which could readily be removed have been carried off to foreign countries." Nor has this plundering been always unaccompanied with cruel defacement of what is left behind. Lepsius's company above all have earned the unenviable title of a "crowbar brigade." In the tombs of the kings at Thebes their ravages are specially apparent. Mr. Fairholt speaks of some of the finest bas-reliefs in a tomb near the Memnonium, the work in which is perhaps the most delicate and full of feeling of any yet discovered, as splintered into fragments in the vain attempt to carry away a portion of them." Again, while a silly Frenchman has desecrated the so-called "Harper's Tomb" (well described by Bruce) by scribbling on the musician's harp that "*La musique embellit la vie et dissipe l'ennui*," in the tomb called Belzoni's, where Sethi, father of Rameses, was

buried,\* Lepsius followed Champollion and surpassed him in cutting away and breaking off decorations. In order to get away the upper portico, he broke in pieces the lower, and then found after all that what he wanted was too large to pass through the door, though to try to make a passage he had one of the beautiful pillars supporting the roof roughly broken down.

The Boulaq Museum, says Mariette, "est sorti de l'excès même du mal qu'il est appelé à guérir. Pillés ravagés dispersés anéantis dans l'ancien temps, les monuments n'ont pas moins souffert jusqu'à l'époque actuelle. . . . Within the last fifty years Egypt has had the garniture of half a dozen Egyptian museums torn from her bowels. *Savants* have demolished a temple to get a statue, a tomb to get a sarcophagus. Therefore it is that the Service de Conservation des Antiquités was created."

In the Album M. Mariette groups all the Osiris figures together; Apis, he says, is Osiris made flesh. A great difficulty in the Pantheon is caused, he remarks, by one deity being transmuted into another. Thus Hathor, the pure Aphrodite, becomes Sethos, the goddess of Sirius, and at Denderah becomes "le Beau," the goddess of the general harmony of nature. He inclines to the old view, that for the initiated there was a God eternal, invisible, without name or form, beginning or end, while for the masses Cyprian's phrase was true: *Ægyptia portenta non numina*.

The stepped pyramid of Sakkara he assigns to the first dynasty—its only monument, and (if correctly dated) the oldest monumental relic of old Egypt. The old empire, which closed with the end of the eleventh dynasty, left no temples, only tombs. He lays much stress on the usurpation of the high priests, which brought about both the fall of the twentieth dynasty (that of Rameses III.) and a decay which lasted till Psammetichus of the twenty-sixth, the priests reigning at Thebes, the kings at Tanis in the Delta (San, the Zoan of the Bible). The gap in works of art between Psammetichus and Alexander he accounts for by the destruction of Sais (where were the porticoes that Herodotus so much admired) and Mendes and Sebynnetus, Philæ (that mass of masonry with cloisters, walls, prophylea, and an obelisk), which Mr. Grant Duff hopes to see converted into a garden, "the Isola bella of Egypt,"—and

\* His sarcophagus was brought over by Belzoni, and placed in the Soane Museum.

the Ptolemaic work in general he calls *la voix de la vieille Egypt agonisante*. He marks the decay in art—a young Ptolemy in the Boulaq Museum is stiff and *guindé*, while Thothmes III., despite the quaint hair and beard, is well-proportioned and vigorous. The best that the race could do, when they gave to granite the suppleness of life, was done from the twelfth to the twentieth dynasty. There was, he says, an undoubted development. The earliest sculpture, the wooden panels from Hosi's tomb at Sak-kara (Album, pl. 12), are harsh-featured. Chephren (pl. 26), early in the fourth dynasty, a figure found in the well of the Sphinx temple at Ghizeh, is good, despite the conventional style. Very remarkable is the standing wooden statue from Sakkara (pl. 18, 19), which M. Mariette assigns to the first half of the fourth dynasty. It is a grand face, with an air of command and an expression of (so to speak) contemptuous goodness. Excellence in wood, then, seems to have been attained much earlier than in stone. In stone the earliest work is heavy—the massive style M. Mariette thinks due to prehistoric earthquakes. It grew lighter, and then degenerated into stiffness.

Some of M. Mariette's symbolism is fanciful. The "scarabæus self-generator" may be a symbol of the resurrection, as the *crua ansata* is of immortality; but when in Plate 6 we have Phtah (Vulcan) as an embryo, "the visible germ of the world of which he is at once cause and effect, the Divine creative wisdom, the crocodile beneath whose feet betokens his conquest over darkness," we are forced to take breath and ask, May not this quaint figure be either a talisman or a plaything like the tongue-lolling Typhons on the same plate?

Phtah, by the way, was more or less a local deity—the god of Memphis, as Ammon was of Thebes, Hathor of Denderah, &c., Osiris alone being the god of the whole land, symbolising the strife of good against evil, truth against falsehood. He is beaten by his brother Set (physical evil), but Horus, his solar son, beats Set by the aid of Thoth (wisdom). Herein Mr. Stuart Poole sees the story of human life, its temporary fall, death, and the resurrection.\*

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\* When Ra (the Sun) as Osiris is depicted in conflict with the great serpent Apap (Typhon), we have a remarkable definition and dating of the myth. For Horus, avenging his father, and being thereby justified and therefore able to justify his worshippers, becomes Horhut driving out Apophis, the shepherd-king, in the 363rd year after the invasion. (See Naville, *Mythe d'Horus*.)

As we said, M. Mariette finds in the Ptolemaic temples more about the Egyptian belief than in those of earlier date. "Under the Pharaohs the doctrine is veiled, there is no guiding thread. Karnak, for instance, despite the thousand texts, full of vague titles, keeps the secret of its dedication. The Ptolemaic temples tell all." Yet reward and punishment, though kept out of sight in the earliest tombs, comes out strikingly at Thebes, where the trial of the soul, with gods for assessors, is as plain to the eye as it is described in words (borrowed perhaps from his Egyptian reminiscences) in Plato's *Gorgias*. Here, too, is seen a difference between the earlier and the later bas-reliefs; in tombs of the old and middle empire (to the end, i.e., of the seventeenth dynasty) it is the dead man himself, with friends and servants about him, who is figured, and never Osiris; in those of the new empire, of which there are fine examples at Bab-el-Molouk and El Kab, the dead man actually becomes Osiris.

Was this one permanent change, the sole change apparently in Egyptian cult, due to foreign influence? asks Mr. Stuart Poole, in one of his valuable papers in the *Contemporary Review*. As to the lower element, he decides contrary to the great mass of symbolisers, who have always believed that under fetish signs was to be found "the wisdom of the Egyptians," that in these lower forms of worship there is no philosophic meaning, *they are simply what they seem to be*. M. de Rougé thinks he has discovered, from the great book of Ritual, that the old Egyptians had an idea of one God, unnamed at first, but afterwards identified with Ra (the Sun). In this he is at one with M. Mariette; but when the latter sums up the Egyptian creed in the following eloquent passage, we must remember he refers not to the earliest times but to those which came after the mysterious change that we have referred to:

"Si l'âme a trop péché sur la terre, si Osiris ne réussit pas à la faire sortir victorieuse des épreuves qui lui sont imposées, elle subira le châtimement suprême, ce châtimement terrible qui est l'anéantissement. Si elle a mérité par ses bonnes œuvres, par ses vertus la récompense promise aux âmes justes, elle entrera dans le sein d'Osiris pour s'y confondre, elle deviendra Osiris lui-même, elle ira en tous les lieux et sous toutes les formes qui il lui plait, contempler l'infini spectacle de ce qui est, elle vivra d'une seconde vie qui ne connaîtra ni la douleur ni la mort."

Mr. Poole, on the whole, agrees with this in a very striking

passage in one of his recent Essays. According to this view (and we who are no Egyptologists have no right to impugn the views of the ablest students of the hieroglyphics) the main feature of the Egyptian creed at the time of the Exodus was intense "other-worldliness," a dry formal weighing of good and evil deeds, almost like that to which the Roman Church has sometimes tended. Naturally such a creed was, especially in a nation of castes, compatible with great hardness, with class standards of morality, with a cruelty that, but for the judicial blindness which in such cases always supervenes, must have made the whole seem unreal. Hence the absence of any reference to an after state of rewards and punishments in the Pentateuch. Bishop Warburton (as we remarked above) long ago enlarged on this in his *Divine Legation*, and it was undoubtedly in one sense a reaction from the wrong and excessive use of the doctrine by those who had cruelly oppressed the children of Israel.

Mr. Cooper shows, from Egyptian literature, the rottenness of Egyptian morals; he decides that the *pallakides* (women kept for temple-service)—whose bad character, Wilkinson imagines, existed only in the prurient minds of the Greek travellers—could not have been otherwise than impure, subject as they were to the desires of a king who was looked on as God manifest in the flesh, and of priests who from the highest to the lowest were supposed to share the Divine character.

To return to M. Mariette. The books which we have named represent a very small portion of his labours. Under his direction, for more than ten years, splendid autotypes have been made of the chief temples. The description of Abydos was published in 1869; that of Denderah, in five volumes, occupied from 1870 to 1874; next came Karnak; and the books "set forth under the auspices of his Highness Ismail Pacha," were published simultaneously at Cairo, Paris, and Leipzig.

Edfou, a gorgeous Ptolemaic temple, has been taken in hand by Edward Naville, the Swiss, a pupil of Lepsius. He tells us, in the introduction to his *Textes Relatifs au Mythe d'Horus Recueillis dans le Temple d'Edfou* (Génève et Bâle, 1870), that Mariette recommended Edfou to him. He staid there seventeen days; and then, when he revisited Egypt at the opening of the Suez Canal, and went up the Nile with a great company of *savants*, he spent a day at Edfou, and collated his plates with the inscriptions. He,

like Mariette, thinks that these later temples which time has but little touched best repay research: "*Les temples ptolémaïques sont maintenant ceux que les Egyptologues étudient le plus volontiers.* . . . Here, instead of bare ritual, we get the history of the gods, and an explanation is found for the mystical allusions of the formulas of adoration therein. It is a radical change from the meagreness of the ritualistic inscriptions of the Pharaohs, varied with records of battles and conquests, to their rich mythologies, so full of detail, just as if those who set them up were anxious to keep the old faith from oblivion."

We have already hinted our doubt as to these Ptolemaic myths being wholly home-grown, and we are strengthened therein by a remark in Dr. Birch's *Rede Lecture* about "the mingling of Greek philosophy with the faith of the Nile." Mr. Stuart Poole, however (who from his kinship with Mr. Lane has an hereditary right to speak with authority), and the great mass of Egyptologists, hold the other view, that, though the fashions changed, the main doctrines of the religion remained the same for twenty centuries. At any rate, whether wholly home-grown or not, the cult of the Ptolemies was very different from what it came to be under the Romans. This is seen in the architecture. The Roman work is coldly imitative—*decrepitude* is the word M. Mariette uses of the samples of it which are found at Sakkara close to some of the very earliest work of all.

Dr. Birch's name is sufficient warrant for the excellence of his books. Besides that named on our list, we recommend his *Rede Lecture* for 1876, *The Monumental History of Egypt*, as even more succinct. Here Dr. Birch just touches on the interpretation of hieroglyphics, pointing out how Young, in 1821, working at the Rosetta stone, "by a process of his own, partly mechanical, made out five letters, but never advanced further, proving that the hieroglyphs in the name of Ptolemy were fuller forms of the demotic signs used for the same name, and that, as the demotic was an alphabetic system, the hieroglyphic must be of the same nature." Champollion did much more; he proved the mixed nature of the language—that the signs are partly ideographs, partly phonetic (£50, and the dubious phrase, fifty pounds, furnish an example of each). This, however, led to nothing but the working out of hosts of proper names, and the doubtful signs of a few abstract ideas. It was only when Coptic was brought in as a help that the inter-

pretation really progressed. Coptic, which is written in Greek with extra letters for the sounds that have no existence in the latter language, was spoken till the sixteenth century, and has left a large literature, chiefly ecclesiastical. Its narrow range is a hindrance to its use in interpreting, inasmuch as the Copts deemed their own theological terms idolatrous, and everywhere replaced them by Greek words. However, Coptic enabled students gradually to grapple with the grammatical forms and structure of the language of the Pharaohs (at first they could only construe : not translate, knowing the root meaning, but ignorant of its secondary sense), and to get a daily increasing vocabulary. Dr. Birch says (quoting Benfey) that the Egyptian was a Semitic tongue. Others point to the negro character of the roots. We must not forget the view of Mr. Palgrave (who has seen the Arab under all circumstances) that Arab and therefore Jew shows a very appreciable negro strain. Anyhow, Dr. Birch admits "the Egyptian type was produced by a fusion of races," though he differs from Sir J. Lubbock in thinking there is no indication of a stone age or of aborigines reduced to servitude ; the mixture of grandeur and pettiness which marks the worship does not strike him (as it does Mr. Poole and others) as evidencing a dual origin.

Undoubtedly, however, the race became mixed as time went on. Waves of invasion swept over the land. Cushites from the south, Semites from the north-east, fair blue-eyed Libyans from the north-west, all left their mark. The Delta was several times held by foreigners. Of the great Rameses II., whose name, popularised by the Egyptians into Sesu or Setesura, which in less melodious Greek becomes Sesostris, Dr. Birch says, speaking of "his personal beauty of the Asiatic type, there is some reason to believe that the blood of the Hyksos flowed in his veins." On the other hand, "the mother of Amenophis III. belonged to the black races." Egyptian, by the way, Mr. Cooper says is far easier to learn than Sanscrit or Arabic, the grammar is so simple ; and, though there are 960 characters, only 150 of them are in common use, and no two can be mistaken for one another. We have but little hope that Messrs. Sayce and Renouf's free Egyptian classes at the rooms of the Society of Biblical Archæology will do much towards Egyptology as a science ; but we feel sure that even a few of such lectures, or a little time given to Mr.

Renouf's grammar, will enable a visitor to the Museum to feel intelligent delight instead of vague wonder at the square yards of imperishable record there brought under his eye. "The task of interpreting has been (says Dr. Birch) aided by the peculiar construction of the hieroglyphs, where every word not perfectly abstract in meaning, consists of two portions—hieroglyphs to represent its sound, followed by hieroglyphs expressing its general or specific meaning;" or in Mr. Cooper's words: "The sentences abound with determinatives, designed to give at a glance, as by a picture, the nature of the words they accompany." All this, complex enough in description, would be at once cleared up in a lecture; and we trust the time will come when a short course of Egyptology will be as much a part of a liberal education as a little knowledge of Greek. It is a case in which a little learning is not dangerous, for the amateur will never go far enough to be able to give up the hand of his guides.

Of Egyptian civilisation Dr. Birch says: "It stands alone, the oldest and that African, finally superseded by Asiatic and European progress. Yet still the oldest, first in arts, sciences, and organisation, an enlightened despotism supported by a territorial aristocracy trained under a sacerdotal culture,\* animated with the love of literature [we have a medical treatise by Cheops!], the thirst for immortality, the conviction of a glorious future." He notes that the monuments which to us seem such a waste of national power have attained their aim; they have lasted, while all the world's contemporary work is scattered to the winds. Egypt was wise in jealously shutting out foreigners: "none of her conquerors improved her internal condition; all either arrested or degraded its development." Will it be so, we cannot help asking, with the somewhat similar civilisations of Japan and China? At any rate, the Chinaman as a colonist has a power of adaptability which climate and physique denied to the Egyptian.

Mr. Cooper's motto: "After the doings of the land of Egypt shall ye not do?" explains the object of his lecture.

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\* We have spoken more than once of Egyptian castes; their existence is denied by several Egyptologists. Sir Gardner Wilkinson says that whether there were castes or not, those men who showed talent were drafted into the higher orders, and so on into the priesthood. This accounts for the long duration of the system.



He shows that the influence of Egyptian literature was negative rather than positive. The Pentateuch says nothing about the Trinity lest the Jews, saturated with Egyptian ideas, should have confounded it with one of the many Egyptian triads. It is intensely anthropomorphic in its description of God, lest He might be mistaken for the incomprehensible Amun Ra, who was a divine principle acting through lower deities, not a divine entity entering closely into relationship with mankind. So, again, because in "Horus the holy child, the Lord of life, the beloved son of his Father, the justifier of the righteous," the Egyptian found redemption, therefore a personal Redeemer is very indistinctly shadowed forth in the Pentateuch. The Jews, too, were long kept without a king, because gradually in Egypt the kingly power had grown till the king was not only absolute but infallible, a very God upon earth. Mr. Cooper's striking lecture is worth careful reading: we do not profess to agree with all that he advances; but the following remark, "it is absurd to illustrate or prove a doctrine in Genesis by a passage in Isaiah, or demonstrate a practice in Numbers by a quotation from Ezra," is not without pertinence. The importance of Mr. Cooper's subject speaks for itself, for (as Dean Stanley well says) "Egypt is the background of the whole history of the Israelites"—this is its special interest to all Christians.

That no notice of the most prominent fact in the relation between the two, viz., the Exodus, is found on any monument or in any yet examined papyrus will surprise no one who considers the Egyptian character. It was the exaggeration of what we find in modern China, where, when the allies were in Peking and had burnt the Summer Palace, the bulletins issued in the neighbourhood represented them as suffered to exist solely by the Emperor's forbearance. As Dr. Birch says: "The dark and mysterious annals of Egypt are chiefly found on sacred monuments, full of the pomp of conquest, but reticent of disaster." It is as if we should try to determine the moral character of an old family from their epitaphs. "Virtues not vices were incised for public consideration, and to the scribe was left the task of recording the private history of the throne or the trials held before royal commissioners."

But we feel that very much of what we had planned is excluded by the limits of this paper. Lady Duff Gordon's

*Letters* we do hope no one who cares about the subject will omit to read. Our notice of them may well be brief, for they do not belong to the class of books of which one learns enough from a review; they should be read from beginning to end. Two points they chiefly impress on us; first, the tyranny of the Government and its pitiable results—only sons blinding themselves that they may not be torn away to war or forced labour from the families that depend on them for support; a waste of life as great as in the days of the Mahmoodeyeh canal: "We are Muslims, but we should thank God to send Europeans to govern us"—and the distrust bred of tyranny. When a father is asked why not send for the doctor to his sick son, he replies: "God knows what a Government doctor might do to the boy." The next point is the very kindly, noble nature of both Arabs and Copts, and the coarse way in which travellers too often treat "the native." Omar praying outside Lady Gordon's door: "O God, make her better," "Oh, may God let her sleep," is well matched by the same Omar resisting an Italian valet's tempting offer of far higher wages; he preferred ragged clothes and kindness with the lady. Lady Gordon nurses a poor sick *reis* (boat captain) in his last illness. The gratitude of the people is unbounded: "I often feel quite hurt at the way they thank me for what the poor at home would turn up their noses at. Hardly a dragoman has been up the river since Er-Rasheedee died but has come to thank me as warmly as if I had done himself some great service, and many to give me a present—eggs, pigeons, even a turkey; and food is worth money, with butter at three shillings a pound. I am weary of hearing: 'Of all the Frangees I never saw one like thee!' Was no one ever at all humane before? For, remember, I give no money, only a little physic and civility." We may well be thankful that there has been one at least such European visitor to Egypt, and that she was an Englishwoman.

Of the picturesque traveller, whose name is legion, we have chosen two—Mr. Fairholt, who went out with Lord Londesborough, and Miss Edwards.

Miss Edwards was specially taken with the temple at Abou-Sembal, the four colossi at the entrance to which form her frontispiece. There she stayed for eighteen days, sleeping in front of the giant faces, "more unearthly in the grey dawn than by moonlight." She speaks of their

"fixed, fatal, appalling look," and notes how "they flushed into life as the sky warmed; for a moment there was the flush of life; then in the steady daylight they became mere colossi, serene and strong." She is eloquent about "the daily miracle of these awful brethren," and she discusses with zest the vexed question as to their type of face—"more negro than the usual Egyptian face, say some; Mongolian, say others; Semitic, says the Viscount de Rougé; he and Sethi were Hyksos." (We cannot contradict this statement, but we take leave to doubt it. De Rougé would scarcely say that Rameses, the oppressor of the Jews, was a Hyksos.) She herself thinks it a portrait of "the handsomest of men, the most perfect Egyptian face." We can judge for ourselves, for besides his fallen colossus at the Ramaseum at Thebes (out of the face of which the Arabs have cut mill-stones), we have the head in the British Museum (called the Memnon),\* of his removal of which, in spite of intrigues and jealousies, and the opposition of officials, Belzoni gives such a triumphant account. The fellahs, finding themselves, for a wonder, paid for their work, fancied that the stone so precious in the eyes of the Franks must be full of gold; this notion got carried to the local authorities, and orders at once came to stop work. "I was just then very ill" (says Belzoni), "but I took my janissary with me and crossed the water to Luxor. I there found the Caimakan, who would give no reason for his proceeding but saucy answers, and the more I attempted to bring him into good-humour, the more insolent he became." A violent scene followed; the Turk drew his sword, but Belzoni seized and disarmed him, gave him a good shaking, and said he would report him to the Pasha, and send the sword and pistols to show how his Excellency's orders were respected.

To return to Miss Edwards. Rameses at Abou-Sembal, she points out, is hard to get a good view of; from below he is too much foreshortened; you must climb the sand-slope to the level of the beards (for two are buried to the throat, one has lost his head, only the southernmost sits uninjured and wholly free from sand). "There they sit, sixty-six

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\* The French broke up the statue, intending to carry off the head. The huge fallen colossus was overthrown either by an earthquake or by Cambyzes, "the Cromwell of Egypt." It is of stone so hard, that the Luxor forgers of scarabs use splinters of it as we do graving diamonds. Well may it be asked, "How was such a vast mass brought from Assouan?"

feet high, without the platform below their feet" (higher, reader, than the towers of most village churches), "the width across the chest is twenty-five feet four inches. The hands are too small, if Charles Blanc's canon is correct that the middle finger should be a nineteenth of the total height. The faces are finished like portraits; the lower parts are only indicated. Verily these old sculptors took a mountain and fell on it like Titans. Without clay models or other helps, they carved and hollowed it as if it was a cherry-stone." Abou-Sembaal seems the most striking of all the Egyptian temples. The scenery adds to the effect; the mountains close in upon the stream, so that the sculptured rock overhangs the water. Opposite is a narrow strip of that Nubia which "exists only by the grace of the desert or the persistence of the Nile in well-doing:" beside the water, a shadoof, with its ox-power, a group of palms, and a few naked Nubians, who certainly do not look like Rameses' kinsmen. Of these Rameses figures, says an American writer (Curtis, *Nile Notes of an Howadji*): "in their faces is a godlike grandeur and beauty which the Greeks never reached. They are not only colossal blocks, but the mind cannot escape the feeling that they were conceived by colossal minds. Such only cherish the idea of repose so profound, for there is no standard in nature for works like these, except the comparative character of the real expression of real heroes and more than heroes. If a poet should enter in dreams the sacred groves of the grandest mythology, these are the faces he would expect to see, breathing grandeur and godly grace. They sit as if necessarily expectant of the world's homage. There is a sweetness beyond smiling in the rounded, placid mouth. . . The Greek gods are human, even their Jove, albeit so grand and terrible; but these elder figures are above humanity; they dwell serenely in abstract perfection." Dean Stanley is equally eloquent.\* "Here you get the most distinct conception of the great Rameses. Sculptures of his life you can see elsewhere. But here alone, as you sit on the deep

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\* For rugged terse suggestiveness, Browning has, as usual, no equal in his lines about an Egyptian city:

"But he looked upon the city, every side  
Far and wide,—  
All the mountains topped with temples,  
All the glades of colonnades,  
All the causeys, bridges, aqueducts; and then  
All the men."

pure sand, you can look at his features, magnified tenfold, till every line of them sinks into you with the weight of a mountain. And remember that the face which looks out from the top of that gigantic statue is the face of the greatest man of that old world that preceded the birth of Greece and Rome—the first conqueror recorded in history, the glory of Egypt, the terror of Africa and Asia, whose monuments still remain in Syria and Asia Minor, the second founder of Thebes, which must have been to the world then as Rome was in the days of its empire. It is certainly an individual likeness. I notice, besides the profound repose and tranquillity, united perhaps with something of scorn, the length of the face, compared with that of most of the sculptures, the curl of the tip of the nose, the overlapping and fall of the under lip." But Dean Stanley cannot help noticing what must strike every one no less forcibly than the rapid transitions from the sublime to the ridiculous in the mythology, viz., the horrible savageness which underlies this stereotyped serenity: "Rameses, with his placid smile, grasping the shrieking captives by the hair; and Amun, with smile no less placid, giving him the falchion to smite them." The whole impression is that gods and men alike belong to an age and world entirely passed away, when men were slow to move and slow to think; but when they did move or think, their work was done with the force and violence of giants.\*

No wonder Miss Edwards is disgusted when a fleet of dahabiehs is moored close by Abou-Semhal, and their occupants give an evening *fete*, "drumming and singing under the very noses of the colossi." It was like the champagne luncheon amid the sphinxes and avenues of Thebes that Miss Martineau (*Eastern Travel*) complains of.

Further south, Miss Edwards's party discover a tomb

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\* The collective effort and the absorption of all individuality in the one great purpose, remind us of what is said of the Zulu way of *swarming* across a river in flood. It is like the work of a mass of insects. Was such work done with enthusiasm? Or is Herodotus right as to the disaffection caused by pyramid building? He is clearly wrong about Cheops shutting up the temples, for Cheops is named as the builder of new and the restorer of manifold ones. Moreover, every king began a pyramid as soon as he came to the throne. We are accustomed to think of three or four at Ghizeh, and a few elsewhere. At Ghizeh there are nine, standing in a necropolis of Memphis, which had been abandoned before the Ptolemies. There are more than sixty other pyramids, all mostly tombs, all standing in burying places. Unlike the Chinese, who waste so much good land on burying-places, the careful Egyptians buried in sand beyond the reach of the fertilising river.

for themselves. They "work like tigers" at getting out the sand, with no tools but a fire shovel, a broom, and two coal baskets, and twenty pair of hands. By-and-by they get two broken oars and more baskets, and then comes the reward in the shape of gorgeous paintings kept by the sand as fresh as the day when they were finished. Of course they take wet paper "squeezes" which destroy the colour, especially of the blue-faced Amun; but "when science leads the way in such defacement, is it wonderful ignorance should follow?"

Miss Edwards is delighted that in Egyptian the same word (*Ma*) expresses truth and justice, and the same (*Nefer*) good and beautiful; and she cannot, despite the cruelty of the conquering kings, think evil of a people among whom a woman's name was "Worth-her-weight-in-gold." We cannot linger with her in the more than half-buried Ptolemaic temple of Kom Omboo; nor in Cairo, when she sees the sheik of the dervishes "ride over a human causeway." "Despite the assertion that his horse's tread is harmless, I saw at least one man in strong convulsions as if he would never walk again (he had not said the prayer which acts as a talisman, was the explanation"); nor in Boulaq Museum, "which, founded only thirteen years, is richer far than the Pompeii Museum at Naples." Here she principally notes the figures with white quartz eyes and metal pupils, coloured to the life, of prince Ra-hotep and queen Nefer-t, contemporaries of Snefru, the builder of the unopened pyramid of Meydoon. Their strong chins, she thinks, mark a difference in race between them and the Upper Egyptians who came a few years later.

She, like others, notes the contrast between the genial jovial scenes depicted at Beni-Hassan (twelfth dynasty) and the solemn after-world, with its courts of justice and awards of weal or woe, which form most of the subjects in the tombs of the kings at Thebes (eighteenth dynasty). She explains it, not, like everybody else, by a difference of date—the realistic scenes being earlier far than these glimpses of the spirit world—but by an epigram: "It was an epicurean aristocracy ruled by Puritan kings. The tombs of the subjects are anacreontics, those of the sovereigns are penitential psalms." Shall we say that the earlier Egyptians had not yet developed the idea of an after-state, or only that they were unwilling to refer to it in their

pictures? Anyhow, in the whole mummy system seems to be realised the mediæval idea that the actual body which dies must rise, or else that the after-life of the soul is in vain. The old Egyptian had not realised that "corruption cannot inherit incorruption;" and so everything was put ready for the day of waking, when the soul, like a human-headed hawk, should re-enter the undecayed corpse. Perhaps the strangest thing of all, in reference to this subject, is what Dr. Birch tells us in his notes to Wilkinson. Besides the soul, *ba*, man had a shade, *khebi*, a spirit or intelligence, *khu*, and an existence, *ka*, besides the life, *ankh*. There is a curious analogy between all this and the belief of some red Indian tribes, who not only distinguish between the soul and the life, but gift man with several souls.

At Thebes, Miss Edwards sees Lady Duff Gordon's rooms—"bare, comfortless, till you look from the west window and see the view." She meets Lady Gordon's "little Ahmed," Mustapha Aga's young son, "who in the morning looks like a prince in the Arabian Nights; in the evening, has the dress and the *élancé* step of a Belgravian youth."

We are thankful to her for quoting from Leigh Hunt two lines, which show that a third-rate poet sometimes has a happy inspiration :

"It flows through old hushed Egypt and its sands  
Like some grave mighty thought threading a dream."

And now for one brief closing word about politics. The present state and future prospects of Egypt may well afford a whole paper to themselves. We must omit Mr. M'Conn's *Egypt as It Is*, just as we have omitted Bonwick's *Egyptian Belief and Modern Thought*. We can only just name M. About's *Ahmed le Fellah*, just as we can do little more than name the new edition of Wilkinson. Every one who studies ancient Egypt is, however, pretty sure to take up Wilkinson, which, by the way, was so wholly based on the wholly erroneous chronologies and idle tales of Herodotus and Diodorus that Dr. Birch's task must have been a difficult one. And every one interested in the matter is sure to read what Mr. Dicey on the one hand, and the Khedive's friends on the other, have to say about the state of the people and the character of the government. Before this paper is published the Khedive may have abdicated in

favour of his son, and we shall have learnt whether the attack on Mr. Rivers-Wilson was due to the unfore-casting revenge of an exasperated ex-despot. The state of things during Nubar Pasha's prime ministry was that the Khedive had allowed Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert to nominate respectively a controller of receipts and of expenditure. Of these the Englishman soon found out that the Khedive had, like Ananias of old, concealed a part of his property. This he had to give up—hence the spite against Mr. Rivers-Wilson. The vast family estates at Dairu and elsewhere were surrendered, and the Egyptian customs were taken in hand. It is a great comfort that in all this England and France have gone hand in hand. The French liked our buying the Suez shares, for they thought (see Valbert in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Jan. 1st, 1876) that this was a pledge that we should also act in concert with them on the Balkans. We failed to do this; but in Egypt, at any rate, our interests and theirs are much the same, and happily what here suits "British interests" must tend to the world's good. Said Pasha was a barbarian, but he only got four millions into debt; Ismail is an enlightened ruler who is said to have reclaimed a million and a half acres, but he has added eighty millions to the debt since 1863. Mr. Dicey says that in this time one hundred millions more have been spent than are accounted for; but this discrepancy may probably be to a great extent explained by the ruinous system of borrowing; out of forty-three millions of loan, thirty-four millions, we are told, were swallowed up in interest and sinking fund! No wonder that the most violent opponents of reform are not the Khedive and his family, but the European and the Levantine usurers of Alexandria and their hangers-on, the blood-suckers who fatten on Ismail's extravagance. Of this set, wholly lawless till the recent change in consular courts, M. About tells some stories that would be farcical, but that they are unhappily true samples of the way in which rascality has trodden down those poor workers who, from the Pharaohs' days, have been set to make bricks without straw. For instance, a Greek hired an Arab's house, and when the time came refused to pay any rent. The Arab sued him, not in the native court, to which as a foreigner he was not amenable, but in his own consul's court. Before the case came on the Greek had transferred his interest in the house to an Italian, and the poor Arab had to begin again with



the Italian consul. The transfer was then made to an Armenian (Russian subject), then to a German, and so on; and in that way for years the man was kept out both of house and money. *O l'étrange racaille!* is M. About's well-merited comment.

We are told (Dr. Birch loudly echoes the sentiment) that nations do not revive. Those who hope great things from Greece, who think that Greece has already done great things in three-quarters of a century of freedom following ages of servitude, will not believe this. We hold that no race can die out without the world losing something; and, if the fellah is the descendant of the old Egyptian, that skill which is shown in so many strange ways in the monuments must still be latent in him. And if this art often seems to us futile, if efforts such as filled the crocodile-caves of Manfaloot strike us as a degrading waste of time, let us reflect that "it is childish, instead of trying to ascertain the ideas, to revile or ridicule the manifestation which was never meant to meet our conceptions, and can never be interpreted by them. There were, we know, reasons which made it a very different thing with them to cherish sacred animals from what it would be in us" (Martineau). Not only in glyptic art but in engineering were the old Egyptians great: they dyked the Nile, and dug lake Maris to regulate its inundations; they have a continent at their back which it will take all man's best energies to subdue. May they so rise as to be able to help in the work! May future generations see a race of peaceful conquerors sally forth from that Nile valley to turn Africa's swamps into wholesome cornlands and to fertilise its deserts. We trust M. Mariette is not too hopeful when he says:

"L'Egypte traverse une époque de recomposition et de restauration qui à peine commencée depuis un demi-siècle est déjà féconde. Rien n'excite la sympathique curiosité du voyageur comme le spectacle de ce pays qui vient à peine de s'éveiller à la vraie civilisation et qui déjà d'effort en effort est parvenu à une hauteur qu'aucun autre peuple de l'orient n'a pu jusqu'à présent atteindre."

A word about the physical geography of Egypt, and we have done. It has long been remarked that no argument for or against development can be drawn from the persistence of the types in Egypt. The cat of the earliest monuments is

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\* We trust M. Mariette's promised work on Nubia will soon appear.

the cat of to-day; so is the ibis, so is the crocodile. But types change only when their surroundings change, and the character of Egypt has from the first been fixedness in climate as in most things. All that the evolutionist claims is that development goes on till the point of comfort has been reached, so far as the circumstances admit. No wonder, then, that the early paintings present the very types which we meet with nowadays. The negro is there with his monkeys and cameleopards, because the dense African forests then, as now, suited, and therefore produced the negro type. Egypt itself as naturally developed a rapidly civilised people, as the conditions of life in several parts of Africa have tended to keep man in barbarism. The first thing a well-fed people, who have not too severe a struggle for existence, and who have a pretty settled Government, desire to do, is to leave some record of themselves for later times. Now (as Mr. Stuart Poole well expresses it), "in no country is life easier, or the acquisition of wealth from the land more rapid, than in Egypt." We are tempted to doubt this when we think of the abject misery of the fellaheen; but a moment's reflection convinces us that the remark is true. "Egypt is a table-land of rock, through which the Nile has cut a passage, which, by its annual overflow, it has gradually fertilised." What none who have not been there can realise, is the exceeding narrowness of the greater part of this Nile Valley. Readers of Miss Martineau's *Eastern Travel* will remember her astonishment at being able to "see across from one side of Egypt to the other," almost until it widens out into the Delta. On this surface the deposit of soil is very small, "not more than four and a half inches in a century for the last 3,000 years," says Mr. Poole. Yet it bears a rich crop year after year, and, if artificial irrigation is used, two or three crops a year may be grown without exhausting it. No wonder the old Egyptians were successful farmers.

Then what a climate it is for preserving monumental records; and this would be sure to encourage the multiplication of them. Stone, too, lay close at hand, both easily-worked limestones and sandstones, and also the syenite of the first cataract. And as there was abundance, so also was there variety of food. Fish was plentiful in the river, wild fowl swarmed in the northern marshes,—no need to go far afield for any of the necessaries of life, and there-

fore abundant leisure to turn the mind to suprasensual matters. How the yearly miracle of the cornfield, the death of the seed corn, and its rising again in a new and glorified form came to take such hold on the Egyptian mind, who can tell? They who believe that much of what we wonder at in the early civilisations is due to primitive tradition, fragments of which were preserved, some here some there, though their origin was forgotten, will see in this a prefiguring of the appointed Divine Sacrifice. "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it remaineth alone," says our Lord; and His use of this figure makes it not improbable that the Truth was under it foreshadowed to the earliest men. Hence the Osiris myth, and hence, too, that strong belief in immortality, in a resurrection of the body, which led to almost all the later developments of Egyptian art. For developments we have seen there are,\* in spite of the dominating permanence. And the crowning wonder is that of all this wondrous system the mystery is gradually being unravelled in lands which, when Egypt was in her glory, were tenanted by the cave-bear and the reindeer and the palæolithic man. There are "the kings in their glory, each in his own house;" and here are the Egyptologists comparing signs, making vocabularies, unfolding to all of us the *records of the past*, finding in every fresh discovery new testimony to the truth of Him whose word abideth "for ever in heaven."

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\* Compare the dry and unattractive nature of the Ritual or (Book of the Dead), even in M. de Rougé's elegant translation, with the glowing description in Mr. Cooper, of the judgment of the soul, the heaven and hell, the *work in heaven*, as helps in which work the little statuettes of Osiris were placed on every mummy's breast, the metempsychosis, &c. It is like coming to a Psalm or a chapter of Isaiah, after a page of the Talmud. Read also, in Naville, the strange passage about the wrath of Ra, and the deluge of human blood.

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ART. III.—1. *Modern Physical Fatalism.* By T. R. BIRKS, M.A. London: Macmillan and Co. 1876.

2. *The Supernatural in Nature.* London: C. Kegan Paul and Co.

THESE works have their origin in the many recent attempts which have been made to explain the universe without God. The weapons by which science is said to have expelled from the human mind belief in miracle, and therefore in the Author of miracle, and to have given back to man a freedom which is in reality but license in disguise, are here taken up and used after a masterly manner in defence of truth.

*Modern Physical Fatalism* is an able examination of the groundwork of H. Spencer's *Negative Philosophy* from a mathematical and physical standpoint. Though dealing with abstruse problems it is characterised throughout by unusual perspicuity of thought and logical acumen. Mr. Birks displays much skill in demonstrating the numerous contradictions and startling paradoxes which underlie the verbose definitions and imperfect reasoning of the "First Principles" of this philosophy, a philosophy which would reconcile religion and science by extinguishing the former and placing blind fate on the throne of the universe. As we shall show hereafter, he conclusively proves that the whole system is based on false assumption, and established by more than doubtful logic. We rejoice that the university which gave birth to this doctrine of physical fatalism has also sent forth so able and complete a refutation of it.

The author of *The Supernatural in Nature* has produced a work of real merit. No extracts or mere epitome can do justice to the freshness of thought and extensive scientific knowledge which it displays. The centre-piece of the book is a scholarly examination of the early narrative of Genesis in the light of modern science. We have nowhere met with a more reasonable explanation of the text or a more judicious application to it of the certainties of science. The attempt to reconcile the revelation of nature with the revelation of the Word is a work worthy of the highest intellect, and must in time yield substantial fruit to the unbiassed labourer. The Bible, if

true, is true for all time. Science, on the other hand, is essentially progressive ; each age in its turn laughs at the simplicity and ignorance of that which has supplied the germ of its own discoveries. It is therefore unreasonable to expect a full accord between the two revelations till the fundamental truths of nature come more perfectly within the grasp of science. Mysteries, no doubt, there will be to the end of time, but much light has been thrown upon the subject by the wonderful scientific advances of the last half-century. Many interesting problems, bearing on theological truth, have been raised and settled ; these the reader will find clearly stated and rationally applied in *The Supernatural in Nature*. Although the primary end of the Bible is not to teach science, used in its limited sense, and the phraseology adopted in its illustrations drawn from nature is, as is becoming in a book intended for universal perusal, simple and popular ; nevertheless revelations are there made concerning the mysteries of existence which no criticism, worthy of the name, can resolve into mere myth or symbol. Though originally given to enlighten man's ignorance on topics beyond his reach, such statements serve in our day another purpose. When verified by the latest dicta of science they yield undoubted proof of their Divine origin. "How could a Jew, whom some call 'semi-barbarous,' and his cosmogony an 'incubus' ; a Jew, without a shred of modern science (whatever shrewd guesses he may have acquired from the 'wisdom of the Egyptians') as to astronomy, or geometry, or geology, or physiology, or chemistry ; a Jew who, speaking out of his own thoughts, would probably say that the earth was flat, and the centre of the system, stars and sun moving round, write a correct, or even an approximately correct account of creation ? How, indeed, unless God taught him !"\* Had the Bible reflected in detail the imperfect teaching of past centuries its record would rightly be rejected by the science of the present day. But when its simple suggestive statements open out with almost prophetic expansion under the ever-growing revelation of nature's mysteries, we behold in them the signature of their Divine Author.

The scientific mind will find in this work no strained coincidences, and none of that empty declamation against scientific men which is unfortunately so common, and withal so

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\* *Supernatural in Nature*, p. 43.

pernicious in its effect. It will repel no one who loves and seeks the truth. As correctives to the form of scepticism rife in these days the above works are invaluable. When some of the leaders of thought in this country declare Spencer's fatalistic philosophy to be a system for all time, and confer upon him the high-sounding title of apostle of the understanding, averring that evolution will account for all things, and that man, ever the victim of circumstances, is the necessary result of inert matter and force, it is important for the sake of those who are not able to form an independent opinion on these subjects, that such statements should receive a decided scientific denial.

One of the most fruitful sources of the errors of the philosophy which discards miracle, together with other "crude beliefs" of our forefathers, is the unnatural or multiple meaning attached to the words used in logical processes. On the one hand, instead of being the exponents of facts, they are in reality the exponents of theories; and, on the other hand, in the place of one definite connotation, their signification is constantly changing, not only in the same volume, but even in the same paragraph. Definitions, however carefully made, if not in accordance with usage, are always apt to mislead both writer and reader. Fortunately the word natural, through the adoption of Butler's definition by Darwin, in his *Origin of Species*, has a determinate connotation attached to it. "The only distinct meaning of the word natural is, stated, fixed, or settled," says the Bishop, in his *Analogy*. A natural law is a uniformity of nature, as far as our observation has extended. This last limitation is of great importance. Mechanicians state that a machine can be made which, after displaying for ages one stated law of action, will make a single change, and then return to its former law for ages to come. Any one observing this operation, century after century, would predict with increasing probability the future of that machine; but being out of sight of the mechanism, and not in the secret of the designer, would after all make one wrong prediction. "No finite number of instances," says Professor Jevons, in his *Principles of Science*,\* "can warrant us in expecting with certainty that the next will be of like nature." There is no necessity in natural law. "There is nothing whatsoever

incompatible with logic in the discovery of objects which should prove exceptions to any law of nature."\* Thus expounded we entirely accept Butler's definition of the word natural; but must strongly protest against any further addition to its significance, and especially condemn the innovation of those who would include the idea of necessity, and so exclude the continuation of Butler's exposition. "What is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent mind to render it so, that is to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once." By such men natural law is regarded as necessary law, requiring no originator, and brooking no alteration or suspension. Adequate reasons for rejecting this doctrine will be given hereafter.

The term supernatural is less easily defined, because more vaguely used. It is often employed as synonymous with miraculous. Hence some, discarding miracle as false or susceptible of natural interpretation, boldly affirm that belief in "The Supernatural," the Author of miracle, is negatived by science, and is only fit for the childhood of our race. Underlying this reasoning are three assumptions: that "supernatural" is applicable to Divine action alone; that miracle is the only manifestation of Deity; that what is natural is self-existent or self-created. By others the term has been applied to the origination, and to any change in the collocations, of matter and law accomplished by free agency, whether Divine, angelic, or human. Others, again, restrict its application to the Divine action in primary creation, to an exhibition of "power independent of the use of means, as distinguished from power dependent on knowledge—even infinite knowledge—of the means proper to be employed." "We must conceive of the Creator as first giving existence to the means, and then using them for the accomplishment of ends."† Very definite lines are here drawn between the origination and use of matter and law. It is evident that, in most cases, the definition of this word varies with the special doctrine of second causes held by the writer. In all, Divine action is the prominent idea; therefore we take supernatural, not in its limited sense as synonymous with miraculous, but as applicable to

\* *Principles of Science*, Second Edition, p. 737.

† Argyll, *Reign of Law*, chap. i.

all direct manifestations of the One above nature. The danger of the present day is to multiply the natural at the expense of the supernatural, to attribute all things to secondary causes. It is only by transcending the thoughts suggested or modified by our dependence and limited sphere of action that we can rise to the conception of God as the author and preserver of the universe, and say with Mr. Cook, "Natural law is habitual, miracle unusual Divine action; the one is a prolonged and so unnoticed supernatural." We may scientifically regard the natural and the miraculous both alike as manifestations of the supernatural. Thomas Carlyle truly writes: "Innumerable are the illusions and legerdemain tricks of custom; but of all these perhaps the cleverest is her knack of persuading us that the miraculous by simple repetition ceases to be miraculous. True it is by this means we live; for man must work as well as wonder; and herein is custom so far a kind nurse, guiding him to his true benefit. But she is a false, foolish nurse, or rather we are false foolish nurslings, when, in our resting and reflecting hours, we prolong the same deception."\* Whether miracles result from the suspension of natural law by the direct Divine volition, or the introduction and use of higher laws unknown to us, it is impossible to say. A perfect knowledge of all natural laws would be necessary before an event could logically be proclaimed *contra naturam*. The essence of a miracle, however, does not consist in an exhibition of power and wisdom more wonderful than that displayed in a natural event, but in the accomplishment of something unusual and superhuman for a definite purpose revealed to man. "The works that I do they testify of Me." "They were performed to assist faith, and not to confound reason."† Their "how" is practically immaterial to those who regard law not as a master, but as a servant whose very existence depends upon the will of the Almighty self-existent God.

There are those who allege, with great show of proof, that "the deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts is this, that the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable."‡ If true, knowledge is coextensive with physics, theology a myth, the future to each individual a blank, and his hopes or fears of a life beyond the product

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\* *Sartor Resartus*.

† Argyll.

‡ Spencer's *First Principles*.



of a hyper-excited brain;—if Spencer's *First Principles* be our Bible, nature, instead of being a revelation of the existence and attributes of God, must be regarded as a huge machine, surrounded by "a mystery ever pressing for interpretation," a mystery which, notwithstanding, Nihilism absolutely forbids us to attempt to solve.

Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism are alike discarded by Spencer on the common ground that they postulate self-existence somewhere, and this assumption, "whether made nakedly or under a disguise, is 'equally vicious, equally unthinkable.' Yet he admits, in the same sentence, that the assumption is one 'which it is impossible to avoid making.' The common fault, then, for which the three rival doctrines are condemned, is that they do what no one can help doing, or believe in 'self-existence somewhere.' The peculiar excellence of the doctrine of the Unknowable is, that it does what its own author declares no one can do, admits self-existence nowhere. A strange foundation, indeed, for a new and improved philosophy!"\* If there be existence, there must be self-existence. "An infinite series of links receding for ever is an effect without a cause."†

To call God the Unknowable, and theology nescience, is basing pretended knowledge on total ignorance, or else in some sense postulating what is denied. God may be incomprehensible in His essence and attributes, but between the extremes of nescience and perfect comprehension there is such a thing as partial knowledge. To Hamilton's reasoning, adopted by Dean Mansel in his *Bampton Lectures*, from which Spencer quotes so largely in favour of his doctrine of the Unknowable, Mill aptly replies: "Our author goes on to repeat his argument, used in his reply to Cousin, that infinite space is inconceivable, because all the conception we are able to form of it is negative, and a negative conception is the same as no conception. The Infinite is conceived only by thinking away every character by which the finite is conceived. To this I oppose my former reply. Instead of thinking away every character of the finite we think away only the idea of an end or boundary." Infinite goodness, differing from finite goodness, not in kind but degree, having the additional negative attribute of absence of limit, is knowable as goodness, though incomprehensible as infinite. It does not posit nescience but

\* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 9, 10.

† Cook's *Monday Lectures*.

knowledge capable of infinite expansion. The infinity of the attributes of God thus becomes a stimulus, not a bar to knowledge.

To assert that this term, applied to Deity, necessarily involves not only absence of limitation in each attribute, but also the possession of all attributes, good and bad, is as illogical as it is irreverent. True theology often tries faith by mystery, never by asking belief in self-evident contradiction. Good and evil apply to the actions, or rather motives prompting to action, of free agents, and apart from them have no meaning. Their existence is not, however, dependent on contrast. Goodness does not need evil as a foil. Though perfect in kind and immeasurably remote, even in their smallest manifestations, each admits of degrees. The first created intelligences, pure and holy, required no evil to make known to them the surpassing goodness of their Maker. The contrast of finite with infinite goodness affords scope not for a passing discrimination merely, but for an eternal contemplation, each increase of knowledge forming a basis for a further apprehension of that which no finite knowledge can compass. The existence of evil in created beings is as certain as it is mysterious, but to argue that this is incompatible with God's omnipotence is beside the mark. God can do whatever He will, and in His wisdom He has seen fit to entrust man with this tremendous responsibility, that within limits of space, time, power, and the other restrictions involved in humanity, he also can do whatever he will, using and increasing, or gradually extinguishing the light "which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." Evil is a possibility, though not a necessity, where free will and conscience are entrusted to finite beings. We cannot agree with the author of *The Supernatural in Nature*, that the time will ever come when "we shall begin to know that the mystery of iniquity is a necessary mystery."\* It is inconsistent with our knowledge of Him who hates iniquity. The key to this suggestion is found in the following statements, which we believe to be erroneous. "Are not onward movements essential to the happiness of finite beings; and can we form any idea of life, growth, progress without conflict, i.e., without evil?" † Are we not to "grow in grace, and in the knowledge and love of our Lord Jesus Christ" in heaven, where conflict is over

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\* Page 295.

† *Ibid.*, p. 107.

and evil for ever excluded? "If we set before us the essential contrast of light and darkness, of good and evil; that good becomes a higher good by trial, and evil a greater evil by refusal of good; that truth must be manifested as separate from a lie, and righteousness must be displayed as opposed to unrighteousness."\* Truth will be manifested as separate from a lie, and righteousness as opposed to unrighteousness, but the latter are in nowise necessary for the display of the former. The contrast between infinite and finite goodness affords scope for an unlimited revelation and unbounded knowledge. The existence of evil ever testifies to the transcendent importance of the gift of choice, and the acceptableness of the service of perfect freedom.

Again, to say God is absolute, and then base on one special connotation of this word the doctrine that He is unknowable is reversing the logical order of things. The definition of a word must precede its use and determine its applicability. If absolute signifies the incapacity to exist in relation to anything else, and as such can be applied to any being, that being is truly unknowable. But if, on the other hand, it connotes existence "out of one set of relations, that is out of all relations of dependence,"† capacity to exist out of all relations, but not incapacity to exist in relation to anything else, then theology calls God absolute. As such He can be known as personal, and has been mysteriously revealed in His Son. Being and personality are positive realities possessed by us with manifold limitations: He is the self-existent, independent Being, before whom limitations vanish, and with whom, in the words of Carlyle, "As it is a universal Here, so it is an everlasting Now." But are we not anthropomorphic? Those who would thus stigmatise all notions of God derived from human attributes, fail to appreciate man's eminence. Instead of viewing God in the light of man, man must be viewed in the light of God. "Let us make man in our own image," the finite the image of the Infinite! Man before the fall, man after the rise to true manhood, through the sacrificial offering of Christ, is the image of God. May we not, then, rather call the Divine attributes displayed in redeemed man theomorphic, than characterise our imperfect ideas of the infinite attributes of God as anthropomorphic? Those who complain of anthropomorphism, instead of attempting to

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\* *The Supernatural in Nature*, pp. 294, 295. † *Monday Lectures*.

rise to the conception of God through the conscious being and purest attributes of the acknowledged Head of creation; either offer us nothing in their place, or, laying aside the higher and nobler, deify law and matter: instead of viewing God from the loftiest pinnacle of creation, they confound Him with His lowest handiwork.

So far from theology's being the equivalent of nescience and physics of science, both have their truths, and alike lead on to the infinite and incomprehensible. Physics falls with theology, if the doctrine of the unknowable be true. Even in this brilliant age, when science annihilates time and space, circling the globe with her electric wires, and revealing by the spectroscope the secrets of the stars, matter itself is an unsolved mystery. Infinite number, space, and time are incomprehensible; nevertheless we have useful sciences of number, space, and time in arithmetic, geometry, and algebra. "There is no object, though finite, of which all the relations, either within itself or to other objects, can be exhaustively known by any finite mind. The number two is one of the simplest objects of thought. But to know perfectly either its square root or its common logarithm in their ratio to unity, since the number of decimals in either is infinite, must be beyond the reach of any finite understanding."\* Few would venture to define life, yet biology has its truths as well as its mysteries. If mystery accompanies the knowledge of physics, knowledge can be the logical accompaniment of the mysteries of theology.

As the science of the first great cause, theology completes the otherwise baseless temple of knowledge, and throws its light, though as yet it be but the twilight of dawn, over the "how" and "why" of the universe. Whether we contemplate the infinities of the stellar and atom worlds in physics, the mysteries of life, mind, and spirit in man, or the higher and more profound mysteries of theology, we are led to regard God, in His essence, attributes, and works, as furnishing an adorable object of study throughout eternity.

If, then, God be knowable, and the author of all things, it is reasonable to expect nature to bear witness not only to His existence but also to His attributes.

Only, however, when the works are viewed in the light of the revelation of the Word can the glory and beauty of

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\* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, p. 17.

that testimony be discerned. The intellectual apprehension of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient God, based on the logic of nature, is but one step in the process of that supreme knowledge which must enter man by other avenues before it can form a complete and firm foundation on which to build that which eternity itself cannot complete. Our subject, the Supernatural in Nature, can be treated positively or negatively. Adopting, with Mr. Birks, almost entirely the latter method, we proceed to determine, by a free use of the works before us, whether the physical fatalism of the present day will satisfactorily account for the origin and existence of the universe as we find it. Space will not allow the discussion of many topics, but we hope to show that scientific facts not only strongly suggest but demand the recognition of the Supernatural, that without it no cosmogony is tenable. The knowable things of physics, matter, energy, and natural law, will explain much that we find around us, but they cannot explain all things, they fail even to explain themselves.

Our present knowledge concerning matter does not warrant the assumption that it is a necessary existence. Although some regard it as questionable whether the Bible explicitly affirms the primary creation of matter, science, so far from negating such an opinion, strongly suggests it as the most plausible solution of an evident difficulty.

Mr. Spencer, who maintains that matter is unknowable as regards the noumenon, knowable only as regards the phenomenon, upholds the doctrine that it is necessarily indestructible. "The plain fact is just the reverse, for this phenomenal matter perishes and is renewed daily before our eyes. Thus, by the theory, of matter the noumenon we know nothing, and therefore cannot know that it is indestructible. Of matter the phenomenon we may know much, and one main thing we know of it, proved by hourly experience, is that it both may be and continually is destroyed. For an appearance is destroyed and perishes when it ceases to appear."\*

"On the other hand, the permanence of matter, the truth revealed by science, depends on these four axioms: that matter is not phenomenal, but the cause on which the phenomena depend; that while phenomena vary from moment to moment, the cause abides and endures; that this cause is knowable, and consists of position and force

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\* Birks *Modern Physical Fatalism* p. 186.

joined in one; and that while the sensible effects which result from the coherent relations of its atoms to each other vary immensely, causing appearances, disappearances, and reappearances, the total amount of matter as tested by weight remains unaltered. In short noumenon matter, though not indestructible, is permanent and indestructible by man. But while this is a truth known *a posteriori* by a long and ever-growing induction, the theory is doubly false which calls it an *a priori* truth, and affirms also that the matter of which it is true is wholly unknowable. . . . The first step then of advancing physios must be over the grave of this doctrine of the unknowable."\*

The indestructibility or conservation of matter is a generalisation from large but limited experience. It can have, as Jevons logically asserts, no universal or necessary character. The conclusion is justly drawn that the probabilities against the creation or annihilation of any portion of matter by man are very great; but the assertion that there is no power in the universe equal to the task is not warranted by the premises. Another extract from Mr. Birks will show the kind of reasoning on which this nihilistic system rests. "The annihilation of matter, we are told, 'is unthinkable for the same reason that the creation of matter is inconceivable;' it contradicts the very nature of thought. 'It is impossible to think of something becoming nothing or nothing becoming something, for the same reason, namely, that nothing cannot become an object of consciousness.' Here, then, it is pronounced to be a contradiction of the laws of thought that anything should either begin or cease to be. Theism is first coupled with pantheism and atheism, and condemned to death and burial as a deceiver of mankind, because it affirms self-existence somewhere, whilst self-existence is inconceivable. And next we are taught that self-existence is the only kind of existence conceivable. Whatever exists now must always have existed and must exist for ever; since it is forbidden by the very nature of thought to think of anything whatever as either beginning or ceasing to be."† The assertion here made by Mr. Spencer with regard to matter, is afterwards predicated of motion, and involves a similar paradox. Nihilism first consigns all real knowledge to the grave, and then presides at the

\* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 136, 137.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 153, 154.

resurrection of as much as pertains to physics, and by implication of more than the system can recognise if it is to exist at all. Matter, then, as real is knowable, and by man indestructible. It must either be self-existent and eternal, or have been created in time. If it were originally simple and homogeneous the present variety is inexplicable. How to produce an unlimited number of substances having quite distinct physical properties from one and the same basis—by addition of like to like—is a problem which requires for its solution more than ordinary imagination and logic. If there be several simple kinds of matter, as chemical and spectroscopic analysis suggest, necessity cannot account for their existence and relative proportions. Whatever theory of matter be adopted no mechanical hypothesis can satisfactorily explain its origin. But to this point we shall return when discussing the conservation of energy.

Before endeavouring to ascertain what bonds law lays on nature, it may be reasonably asked if physical fatalism can account for the existence of these laws. Natural law has no origin in necessity. Every law of nature is one of many possibilities. Our mental constitution does not negate the conception of other laws as substituted for those actually in existence, nor hinder us from making any substitute the basis of logical deduction. This is verified in the history of every scientific advance. Theory after theory, each possible and thinkable, rises and falls, as observation and experiment supply new data, before the real law is ascertained. Thus, that grandest of all physical laws, the law of gravitation, according to which every particle of matter attracts every other particle and is attracted by it with a force which varies inversely as the square of the mutual distance, is no *a priori* truth but a generalisation following a patient and thoughtful study of individual instances. It is easy to conceive of matter unaffected by gravitation or the subject of a repulsive force, or imagine, with Newton, that the attractive force varies inversely as any power of the mutual distance other than the second, and build up a solar system on the assumption. A notable change has taken place in Mr. Spencer's opinions with regard to this law. In the first and second editions of the *First Principles* it was stated that physicists were obliged to assume the law because it resulted from the necessary conditions of geometrical space that other laws were unthinkable. These statements are withdrawn in the third

edition and replaced by the opposite assertion "that action at a distance, by any rule of variation whatever, is 'positively unthinkable,' and that action equal in amount, whether the intervening space is empty or occupied, is equally incomprehensible and inconceivable. He gives no word to explain this abrupt transition by which that is an inconceivable absurdity to-day which yesterday was proclaimed a necessary and *a priori* truth."\* If natural law has a necessary origin, Professor Tait's maxim, "Nothing can be learned as to the physical world save by observation and experiment, or by mathematical deductions from data so obtained,"† must be discarded, and physicists retire into their studies to deduce the laws which, in fatalistic phraseology, govern the universe. Again, if necessary, these laws should at once appeal to our minds as true, needing no confirmation in nature. No repetition of instances is required to convince us that two straight lines inclose a space, that the whole is greater than its part; to apprehend is to believe. They are necessary truths. Do natural laws thus present themselves to the understanding? Certainly not. We may apprehend the meaning of the law of gravitation, and yet logically doubt its existence, until interrogation of nature or the testimony of competent observers convinces us that our disbelief is ill-founded.

Natural laws, or sequences, based on a number of observations, finite as to extent both in time and space, can only be applied to like instances in the future with increasing probability. No number of observations can render the sequence necessary; why after the five-thousandth rather than the first? As in the machine of human device previously mentioned, what surprises in the shape of alteration or suspension of any law the future may reveal cannot be ascertained. We do not regard the universe as a machine; but even if it were, miracles, in the sense of suspension or alteration of natural law, are logically as possible as the one change in the said machine, if the originator anticipated the need of such variation. Natural law is not necessary as to extent in time or space. There may have been times when the law of gravitation was not; there may be worlds where attraction follows another rule of variation; our mental constitution forbids the concep-

\* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 222, 223.

† *Recent Advances in Physical Science*, p. 342.



tion of time or space, when and where the part is greater than the whole, or two straight lines include a space.

Law in nature is, however, more than the registration of sequence. The "what" naturally leads on to the "how" and the "why." Laws cannot govern. The universe may be governed according to law, but not by law :\* law is the expression of power. In the words of Tyndall: "The scientific mind can find no repose in the mere registration of sequence in nature. The further question intrudes with resistless might, Whence comes the sequence? What is it that binds the consequent with the antecedent in nature? The truly scientific intellect never can attain rest, until it reaches the *forces* by which the observed sequence is produced." But whence comes this transcendently superhuman force so intelligently applied? To that question necessity can give no reply. Our ideas of force arise from its personal exercise; it is associated with mind and will. It is then eminently scientific to attribute the force displayed in nature to an omnipotent free agent. Why should the present laws exist instead of some of the numberless other possible laws? Here again necessitarian philosophy, when logical, is silent. We find the "why," applied to their origin, reflected back to their use. They are means to an end, and as such postulate a Being who has chosen them as the ministers of His service. The most scientific explanation of the laws of nature is to regard them, not as self-existent, but the expression of will on the part of an Almighty Lawgiver, chosen, with definite ends in view, out of many possible modes of action, and upheld by Him as long as they shall accomplish His purpose in the government of the universe. What marvellous changes may be rung, in the future, on other modes of action, and elements and elemental combinations yet unknown, imagination cannot even suggest. When such wonders are wrought by so few of the numberless possible collocations of the things that now are, what may not the future have in store!

One of the latest weapons of materialism, in its evolutionary garb, is the doctrine of the conservation of energy. This is said to circle the universe with the bonds of necessity to an extent never anticipated before. We hope to show that this allegation is utterly false. Space forbids reference to the numerous contradictions and complete

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\* Carpenter.

confusion of ideas in Mr. Spencer's chapters on continuity of motion and persistence of force. The reader will find in Mr. Birks' volume a key to this labyrinth, and an able exposition of the truth contained in the facts thus misinterpreted. As the subject is a difficult one we make no apology for endeavouring to explain, in a concise manner, the doctrine itself, before attempting to trace its bearing on the subject in hand.

The law of the conservation of energy is based on the fact that all force exhibited in the physical world, as far as our imperfect knowledge goes, is entirely a function of mutual distance. Each particle of matter attracts every other particle with a force varying inversely as the square of the mutual distance, whatever be the velocity of the particles at any moment, and whether the intervening space be void or occupied. With such an attractive force, and two particles at a distance from each other, the integral or sum of the force which would be exerted in the passage of the particles from their first positions to contact, measured by half the square of the final velocity, is termed the potential energy of the system. Suppose the particles be at any finite distance apart and at rest: then if motion take place, and the particles approach each other, the possibility of the future exertion of force, or the energy of position, is diminished, but an equivalent of motion is produced, this being the result of the action of the attractive force. This motion measured by half the square of the final velocity, or the summation of all velocities from rest up to the actual velocity, is termed the kinetic energy of the system, or *vis viva*. The law of conservation of energy states that the sum of the potential energy, or energy of position, and kinetic energy, or energy of motion, is invariable. The misinterpretation of this statement arises chiefly from the confusion of cause and effect, the assumption that "potential and kinetic energy are the very same thing, attribute, or substance, its form alone having varied. For the formula in dynamics does not assert the constancy of either, taken separately, but only of their sum. The one is an integral of force, the other of velocity or motion. But force and motion are not the same. One is the cause, the other the effect. The whole process of continual change depends on this contrast. So also does the whole theory of dynamics. The first law of motion, the starting point of Newton's *Principia*, assumes it. There may be balanced

forces, or pressures, without motion. There may be uniform rectilinear motion, without force. The whole reasoning of dynamical science depends on the clear, sharp contrast between speed or velocity, of which the effect is a uniform change of distance or place, and force, of which the effect is a change in the velocity or speed, or the direction of motion. Thus potential and kinetic energy cannot be the same thing. The integrals of two different things must be different also. Motion is produced by force, and force produces motion. But motion cannot transform itself into force, and force cannot transform itself into motion. The connection indeed is so close, and the relations are so definite, that in loose and popular speech the expressions may be allowed. But in the view of strict science they are always inaccurate."\* If energy be one thing the constant change from the kinetic form to the potential, and *vice versa*, is inexplicable. "Why should energy, which is indifferently force or motion, cease to be force and exist as motion, or cease to be motion and exist as force? The confusion of thought which mingles cause and effect under one ambiguous name, applied in turn to either or both, leaves the whole series of changes without any possible reason or explanation. What other power compels this blind Titan to occupy a whole eternity with ceaseless and purposeless transmigrations? It is only when force is seen clearly to be distinct from motion, and its cause, that any key to the countless phenomena of the universe can be found. This, accordingly, was the very first step taken by Newton in those laws or definitions which form the prelude to his immortal discoveries. The first step of the new philosophy is to obliterate this clear line of contrast."†

Attractive forces are not, however, the only ones which are met with in nature; repulsive forces also exist, though physicists are not agreed as to their exact location and laws. As far as known they vary inversely as a higher power of the distance than the second, and are supposed by some high authorities to be inherent in the particles, or monads, of a substance other than matter termed ether. In a purely repulsive system the energy of position is greatest at contact, and zero at an infinite distance, whilst the energy of motion increases with the distance. If an attractive and repulsive force, such as the above, be com-

\* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 188, 189. † *Ibid.*, pp. 192, 193.

bined at one point there will be a neutral limit within which the attraction and without which the repulsive force will be in the ascendant.

According to the nebular hypothesis, and in consonance with the evident excess of attractive force, the universe existed in ages long past as a diffused mist, which, by reason of the attraction, has since condensed into its present form. In this diffused state the energy of position is at a maximum, and that of motion at a minimum. Pursuing the hypothesis to its extreme limit we should expect to find a condition of perfect rest. "A probable view of the atomic forces in actual operation is that they are either self-repulsive, as in the action of ether on ether, or mixed with a neutral limit, as in the action of matter on matter or on ether. In this case, assuming a system, finite however immense, where even the nearest particles have a distance greater than that of neutrality, and an original state of rest, the later change will be one of condensation, but not indefinite or without limit, with a constant substitution of *vis viva* or kinetic energy, for the attractive potential energy of the first position, and since compression within the neutral distance will be followed by reversed or expansive action, the tendency will be to a growing amount of rotatory motion."\* Thus the formation of suns, with their relative motions and circling planets, is accounted for. Numerous facts show that the condensation is as yet far from complete, that the primary attractive potential energy is by no means exhausted. The progression is still from the potential to the kinetic with integration of matter. Science, however, does not point to an ever-circling change from the diffused through the integrated to the diffused, but marks out a beginning and an end, one finite course, without any explanation as to origin or progress from necessitarian philosophy. Mr. Birks proceeds: "There will be, on the whole, no reverse tendency to a later diffusion, but a steady progress from a condition of wider diffusion and absolute rest to one of greater condensation and permanent steady motion. This agrees with the general conception of the nebular theory. But it is wholly opposed to the doctrine of a fixed amount either of potential energy or of collective motion, and to the singular hypothesis of a series of alternate evolutions and

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\* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 195, 196.

dissolutions reaching onward through all eternity." To assert that the same forces which produce condensation will reproduce dissipation in a finite system is against sound logic, and negatives the very doctrine on which it apparently rests. The origin of the mistake is evident. The process of condensation, termed evolution, is thus defined by Mr. Spencer: "A change from incoherent homogeneity to coherent heterogeneity accompanying the dissipation of motion and integration of matter." This statement contains more than one cardinal error. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that it completely reverses the law of conservation of energy. Integration of matter with dissipation of motion is in other words diminution of energy of position, with mutually attractive forces, and at the same time decrease of kinetic energy! Dissolution, the antithesis of evolution, in Mr. Spencer's vocabulary, is "absorption of motion and the concomitant disintegration of matter," or simultaneous increase of both kinetic and potential energy! A system built on such a definition cannot be received as a true explanation of the universe.

Before applying the above statements a few words must be said on the dissipation, or rather degradation, of energy, as explained by Professor Tait in his *Recent Advances in Physical Science*. Where attractive and repulsive forces both exist, the tendency, in a finite system, will be to uniform condensation within limits regulated by the repulsive forces, with uniform distribution of motion. Light, sound, heat, &c., are all forms of kinetic energy, the corresponding varied sensations arising from differences in the character and rapidity of the vibrations, which affect organs specially suited for their reception. All these varieties of motion tend to be resolved into that which reveals itself to us by the sensation of heat. Higher forms can be completely changed into lower, but the most perfect machine cannot convert even one-fourth of the heat supplied into useful motion, the rest passing off as heat of lower intensity. In the words of Professor Tait: "The energy of the universe is getting lower and lower in the scale. . . . Its ultimate form must be that of heat, so diffused as to give all bodies the same temperature. Whether it be a high temperature or a low temperature does not matter, because when heat is so diffused as to produce uniformity of temperature it is in a condition from which it cannot raise itself again,"\*

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\* *Recent Advances in Physical Science*, p. 146.

or be raised by any process known to man. This doctrine also negatives the idea of ceaseless evolutions and dissolutions.

The conservation of energy, with its attendant truths, when rightly interpreted, points to a beginning and an end. If the integration of matter and degradation of energy be not complete, the universe must have originated in time: had it existed from eternity it would long since have "burnt out." The force required for integration is inherent in matter. If matter be eternal, either it must have existed for ages apart from this force, or its particles must have been so situate that the system was at rest. If the former, how did matter ever gain the force? If the latter, none but an independent power could disturb the equilibrium. The act of One above nature can alone logically meet these difficulties. The supernatural origin of matter, as well as of force, is the most simple, tenable, and therefore scientific theory to explain its existence.

It may be truly urged that this is answering difficulty by mystery, but we hold the counter theories much more unlikely and quite as mysterious. Matter itself is a mystery. Till science can tell us what it is we venture no more definite statements as to its origin. It is, however, very significant that force, one of the manifestations of mind, is obtruding itself into the latest definitions, as displayed in the "force centres," the "dynamised space," of Birks, and the vortex theory of Thomson. What if the idea of creation out of nothing is unnecessary, and an outflow of Divine force alone be indicated! The self-creation of matter is indeed a "pseud-idea." It involves potential existence preceding actual existence! How and why did the change take place? The atoms, moreover, before their actual existence, must choose what kind of atoms they will be, and what laws they will obey. Look at them, when in existence, from the standpoint of the law of gravitation. "The laws they fulfil without deviating need little short of omniscience to satisfy them for a single moment. Each atom must either be able to divine, each instant, the place and distance of every other atom in the universe, to effect an almost infinite summation of these various tendencies to be obeyed, and that without a moment's cessation or pause, or else be guided passively by the hand and secret wisdom of the Almighty Creator."\* What, indeed, must

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\* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 259, 260.

the problem be when physicists state that in hydrogen, under ordinary conditions, each atom has its direction entirely altered by collision with other atoms seventeen hundred million times per second! Well may we in amazement ask who is sufficient for these things.

Assuming the fundamental facts of the conservation of energy, no theory which does not allow a beginning for force and matter will account for the present state of the universe. The hypothesis of La Place requires the start. Moreover, it assumes, in addition to matter and force, a definite relative position of the atoms which could not occur a second time.

The existing collocations of the material world are as important as the laws which the objects obey. "Mere laws without collocations would have afforded no security against a turbid and disorderly chaos." "An unlimited number of atoms can be placed in an unlimited space in an unlimited number of modes of distribution. But of infinitely infinite choices which were open to the Creator that one choice must have been made which has yielded the universe as it now exists."\* Law, so far from binding nature fast in fate, entirely fails to explain why the atoms have their actual velocities and positions at any one moment. It can only remove that part of the indeterminateness which is due to lapse of time, "so that the amount of variability removed is to that which is still retained, and which no law of force can remove, in the ratio of unity to three times the number of atoms in the whole universe."† Even this partial removal of indeterminateness is not warranted by the law of the conservation of energy, unless "we make the very large and groundless assumption that no laws of action exist anywhere in the universe but the law of gravitation, and a few others of the same class, in which the force exerted by one unit on or towards another is a function of their distance alone."‡ The necessitarian philosophy cannot account for the existence, variety, and relations of the very things by which it would explain the universe. A theory which overcomes the greatest difficulties of physical fatalism, and gives a rational explanation of the present state and past history of the universe, must be considered thoroughly scientific. As

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\* Jevons.

† Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, p. 236.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

such the doctrine of an Almighty Creator and Governor demands more than the sneers of those who regard science as their peculiar property, and the reception of their philosophy as the test of a well-balanced mind.

Physical fatalism is equally unfortunate in its attempt to solve the mysteries of life by means of matter and mechanical force. Proceeding with confidence where others fear to tread, it openly courts criticism. Although some of the first principles of biology are still *sub judice*, we think there is abundant evidence, without surpassing the limits of knowledge, to show that the postulates of physics are utterly inadequate to explain the marvels of animal and vegetable life, much less the free agency and spiritual gifts of man. One of the most important biological discoveries of modern times is the unity of the physical basis of life. In man, as in the lowest plant, life exists in connection with a transparent, colourless, structureless, viscid substance termed protoplasm, or bioplasm. All living creatures, at one period of their existence, consist of an apparently homogeneous particle of this protoplasm. Through it the organs are constructed, all their functions performed, and the continuation of the species effected. Materialism regards it as a molecular machine, resulting from the interaction of matter and mechanical force, whose combined properties, called life, are entirely explained by its physical constituents. In our opinion protoplasm is the product and instrument of life; and we hold that materialistic theories fail to account for protoplasm as completely as protoplasm fails to account for life.

Granting the gradual formation of the universe, there is abundant proof that the earth was once in such a condition as to preclude the possible existence of living protoplasm. Science recognises no other physical basis of life. Haeckel, the arch-defender of materialistic evolution, making the denial of the supernatural a premise, announces that "spontaneous generation" must undoubtedly have occurred. "It is a necessary hypothesis which cannot be ruined either by *a priori* arguments, or by laboratory experiments." Here spontaneous generation evidently signifies the production of living protoplasm from the chance concurrence of atoms under the influence of mechanical force. Those who reject materialistic evolution do not doubt that God made use of these agents in creation; but they also boldly affirm that, were living protoplasm now seen to spring



from its chemical elements, that circumstance would not lessen in any degree the force of the arguments against materialism. An adequate cause for that result would still be required. The spontaneous origin of living protoplasm has, however, never been observed, though some of the first intellects and most skilful experimentalists of the day have long been engaged in the attempt to establish the doctrine on a scientific basis. The most recent researches on the life-history of the lowest organisms confirm the well-established truth that living protoplasm always arises from living protoplasm. Haeckel would elevate this unproved hypothesis to the dignity of an ascertained fact. If we find no presumptive evidence in its favour the philosophy which requires it and the teaching it originates must alike be regarded with suspicion.

It is a suggestive fact that, compared with the products of life, the chemical compounds of inanimate nature are exceedingly simple. Matter and mechanical force working respectively with and without life produce very different results. The elements contained in protoplasm exist in nature, apart from that substance or its products, either free or in such simple combinations as water, ammonia, and carbonic acid. No compounds are found which in the slightest degree hint at the natural production of protoplasm. We ask those who talk of the formation of this substance by the fortuitous concourse of atoms to point out in nature some steps of the process. Where are the missing links? The atoms of carbon, hydrogen, and the other elements in protoplasm do not run together and form a complex whole under the blind guidance of mechanical force. Let life leave protoplasm, and physical forces, so far from sustaining, resolve it into its simple constituents. The formation of protoplasm involves forces of which pure chemistry knows nothing. Man possesses a power of modifying conditions which can never be attributed to *Foris*, therefore there is a strange logical inconsistency in expecting unaided physical forces to accomplish that which completely baffles human ingenuity. Years of careful research fail to reveal the chemical constitution, much less methods of synthesis, of albumen, one of the primary products of the decomposition of dead protoplasm: and yet we are asked to believe that the fortuitous concourse of atoms has "evolved" not this comparatively simple substance, albumen, but living protoplasm with its marvellous poten-

tialities! Each unsuccessful attempt at the natural synthesis of living protoplasm increases the improbability of the materialistic hypothesis, and declares the need of a supernatural element in the process. We have constant failure when the theory demands success! If protoplasm ever originated through the interaction of matter and mechanical force the uniformity of nature authorises a constant repetition of the process. The "conditions in a cooling planet" can have no magic vitalising power capable of producing a substance which a moderate temperature resolves into the simplest chemical compounds. Experimentalists have at command matter kinetic energy in all its forms more intense than is compatible with life, and in addition the power of varying their collocations. What more can be wanted by the materialist? The conditions under which protoplasm evolves protoplasm are remarkably simple, the process requires no great intensity of mechanical force. Professor Huxley says "yeast will increase indefinitely when grown in the dark in water containing only tartrate of ammonia, a small percentage of mineral salts and sugar," and manufacture nitrogenous protoplasm "in any quantity."

If it be granted that the chance collision of atoms might have produced a particle of protoplasm, from whence are its properties derived? No other chemical compound is known which can so select and influence the crude elements in its immediate vicinity that they combine and form matter like itself. No mechanical force will inspire life into dead protoplasm. Life has no physical correlative. The assimilative powers, varied movements, and cyclical changes of protoplasm are inexplicable on any theory of complex molecules.

Mr. Spencer would explain life as a "definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences." We cannot enter in detail into Mr. Birks' examination of this definition, but will select his most important remarks. "First, life is a combination of changes. It is not the cause or source of changes, but those changes themselves." Changes of what we are not informed. Observation limits those changes to one substance, protoplasm. "Again, if life is a combination of various changes, who or what is to combine them? The theory excludes any reference to a Creator. . . . Not the

living plant or animal. The definition recognises no such existence, but seems purposely framed to exclude it. Do these changes, then, combine themselves? Do successive changes all exist before they combine or combine before they exist? Either alternative is unthinkable."\* "Life is a definite combination of changes. But by whom and what is this combination defined? What is there to sever these changes from the millions on millions of others, adjacent to them in place, and coexisting with them in time, which it is meant to exclude?"\* Then, "external and internal relations are named in contrast to each other." "These epithets external and internal, introduce by stealth and in secret that idea of a living unit, with a defined limit to the range of its powers which the theory refuses openly to recognise because it would be fatal to the whole course and tenor of its reasoning."\* A good definition should be clear in its verbiage and reflect fact rather than theory. Mr. Spencer's definition is not recommended either by its perspicuity or applicability to the thing defined. It is an application of his theory to life, and assumes in its terms the very distinction it is intended to supersede. Mr. Birks adopts as a provisional definition of life "that force or power of some living individual existence, whether man, animal, plant, or germ, by which it can attract into union suitable material and repel or reject the unsuitable, in agreement with some plan of living structure or external life-work peculiar to each specific form and type of life."† In substance we accept this statement, though objection may be taken to the introduction of the words 'life' and 'living' into a definition of life. Moreover, as it is intended to apply solely to life as manifested in physical organisms, the fact that this "force or power" acts only through one substance, protoplasm, should have been duly registered. The essential elements of life, according to Mr. Birks', are individuality, vital force, and a definite plan, to which science adds a definite physical instrument, protoplasm. The fatalistic philosophy cannot satisfactorily account for any of these things.

There is undoubtedly something which individualises living organisms, separating them from the purely physical changes taking place around them and in them. The

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\* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, p. 275.

† *Ibid.*, p. 278.

atoms of matter composing every organism are, in almost all stages of the developmental cycle, in a state of perpetual change, yet identity is preserved. This individuality may be associated with conscious personality, simple sensibility, or total absence of all feeling. Mere change of form and internal structure combined with the constant flux of atoms is no bar to identity. The caterpillar, chrysalis, and butterfly, are not regarded by the biologist as distinct creatures, but one individual. There may be no internal consciousness of identity but there is evidently a bond of union, and that in all its potentialities is contained in the protoplasm of the egg of the butterfly. Our ignorance of the lowest forms of life has in times past afforded a fine field for materialistic speculation. Now, after overcoming almost insuperable difficulties, science talks of the life-history, or individuality, of the lowest organisms, and discards Bathybius as having no counterpart in nature. The Bathybian diffusion of protoplasm, suggested by Huxley, and its imaginary division into plastidules by Haeckel, will never dispose of the individuality of living organisms, or make the gap between the living and not-living a whit the narrower. Even Mr. Spencer, as Mr. Birks indicates, admits again and again in effect that each animal is a living individual. There cannot be individuality, in spite of atomic variation, without some adequate cause: physical fatalism cannot consistently allow that cause, and without it the living organism is inexplicable. Though separable in thought the three essentials of life are one in fact. There is a force or power working out a definite plan, which individualises the organism from the surrounding physical changes. In what substratum this force inheres we do not know. The idea of a vital force is irresistibly suggested by a study even of the simplest organisms. The minute structureless masses of protoplasm forming some of the lowest marine invertebrates build up most complicated and geometrically perfect calcareous and siliceous shells. Materialism, however closely the protoplasm be examined, can give no reason why one mass should select carbonate of lime and another silica from water rich in other salts; or why, in the human body, of masses of protoplasm arising from division of the selfsame germ one should produce bone, another muscle, and a third transform itself into digestive ferments. The assimilative powers and spontaneous movement of a single

bioplast are a conclusive answer to all mechanical theories of life. We are far from saying mechanical force plays no part in the movements and other properties of protoplasm: we only affirm it comes in as a servant not a master, it works in subjection to a higher power. If the Selective powers of homogeneous protoplasm be acknowledged there is a force which does not vary entirely with the distance; therefore the assumption made as the basis of the conservation of energy, like the doctrine itself, is not of universal application.\*

The wonderful powers exhibited by protoplasm completely eclipse all human jugglery. Will matter and mechanical force explain the mystery that minute particles of structureless organless protoplasm, a substance in which the microscope can detect no promise and potency of marvels to come, and from the examination of which not the most imaginative would predict a glorious future, produce, by the assimilation in each case of like elements, now a fungus, now a frog, now a bird, and now a man! Professor Huxley allows that life is the cause of organisation and not organisation the cause of life. There exists behind the mere atoms of all germs a far-seeing co-ordinating power, of which pure physical science knows nothing. In the words of Sir L. Beale, "Bioplasm prepares for far-off events." This power must be present in every germ, not in part but in its full completeness, for the very first steps in the constructive process presuppose those which follow. In the development of man, as in the formation of the giant cups of the southern seas, the numberless bioplasts resulting from the division of the primary germ work in great measure independently of each other, every bioplast having its own small area of influence, yet for one common though complex end. Maudsley assumes that, as force is not self-genetory, the transforming power of an organism must grow in proportion to its bulk, and therefore argues that, as this increment of power must come from the transformation of mechanical force, it is not "extravagant to suppose that a similar transformation might at some period have commenced the process, and may ever be doing so." Mr. Cook aptly urges that we have no evidence to show that the co-ordinating power, contained in the original germ, is increased by the growth of the individual. "Very evidently that power is not changed, for the plan of

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\* Birks' *Modern Physical Naturalism*.

an organism is the same from first to last, through its whole growth." The total absence of any such co-ordinating power in inanimate nature is acknowledged by Mr. Spencer, therefore we must suppose chemical units combine so as to form infinitely more complex units, which in some unknown manner gain the powers of life. This pure assumption, besides having no presumptive evidence in its favour, involves several untenable hypotheses.

The production of the complex living units is only possible on the assumption that life is a form or combination of mechanical forces, a supposition discountenanced by fact. Whatever comes out in the compound must go in with the elements. Again, whatever the plan behind the germs, their protoplasm exhibits no corresponding chemical or structural differences. Nothing but homogeneity is found to account for the most elaborate heterogeneity! This doctrine of complex molecular units, like Mr. Darwin's theory of pangenesis, deals with variations which ordinary science cannot approach. They do not admit of direct proof, but we are expected to treat them as facts though all indirect evidence is against them.

This complex union, moreover, must be effected, and the peculiar succession of collocations held together, by chance. Mechanical force has no power of self-direction. Any one who seriously talked of nature turning out a finely finished locomotive, or chance publishing Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, would rightly be regarded as ignorant of nature or altogether devoid of logical power. What, we ask, is the hypothesis of the formation of all the varied animal and vegetable organisms by mechanical force from matter, but such a wild fancy magnified a hundredfold? We have not only to account for the formation of the engine and the book, but the corresponding existence of rails and readers. Even Tyndall says inadvertently, with curious self-contradiction, that a living organism is "woven by a something not itself," and to this all nature bears witness. Modern speculation cannot by any division of the process, however fine, dispose of the difficulty.

The argument from design in nature has lost none of its original force, though so loudly decried of late by those who would attribute all things to mechanical causes. We believe mechanical evolution is destined to an early grave. Already we hear Darwin admitting, in his *Descent of Man*, that "in the earlier editions of my *Origin of Species* I pro-

bably attributed too much to the action of natural selection or the survival of the fittest. I had not formerly sufficiently considered the existence of many structures which appear to be, as far as we can judge, neither beneficial nor injurious, and this I believe to be one of the greatest oversights as yet detected in my works."\* And again: "In the greater number of cases we can only say that the cause of each slight variation, and of each monstrosity, lies much more in the nature and constitution of the organism than in the nature of the surrounding conditions, though new and changed conditions certainly play an important part in exciting organic changes of all kinds."† The more closely the theory is examined the more threadbare does it appear, and we commend the closing chapter of Mr. Birks' volume to those who regard "natural selection" as the magic phrase which is to expel the wisdom of the Almighty Creator from the internal and external adaptations found in connection with living organisms. We believe with Argyll that at every step the scientific inquirer "finds himself face to face with facts which he cannot describe intelligibly, either to himself or others, except by referring them to that function and power of mind which we know as purpose and design."

Having no scientific ground whatever for the origin of life from the chance reaction of matter and mechanical force, but the very strongest evidence against the possibility of such an occurrence, we think belief in the interference of a supernatural power most reasonable. It is almost past credence that the miracles of wisdom, which biology is ever revealing but never exhausts, should be attributed to blind chance, when we consider that the highest human intellect may spend a lifetime in the study of one living organism, and yet have to confess at the close that the revelation of ignorance has kept pace with the attainment of knowledge. Nature displays the beneficent action of an Omniscient Creator. With the author of *The Supernatural in Nature* we believe the Biblical account of the origin of the earth and its living occupants to be substantially true: it is not inconsistent with any of the certainties of science. "We wonder that, in relating the primal illumination of the earth, he (Moses) tells us first of the light, and after that of the luminous body, the sun."‡ Was Moses acquainted with the nebular theory, or the fact that light is a form of

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\* Vol. I., p. 152. † Vol. II., p. 388. ‡ *Supernatural in Nature*, p. 144.

motion? But it is impossible to condense into a few lines the intelligent exposition of three hundred pages, which has already been commended to the reader's notice. One question, however, cannot be altogether ignored. What are the bearings of the Mosaic account on the evolution theories of the day? One thing is certain, Faith must never quail before Science, for the Bible and the universe bear the stamp of the same Divine Author.

Theories are ever changing, and even the very facts of science are encircled by mysteries, the removal of which may any day give them an entirely new interpretation. In the study of nature, patience, which should be at a premium, is too often at a discount. At a time when every fact must have its explanation, and extravagant theories are too often advanced as undoubted truths, the protest of a Virchow is most cheering to those lovers of science who also respect the higher revelation. The term creation, applied to the origin of living beings, signifies the re-arrangement of the matter and forces already in existence through the introduction, by Divine fiat, of new forces or powers acting according to new laws. As usually understood it postulates a distinct origin for each species.

Evolution, on the other hand, essentially connotes the derivative origin of species: in other words, life, not only in the individual but also in the species, springs from pre-existing life. Though the all-absorbing question with many naturalists at the present day is, How has this been accomplished? we must not forget that the still more important question, Has derivation occurred? is still unanswered. All materialistic theories, involving spontaneous generation, we reject as unscientific. Creation must precede evolution. But in contradistinction to the special creation of each species, or direct evolution of the species by Divine power from matter and mechanical force, it is not unreasonable to suppose that God may have used the first created beings in the origination of the rest. Geology shows a general progression from the lowest up to the highest forms of life. We read in the Bible of a similar progression; far from being one act, creation consisted of a succession of acts extending over a long period of time. There is nothing whatever in the text to negative the derivative origin of species. The *exact* method by which the varied forms of life were introduced



on our globe has not been revealed to us. It has been left as a problem for man by his study of the Divine works to attempt to solve. However accomplished, the origin of species was of God.

One of the most striking points in the Divine narrative, grand in its simplicity, is the special record of the creation and pre-eminence of man.

This is in perfect agreement with our present knowledge of his powers and history. Science bears no testimony to his bestial origin. It is true Professor Haeckel traces man's pedigree without difficulty from inanimate matter upwards, but all are not gifted with the imagination that finds in every atom a soul, and sees all things as "equally living." Reversing his dictum, that "where faith begins science ends," he makes faith the basis of science, instead of a castaway whom she refuses to recognise. His cosmogony is founded not on the facts which ordinary senses reveal, but on assumptions which ordinary faith fails to grasp. Haeckel is obliged to concede that it is by deduction, not induction, that the brute origin of man is established. In other words, having demonstrated the truth of materialistic evolution in the case of the lower animals, no other theory from his atheistic standpoint being possible, man must have come from the missing links. His genealogical tree presents some striking peculiarities. Before we arrive at the vertebrates there are at least four purely hypothetical classes of animals, which, for embryological reasons, must have existed! By reversing the laws of embryology the gulf between the invertebrates and the vertebrates is bridged. Man himself comes from the unknown extinct apes of the miocene through the dumb apemen, another purely imaginary species. Truly evolution can work wonders on paper. Giving up the comparatively glorious possibility of descent from monkeys, some would now create a common ancestor for man and monkey, closely related to the sheep. Whatever our progenitors *may* have been, we ask for a few of the links to aid our faith. Evolution, let us ever bear in mind, takes no leaps. After many years' diligent search none have been found! Darwin himself says their absence is amazing; and Dana truly observes, "If the links ever existed, their annihilation without trace is so extremely improbable that it may be pronounced impossible: until some are found, science cannot assert that they ever existed." This sudden fall

from man to the ape level is made specially prominent, in that there are all possible gradations from the lowest man to the highest.\* We find abundant variation, but no suggestion of mutation of the species. Adding to this the fact that the cranial capacity of man is double that of the highest ape, we may truly say there is not the slightest direct evidence in favour of the derivative origin of man; and each year renders it less likely that geology will supply the necessary proof. We have, however, positive testimony in favour of his independence. The very oldest human remains exhibit no approach to the ape type. Our geological knowledge of man now extends to the quaternary age, yet the fossils, neither in erectness nor in cranial capacity, yield precedence to their representatives of to-day. "We can decidedly pronounce that there are among living men a much greater number of individuals who show a relatively inferior type than there are among the fossils known up to this time."† When we also consider that the lowest existing races are evidently the degraded descendants of more worthy sires, and not apes struggling after manhood, it is not surprising that our thoughts should revert to the time when man, in the perfection of manhood, is said to have come from the hands of his Maker.

Evolution cannot account for man as an animal; but even if the possibility of physical descent from the apes were allowed its real difficulties then begin. This Professor Huxley recognises in his *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*. "His structure, wonderful as it is, does not even approximately represent his essential nature. With a certain difference in structure between the lower apes and the gorilla, we find a moderate and measurable difference of nature; but, with a less marked difference of structure between the gorilla and man, we have an immeasurable and practically infinite divergence of nature."‡

Man's physical structure will in no wise account for his essential nature. By the possession of conscious personality, of mental power such that he can rise above matter, and in abstract proposition discourse on its marvels, of "a perception of right and wrong in motives, and a feeling that the right ought and the wrong ought not to be chosen," and of a free will by which that choice becomes possible, man is raised infinitely above all other animals.

\* Dana.

† Virchow.

‡ *Supernatural in Nature*, p. 300.

No community with these in bodily descent could ever account for his powers or lessen his pre-eminence.

We are asked, in the much-abused name of science, to believe that matter and mechanical force will account for all this! Man is but a series of changes. The dust of the earth, as devoid of life, sensation, and choice of position, as mechanical force is of self-direction, assumes the form of man, lives, moves, thinks, loves, acknowledges in reverent worship a power above, and then falls back into the dust again. Soul and spirit are results, not causes, and vanish with physical dissolution! But every sane man is conscious of his own personal identity, and time does not efface that consciousness. If matter, with its inherent mechanical forces, be the cause of the unity, that unity should be broken. Matter comes, and matter goes, but we go on for ever. Our surest knowledge is not the knowledge of matter but of mind. The certainty, without which all other certainties were impossible, is that I, a feeling, thinking being, exist. The real existence of matter is an after-thought, an inference based on states of consciousness. If matter is real, mind must be real, and distinct from matter. The attributes of the two, extension and absence of extension, inertia and absence of inertia, cannot co-inhere in the same substratum without direct reversal of axiomatic truth. The two sides of Tyndall's hypothetical atoms must part company, for a thing cannot be and not be in the same sense at the same time.\* But we cannot here examine the materialistic views as to the higher nature of man. Physical fatalism has insuperable difficulties to surmount before it can logically approach mind or spirit. Until it can give a more rational account of the origin of matter, force, law, and life, and bring forward some slight direct evidence in favour of the brute origin of man, we need not seriously trouble ourselves about its higher flights.

If involution and evolution are an eternal equation, then "for the development of man, gifted with high reason and will, and thus made a power above nature, there was required, as Wallace has urged, a special act of a Being above nature, whose supreme will is not only the source of natural law, but the working force of nature itself."† On the principle that every effect must have an adequate cause, we maintain, with Mr. Cook, that, as a consciously dependent

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\* Cook's *Monday Lectures*.

† Dana.

person, man is an unanswerable argument for the existence of an Independent Person. Granting the existence of an Almighty Omniscient God—and the whole universe in its grandeur, as in its details, bears unceasing witness to the fact—the difficulties of materialistic evolution vanish. There is as little need to endue matter with the potency of life, mind, and spirit, as to create a scientifically unknown ancestry for man.

We cannot refrain from one thought more. Man, viewed from the standpoint of materialistic evolution, is an automaton, and therefore irresponsible for his actions. Freedom of will becomes nonsense, and conscience a chimera; virtue and vice are empty words; antipathy is irrational, and love deprived of its noblest motive: all is necessity, inevitable fate. The Euclids of philosophy here chime in, and pronounce a palpable *reductio ad absurdum*.

It is sometimes well to bring speculation to the test of common sense. If we read Shakespeare, and all our noblest writers, in the light—or rather darkness—of the necessitarian philosophy, their grand utterances, reflecting the history and problems of man's higher nature, are meaningless and unscientific, for they regard him not as the outcome of inert matter, but as the image, distorted though it be, of One above, and as influenced by the hope or fear of a life beyond. Physical fatalism, in laying down its very premises, rejects the whole teaching of the Bible, and reduces to mere verbiage most of the finest literature extant. The readiness with which some materialistic cosmogonists not only discard a system that has survived the adverse criticism of centuries, and holds to-day a firmer grasp upon the world than ever, but even employ the unwarranted denial in bridging over the otherwise impassable gulfs of nature, displays a dogmatism unsurpassed in all the records of theology. Such theories we leave to time and science. So long as man has a conscience the sublime truths of Christianity, abounding in blessings for this life, and unspeakably rich in hope for the life to come, will never wane before the cheerless dogmas of a Fatalism whose genealogy of causes has its root in the Unknown.

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- ART. IV.—1. *The Christian Doctrine of Sin.* By DR. JULIUS MUELLER.
2. *The Problem of Evil.* By PROFESSOR NAVILLE.
3. *Lectures on Systematic Theology.* By REV. CHAS. G. FINNEY.
4. *A Theodicy or Vindication of the Divine Glory,* By ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE, LL.D.
5. *Theological Institutes, &c.* By REV. RICHARD WATSON.
6. *The Congregational Lecture on the Doctrine of Original Sin.* By GEORGE PAYNE, LL.D.

MUELLER, in defining sin as "that which ought not to be," has furnished a formula of much philosophical value—one whose soundness and comprehensiveness are sufficiently evident. At first sight this definition may look too general and simple; the more, however, it is reflected upon, the more undoubted is its worth, as it obviously sets itself in opposition to all false theories whatever. We may bear it with us round the whole circle of moral speculation, and find it to be capable of universal and efficient application. In fact, it is so comprehensive as to answer every purpose for which it was framed, and so manifestly just as not to be gainsaid.

Descending, however, from this abstract view to one somewhat more concrete, the scientific method of treating moral evil generally resolves it into a principle of selfishness, of which the endless forms of moral evil are only so many modifications. The agreement among authors on this point is striking. It is almost startling to find Pascal and Rousseau, Jonathan Edwards and Jeremy Bentham, Finney, Comte, and J. S. Mill, Müller, Hegel, and Schiller apparently blended in one common sentiment. This agreement is, however, more in appearance than in reality. Bentham, Comte, and Mill understand selfishness in a widely different sense from Pascal, Edwards, Müller, and Finney. For while the former confine it merely to evils which disturb the economy of human society, the latter make it to be a trespass against the claims of God and against the moral order of the universe.

It is highly significant, however, that the Political Economist and Sociologist is compelled to admit the necessity of a moral basis for the thrift and well-being of society, and to find in the Divine precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," the remedy for all social evils. Indeed all communistic theories, in a perverted form, pay a blind homage to the Christian doctrine of universal benevolence. The thing to be regretted is, that by divorcing the precept already cited from its greater companion, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," it renders obedience to the former impossible. When heaven is ignored, earth cannot be blessed.

It is needful to observe that selfishness, in the philosophic use of the term, bears not the narrow meaning commonly attached to it: being understood to signify the gratification of self at the expense of universal order, and enforced by Divine authority. It is therefore a private principle at war with the general good, fraught with enmity against all interests and authority which thwart its aims. It is thus enmity against God, trampling on all claims the holiest and highest; and, if allowed to spread unchecked among all orders of moral beings, would involve the universe itself in anarchy and misery. In the wide sense thus assigned to the term selfishness the unity of moral evil is seen. Rousseau's words are here worthy of citation: "The good man arranges himself with reference to the whole, while the bad man arranges the whole with reference to himself. The latter makes himself the centre of all things—the other measures his radius, and keeps at the circumference. Then he is in his right place with respect to the common centre, which is God, and with respect to the concentric circles, which are the creatures." Selfishness is thus seen to be a principle that displaces God and deifies self; that would subordinate God to the creature instead of the creature to God. Pascal's words are: "We are born unrighteous, for every one is self-seeking. This is against all order; we ought to seek the general good; and this selfish tendency is the beginning of all disorder." Stephen Charnock's resolution of the matter agrees with this. "As grace," says he, "is a rising from self to centre in God, so is sin a shrinking from God into the mire of carnal selfishness. And therefore all sins are well said to be branches or modifications of this fundamental passion." With Jonathan Edwards this view of sin was a corollary of his benevolence theory. Julius Müller affirms

sin to be "a principle of inborn selfishness." Luthardt says: "It is the special merit of Müller to have asserted the fact that selfishness constitutes the essence of sin." Kant's account of man's fall is that the alternatives before the soul were the moral law and self-love, and it chose the latter. "Man no longer desired the good of all, but the good of himself; he no longer sought for the happiness of mankind, but for the gratification of his own passions." Hegel teaches that "the life of nature is a life of selfishness," and that "evil is making self the ruling principle of universal good." "Good," say Naville, "is charity, love, the opposite of selfishness—the consecration of the individual will to the general good." Luthardt remarks, "Wherein consists the essence of sin, is a question which has at all times been discussed. No more correct answer can be given than that it consists in selfishness." Finney, in his systematic theology, reasons the matter up from the ultimate ground of obligation to all kinds of moral and theological issues. And this view of the subject has received at his hands exhaustive treatment. He takes up the various forms of evil, and shows that they are all so many manifestations of selfishness. But Finney's theory of benevolence is not to be identified with Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism, nor with any later improvement of it. Finney, indeed, offers a strenuous opposition to utilitarianism. "Utilitarianism," remarks Dr. Calderwood, "is in the very singular position of professing itself a theory of universal benevolence, and yet laying its foundations on the ground that personal happiness is the sole end of life." The difference, however, between the two theories is thus sufficiently obvious; as the ultimate aim of the one is personal happiness, the other the good of universal being.

This view, however, is not to be held apart from other important truths, as will be seen in the following deductions.

If sin is selfishness, benevolence, its moral antithesis, must needs comprehend all good: a view not without the sanction of Scripture, to which indeed our Lord seems to set His seal in His synoptical presentation of the moral law. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." To this first and great commandment He adds the second, which is "like unto it," the same in principle with it, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," and asserts that "on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets"—all revealed religion. Hence this law of love is "the royal law:" whose principle underlies and embraces every other law,

or branch of law, which is of Divine authority. In the love thus enjoined we have the central, all-comprising principle of good; so that, as the various forms of sin are so many modifications of selfishness, the manifold virtues and moral excellences are so many modifications of benevolence. Kant said, "There are many virtues, but one virtuous determination," and that determination is the consecration of the individual to the interests of universal being; the submission of the will to the law of love. Love, however, in such a system, must be discriminated from all forms of mere feeling; or, as Finney would say, modifications of the sensibility. Love so understood becomes a phenomenon of the will; the reigning settled attitude of the will in relation to the glory of God and the welfare of His creatures: in other words, good will, or willing good, to God and all other beings capable of good.

Another deduction is that sin is not the offspring of the intelligence, understanding thereby the reason in relation to moral truth; for the intelligence must ever approve of the law of universal benevolence, which "commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of God." The origin of sin must be rather sought in some other and lower element of our nature. Its immediate seat is the sensibility: this, however, not as limited to mere sensuousness demanding an alliance of the soul with a material body, but as shared by men with beings "whose dwelling is not with flesh." Sensibility being thus understood to mean the faculty which forms the basis of self-enjoyment in all beings capable of happiness, any difficulty connected with this subject ceases. A further inference, scarcely to be distinguished from this, is that the intelligence, representing duty, obligation, God, is ever in opposition to sin. Thus, there is in us that which pleads for God and righteousness, rendering man redeemable as it brings him within the reach of the moral influence of the Gospel.

Another deduction drawn from the proposition which resolves all sin into selfishness is, that sin, as such, is not the object of immediate choice; and, when committed, is not committed *because* it is sin, but *notwithstanding* it is sin: in other words, for the sake of the gratification it yields to a creature governed by a selfish disposition. In regard to this matter Bledsoe says: "Sin is committed not for its own sake, but for the pleasure which attends it. If sin did not gratify the appetites, or the passions, or the desires of men, it would not be committed at all: there would be no temptation to it.



. . . . The direct object of our choice is not disobedience; not sin, but the forbidden thing; the prohibited gratification. We do not love disobedience, but the thing which leads us to disobey." Charnock, indeed, goes so far as to maintain that "To will sin as sin, or purely evil, is not in the capacity of a creature, neither man nor devil. The will of a rational creature cannot will anything, but under the appearance of good in the sin itself, or some good in the issue of it." By "good" Charnock means self-gratification, as he shows in another passage: "No sin is committed as sin, but as it pretends to a self-satisfaction." This seems a fair inference from the proposition we have before us. For if sin is committed for its own sake, its commission would seem to be in obedience to a dictate of the intelligence, which, we have seen, cannot be the case. While, however, this view appears in harmony with our consciousness, it should be supplemented by another, that the consciousness of freedom carries in itself a certain temptation to an abuse of it. And, moreover, the very restraints and prohibitions of moral law, in their effect upon a depraved being, may tend to disobedience: "the motions of sin which are by the law," in the Apostle's words, may bear such a meaning. Even Finney, who so strongly rejects the notion that sin is committed for its own sake, admits that there may be cases of exceptional wickedness in which sin is committed simply for the gratification which disobedience of God *per se* affords. And then the self-satisfaction mentioned by Charnock would consist in the very fact of disobedience.

The nature of sin, however, involves another question of much moment—namely, the ground of moral obligation. Finney defines this to be "that reason or consideration intrinsic in the object of ultimate choice, which necessitates the affirmation of obligation to choose it for its own sake."

On this question there is a wide diversity of opinion, even among those whose views are generally orthodox. The sovereign will of God; the theory of Paley (which is selfish in essence, though religious in form); the utilitarian scheme; the theory which makes right to be the ground of obligation; moral order, duty, the nature and relations of moral beings; the eternal fitness of things; and, lastly, the theory which accepts universal happiness as the ground of moral obligation, have respectively their advocates among thinkers. The last of these theories, as we have seen, is not to be confounded with utilitarianism. In the discussion of this question it is

needful to be on our guard against sliding into the common error of mistaking the conditions of moral obligation for the ultimate ground of moral obligation. That the will of God, for example, is a condition of moral obligation, as the standard of conduct is cordially admitted by those who reject it as the ultimate ground of obligation. The same remark might be made of utility, order, duty, &c., &c., all of which are conditions of obligation. It is evident that the final ground of moral obligation must be an absolute as distinguished from a relative good: meaning by relative good that which is good because of its necessary relation to something beyond itself. And, according to Finney, the preceding theories have all this error in common, that they assign as the ultimate ground of obligation a relative instead of an absolute good. On the contrary, happiness, or the well-being of the universe, he maintains, is such a good—a good in itself, without reference to anything ulterior to justify it—so that no reason can, or need be, assigned for its worth: its value being immediately, necessarily, and universally recognised by every sane mind, which is, as the abettors of this theory hold, more than can be affirmed of any other theory of moral obligation. Thus, if right be held to be the ground of obligation, right is at once perceived to be a term of relative import, and not one which terminates absolutely in itself. It looks to something beyond itself, and derives its rectitude from its relation to that. Moreover, if sin be resolved into selfishness, universal happiness, as the ground of moral obligation, becomes a necessary complement of that proposition. For if selfishness and sin be identical, then benevolence, the opposite of selfishness, obviously becomes the summary of all moral good. In which case, what can the ultimate reason of virtue be but the happiness of the universe? Always bearing in mind, however, before and above all things, the glory of God as included in this.

Hence the value of order, as it is a condition of universal happiness; and hence the reason of the moral law, as the means of securing universal order among moral beings. For it is evident that order, on the part of moral intelligences, can only be secured by their conformity to the law of love. Every departure from this law is, therefore, an aberration from order, and a trespass against the well-being of the universe. Thus, the moral law is seen to be no creation of mere arbitrary authority, but the offspring of universal benevolence under the control of infallible intelligence, and

rendered binding by the authority of the supreme will. A claim to virtue, therefore, demands an unconditional surrender of the will to this law. We are virtuous as we conform to the law of disinterested benevolence, and sinful as we depart from it. Sin and holiness thus become one with the end to which an intelligent being devotes himself, and the essence of moral action resolves itself into motive; so that, the ground of moral obligation being the good of universal being, that must become the ultimate object of pursuit with all who would be virtuous. And between this worthy end and the unworthy and unlawful end of seeking supremely our own gratification, there is no alternative.

It must not, however, be thought that Christianity forbids a due regard to our own interests and happiness; an exaggeration with which Herbert Spencer charges it. This charge is dispelled by the very words of the law: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour *as thyself*." For they plainly recognise, if they do not enjoin, such a regard to our own happiness—making that regard the measure of what is due from us to our neighbour. To rise above self-love, which is inseparable from our nature, is impossible. Christianity, however, enjoins no impossibility. The law of God comes in not to forbid but to regulate self-love, and to save it from degenerating into selfishness. Self-love is consistent with the highest devotion to God and to the welfare of our fellow-creatures. What the law of universal benevolence enjoins is, that when self-gratification comes into competition with the moral order of the universe, on which rest the highest interests of being, the smaller must give way to the greater; self-gratification must be sacrificed to the claims of God and of our fellows. Love must rule and self be denied. And in this, as in other respects, Christianity has the approval of reason and conscience.

It is open to question whether the idea intended by Finney in the phrase "the ultimate ground of moral obligation" should not rather be denominated "the ultimate reason of moral distinctions." Obligation seems to demand an authority which makes duty to be binding on the ground of responsibility. In harmony with Monseil's remark: "All men are conscious that they never feel under obligation towards things but towards persons; a fact which plainly argues that the source of all obligation exists in a person having right to supreme legislation." As Kant says, "We cannot have the intuition of obligation without thinking at the same time of

another—namely, God and His will.” Thus, while moral government still rests on the intrinsic value of happiness, the Supreme Governor and His will are held to be the fountain and foundation of obligation.

Müller remarks “that a diabolical hatred of God seeks to dissolve or pervert this connection between the law of God and man’s sense of obligation. It discerns,” he adds, “nothing in the Divine law beyond the arbitrary will of God as a law-giver demanding the submission of man; accordingly it refuses to discern any moral obligation to obey His command.” To what extent Kant’s *Autonomy of the Will* may be responsible for the feeling thus so strongly condemned by Müller we will not undertake to say. Kant’s teaching makes virtue to be incompatible with obedience to external authority. And if the will of God could be severed from His intelligence as the source of law, according to the fantastic notion of Duns Scotus, there might be some foundation for Kant’s teaching on this point. For on such a view the Divine will becomes a matter of mere arbitrariness resting on no reason. But who thinks of harbouring such an impossible notion concerning the law of God? Kant’s objection, however, falls to the ground when it is remembered that human intelligence gives its readiest assent to the law of God, which is the law of universal benevolence. Thus, we see that there is a wise autonomy of the will: not certainly in the sense that the will governs itself, which is an absurdity, but in the sense that in every instance of virtue the will submits to the law of reason and conscience. For if in any sense we are “a law unto ourselves,” we are so in virtue of the conscience, which though *in* us is not altogether *of* us, but is God’s witness and viceroy, holding a sceptre under Him. For no theory of conscience can be held without God. The grand correlative of conscience is God. Kant, in fighting the battle against rationalistic deism, did good service; but it is impossible to read his exposition of morality without deploring its slender recognition of God. That Kant was an atheist we do not with De Quincey believe, but that much of his teaching is “without God” is only too obvious. Every view of autonomy, unless guarded by sufficient explanations, is fallacious. Autonomy may be allowed in the sense that as God reveals Himself and His will to man through the human intelligence, we are under obligation to obey its dictates. If, however, our aim, even in this, be simply to bring about the unity of our nature by doing away with the discord between

our propensities and our intelligence without reference to the Divine will, we come altogether short of the Christian notion of obedience and holiness.

Kant's notion of autonomy in another and better form is realised in the highest state of Christian experience when the soul "joined unto the Lord is one spirit" with Him. Obedience then becomes less a matter of regard to the letter of the law than an inward, living spring of spontaneous action. This, however, implies no disparagement to the law, nor does it regard its external authority as incompatible with the highest form of virtue. The "yoke" and the "burden" are still there; but the one is become "easy" and the other "light." The soul now thoroughly pervaded with love, the great principle of the law is become assimilated to the latter, since the opposition offered to it by our selfishness disappears.

No proper theory of sin can be held which does not distinctly recognise the Deity. Sin, whenever felt as personal guilt, is discerned to be against God. "Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned and done evil in Thy sight." Hence sin is presented to us in the Scriptures as "transgression" and "disobedience" as well as "wickedness" and "iniquity." And while all the terms which are employed in Scripture to describe moral evil suppose wilful departure from an authoritative standard of conduct, they appear nevertheless to possess distinctive shades of meaning. "Sin" seems to be a generic term for all moral evil. "Wickedness," again, while vying with the word sin in the width of its meaning, suggests somewhat more distinctively the wilfulness of the evil-doer, and the contradiction of his conduct to his own conviction of right and obligation. "Iniquity" is expressive of a violation of just claims. "Transgression" a trespass against the law that would keep men within the limits consistent with the welfare of universal being; and "disobedience" suggests the idea of opposition to a personal will and authority.

With all theories grounded on materialism or pantheism sin is obviously incompatible, for the evident reason that they exclude freedom, with its implied responsibility—the point of departure in all moral teaching—without which we cannot proceed at all; an unchallengeable condition of moral action, whose denial involves the annihilation of moral law and government. It is one of Müller's enlightened remarks, "It would be quite impossible for us to define moral law, even in its broadest outlines, as distinguished from the law of nature, without specifying its exclusive reference to beings

possessed of a will." According to materialistic theories of being, we have only matter and molecular force. Hence the necessitated character of all activity: self-determination there is none; nor even a self to determine in any higher sense than the individuality which belongs to the mere animal. Law is everywhere and everything, and free agency has no existence. "In natural science, law is the expression of what *is*. In moral science, law is what *ought to be*." Pantheism is in the same position with Materialism. Excluding the liberty of the creature, it renders man incapable of being placed under moral rule. On pantheistic grounds God is everything, and man is virtually annihilated: annihilated in respect of all that constitutes him a personal being. The manifold phenomena of the world—mental as well as material—are manifestations of the one central will. Hence all schemes which by over-magnifying the Divine will so as to make it overshadow and absorb the human will—even when not in form—are in reality pantheistic. And it is in our consciousness of guilt and blameworthiness that pantheistic forms of teaching meet their sturdiest resistance. Richard Holt Hutton says: "Here is the eternal protest against pantheism, God not *in* man but *against* him; telling us of a life separated from ours, as far as the east is from the west."

On the hypothesis of evolution, sin is simply a remnant of the lower animal not yet eliminated. Until, however, the hypothesis receives its demonstration its consideration may be justly postponed. It is obvious that such a view of sin as is yielded to us by this hypothesis is not to be reconciled with the definition of evil as "that which ought not to be." For evil in that case would be only a natural and inevitable feature of humanity in its progress towards a higher form of existence. A *vitium* there might be, but no *culpa*; a fault of nature, but no blameworthiness and guilt; as there would be no abuse of freedom, nor trespass against recognised holy authority.

The question of evil has been perplexed by misconceptions of its nature. The confusion of the *more* and *higher* with *good*, and of the *less* and *lower* with *evil*, furnishes an example of this kind. Archbishop King, in dividing evil into (1) imperfection, (2) natural evil, (3) moral evil, appears to have fallen into this error. Exception might be taken to this division on the ground that what is here meant by "imperfection"—being a feature pertaining to the nature of a created being—is not to be logically discriminated from

"natural evil." But we take stronger ground than this for our objection. The division implies that the necessary limitation of a finite nature is in itself an evil; as also the inferiority of one thing to another in the system of being called "comparative imperfection." We are forbidden, however, by our definition to rank anything in the category of evil on either of these grounds. It is obvious that, on the supposition of creation, the former of these things must be. For how exalted soever the creature, it cannot but be limited in nature. And as it regards the gradation of being, implied in the other thought, it is unwarrantable to say it "ought not to be," as its absence would be an obvious loss to the beauty and interest of the universe. We therefore submit that the phrase comparative perfection is, in this case, more correct than comparative imperfection. For everything which answers its purpose in the universal economy, however humble its place and design, is perfect in its kind. Are we to designate the daisy an evil because it is not a rose, or a dog an evil because it is not a horse, or man in his primal innocence because "he was made a little lower than the angels?" Whither would reasoning so vain lead us? Not such was the verdict of "the only wise God," who declared the creation as a whole, and everything in it to be "very good."

Dr. John Clarke, Boyle Lecturer in 1720, has some able remarks on the foregoing and kindred topics. Replying to Bayle, who grievously harassed the theologians of that day, he says: "Animal creatures compared with men may, in this sense, be styled bad or evil. And so may man himself with regard to angels. And angels with respect to still superior intelligences. There is no end of such comparisons; and it is the Supreme Being alone concerning whom absolutely and universally goodness can be affirmed: according to that saying of our Saviour, Matt. xix. 17, 'There is none good but One: that is God.' " Naville's remarks on this point are in the same strain. "Good," he says, "consists not in the *quantity* of power, but in its *direction*. Everything may be good, and perfectly good in its own place, without ever leaving its own order. Evil can never be good—it is disorder, and disorder has no legitimate place."

Leibnitz wrote his *Theodicée* to meet the assaults of Bayle, who, while too philosophical to receive Christianity, could accept the absurdity of Manicheism: a striking example of the perverting influence of unbelief on the intellect. A similar instance we have in the case of James Mill, respecting

whom his son, in his *Autobiography*, gives us to understand that, though entirely hostile to Christianity, and not accepting even the being of God, he "would not have equally condemned the Sabeian or Manichean theory of a good and evil principle struggling against each other for the government of the universe, and he expressed surprise that no one revived it in our time."

Bayle's objection to the rule of One Supreme Being is drawn from the evil existing in the world. The form of his argument, briefly stated, is, that the Creator of this world cannot be both omnipotent and virtuous. The existence of so much manifest evil in the world forbids us to ascribe such a combination of attributes to one God. If He is omnipotent, then He is not virtuous; for if He were, He would not have made a world into which evil could enter. If, on the other hand, He is virtuous, He is not omnipotent; for, in that case, His virtue would have led Him to use His Almighty power in preventing the intrusion of evil. Whatever value may pertain to this reasoning, it has not the interest of novelty; for it is that of the ancient Stoics and Epicureans. To vindicate God's omnipotence and goodness in the face of existing evil, Leibnitz wrote his *Theodicee*—a work marked by the lofty genius of its author, but which we are compelled to regard as falling short of its design. Plato, between whom and Leibnitz there are not wanting points of resemblance, attempted the same task, and with a similar result. To account for this failure of Leibnitz, it must be remembered that he was the disciple of Des Cartes, whose teaching, by the excessive form in which it presents the all-controlling power of God, excludes all real freedom, and leads, by logical sequence, to Pantheism—a result actually reached by Spinoza, another of Des Cartes' disciples. Leibnitz entering upon his task, thus embarrassed by the necessitarian notions inherited from his master, fails, as we think, to refute the objections of Bayle and to vindicate God. Conceding to Bayle his leading fallacy, namely, that it is within the sphere of Omnipotence to produce virtue at will, Leibnitz was compelled to adopt an optimist basis for his theory. And Leibnitz's *Theodicee* may be regarded as a splendid attempt to justify the existence of an evil world on optimist principles. The world is as the will of God would have it, and is therefore, with all its evils, the best of all possible worlds. Evil is the necessary result of the limitation of the creature, and is justified by the good arising from it to the universe re-



garded as a whole. This view of Leibnitz contains, in principle, the teaching of Shaftesbury, though it may not wear the same dangerous form which was reduced to poetry by Pope :

“Respecting man, whatever wrong we call  
May, must be right, as relative to all.”

Thus evil has assigned to it an important function, and subserves high useful ends in the economy of the universe. To describe sin, therefore, as evil, is a libel, and the moral abominations of mankind find their justification as necessary to the perfection of being regarded as one great whole. This, however, is the talk of men only while they fill the philosophical chair. When they descend to occupy common ground, they straightway learn to speak as other men in condemnation of the moral evils that desolate society, and especially of those which trespass against themselves. Naville shrewdly remarks that there is at any rate one evil among men, and that is the opposition offered to optimist teaching; or why is it so strongly resented?

Renouncing optimism, in order to maintain the reality of evil, we equally disclaim Schopenhauer's pessimism, which is the outpouring of a diseased mind. Our world is not the best of all possible worlds, for sin has entered to mar it. But neither is it also the worst of all possible worlds, for it is not a world abandoned to the reign of evil. It is neither the scene of utter darkness nor of perfect light, but one in which the two elements are commingled; exactly answerable to the Scriptural representation of a world where God is working out his redeeming purpose in the restoration of fallen beings, and overruling even the natural evils of the world to discipline the restored for a higher state of existence.

It is well, in considering such a theory as that of Leibnitz, to recall one or two obvious truths underlying the question of moral evil. We cannot assign to evil a legitimate function in the world; for then it is evil only in name, but good in reality. The Christian notion of sin can be maintained only by abiding faithful to our definition of evil, as “that which ought not to be”—a disorder and trespass forbidden and condemned by God's holy law. We cannot make evil the offspring of necessity; for freedom is a stern postulate of evil, as “that which ought not to be.” “The denial of liberty forecloses the question of evil.” The application of obvious truths like these invalidates the foundation of Leibnitz's *Theodicée*. If Leibnitz's best of all possible worlds meant no

more than that to the eye of God it seemed best that there should be a universe in which various races of intelligent beings, governed by moral motive, should find place, we see not what sound objection could be raised against such a view. Or if by the best of all possible worlds were meant simply that God is making the very best that can be made of a bad state of things, no opposition need be offered. We cannot, however, save Leibnitz on either of these grounds, for he maintains that God can cause virtue to be in the world without mixture of vice, and even that He may easily cause it to be so. And here, we think, lies his leading fallacy. But, as a necessitarian, he was bound to say as much. Or, further, if by evil Leibnitz could be understood to mean the possibility of evil—peccability, not sin—his basis in this amended form would be defensible; for it is a sound remark of Wesley that all finite beings appear to be fallible. Fallibility, however, implies freedom. The limitation of the created nature is not in itself evil, nor does it in creatures capable of moral rule necessarily lead to evil. To solve the origin of evil thus on a metaphysical instead of a moral basis—a limitation of nature instead of an abuse of freedom—can never satisfy earnest inquiry. It is liable to many formidable objections. It strips evil of its moral character, reducing it into a natural phenomenon. It also renders escape from evil impossible, save by an exit from existence. And assuming the truth of the Scriptural account of the fall of angels, it leaves inexplicable how a portion of them remained faithful, while others fell, since they were all alike limited in capacity. Moreover, it denies His freedom from evil “who was manifested to take away our sins,” and “in whom is no sin.”

Bayle held that between his Manicheism and Pantheism there was no alternative. His words are, “According to the idea we have of a created being we cannot comprehend it to be a principle of action—that it can move itself.” Thus, according to Bayle, if humanity be the production of Omnipotence, we are but puppets of Divine power, whose movements may be interesting to watch, but which nevertheless are strictly mechanical. No wonder that when persons come to adopt such views they should be able, with M. Taine, to treat historic personages with an impassive indifference to their moral character. Here again Leibnitz, by the metaphysical form in which he maintains a *concursus* of Divine power, along with every volition of the human will, was able to oppose to Bayle’s notion but a feeble resistance. Leibnitz’s

position is, that the positive part of the human volition comes from God, but the pravity of it from the necessary imperfection of the creature. This question requires the closest attention, as false views thereon lead to pantheistic conclusions. The main error of Schleiermacher consists in an exaggerated view of the creature's dependence on the Divine Omnipotence. Müller's teaching gives full satisfaction. "The fact," says he, "that man in his sin is still encompassed by the sustaining providence of God does not in the least detract from his guilt [nor, we may add, in the least implicate God in his guilt]: man derives his power to act, to decide, to desire, from God every moment of his life; but he desires, or resolves upon, or does evil himself." "We live, and move, and have our being" in God, "by whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things." This is the true Pantheism; and while it asserts the dependence of the creature upon God, it clearly marks the personal distinction between them. So that the Divine agency is not made necessarily to exclude the fact of human freedom. God's sovereign rule and universal efficiency are maintained along with the free, responsible agency of man. And to hold that the two facts are incompatible is to impose restriction upon the absolute power of God, presenting Him as unable to constitute beings capable of moral rule. God's upholding and all-controlling power leaves room for the origination of human action. And it is a solemn aggravation of sin that the very power by which God sustains the creature in existence, and enables it to act at all, is by an abuse of freedom employed in contradiction to His will: "I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against Me."

Bayle, however, goes so far as to assert that the possibility of sin—the faculty which renders man capable of sin—is evil. His reasoning is, "It cannot be conceived that the first man could receive from a good Principle the faculty of doing ill. The faculty is vicious, and everything that can produce evil is bad, since evil cannot proceed but from a bad cause." We thus see that the origin of evil, in its bearing on the Divine character, limits itself solely to the question, Whether it is consistent with the wisdom, goodness, and power of God that there should be a *moral* universe at all? Is the existence of moral agents a reflection on God's character? Is the existence of a Supreme Being incompatible with any other than a mechanical universe in which freedom can find no place? "A creation necessarily good is a contradiction" (Naville):

a short, pregnant sentence before which the sophistry of Bayle vanishes. Bayle's, and kindred teaching, is to be overcome only by holding the obvious truth that virtue is not to be produced by the direct exertion of mere power, as it must be the offspring of motive operating upon the intelligence of a free agent. Hunt, in his *History of Religious Thought*, says: "The Christian no less than the optimist philosopher is unable to understand why evil should be permitted at all." Bledsoe firmly withstands the notion that evil is "permitted at all." It exists not by the "permission," but in spite of the Divine Will. And taking permission to mean acquiescence or approval, Bledsoe is right. Müller, however, who is favourable to the phrase "the permission of evil," explains that by "permission" is not meant "to allow," *i.e.*, with consent, but "to suffer" it to be. Archbishop King gives three ways in which the entrance of evil into the world might have been prevented. "(1.) If God had created no free being at all. (2.) If His omnipotence interpose, and occasionally restrain the will, which is naturally free, from any wrong elections. (3.) If He should change the present state of things, and translate man into another, where the occasions to error and incitements to evil being cut off, he should meet with nothing that could tempt him to choose amiss." On these several ways of preventing evil Dr. Calderwood remarks: "Of these the first must be discarded as involving a claim for restriction upon the absolute; the second, as implying a breach on the nature of the creature; and the third, as inconsistent with the conditions of moral life."

In referring to the origin of evil, Dr. Calderwood wisely discriminates between the provinces of philosophy and revelation. Philosophy is competent, by an analysis of consciousness, to detect the present abnormal condition of men, but incompetent to account for this fact. And as the origin of evil in man is not a psychological but an historical fact, any information we have on this subject must be obtained from "a direct revelation." In harmony with this view Naville also says, that "the Christian dogma of the fall of humanity contains the philosophic doctrine which most reasonably accounts for the facts of experience, which give rise to the problem of evil." Our attention is thus led to the Mosaic narrative of the Fall. And we are immediately met by the inquiry, Is the record to be accepted as sober fact, or instructive allegory? All rationalistic and transcendental teaching adheres to the latter view. Tholuck, even, compromises the

matter by admitting that while the Fall itself is an historic fact the narrative is but a figurative representation of that fact. The adoption of the allegorical view is attended with the serious difficulty, that it not only invalidates the authority of the Mosaic record, but, moreover, clashes with its corroboration by our Lord and His apostles. It is undeniable that the case of Adam's probation and fall in Eden, as given in the Scriptures, presents all the features of a perfect moral trial. For the temptation appealed not only to "the desires of the flesh," but also "of the mind;" while the real agent in the seduction concealed himself under the guise of his humble animal instrument. It is conceivable, however,—with what force our readers are left to judge for themselves,—that this very feature of the case may be urged against the orthodox view as forming too complete a case to be accepted as a concrete fact. But what is our gain on the rejection of the literal sense of the narrative, and the adoption of the allegorical interpretation? We rid the case, it may be said, of its miraculous and supernatural elements. If, however, the presence of these elements is held to be fatal to the authenticity of the record, the question of "a direct revelation" is manifestly foreclosed. That the narrative is characterised by the language of symbol in the Divine address to the serpent is admitted; this fact, however, by no means denies the strictly historic nature of the event.

In regard to the primitive moral state of man, Dr. Payne holds that the knowledge and love of God possessed by Adam before he sinned—though acquired as soon as his faculties came to be exercised in the contemplation of God and of His works—were not concreated with him. Bledsoe holds a similar view. And Müller, while not so explicit on the point, seems to lean in the same direction. The reason for this view appears to be the assumed impossibility of creating a moral character by immediate power. Accordingly, all that can be ascribed to man at the very beginning of his earthly existence is an innocence implying the absence of positive evil. This view, however, could be admitted only along with the qualification that at the earliest period of his being man was pre-disposed to obedience and holiness; and, further, we should be warranted in calling for some explanation of "the image and likeness of God in which he was *created*."

That the prohibitory command and sanction were thoroughly understood by the probationers, and had duly impressed their minds, is apparent from the exactitude with which the woman

when tempted was able to reproduce the words in which God had conveyed to them His command and threatening. The test to which the new-formed creatures were subjected imposed no harsh or difficult task : involving only abstinence from the gratification of the lower principles of their nature at the expense of the higher, in obedience to Divine authority.

In this transaction is found a *bona fide* probation of a moral being. Uninfluenced by fate, predestinating decree, or the limited capacity of the creature, he was "sufficient to have stood, though free to fall." Necessity there was none. Sovereign of his own choice, he was competent to obey, equally so to disobey. The decision was his own : his own notwithstanding the temptation. For while that was the occasion, he himself was the cause of his fall. Uninfluenced by motive, constituted a moral agent as he was, it was impossible he should be. But uncompelled to obey wrong motive he certainly was.

Strange to say, Schiller, Hegel, and others have lauded this act of disobedience as imparting to the first man the consciousness of his personality, and enabling him to lay the foundation of a moral existence. By the voice of God forbidding man to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, Schiller understands the instinct which drew him back from the tree ; by disregarding which he rose above the level of a mere animal existence, and became a man. So he and we are to be congratulated on this act of disobedience to instinct ! It is much easier to understand how instinct should draw man to the tree than hold him from it. Well has Luthardt described the words in which these views are conveyed as "proud words : " may we not add "foolish words ? " And how the above is to be regarded as an account of the fall of man, we can scarcely understand in any other light than that of a burlesque. To call that a fall which was necessary to assert and secure the dignity of our nature, looks much like an abuse of language and confusion of thought. Evil, however, with this school is not "that which ought not to be." But rather that without which no good could or can be. For good is the conquest of evil ; and therefore, according to this school, good is conditional on the existence of evil, and not simply on its possibility. As if a nature free from evil could not be good. And that thus, as the evil tendency of any nature became reduced, the personal goodness decreased in like ratio. It is hard to see how anything but the high names of the authors and sponsors of these views could pro-

cure for them a serious hearing. Another baseless notion emanating from the same source is, that evil is necessary to the self-consciousness of a moral being. Implying that the love of God, with its attendant delight, is not sufficient as a basis of self-consciousness. What, then, of Him who knew no sin? For surely His "sorrows" are not to be confounded with moral evil.

In conceiving how a creature holy and upright, possessing the image and likeness of God, might be accessible to evil, it may assist us to remember that, while man was possessed of an intelligence—mirroring the image of God, and steadily upholding the idea of obligation before him—he was also furnished with a sensibility marked by appetencies and propensities capable of being variously gratified. And in this feature of human nature, even in its uncorrupted state, we have a possible inlet for the entrance of evil into the heart. This is substantially Bishop Butler's elucidation of the case, and he is among the safest of guides on such a subject. Along with this view should also be recalled what has been already advanced in regard to the temptation to evil which must necessarily inhere in the consciousness of freedom. And in the light of this combined view, we may be enabled to understand how even a creature in possession of uncorrupted holiness and uprightness might fall from his integrity.

According to the tenor of orthodox teaching, the immediate result of disobedience was a liability on the part of the transgressor to the full penalty of all implied in the dark word death; a threefold evil including the departure of the Holy Spirit, and the consequent loss of the moral image of God, usually denominated spiritual death; the bodily change by which the material frame became mortal and doomed to dissolution; the consignment of the soul to an everlasting separation from God, which may be regarded as the perpetuation of the spiritual death already noticed. Not the spirit's annihilation, which by no means answers to the counter-Scriptural idea of "eternal life;" but its alienation from the glory and blessedness of the Divine presence. This penalty, in unmitigated form, would have passed with instant execution upon the guilty but for its arrest by a governmental provision, the fruit of God's mercy in Christ devised in anticipation of man's offence. In this case the race would have met its extinction in the death of the original pair.

Pelagius, however, maintained that death is not due to sin, but that man is naturally mortal apart from any act of

disobedience. Jeremy Taylor shares in this view. "Death," says he, "which at first was the condition of nature, became a *punishment* on account of sin; just as it was to the serpent to creep upon his belly, and the woman to be subject to her husband. These things were so before, and would have been so; but they would not have been a curse if any of them had been hindered by grace and favour, but by God's anger they were now left to fall to the condition of their nature." From this view the mass of Christian divines dissent; inferring from the Apostle's words (Rom. v., 1 Cor. xv.) that the dissolution of the frame is the penal result of disobedience. How men, in the event of no such catastrophe as the Fall, would have been disposed of, no one ventures dogmatically to affirm. Knapp holds the singular notion that the bodily immortality of man was maintained by "the fruit of the tree of life," but that the fruit of the forbidden tree gave rise to inordinate desires in the soul, while it empoisoned and killed the body. Bledsoe, without directly impugning the notion that temporal death is the legal fruit of sin, seems, nevertheless, to reason in opposition to that view, maintaining that there may be, and is, in the case of animals and infants, both suffering and death under an administration of infinite goodness and wisdom, where there is no sin. And that the contrary teaching goes to strengthen atheism.

This subject connects itself with the question of original sin—a doctrine of dogmatic theology which has given rise to a wide variance of opinion, and no little theological warfare. The phrase "original sin," as used by theologians, is not to be understood of the first sin of "the first man," but the effect of the first offence upon mankind. Jeremy Taylor, however, defines the subject in the former of these senses. We are reminded by Dr. Pope that Adam's sin was not *the* original sin; the first instance of the abuse of freedom occurring elsewhere in the universe, and among a super-human class of beings: a fact made known to us in Holy Scripture with the reserve befitting a communication whose design it is not to minister to curiosity, but to lead a lapsed race back to the favour of God. By one class of divines original sin is held to include the imputation of Adam's guilt to his posterity, as well as the depravity naturally derived from him. By another class, however, the idea of guilt is excluded, and original sin is expressive simply of the depravity which marks our nature. The diversity of opinion thus indicated rests very much upon whether Adam is to be regarded as the federal head and representative of



the race, or merely as its natural head? For, on the former view, original sin embraces the element of guilt as well as of depravity. Augustine's teaching, always strong, and often excessive, goes to blend Adam and his posterity apparently in one organic whole, as a tree, though distinguishable into roots, and trunk, and branches, is one. This notion taken literally would destroy our personal identity and make us responsible for Adam's sin as it is our own, since we are an integral portion of that humanity, which is one both in its head and members. We may thus be held liable for the sins of all other men and they for ours. Moses Stuart justly describes this as "a fictitious unity;" while Richard Watson says of it: "It is so little agreeable to that distinct agency which enters into the very notion of an accountable being that it cannot be maintained, and it destroys the sound distinction between original and actual sin." And yet, notwithstanding the absurdity of this view, it has been espoused by great names—Jonathan Edwards among others. Nor was it unusual for New England divines of Edwards' day to inculcate as necessary to a sound and complete Christian experience the conviction and confession of identity with Adam in the guilty transaction of the garden, and bitterly to reproach oneself for it. Naville, indeed, unless we misapprehend him, comes dangerously near this exaggeration of Augustine when he says: "Two things are to be distinguished in the individual,—(1) His personal will responsible for its acts and consents to natural inclination; (2) the human nature that is in him, for his share of which he is responsible, not as an individual, but in his character as a man:—" words which we find easier to read than to understand. The nearest notion to these views which we can deem at all admissible is that in Adam the human will was on its trial.

The federal relation of Adam to mankind supposes, as the term implies, a covenant into which God entered with him, as the representative of the race, called by the older divines "the covenant of works." Pictet explains this covenant to mean the dispensation under which Adam was placed, so that on the performance of a certain act or acts the blessings he possessed should be enjoyed by his descendants. Respecting such a covenant, however, the Mosaic record is silent. Much indeed of what has figured on this and kindred topics in the reasoning of divines can be regarded in no other light than bare assumption. As, for example, when Dr. Payne, to show the enormous gravity of Adam's offence, enhances it by the

fact that the momentous consequences to his posterity, dependent upon his conduct, was known to him. "Nothing is said concerning the degree of knowledge imparted to Adam and Eve, as to the nature, terms, and limits of their probationary state." How rare is the wisdom which is willing to keep silent where God has not spoken.

Augustine's view of original sin,—with whom, it may be remarked, the phrase originated,—we have seen. Pelagius, Augustine's great opponent, rejects the notion of original sin altogether. Man, according to Pelagius, as has been already observed, was created mortal; nor did his sin go beyond himself. Bad example, wrong education, and other external causes account for the prevalence of sin. With these views Socinians ally themselves: an explanation wholly insufficient in the face of the acknowledged universality of evil. From the strict Pelagians, however, we have to discriminate the semi-Pelagians, who have modified in several essential forms the views of the former. The semi-Pelagians admit death to be the effect of sin, and represent the power of the will in the direction of good to be greatly reduced by the Fall; and while an ability to take the initial steps in the process of salvation is claimed for man, the necessity of Divine grace in order to its consummation is admitted. In neither form of Pelagianism, however, is there a recognition of the imputation of Adam's guilt to his posterity. And even in the formularies of the Reformed Churches the element of depravity is the only one that clearly appears; the guilt of man being made to arise out of his depravity rather than the depravity from the guilt.

Dr. Payne, in his *Lectures on Original Sin*, elaborated a theory which is, in some of its features, peculiarly his own, and therefore demands more than passing notice. According to this theory, man created in the outfield of the world was led within the enclosure of the garden to be subjected to a moral testing affecting his relation to mankind as their federal head and representative of his posterity. In virtue of the constitution under which Adam was thus called to act, he was the beneficiary of the future race in respect of certain "chartered blessings"—namely, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and immunity from bodily death, called "chartered," as they are the gifts of God's sovereign goodness and bounty, and could not be claimed in equity. These "chartered blessings," in the event of his incorruptible loyalty under trial, would descend to Adam's seed, but on the alternative

of disobedience would be lost both to him and them. The trial of Adam in his federal relation, however, was confined to the one single command, "Thou shalt not eat of it." So that no other violation of the Divine will, whatever its effect upon his own personal relation to the Supreme Ruler, would be able to intercept the transmission of these "chartered blessings" to mankind.

The theory further affirms that, to render the trial fair and sufficient, man must meet the exigency of the case in the exercise of his own powers, unaided by the Divine Spirit. Man thus left to himself fell, and, according to Dr. Payne, one of the lessons to be learned from the defection of Adam is, that man, devoid of God's Spirit, is unequal to the demands of God's moral government. And now original sin, in its guilt, is the loss of the aforesaid "chartered blessings," and does not imply the imputation of blameworthiness to mankind on account of Adam's offence, any more than the blameworthiness of a nobleman who has been guilty of treason is imputed to his children, though they be involved in its legal consequences of confiscation of title and estate. "Adam," to cite this writer's words, "was guilty in committing the act; his guilt does not attach to us, yet it involves us in all the consequences of the act as if it had been our own." On this view of the case we see no reason why Dr. Payne retained the phrase "imputed guilt," which nevertheless he did: this, on his showing, is original sin in its guilt. In its depravity it is the inevitable ascendancy of the lower principles of our nature arising from the loss of the Holy Spirit. Such in substance, we think, is Dr. Payne's theory of original sin.

In some of its features it is neither new nor objectionable; in those very features, however, which are distinctive of the theory, it discredits itself. Its unsupported assumptions, so far as we can see, serve rather to aggravate any difficulties which may be supposed to pertain to the doctrine of original sin than to remove them. We fail to see any reason for introducing into the case the assumption that the trial of man's faithfulness should be limited to one specific command of God. With Richard Watson we prefer to regard the prohibition in Eden as designed to test man in respect of his submission to the law of supreme love to God, of which the various features of the moral law are but modifications, and that had the law of love been transgressed in any other form the same guilt would have ensued, and therefore, presumably, the same sad consequences would have been entailed upon

both the offender and his posterity. It is further supposed possible by this theory that man might have been obedient in relation to this one command, and yet have been disobedient in other respects; in which case Adam, having proved obedient in his representative capacity, would have transmitted the "chartered blessings" to his posterity when he himself had become an object of the Divine displeasure—a result so full of embarrassing incongruity as to forbid our acceptance of any notion which affirms its possibility. The theory is open again to the objection that, by depriving man while under trial of the Holy Spirit, he is visited with the penalty before the offence is committed. And then, looking at another feature of the theory, if the moral inadequacy of man, apart from the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, is a lesson we are to draw from Adam's delinquency, must we not conclude—notwithstanding any natural ability which Dr. Payne attributes to man—that his fall was ensured by the withdrawal of the Divine Spirit from him? And is it conceivable that God would have withdrawn His Spirit from man when, by continuing His presence, the fall of man, with all the mighty sum of moral and natural evil involved therein, would have been averted; for it looks to us to be a fair deduction from this theory that the "chartered blessings" descending to all future generations of men from a federal head, faithful in regard to one particular instance of Divine authority, this world would never have seen either sin or death, nor become, on any fair construction of the case, the scene of moral probation to the race. It requires, finally, no great insight to see that the scheme is vitiated by the assumption that God could, if He would, have prevented the entrance of moral evil into the world. This notion shatters our definition of evil as "that which ought not to be"—a definition in whose security alone we are safe.

Methodist theology includes both the element of imputed guilt and of hereditary depravity. In the words of Dr. Hannah's definition, original sin "is the transmission of the hereditary guilt and depravity of the first sinning pair to their posterity." Dr. Pope somewhat qualifies this definition when he says: "The guilt of the first transgression is reckoned in its consequences upon all the race represented by the first transgressor. But not apart from their own sin, all are not only regarded as sinners, but made sinners also through the inheritance of a nature of itself inclined only to evil." In this view Dr. Pope agrees with Goodwin, as

quoted in Watson's *Institutes*. Thus, while the depravity is made to be partly the effect of guilt imputed, it is to a certain extent also the ground of that imputation; which modification of Dr. Hannah's definition appears to bring the notion of original sin nearer to the Methodist teaching of an earlier period. For in those of Welsey's *Sermons*, which touch on original sin, the view is confined to the natural effect on mankind of the first transgression,—in harmony with the well-known definition of the Ninth Article of the Established Church. Mr. Watson, also in his *Biblical and Theological Dictionary*, says: "Original sin is that whereby our whole nature is corrupted, and rendered contrary to the nature and law of God, or according to the Ninth Article of the Church of England, &c., &c.;" adding, "This imputation of the sin of Adam to his posterity is also what divines call, with some latitude of expression, original sin." His adoption of this latter view, however, is not declared. In his *Institutes*, Mr. Watson, it is true, employs words which, in their severest construction, might be understood to carry in them the notion of guilt in original sin. It is, nevertheless, to the moral effects naturally arising from the Fall that he, in the remarks which immediately follow, confines our attention. He denies "a direct corruption of human nature by a sort of *judicial act*"—and with this view we quite coincide—but it needs some subtilty to save him from a certain inconsistency when he makes the spiritual death of mankind to be part of "the full *penalty*" of Adam's sin. The definition of original sin, as contained in the *Conference Catechism*, also omits the element of imputed guilt. And it might be thought more consistent with the Methodist scheme of doctrine to hold that as our recovery to God is due to the merit of Christ without the direct imputation of His righteousness, so is our fall from God due to the fault of Adam without the direct imputation of his offence. Both are imputed only in their effects. The imputation of Adam's guilt to mankind, in any sense, is a doctrine that rests mainly on the teaching of St. Paul, as found in the Fifth of his Epistle to the Romans—where the Apostle draws a parallel between Adam and Christ in the result to the race of their obedience and disobedience respectively. Not only does the Apostle assert that "by one man's disobedience many were made (constituted) sinners," ver. 19; but, moreover, that "by the offence of one (one offence) judgment came upon all men unto condemnation." And that this condemnation is not due solely to the personal

sinfulness of mankind, is apparent from the fact that the Apostle makes death to be the fruit of sin. But as multitudes fall a prey to death in infancy, it is clear that their death cannot be the result of personal transgression, and must be owing to the condemnation which has befallen universal humanity, as the consequence of the first act of sin, which stands at the head of all human evil. On a Methodist construction of the case, however, it stands thus in theory only. For, the universal atonement of Christ, together with the universal grace of the Spirit—the fruit of the Father's universal love—have, from the very introduction of evil into the world, come in to ameliorate the case. The salvation of all who die in infancy is, by this means, secured—and, indeed, no man is condemned to eternal death for Adam's offence. Every man is placed in a position to work out his salvation, for God's grace comes unbidden, as heaven's own light—"working in us to will and to do of His good pleasure." That this has been traversed by contrary teaching, need not be said. Müller and others understand by those "who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgressions," not infants incapable of personal transgression, but those who had not transgressed a positive and express law. Bledsoe strongly reprehends the notion that the guilt of Adam should be reckoned to those whose innocence is guaranteed by their helplessness; and treats the whole as a baseless fiction.

The new school of American theology—as it was once called—seems to have largely identified itself with Knapp in his view of original sin. In regard to the relation existing between Adam's offence and the sinfulness of mankind, Knapp, while admitting that the Scriptures assert such a relation, denies that they reveal any *quo modo* of the fact. This is Butler's view in regard to the doctrine of the atonement; the Scriptures reveal the fact, but no theory. That our information respecting the relation of Adam's sin to his posterity is by no means so full and ample as that imparted to us in regard to our recovery through "the Second Man, the Lord from heaven," must be admitted. And the reason of this is obvious. The universality of sin is manifest and undeniable, and it is of far higher moment to us to learn how to escape an evil in which we are confessedly involved than to learn how we fell into it. Finney adopts Knapp's foregoing view. Of Finney it might be remarked that, as a theologian, he is *sui generis*, and not to be ranked with any particular school, having formed a

system of theology peculiarly his own. On most of the points at issue between the new school and its older rival, he fraternises with the former. The new school holds the universal depravity of mankind, but rejects wholly the notion of the imputed guilt of Adam's transgression. Finney, in his treatment of the question of depravity, remarks that the word literally and primarily means "very crooked:" not in the sense of original or constitutional crookedness, but in the sense of having become crooked. The term "does not," he says, "imply original malformation, but lapsed, fallen, departed from right or straight. It always implies deterioration, or fall from a former state of moral or physical perfection." That man is become the subject of such depravity is admitted almost on all hands. In regard, however, to the nature and extent of the depravity, in its hereditary form, opinion varies. Augustine depicts unregenerate man in terms so dark as to lead us to ask—what of man is left under this mass of evil and helplessness? Allowing his indignation to master him in his vehement desire to beat down human pride, "he seems to annihilate both man and his pride together in the presence of God and of His sovereign grace." Much of this is probably owing to the life Augustine led before his conversion, and the Manichean errors in which he was then entangled. Augustine's conversion was a marvellous triumph of God's grace, and issued in piety of the highest order. "He was a burning and a shining light," yet his teaching is by no means to be regarded as a pure gain to the world. In the diabolical form in which it presents man in his unregenerated state, together with his almost fatalistic predestinarianism, Augustine's teaching empoisoned, to a large extent, both the philosophy and theology of the Church; and as perpetuated in various forms since his day has, we fear, not promoted the progress of God's "glad tidings" through the world. Augustine's view of human depravity, in slightly softened garb, reappears in the *Formula Concordiæ* of the Lutheran Church—a document which, while marked by the keenest acumen, is nevertheless excessive in its description of human depravity. According to this formulary man is, in things spiritual, like a stock or stone, and differing from them only as he is rebellious and an enemy to the Divine will. He is able neither to understand, believe, embrace, think, will, originate, perform, nor even co-operate within the strictly spiritual sphere. How the personal guilt of the unregenerate is to be maintained on such a view it is impossible to see. In the face of such

teaching the groundwork of religion, personal responsibility, takes its departure, and moral government disappears along with it. Well has Müller remarked, "These affirmations concerning the depth of human depravity lead to inferences obviously sanctioning the doctrine of unconditional predestination." Such extreme views are ever doomed to the penalty of self-contradiction when those dangerous inferences, logically arising from them, come to be guarded against. And the fate of these misstatements is, that in the end they come to minister to the very errors they were meant to withstand. But truth is far-reaching in her vindicatory power. On these Augustinian and kindred views of unregenerate men, it is hard to discover where the transition from a state of sin to one of grace can exist; upon what the truth and power of God may work; to what the Divine voice may appeal; or on what the Divine hand lay hold. The Holy Spirit "coming" to such a nature has nothing in it; no moral basis on which to operate. To be rendered amenable to any restorative process, man must be divested of one set of faculties and attired in another. Regeneration, instead of being a moral, becomes a physical change, and must precede conversion, regarded as the return of man to God. "Repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ," cease to be prerequisites of salvation, since they are as impossible to unregenerate man as any imaginable physical impossibility, if, as these views set forth, he can neither think, believe, nor co-operate in regard to his personal restoration to God. Human salvation is thus denuded of all conditions, and man reduced to a mass of passivity, to be operated upon by the sovereign and resistless power of God. The adaptation of the Gospel, as a means, ceases. Divine truth, as an instrument of renewal, retains no function; and all the mighty motives by which Christianity appeals to unregenerate men are bereft of their force and meaning. It has been said that Mr. Wesley, in his *Sermon on Original Sin*, has allowed certain passages to escape him which are scarcely reconcilable with the anti-Calvinistic genius of his general teaching; and in particular with the views he holds on the subject of conscience. For, though Mr. Wesley holds that what is called "natural conscience" is the light of God in the soul, nevertheless the soul must, on that supposition, have a capacity to receive and respond to that light. It must not, however, be forgotten that whatever Wesley takes from man with one hand he, in his system of universal grace, restores to him



with the other. It is one of Müller's pregnant remarks, "Man has *need*, or else where is the wisdom of redemption? And man has *susceptibility*, otherwise redemption would be of no avail." The most serious objection to this excessive teaching on the subject of human depravity, which we are now discussing, is that by virtually stripping man of the elements of a moral nature, they place him out of all relation with redemption; for redemption has relation only to a creature who, however deeply fallen, retains a capacity for action. It is an admirable suggestion of Monsell's that the moral employment of the word "help," which is of so frequent occurrence in Scripture, while it denotes the necessity of Divine grace implies no less the co-operation of man. Much of the error entertained on the subject of human depravity probably arises from the want of distinguishing clearly between the moral character and the moral nature of man. The depravity of the former, in the case of every unregenerate man, is, and must be, entire; for so long as he is committed to a sinful end of being, the character—meaning by that, with Müller, "the formed will"—must be devoid of all that is holy. The heart—that is, the heart of the soul, the reigning attitude of the will—"is evil, and only evil continually."

The moral nature of man, however, includes faculties which, under Divine light, can perceive the claims of God and righteousness, and sympathise with them. It is thus, that while man yields a base submission to the dictates of mere propensity in opposition to the high claims of duty and obligation, he is rebuked by his enlightened reason and conscience. And herein is the very essence of his guilt,—that the enlightened intelligence, animated by a conviction of obligation, eloquently urges submission to Divine authority; he, in the abuse of his freedom, hardens his neck and refuses. Hence the bitter strife between good and evil which rends the soul. And if there were nothing left in man by his fall from God to sympathise with the holy and the good, no account could be given of this moral distraction. The Fall must not be made to dehumanise man. Pascal intimates that man in his fallen condition is "a discrowned monarch." Robbed of the moral image of God, the natural image is not wholly lost. In becoming a sinner Adam ceased not to be a man. And hence his intrinsic worth, justifying the wondrous means of his redemption. And by unduly depressing and depreciating man, even in his moral prostration, we strike

at the root of his restoration by Christ. Nor is it by indulging in exaggerated views of the degeneracy of human nature that we obtain a correct impression of man's real degradation. Such an impression is obtained only when, with exalted conceptions of the nature, we dwell on the voluntary surrender of that nature to sin. We discover then, even in fallen man, that on which the hand of mercy may seize in the work of restoration to God. Luthardt, speaking of the conscience, says, "This is the point at which God begins the work of deliverance in man; but here, too, is that place of inward torture which can become a hell." It is ever thus, "the same fountain may send forth both bitter waters and sweet." The privilege abused becomes a curse. The feature in our moral nature which makes our restoration to God a possibility, also renders it possible we should be lost to God.

Dr. Payne, as we have seen, reproduces Jonathan Edwards' view of depravity, as the predominance of the lower principles of our nature, resulting from the forfeiture of the Holy Spirit—which differs not from Richard Watson's "deprivation," leading, by necessary consequence, to "depravation;" and is John Howe's "living temple" falling into moral disrepair and desolation on the departure of the Holy One. And all in substantial agreement with the dogma of the schoolmen—"In Adam the person corrupted the nature. In us the nature corrupts the person."

Finney's explanation of our depravity is but a reproduction of Knapp's views, and is to the effect that in the earliest years of human existence the intelligence is necessarily dormant while the sensibility is growing and developing; so that when man comes to take possession of himself in the exercise of his reason and conscience the sensibility is already master of the situation, and sways an ascendant power over the soul. And in this abnormal development of the sensibility in relation to the intelligence consists the natural depravity of man. Man is thus led at the commencement of his responsible being to commit himself to a wrong, a selfish end of life: so that his first step is false. This, though not necessarily, is nevertheless uniformly the case; and every one between the beginning of his responsible age and his conversion to God "walks after the flesh," under the dominion of the sensibility in opposition to the intelligence. The natural depravity thus issues in moral depravity or sin. Under the influence of depraved sensibility the will settles

into an habitual, carnal, selfish state, "fittingly described," remarks Finney, "as indwelling sin."

According to Finney, the sensibility in the unrenewed acquires frightful relative proportions leading to an utter depravity of character. Moreover, very much of the depravity of the nature is maintained to be, owing to the effect of sin upon the body especially, upon the nervous system, and is transmitted by way of natural generation. Finney intimates that such is the effect of sin upon the race that no example of a sound mind in a sound body is to be met with in the whole range of mankind. The relation of this state of things to Adam's sin is, as already stated, according to Knapp and Finney, said to be unrevealed. That there is such a relation is admitted, but what it is there is no attempt to explain. We are barely able, however, to see that this foregoing account of human depravity requires to have any connection with Adam's sin assigned to it; as the explanation may be in its essential point maintained without any reference to the first offence. But the important feature in Finney's teaching on this subject is the distinction already hinted at which he makes between *physical* and *moral* depravity. Assuming the position that nothing "back of the will" is to be called moral, he denies the moral character of anything purely natural and involuntary. The nature, therefore, cannot be said to be sinful. On Finney's principles, sin is a voluntary act—the wrong choice of a voluntary agent—and can be predicated of no kind of substance whether of mind or body. The depravity we naturally inherit, or which in any way characterises our bodily or mental constitution, is physical, and becomes moral only when its impulses and tendencies are obeyed. The natural depravity, until it be taken up by the will—embraced by the heart—is more correctly described as temptation than sin. Accordingly, it is so described by Finney, and natural depravity is said to be a source of "fierce temptation"—"leading," as we have seen, uniformly but not necessarily to sin. In harmony, as he holds with St. James's teaching, "Lust when it hath conceived bringeth forth sin, and sin when it is finished bringeth forth death." Lust becomes "sin" only when the will is surrendered to its tendency. Then it brings forth sin, its deadly offspring. The physical thus becomes moral depravity—temptation issues in sin, whose consummation is death. Much stress is consequently laid by Finney on St. John's definition, "Sin is the trans-

gression of the law"—lawlessness a voluntary practical disregard of the law of love which enjoins upon every moral being the consecration of himself to the interests of universal being. It is not uninteresting to observe the agreement between this view of Finney and that of the Council of Trent. "This concupiscence," say the Council, "which the Apostle sometimes denominates sin, the holy synod declares the Catholic Church never understood to be called sin, because it is really and truly sin in the regenerate, but as it is from sin, and inclines to sin." In denying the sinfulness of the nature, Finney sets himself in opposition to Protestant standards of doctrine generally; and therefore has been deemed heretical on this point.

The distinction between natural and moral ability, as having been mixed up with the question of sin, claims some notice. In falling from God, man was not reduced to the condition of a "necessary agent." By the disobedient act he fell under the dominion of supreme selfishness, but he retained his freedom. This is man's inalienable heritage, which, though he may merge in moral servitude, nevertheless clings to the very foundations of his being. Thus, on the theory of natural ability, man is able to obey God, but lacks the disposition. In fact, *moral* inability is nothing else than this "want of disposition." Man has all the faculties requisite to obedience. He needs no additional attribute of nature; but while the attitude of the heart is supremely selfish, he is resisting and disobedient. Natural ability to fulfil a duty thus becomes tautological, if not an absurdity and a contradiction in itself; for the obvious reason that our ability and obligation must be conterminous. What exceeds our ability is beyond the sphere of duty. Dr. Payne, in accordance with his view that none of the faculties are in themselves evil, remarks, "Our dependence is upon the Holy Spirit for disposition rather than power." The Spirit's influence is, however, an acknowledged *sine quâ non* in regard to the disposition to return to God.

The question of ability is vitally related to that of freedom. If the former be denied, the latter cannot be maintained. Whatever infringes upon ability, touches freedom in the same degree. And how are both to be held in the face of universal depravity? Adopt what theory of human depravity you will, modify your statements as you please, still you have on your hands the fact of what must be admitted to be, through some peculiarity of nature, the deflection of the whole race

from the right way, and the true aim of life. "We have turned every one to his own way." And this fact has to be reconciled with the responsible freedom of every one, and with the unfeigned condemnation of every sin, even to the very first act of deliberate wrong-doing. For if any one act of sin may be justified, so then may every other. We have thus reached, what appears to us, the most difficult problem within the domain of theological science, and one which has driven Müller, and some others, to find a solution in an "extra-temporal" or pre-existent state of probation. We enter upon life enthralled with a predisposition to evil, while we are, nevertheless, the subjects of self-blame and of conscious guilt. There is thus an apparent necessity to do evil with the self-accusation which supposes freedom. The logical conclusion with Müller, therefore, is that we have sinned before our birth in time; we underwent a *bona fide* probation, and, falling under that trial, are in our present depravity suffering the consequence of that defection. But few, however, have been found willing to embrace so extravagant a notion; still the problem craves some solution at our hands. It would be difficult to find one adequate to the whole necessity of the case. The only one we have to offer is neither novel nor recondite, and is founded upon the fact of the universal grace of the Holy Spirit, admitted by all who allow universal atonement; admitted, moreover, to be contemporaneous with the entrance of man upon a moral and accountable state. And here, upon the very threshold of responsible life, when planting his first step upon that solemn territory where an everlasting destiny has to be achieved, God meets man with unsought light and grace sufficient, if embraced and obeyed, to preserve him from the rebellion of self-will, and the error of fatal choice. We admit, with Finney, that there is a uniform departure of men from a holy aim of life; but, with him, we maintain also that there is no necessity for such a deflection. The idea of necessity must be carefully excluded from the case, for once admitted, the reality of sin is thereby depied. The question as to whether any may be supposed to yield to "prevenient grace" at the moment of emergence into responsible being, is one we can neither affirm nor deny. Nor would the affirmation or denial lead to any material modification of our foregoing statements and reasoning, for the broad fact of universal defection still remains.

Many topics lying within the range of the subject of this article must, for want of space, be altogether omitted, whilst

to others we shall be able to direct but a too scanty attention. Amongst the latter is the impossibility of self-redemption. The sinfulness of man is a fact which renders him wholly dependent upon means beyond himself for his redemption. For while his "own wickedness" in its injurious effects is fitted to "correct" him, and his backslidings to "reprove" him, sin, as "that which ought not to be," excludes every element of self-redemption from the case—whether viewed objectively in its relation to transgressed law, or subjectively in relation to personal depravity. The insulted authority of the law demands an expiatory compensation far beyond the culprit's ability to furnish; and the estrangement of heart from God, "the shy distrust" consequent upon the consciousness of guilt, together with the hereditary bias to evil which marks unregenerate man, places self-redemption beyond all claim to consideration. And no truth is more manifest than that our salvation, both in its objective and subjective aspect, is of the Lord. "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." Nor is it impossible to regard this subject as connecting itself with the condition of humanity beyond this life. For as our Lord's words, "If ye believe not that I am He, ye shall die in your sins," and kindred texts suggests that at death the reign of mediatorial mercy terminates, then the "wicked, driven away in his wickedness," becomes evermore its hopeless captive, held in the bonds of his own sin beyond all power of release. There is a superficial and unphilosophical way of dealing with the eternity of evil, on the ground of sentiment rather than intelligence. It is obvious, however, that questions affecting the moral government of God, or indeed any government of moral agents, is not to be settled by an appeal to the sensibility, but to the reason and conscience. Government is not the offspring of the sensibility, which is ever impatient of the restraints and sanctions of moral law, but of the intelligence, whence law derives its existence. And it is at the stern dictate of the intelligence we maintain—(1) That so long as the moral constitution of the universe is upheld, must there be the possibility of evil; and (2) so long as there shall be infinite intelligence united to infinite benevolence in the character of the Supreme Governor to administer law over creatures gifted with freedom, where there is sin must there be misery along with it. Nor let this view be thought to thwart the Divine glory and blessedness. For such a con-

struction of the case there is no warrantable foundation. The glory and blessedness of God have coexisted with sin, and its attendant misery, for untold ages, and therefore may continue to do so for evermore.

May it not, however, be supposed that in the deteriorating and destructive effect of sin itself upon the soul we find the means by which it shall eventually escape its doom, by the simple ruin of its very existence? Notions of this kind, we suspect, are owing to an unconscious descent from a spiritual to a material sphere of thought. Nothing is more easy and natural than such a perversion and error, as every word we employ is necessarily stamped with a material idea. False analogies, however, of this kind must be discarded when a question of this nature is under scientific treatment. Simple and direct apprehensions of what, for want of a better term, we must call the substance of the soul, perhaps are beyond our present ability. Hence our speech on such a subject becomes negative, defining not so much what the soul is as what it is not. When, however, we say of the soul that it is *immaterial*, we are warned against the error of reasoning on grounds of strict analogy from the body to the soul. To avoid such an error entirely, however, is scarcely possible—at any rate, not without effort and care. Evil always presents itself to us along with some material image, some substance coming within the range of our senses, which it necessarily deteriorates and goes to destroy. When, therefore, we figure to ourselves evil as a characteristic of a spiritual being, we become the unwitting victims of the delusion which makes a moral evil to be of the very substance of the soul. We are reminded by Dr. Pope that “whatever sin is, it is the accident of a nature not in itself changed.” “Accident” is here used in its metaphysical sense as something “come to” or “added to” the nature which it characterises, but not an essential element of that nature. Physical disease, in the very consummation of its deteriorating power, is provided with the means of delivering from suffering, by the extinction of life and feeling. But, then, physical disease is of the fibre and substance of the body; and as moral evil is not, and cannot be, so far as we are able to see, of the substance of the soul, all analogical reasoning is thereby estopped. The ravages of moral evil are not related to the soul’s substance, but to its principles, motives, aims, spirit and temper; these it utterly corrupts and desolates, while it leaves the substance of the spiritual being untouched.

It might, however, be thought that, though there is nothing in the natural action of moral evil to extinguish the soul's existence, there may be such a tendency in the penalty of sin, on the supposition that the penalty of sin is something apart from the natural effect of sin upon the soul. Our reply is, that we dare not say that "the only wise God" could not establish such a relation between the soul's penalty and its very being, so that the one should operate to destroy the other, and when the proof of this is produced, we shall be prepared to consider it on its merits. Our conclusion of the matter, for the present, is that neither in the natural operation of evil, nor in any form of penalty attaching to it, is there aught which goes necessarily to obliterate the existence of the human soul.

When, however, we come to speak of future retribution as marked with different degrees of penalty, we feel ourselves to be on firmer ground: ground which we may pronounce to be doubly sure, as Revealed Truth asserts not only a variety in the amount of woe which will befall the lost in another world, but, moreover, ascribes to sin in this world different degrees of guilt and heinousness corresponding to the future calamity. Thus, while in "the world to come" we have "the greater condemnation," "the sorer punishment," the less "tolerable doom," we have also in the present life "the secret fault," "the presumptuous sin," "the great transgression," the "all manner of sin and blasphemy" which comes within the reach of forgiving mercy, with the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost which hath never forgiveness, on account either of the objective turpitude of the crime, or of the disastrous subjective effect it produces on the heart, as we may feel inclined to regard it. And while an Apostle declares that "the blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanseth us from all sin," he nevertheless says, "There is a sin unto death: I do not say that he shall pray for it." It is therefore clear that while all sin "is exceeding sinful," it admits of a gradation of guilt and ill desert.

Müller remarks that while sins of a more sensual form have associated with them a larger amount of shame and humiliation, evil exists in an intenser and profounder form in the "spiritual wickedness" of pride, arrogance, and a direct hatred of God and of His authority. For while in the former class of sins man approaches the animal, in the latter he resembles the originator of all evil.

We are warned, however, that we have reached the limit



of our article. When the supreme and far-reaching moment of the question of evil is reflected upon, together with its central and vital relation to all moral and theological truth, no wonder will be felt that so much, at various periods, has been written on it, and that the greatest intellects have been attracted to its discussion. Moreover, when the manifold perplexities and mysteries of the subject are apprehended the wide variance of opinion entertained upon it can excite no astonishment. Sin when viewed on the one hand in the possibility of its universal spread, like a moral gangrene, involving all in its ruin ("the *fruit* of evil-doing")—or on the other in the surpassing expensiveness of the means employed to withstand and suppress its ravages, must be deemed an evil whose magnitude is beyond human comprehension. And in the light of those astounding means to which Almighty love and wisdom have had recourse to preserve the universe from the desolations of sin, will the character of God appear in its richest glory. "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out!"

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ART. V.—*Selection from the Correspondence of the late Macvey Napier, Esq.* Edited by his Son, MACVEY NAPIER. London: Macmillan and Co. 1879.

HERE are some four or five hundred letters written to the Editor of the *Edinburgh Review* by its leading contributors during one of the most eventful periods of modern times 1829-1846. The interest of this correspondence is far more varied than might be supposed to attach to communications ordinarily passing between an editor and his staff. These, we apprehend, are as a rule prosaic enough. Suggestions of topics and outlines of articles to be written on them, deliveries of copy or apologies for its non-appearance, deprecations of criticism, and, in return, the compliments which such modesty tends to call forth, notifications of the success of this or that production or of the reasons which delayed its appearance, these, together with brief observations on the health of the parties, the state of the weather, and the course of public affairs, would, we presume, sum the contents of the post-bags of our literary hacks. But it is otherwise when the portfolio of so responsible a personage as the manager-in-chief of a great political organ is open to inspection, and the confidential correspondence of such men as Brougham, Jeffrey, Macaulay, Carlyle, and a dozen more, is exposed to view. The generation for which they catered has departed, but a still more inquisitive one has arisen in its stead. The word inquisitive suggests our chief objection—and it is not a slight one—to a book of this kind. An indiscriminate publication of all the petty jealousies and foibles which such a correspondence generally reveals seems but a poor tribute to be paid by the living representatives of an editor to the abilities and excellences that gave importance to his office. A certain measure of rough justice may perhaps be dealt out by this means to men whose business it has been to sit in judgment on the performances of other people. Out of their own mouths they are convicted of being “men of like passions” with those whom they had summoned to a self-constituted tribunal, and lynched or let go according to their pleasure. At all events, this book adds an exceedingly interesting chapter to the history of one section of modern literature; and the general effect is not to diminish in our

eyes the mental stature of those who figure in it, nor very largely to modify existing impressions concerning them. If anything, it will serve to deepen those impressions. As we read, we seem to be present at an editorial council whose sessions never break up, with the advantage that each man's sentiments are expressed at full length, and not as condensed in the minutes of a secretary, and are poured forth with a freedom and familiarity, both with regard to his own productions and those of his fellows, which no actual council-chamber could admit. The result is a series of life-like self-delineations beyond the art of any biographer to rival.

Before introducing our readers to some specimens of this unconscious self-portraiture, we must refer to the perhaps not quite unconscious collector of them. Not quite unconscious, we say, for it is obvious that the editor of such a journal—sitting, so to speak, at the centre of the whirlpool which his issues were constantly creating in the political ocean—must have been fully aware of the high places his collaborateurs were destined to attain in the national literature. Hence his careful preservation of these their most fugitive effusions. His son after him has preserved them with equal care, and now after the lapse of forty years, during which all the most notable contributors (except Thomas Carlyle) have passed away, at the instance of many friends on both sides of the Atlantic they are given to the world.

The son's references to the father are few, and intended merely to point out the successive steps which led to his appointment as editor. Born in 1776, and educated at the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh, Macvey Napier became, in 1799, "a member of the Society of Writers to the Signet." In 1805 he was appointed their librarian. In the same year he wrote his first article for the *Edinburgh Review*, then in the third year of its existence, receiving as remuneration from the editor Jeffrey the "booksellers' allowance" of five pounds. Among his first communications from Jeffrey was a letter of recommendation to "Mr. Brougham," with whom he was afterwards to enter into such close relations. The letter sufficiently indicates that even at this early period Brougham had proved himself a somewhat intractable yoke-fellow, for Napier is charged not to reveal to him his occasional connection with the *Review*. In 1811, a review of Stewart's *Philosophical Essays* for the *Quarterly*—then just two years old—brought Napier hearty encomiums both from Gifford the editor and Stewart the subject. Three

years later we find him engaged on the Supplement to a new edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and in 1816 appointed Lecturer on Conveyancing to the writers to the signet. In 1820 he was proposed by Dugald Stewart as a candidate for the chair of Moral Philosophy, vacant through the death of Dr. Thomas Brown, but, being a Whig, he declined to compete. His connection with Constable ceased on the completion of the Supplement to the *Encyclopaedia* in 1824, but a new edition of the whole work being projected shortly afterwards, Napier was chosen to conduct this important undertaking. The year 1829 terminated Jeffrey's brilliant reign of six-and-twenty years as chief of the *Edinburgh Review*, and saw Macvey Napier on his recommendation installed in his stead. In a preface to his collated reviews, published in 1844, Jeffrey thus refers to this event. "I wrote the first article in the first number of the *Review* in October, 1802, and sent my last contribution in October, 1840. I was sole editor from 1803 till late in 1829. In that last year, I received the great honour of being elected, by my brethren of the Bar, to the office of Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, when it immediately occurred to me that it was not quite fitting that the official head of a great Law Corporation should continue to be the conductor of what might be fairly enough represented as a Party Journal, and I consequently at once and altogether withdrew from the management, which has ever since been in such hands, as can have left those who take an interest in its success no cause to regret my retirement." The following racy epistle, written during his journey South that summer, shows in what high glee Jeffrey threw up the editorial reins. It refers to the backward state of preparation of the July number, and would almost seem to imply that he had left his successor sadly in the lurch.

"I have just come in, and find your letter. Alas for our sins and miseries! You may depend upon Empson, for he has my orders as well as yours, and dares not fail now in the very heat of the battle. I do not understand what is come over Brougham. I have heard nothing of him, and my last act in leaving Scotland was to urge him to despatch. In his extremity I am sorry you did not apply to our ancient friend Colonel Browne, who, I rather think, has an article about finished, on the Affinities of Greek and Sanscrit. It irks me to give you so much trouble, but it will be a stormy entry on a smooth voyage, *et olim meminisse*. You must give out everywhere that my health absolutely required my retreat

from the severe duties of the editorship—nay, that I was bent upon dying at my post, and would infallibly have perished at midnight over a proof-sheet, had not my friends forcibly pushed me into a post-chaise, and sent me off screaming violently for the printer, one of the most generous taking the whole responsibility of this perilous desertion on himself. This at least must be the outline of your fable, but I trust for the details, and even colouring, to yourself. With great gratitude and commiseration."

And so he makes his bow, betaking himself with great gusto to the "fresh fields and pastures new" of the sunny South, while his poor substitute is vainly raising the hue and cry among dilatory contributors for articles wherewith to make his own first bow to the public.

A new editor would naturally endeavour not only to assure himself of the continued interest of old contributors, but also to obtain the assistance of fresh ones. It is curious that the list of correspondents is headed by the name of Dr. Chalmers, who had the year before been transferred from the Chair of Moral Philosophy at St. Andrew's to that of Divinity at Edinburgh. His first communication is, however, unfortunately his last. One mental characteristic is adverted to in it which was in him a conspicuous feature, and would of itself have caused his contributions to the *Review*—if they had been forthcoming—to stand in strong contrast with the versatility of some others. So Barrow, another mathematical divine, speaks of his "imperfection, not to be able to draw his thoughts easily from one thing to another."

"*July 25, 1829.* My dear Sir,—It gives me very sincere regret that I cannot comply with a proposal, the honour and kindness of which I am alive to. I feel the utmost pain in turning from one kind of severe labour to another, and this infirmity, I fear, has been growing upon me of late. At present, I am wholly engrossed with my preparations for the Chair, and do most honestly assure you that I have no remaining time or strength for anything else. I can truly say that there is no individual connected with the periodical literature of our land whom I would have more readily obliged, had it been possible. You now occupy the highest station in this literature, and may you be the instrument of extensive and abiding usefulness."

The next letter the new editor receives is the first of more than one hundred and twenty from a contributor who did more than any other man to sustain the character of the *Edinburgh Review* and, we may add, to mould the taste of the British nation, Thomas Babington Macaulay. It has

reference to the last of his three essays on James Mill's *Utilitarianism*. These essays were not inserted by the author in the collection published in 1843, not because he was disposed to retract the doctrines they contained, but because they did not do justice to the character and abilities of his antagonist. The letter shows us Macaulay in all the heat and glow of the early conflict.

"London, October 8, 1829. Dear Sir,—The *Westminster Review* has put forth another attack on us, and both Empson and I think that, as the controversy has certainly attracted much notice in London, and as this new article of the Benthamites is more absurd than anything they have yet published, one more paper ought to appear on our side. I hope and trust that this will be the last blow."

It may have been the last blow given: it was certainly not the last needed. But Macaulay's genius did not lie in the direction of abstract ethics.

As Mill had been one of Napier's coadjutors in the seventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, it must have been hard for him to edit papers which held his friends' opinions up to ridicule. To M'Culloch, who served in both departments and who sympathised with the Utilitarians, he apologises "for inserting another blow" at them, and speaks of having "softened its severity."

Jeffrey behaved much more handsomely than might have been expected from the unceremonious manner in which he quitted his post. He confessed that he "ought not to have run away before the end of the battle like a schoolboy on the eve of vacation, or Lord Hermand the last day of a session," and offered a peace-offering, in the shape of two articles, which appeared in the number for January, 1830, one on the Lady Fanshawe and the other on Felicia Hemans. Another letter from Jeffrey about this time contains his opinion on the first number for which Napier alone was responsible. It is otherwise remarkable for his critique on Sir William Hamilton's first contribution to the *Review*. It shows how even the trained eye of such a critic as Jeffrey might fail to discern the marks of superior genius. Indeed, one of his weak points seems to have been that, even in his own department of *belles lettres*, he was unmerciful if not unjust to new candidates for fame. How much more likely was he to be at fault in attempting to gauge the intellectual proportions of a philosopher like Hamilton. Hamilton was far

from being unknown to him. They were both members of the Scottish Bar, and Jeffrey had lent him his support in his unsuccessful candidature for the Edinburgh Chair of Moral Philosophy in 1820. But the two do not seem to have been intimate, and of course the authorship of the article on Cousin was as yet a secret known to Napier alone. The latter had, it appears, great difficulty in persuading Sir William to write: it was only by representing the difficulties of his new position and the importance of giving philosophy a more prominent place in the *Review* than it had yet occupied, that he succeeded in overcoming Hamilton's disinclination to literary effort. Had he not succeeded, one of our deepest thinkers and the founder of an important school of philosophy might never have emerged from the obscurity in which from youth to middle age he was contented to remain. Jeffrey's letter is as follows:

"November 23, 1829. My dear N.,—I have run hastily over the No. [October, 1829], and say privately to you that I think it does you great credit, and is clearly above the average of late numbers. Macaulay [*'Utilitarian Theory of Government'*] I think admirable. The beginning is too merely controversial, and as it were personal, but after he enters on the matter, he is excellent. It is out of sight the cleverest and most striking thing in the number. Your American reviewer [Hazlitt, article on Dr. Channing] is not a first-rate man—a clever writer enough, but not deep or judicious, or even very fair. I have no notion who he is. If he is young [Hazlitt was now fifty-one, only five years younger than Jeffrey himself] he may come to good, but he should be trained to a more modest opinion of himself, and to take a little more pains, and go more patiently and thoroughly into his subject. Cousin [by Sir William Hamilton] I pronounce, beyond all doubt, the most unreadable thing that ever appeared in the *Review*. The only chance is, that gentle readers may take it to be very profound, and conclude that the fault is in their want of understanding. But I am not disposed to agree with them. It is ten times more *mystical* than anything my friend Carlyle ever wrote, and not half so agreeably written. It is nothing to the purpose that he does not agree with the worst part of the mysticism, for he affects to understand it, and to explain it, and to think it very ingenious and respectable, and it is mere gibberish. He may possibly be a clever man. There are even some indications of that in his paper, but he is not a *very* clever man, nor of much power; and beyond all question he is not a good writer on such subjects. If you ever admit such a disquisition again, order your operator to instance and illustrate all his propositions by cases or examples, and to reason and explain with reference to these. This is a sure test of sheer nonsense, and

moreover an infinite resource for the explication of obscure truth, if there be any such thing. The Chemistry is more shallow than I expected, and omits in a great measure the great topics of Heat and Galvanism. But it is clear, direct, and, for its compass, very concise. I like Brougham's. They are not brilliant, but they are strong, straightforward, and, to my taste, not tiresome, even the Useful Knowledge. Now, there is my word on the whole thing, and I have only to add *Imprimatur* and *maie virtute*. Ever yours."

It was doubtless some comfort to the new editor to have his first issue stamped with the *imprimatur* of the old one. But we cannot help thinking he must have preferred his own standard to the one he had displaced, and to which this letter so patronisingly invites him to conform. In matters of taste Jeffrey was undoubtedly strong: of philosophy he had not the slightest tincture. The clever was evidently with him the highest style of writing. The first three articles are judged by this canon, and have assigned to them three degrees of comparison. Macaulay is marked "cleverest," Hazlitt "clever enough," Hamilton "possibly, but not very clever." Brougham is let off with a dubious verdict, and while condemned as "not brilliant" is excused as "not tiresome." Everything is sacrificed to mere readableness, a quality important enough in the lighter forms of literature, but by no means worthy to rank as the dominant idea of the *Edinburgh Review*. The critic utters his own strongest condemnation when he pronounces Cousin's philosophy "gibberish." If that were so, the article on Cousin was something worse than "mystical," and the writer of it could not have been even "possibly clever." Had Jeffrey lived to our own day, he would have seen not only quarterlies but monthlies well sustained by the public, which are considered lacking in stamina if they do not contain one or more pieces of the "unreadable" sort. Metaphysics has in fact become quite a popular study: its fundamental connection with every question both of natural and moral science is acknowledged. But it must be said in justice to Jeffrey that he only shared an ignorance at that time common to the whole literary world. When in 1836 Hamilton became a candidate for the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University, his supposed obscurity of style was made an objection. The philosopher whom he had criticised bore testimony that he had "not even the slightest appearance of obscurity." And Sir William himself met the allegation in the following



characteristic manner. "There are, I may be allowed to say, two kinds of obscurity; one the fault of the writer—the other, of the reader. If the reader, from want of preparation, be not competent to a subject, that subject, though treated as lucidly as is possible, will to him be dark or unintelligible. This is the case of the two articles in question. The first, that on the 'Philosophy of the Absolute,' in relation to M. Cousin's 'Cours de Philosophie,' is on the subject of all others the most difficult and abstruse—a subject which, whilst it forms the cardinal point of the recent Continental philosophy, was one with which no British metaphysician had yet ventured to grapple; and to the discussion of which, accordingly, even the philosophical language of this country is wholly inadequate. . . . A journal like the *Edinburgh Review* is not the place for elementary expatiation. Its philosophical articles are addressed not to learners but to adepts." Jeffrey—now Lord Jeffrey—and Macvey Napier were among those who aided in securing Sir William's election.

The same number of the *Review* called forth some observations from Macaulay in reference, not to the articles of others, but to the editorial supervision of his own. It is not to the editorial prerogative itself that he offers objection, but simply to the manner of its exercise. "The passages omitted were the most pointed and ornamental sentences in the *Review*. Now for high and grave works—a history, for example, or a system of political or moral philosophy—Dr. Johnson's rule, that every sentence which the writer thinks fine ought to be struck out, is excellent. But periodical works like ours, which, unless they strike at the first reading, are not likely to strike at all, whose life is a month or two, may, I think, be allowed to be sometimes even viciously florid. Probably in estimating the real value of any tinsel which I may put upon my articles, you and I should not materially differ. But it is not by his own taste, but by the taste of the fish, that the angler is determined in his choice of bait." However the editor and the contributor may have agreed as to the value of tinsel, we cannot but think that the former had the advantage over the latter in his judgment as to its place in his pages. The piscatory argument is worth very little, and is altogether unworthy of Macaulay. Fishing is, we presume, pursued for the good of the fisher, not at all for the good of the fish. To adopt this maxim of his in literature would be to justify far worse abominations than floridness of style. Had Macaulay foreseen the lasting

popularity his essays were destined to attain, he would himself, no doubt, have pruned their luxuriance with even greater severity than that of which he complains. In his preface to the whole collection he speaks of them as "overloaded with gaudy and ungraceful ornament," and declares himself "so sensible of their defects that he has repeatedly refused to let them appear in a form which might seem to indicate that he thought them worthy of a permanent place in English literature."

If Macaulay's solicitude for the purity of the public taste is not very strongly marked in these references to his own study of it, it comes out conspicuously enough in a letter of the same period, in which he proposes one of his most famous articles. "I have been thinking of a subject," he writes, March 22, 1830, "light and trifling enough, but perhaps not the worse for our purpose on that account. We seldom want a sufficient quantity of heavy matter. There is a wretched poetaster, of the name of Robert Montgomery, who has written some volumes of detestable verses on religious subjects, which, by mere puffing in magazines and newspapers, have had an immense sale, and some of which are now in their tenth or twelfth editions. I have for some time past thought that the trick of puffing, as it is now practised both by authors and publishers, is likely to degrade the literary character, and to deprave the public taste in a frightful degree. I really think we ought to try what effect satire will have upon this nuisance, and I doubt whether we can ever find a better opportunity."

By our placing these quotations in juxtaposition we must not be misunderstood to mean that the redundancy of Macaulay's style is a fault to be compared for one moment with the outrages on common sense which disfigure the pages of his victim. The sentences in his own writings which Macaulay pronounces "gaudy and ungraceful," are of classical purity in comparison with any that are quoted by him, or that could be quoted by anybody, from this now deservedly forgotten poet. There is a sense in which it is quite true that the taste of the reader must be consulted as well as that of the writer, and Macaulay would not have done so much to raise the standard of English composition, if he had not condescended a little to the appetite he sought to refine. And he did the public a great service when, in this scathing article, he opened its eyes to the real character of the trash it had been content to swallow. Yet he fails to explain

Robert Montgomery's temporary success. He admits that puffing can never "raise any scribbler to the rank of a classic," and that "some of the well-puffed fashionable novels of 1829 hold the pastry of 1830." And we do not think the power of unlimited puffing is proved by saying that "the author and the publisher are interested in crying up the book, and nobody has any very strong interest in crying it down." Mere advertisement could not carry a book through twelve editions. There must have been some points of affinity between the poet and the public for the latter to have endured him at all. There were, we think, three such points in the present case. His verse was smooth; his imagination, or rather his language, was wild; his theme was religious. There was at that time a circle of readers whom the great awakening of the previous half-century had deeply imbued with the religious sentiment, but whose literary culture had not kept pace with their spiritual enlightenment. Whatever sympathies with poetry they possessed had been fed on Young and Cowper, in whom, notwithstanding the occasional tameness of the one and turgidity of the other, we must acknowledge real poetic worth. With the present century came Kirke White and James Montgomery, the last of these falsifying by his long popularity the evil omens of this same *Edinburgh Review*. Then came Pollok, with his weird description of the fortunes of the race, aiming to be a second Milton. These had ministered to the intellectual taste of the religious world without very greatly purifying it. And when close on the heels of Pollok followed Robert Montgomery, treating the same class of subjects in a still more daring manner, and combining, as it seemed, the smoothness of Pope with the splendour of Byron, the vulgar enthusiasm knew no bounds. Criticism for the time was forgotten, and it required the sarcasm of Macaulay to demolish claims which, without religious fervour to back them, could never have been put forward at all. The reaction was complete. In Keble's *Christian Year* the public was already provided with a purer model, and in due time Tennyson's *In Memoriam* completed a revolution in poetry on its moral side, which, in its more general aspects, had been long fostered by Wordsworth and Coleridge. The soberer tone of feeling has communicated itself also to religious literature generally, without detriment, as far as we can see, to its practical earnestness; and sensationalism is left, for the most part, to the fleshly and godless school to which,

if to any, it naturally belongs—a school whose existence is one of the disgraces of modern society.

One more quotation on the advertising business we must leave our readers to interpret. They must not view it too seriously: it goes to establish a proposition we laid down at the outside, one which many forget though few would deny, viz., that critics are but men. "We have had quite enough," says Macaulay, "of puffing and flattering each other in the *Edinburgh Review*. It is in vile taste for men united in one literary undertaking to exchange these favours." So even the *Edinburgh Review* could upon occasion play the part of a Mutual Admiration Society, and use its great influence for the purposes of puffing, with this advantage over other adepts in the art, that its anonymous character concealed the relation of puffers and puffed. Surely it was time for some of the virtuous indignation poured on other transgressors to return in the form of repentance into the bosoms of those who gave it birth. One thing we are sure of, that—whatever may be said of his predecessor—Napier's hatred of such tricks was as sincere as that of his clever correspondent. Every letter of his bears the stamp of an honest soul. There was another person more deeply implicated in the puffing business than either of them.

Brougham's connection with the *Review* is most amusingly illustrated throughout the course of this correspondence. Brougham claimed a right to put in and put out what he pleased, grounding his claim on his early and constant services. There is not a doubt that his contributions were literally voluminous. He stated that he had written a fifth of the whole. As a sample, his articles for October, 1829, were four in number. Those for October, 1830, were as many. But as to the date at which he joined the "literary Fronde," as it has been called, he and Jeffrey are in direct collision. He says in his Autobiography that he contributed several articles to the first number. Jeffrey says, "he did not come in till after the third number, and our assured success." One outbreak of imperiousness occurs in a letter dated September 8, 1830, in which he promises an article on the second French Revolution. It is as follows:

"MY DEAR PROFESSOR,—I have no objection to do J. Allen, and send it you on Monday, if my brother brings it with him from Edinburgh. But I must beg, and indeed, make a point of giving you my thoughts on the Revolution, and, therefore, pray send off your countermand to Macaulay. The reason is this: all our move-

ments next Session turn on that pivot, and I can trust no one but myself with it, either in or out of Parliament. Jeffrey always used to arrange it so upon delicate questions, and the reason is obvious. Were it possible (which it plainly is not) to disconnect me and the party from the *E. R.*, I should care little how such questions might be treated there; but as it is, I and the party I lead are really committed. I have already begun my article, and it is of great importance that it should stand at the head. I have direct and constant communication with the leaders of the Revolution, having been their first ally in England in and out of Parliament, where I predicted the event 80th June last in plain terms."

To exclude politics from a political journal at such a crisis would, of course, have been suicide, but why Brougham alone must indite the politics does not so easily appear. His "I and the party I lead" was perhaps a more appropriate collocation of terms than Wolsey's "*Ego et rex meus.*" But why could not the captain of the Reform regiment be content to let another blow the bugle, particularly when that other was Macaulay? If Brougham was a wire-puller behind the scenes, Macaulay, then at Paris, was a spectator in front of them. If the one was followed as a political leader, the other was trusted as a political thinker. His article on Hallam had accomplished that. But the battle in this instance was to the strong. Macaulay's lucubrations, already prepared for the *Review*, found their way into Lardner's *Cabinet Cyclopaedia*. And though he did not secede from the *Review*, nor threaten it with such a disaster, he was hugely mortified and affronted, not with Napier but with Brougham, for what he calls his "unjustifiable dictation."

A letter from our old Chelsea sage, now in his eighty-fifth year, is characteristic enough. It reveals something both of his strength and his weakness. He despised Byron's pretensions to greatness: Napoleon's quite carried him away. Noteworthy also are his remarks on "literary conscience."

"*Craigenputloch, Dumfries, November 28, 1880. My dear Sir,*—I am much obliged by your favourable reception of the proposition touching my brother, and no less so by your wish that I should write something for you in the *Edinburgh Review*. I have already written in that *Review*, and should be very happy to write in it again; as indeed there can be no more respectable vehicle for any British man's speculations than it is and has always been. My respected friend your predecessor had some difficulty with me in adjusting the respective prerogatives of author and editor, for though not, as I hope, insensible to fair reason, I used sometimes to rebel against what I reckoned mere authority, and this partly

perhaps as a matter of literary conscience; being wont to write nothing without studying it if possible to the bottom, and writing always with an almost painful feeling of scrupulosity, that light editorial hacking and hewing to right and left was in general nowise to my mind.

"In what degree the like difficulties might occur between you and me I cannot pretend to guess; however, if you are willing, then I also am willing to try. Occasionally of late I have been meditating an essay on Byron, which, on appearance of Mr. Moore's second volume, now soon expected, I should have no objection to attempt for you. Of Mr. Moore himself I should say little, or rather, perhaps, as he may be a favourite of yours, nothing; neither would my opinion of Byron prove very heterodox; my chief aim would be to *see* him and show him, not, as is too often the way (if I could help it), to write merely about him and about him. For the rest, though no Whig in the strict sense, I have no disposition to run amuck against any set of men or of opinions; but only to put forth certain truths that I feel in me, with all sincerity, for some of which this Byron, if you liked it, were a fit enough channel. Dilettantism and mere toying with truth is, on the whole, a thing which I cannot practise; nevertheless real love, real belief, is not inconsistent with tolerance of its opposite; nay, is the only thing consistent therewith—for your elegant *indifferents* is at heart only *idle*, selfish and quite intolerant. At all events, one can and should ever *speak quietly*; loud hysterical vehemence, foaming, and hissing, least of all beseems him that is convinced, and not only *supposes*, but *knows*.

"So much to cast some faint light for you on my plan of procedure, and what you have to look for in employing me. Let me only further request that if you, for whatever reason, do not like this proposal, you will without shadow of scruple tell me so. Frankness is best met by frankness; the practice presupposes the approval.

"I have been thinking sometimes, likewise, of a paper on Napoleon, a man whom, though handled to the extreme of triteness, it will be long years before we understand. Hitherto in the English tongue, there is next to nothing that betokens insight into him, or even sincere belief of such, on the part of the writer. I should like to study the man with what heartiness I could, and form to myself some intelligible picture of him, both as a biographical and as a historical figure, in both of which senses he is our chief contemporary wonder, and in some sort the epitome of his age. This, however, were a task of far more difficulty than Byron, and perhaps not so promising at present.

"Have the goodness to let me know by your first convenience what you think of this; not hesitating to say *Fiat* or *Ne fiat*; and believe me always faithfully yours,

"THOMAS CARLYLE."

With the lapse of time Carlyle's ideas about Napoleon appear to have become more sober as well as intelligible, if we may judge from the portrait he draws of him at the conclusion of his *Hero-Worship*. He makes but a sorry finish to a race that begins with demigods and culminates with Luther and John Knox. If still "our chief contemporary wonder," he is no longer regarded as "the epitome of his age." He is ranked far below Cromwell.

The proposed essay on "the grand Napoleon of the realms of rhyme," as Byron called himself, fell through. The subject had already, in fact, been dealt with by Macaulay. A little later Carlyle was again solicited by Napier to write a notice of the poet for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*; but, though he gives his consent, he seems to have had himself excused, the notice that actually appeared being attributed to T. H. Lister. The following shows how far he was from condoning Byron's moral obliquities on account of his mental powers:

"*Craigenputtoch, Dumfries, April 28, 1832.* My dear Sir,—If it can gratify any wish of yours, I shall very readily undertake that little piece on *Byron*; but it will be *tacente Minervâ*, without inward call; nor, indeed, am I sure that you have fixed on the right man for your object.

"In my mind Byron has been sinking at an accelerated rate, for the last ten years, and has now reached a very low level: I should say *too* low, were there not a *Hibernianism* involved in the expression. His fame has been very great, but I see not how it is to endure; neither does that make *him* great. No genuine productive thought was ever revealed by him to mankind; indeed, no clear undistorted vision into anything, or picture of anything; but all had a certain falsehood, a brawling, theatrical, insincere character. The man's moral nature, too, was bad; his demeanour, as a man, was bad. What was he, in short, but a huge, *sulky dandy*; of giant dimensions, to be sure, yet still a dandy; who sulked, as poor Mrs. Hunt expressed it, 'like a schoolboy that had got a plain bun given him instead of a plum one'? His bun was nevertheless God's universe, with what tasks are there; and it had served better men than he. I love him not; I owe him nothing; only pity and forgiveness; he taught me nothing that I had not again to forget. . . .

"You will find the literary world of London, and, indeed, all the worlds of it, in a very wonderful condition; too like what Ephraim Jenkinson described long ago: 'The world, my dear sir, is in its *dotage*.' Heaven send it a speedy recovery, or quiet death."

Equally striking is his sketch of Bentham. How we should like to have had from the author of *Hero-Worship* a full-length portrait of the great Utilitarian! The following is a bare outline, so far as we know, never filled up. "A far finer essay," he says, referring to another subject, "were a faithful, loving, and yet critical, and in part condemnatory, delineation of Jeremy Bentham, and his place and working in this section of the world's history. Bentham will not be put down by logic, and should not be put down, for we need him greatly as a backwoodsman; neither can reconciliation be effected till one party understands and is just to the other. Bentham is a denier; he denies with a loud and universally convincing voice; his fault is that he can *affirm* nothing, except that money is pleasant in the purse and food in the stomach, and that by this simplest of all beliefs he can reorganise society. He can shatter it in pieces—no thanks to him, for its old fastenings are quite rotten—but he cannot reorganise it; this is work for quite others than he. Such an essay on Bentham, however, were a great task for any one; for me a very great one, and perhaps rather out of my road."

Volcanic heavings are here distinctly perceptible; after nine years' internal working—*nonum premetur in annum*—they find relief in the following explosion, in the lecture on "The Hero as Prophet," contrasting Bentham with—Mahomet:

"But there is another thing to be said about the Mohammedan Heaven and Hell. This namely, that, however gross and material they may be, they are an emblem of an everlasting truth, not always so well remembered elsewhere. That gross sensual Paradise of his; that horrible flaming Hell; the great enormous Day of Judgment he perpetually insists on: what is all this but a rude shadow in the rude Bedouin imagination, of that grand spiritual Fact, and Beginning of Facts, which it is ill for us, too, if we do not all know and feel: the Infinite Nature of Duty? That man's actions here are of *infinite* moment to him, and never die or end at all; that man, with his little life, reaches upwards high as Heaven, downwards low as Hell, and in his threescore years of Time holds an Eternity fearfully and wonderfully hidden: all this had burnt itself, as in flame-characters, into the wild Arab soul. As in flame and lightning, it stands written there; awful, unspeakable, ever present to him. With bursting earnestness, with a fierce, savage sincerity, half-articulating, not able to articulate, he strives to speak it, bodies it forth in that Heaven and that Hell. Bodied forth in what you will, it is the first of all truths.



It is venerable under all embodiments. What is the chief end of man here below? Mohammed has answered this question in a way that might put some of *us* to shame! He does not, like a Bentham, a Paley, take Right and Wrong, and calculate the profit and loss, ultimate pleasure of the one and of the other; and summing all up by addition and subtraction into a net result, ask you, Whether on the whole the Right does not preponderate considerably? No; it is not *better* to do the one than the other; the one is to the other as life is to death,—as Heaven is to Hell. The one must in nowise be done, the other in nowise left undone. You shall not measure them; they are incommensurable: the one is death eternal to a man, the other is life eternal. Benthamite Utility, virtue by Profit and Loss; reducing this God's-world to a dead brute steam-engine, the infinite celestial Soul of Man to a kind of Hay-balance for weighing hay and thistles on, pleasures and pains on. If you ask me which gives, Mohammed or they, the beggarlier and falser view of Man and his Destinies in this Universe, I will answer, It is not Mohammed!"

Carlyle himself was a denier, or at all events denouncer, of a much fiercer sort than Bentham. And his assertions are as stout as his negations. But they lack definiteness. Force of character is admirable, when employed to propagate the right and the true and the good. But what authority is there to define to us these abstractions, and what means of acquiring force of character in case we do not possess it? Kant's "categorical imperative," making duty the revealer of God, and not God the revealer of duty, is responsible for this. Yet Carlyle must be counted as a power for good. His researches into German philosophy did not emasculate his native vigour. His task seems to have been to brace the moral fibre of the British nation, as it was Hamilton's to brace the intellectual. And, like Hamilton, he was at first misunderstood. Even Macaulay speaks unfavourably of him. An article of his, entitled "Characteristics," which now stands first among the *Miscellaneous Essays*, appeared in January, 1832. Of it Carlyle says, while in the ardour of composition, "I am in the aphoristic style, and need an incessant watchfulness to keep from being abstruse." Macaulay's comment on the piece is, "As to Carlyle, he might as well write in Irving's unknown tongue at once. The *Sun* newspaper, with delicious absurdity, attributes his article to Lord Brougham." Jeffrey, of course, follows suit. "I fear Carlyle will not do, that is, if you do not take the liberties and the pains with him that I did, by striking out freely, and writing in occasionally. The misfortune is that

he is very obstinate, and, I am afraid, conceited, and unluckily in a place like this, he finds people enough to abet and applaud him, to intercept the operation of the otherwise infallible remedy of general avoidance and neglect. It is a great pity, for he is a man of genius and industry, and with the capacity of being an elegant and impressive writer." Carlyle patched with fragments of Jeffrey must have made a mosaic of very curious pattern. The "capacity for elegance" has never been developed, but whose now is the "general avoidance and neglect"? The fact is, Jeffrey and, for that matter, Macaulay, were but philosophers of taste: Carlyle is a philosopher of life. The general strain of the latter's correspondence may be compared with the general strain of the former's, by the two following quotations. Macaulay says: "I am glad to hear that my articles are liked at Edinburgh. I have been laid up for a fortnight, and, therefore, know little of what is said here. But what I have learned is favourable." Three sentences on one's own reputation is an egotism pardonable enough in a private letter. But we may search the whole correspondence in vain for anything indicating such a sense of responsibility as is thus betrayed by the "obstinate and conceited" Carlyle:—"A mighty work lies before the writers of this time. I have a great faith and a great hope that the *Edinburgh Review* will not be wanting on its part, but stand forth in the van, where it has some right to be." We cannot help tracing the same difference a little farther in their respective references to a bereavement suffered at this time by Macvey Napier. "The hand of Death," says Carlyle, "has been busy in my circle, as it has been in yours; painfully reminding us that 'here we have no continuing city.' The venerated Friend that bade me farewell, cannot welcome me when I come back. I have no Father in this land of shadows." "During the last few months," says Macaulay, "I myself, for the first time in my life, felt the pain of such separations, and I have learned how little consolation can do, and how certain is the healing operation of time." The sage of Chelsea recognises facts: the son of Zachary Macaulay recommends us to forget them. The former tells us in his "Characteristics," just referred to, that "literature is a branch of religion." The latter would perhaps hardly admit religion to be so much as a branch of literature.

References to politics are plentiful in this volume. Among the rest are notices of the great Reform agitation of 1832.

Nobody cares to discuss the merits of a change which everybody has for a generation submitted to. This, however, we may say without wounding the most delicate susceptibilities. Extreme views as to the issue of this measure have been falsified by the event. Prophets of ruin and prophets of peace have been alike disappointed. Pandemonium is not yet builded, neither is Paradise yet restored. But the balance of good is in favour of the new order of things. The following from a foremost leader in the strife seems instinct with all the fury of it. As we read it, we seem to stand at the parting of the ways. The nation's destiny trembles in the balance. The Lower House, just elected for the purpose, has declared in favour of the Bill. The Upper House, jealous of its prerogative, yet hoists the flag of "No Surrender." The leader of the people—true patriot in some men's eyes, false demagogue in others—rallies his forces to the assault. The northern organ, champion of freedom, must not now utter an uncertain sound. A decisive blow must be struck for liberty. All this we see in Brougham's letter. His injunction of secrecy must be explained by his sense of what was due to his position as Lord Chancellor. But if that tied his tongue, it did not sheathe his pen.

*"London, September 14, 1831. My dear Professor,—I shall certainly send you something on the present truly alarming state of things as regards the Bill and the peace of the country. Meanwhile not a moment is to be lost if the people of Scotland have any desire for Reform. They must show it peacefully and calmly, but steadily. The enemy of reform and peace is at work, declaring that all feeling of Reform is at rest, and that the people no longer care for it! A grosser delusion never was heard of. But it is sure to throw out the Bill; and if Scotland announces meetings everywhere to petition the Lords, the peace of the country will be preserved and the constitution perpetuated. If not, I really tremble for the consequences. My having written to you must on no account be known. I am quite ready to avow that I strongly desire the people's sentiments to be declared in vindication of their own consistency, and to frustrate the intrigues of those who, some from fair and honest though mistaken views, others for factious and interested reasons, are really the worst enemies of both the King and constitution. But if it were known that I wrote to you upon the subject, much absurd misrepresentation would be attempted. Therefore you must act entirely from yourself."*

A good deal more of reference to political matters occurs in Brougham's letters, but the interest of them is mainly personal. The success of Reform, even in the partial degree

already achieved, had brought him a place and a peerage, the "solid pudding" as well as the "empty praise." But though the peerage continued, the place was soon forfeited by the impracticableness of its occupant. Four years he retained the chancellorship. When the Whigs fell, he fell, but on their return to power soon after, they put the seal in commission, and ultimately bestowed it on Lord Cottenham. Brougham's mortification was extreme. He never recovered the blow, but remained through life a disappointed man, siding with no party, but, as occasion served, assailing both. Reform brought no elysium to him, unless it were the elysium of Cannes. The following was written shortly before the return of the Whigs to power, and while he was yet buoyed up with the hope of returning with them.

"*House of Lords, April 3, 1835.* My dear Professor,—What you say of any *alienation* between us here is almost all groundless. The underlings of the party had been persuaded by such lies as the papers circulate, that the King and Court turned them out of their places because I was too strong a Reformer, and I believe those underlings would throw their own fathers and mothers overboard to get back to their mess of pottage. If they had known my extreme aversion to office, and my all but irrevocable determination never again to hamper myself with it, and thereby and by party connection to tie up my right arm, and prevent me from working my own appointed work,—these gentlefolks might have saved themselves the trouble of wishing to get rid of me as an obstacle to their restoration. But Lord Althorp's fixed and immovable resolution to remain out, shakes mine; for, in truth, I hardly see how a Government (a Liberal one) can show itself with nobody in it whom the people care or even know anything about. However, all this is not to be talked of. *Those underlings* have kept in, and are keeping in, the Tories.—Yours ever, H. B."

Five days later Peel and Wellington resigned, and Lord Melbourne resumed office. But Brougham was excluded. "What," asks Earl Russell, in his *Recollections and Suggestions*, "was the nature of the objections which prevented Lord Melbourne from offering to return the Great Seal into the hands of Lord Brougham? The objections came first from Lord Melbourne, and were frankly communicated by him to Lord Brougham. His faults were a recklessness of judgment, which hurried him beyond the bounds of prudence, an omnivorous appetite for praise, a perpetual interference in matters with which he had no direct concern, and, above all, a disregard of truth. His vast powers of mind were

neutralised by a want of judgment, which prevented any party from placing entire confidence in him, and by a frequent forgetfulness of what he himself had done or said but a short time before. It was for these reasons that, many weeks before the change of Government, Lord Melbourne resolved not to offer the Great Seal to Lord Brougham. He told me of his fixed resolution on this head many weeks before the dissolution of Sir Robert Peel's ministry. Observing, as I did, the characters of the two men, I thought Lord Melbourne justified in his decision, and I willingly stood by him in his difficulties."

It was almost inevitable that some of the spleen stirred up by this disappointment should be poured out on the head of the manager of the *Review*. Napier had from motives of prudence withheld articles designed by Brougham for the January number. The silence of the *Review* at this crisis he ascribed, and said other people ascribed, to "the worst motives of trimming, and waiting to see how the cat jumped." But the non-appearance of the articles in question he accounted for in another way. It was not Napier's policy that was to blame, but other people's craft. "You would, I know, have printed those articles had you got them. But they were intercepted." One of them appeared in April, and with it five more from the same pen. Here is the list of them: "The British Constitution—Recent Political Occurrences;" "Thoughts upon the Aristocracy;" "Newspaper Tax;" "Memoirs of Mirabeau;" "French Parties and Politics;" "State of Parties." Channels enough these surely through which to vent his political gall. But the catalogue forms a curious comment on the complaints heaped on the head of the poor editor in the following communication, which we must quote, before passing on, as a sample of the author's spirit:

"*London, June 9, 1835.* My dear Sir,—I wish to know whether or not Mr. Allen has undertaken to give the character of Bolingbroke's style, eloquence, &c., or only the *political* and *factions* portion of the subject, because if he is possessed of both parts, I shall beg leave to decline interfering with him. I hope you may take in good part what I must now in fairness to you, and in common justice to myself, add.

"Ever since you succeeded to the management of the *Edinburgh Review*, I have found that my assistance was reckoned, justly God knows, a very secondary object, and that one of the earliest friends of the Journal, and who had (Jeffrey will inform you) enabled it

to struggle through its first difficulties as much as any one or even two of the contributors, was now next thing to laid upon the shelf. This is the common lot of those who, in any concern, outlive their contemporaries; and no one, I must say it for myself, in this world has less of personal punctilio about him, or cares less for such trifles when in pursuit of a great object. But, at the same time, I really do feel that I ought not to be merely made a hack of, and 'offered' such and such books; that is, whatever nobody else likes to do. Yet it does so happen that of late years this is my position. Dr. Southey, I assure you, is considered in a very different way by the *Quarterly Review*. However, let that pass. My resolution now is, that I shall review such things as suit my taste and my views on subjects and on public affairs, and if there is any kind of objection in any quarter (which I am well aware in these times of intrigue and jobbery is very possible), I cannot help it, and I shall interpose no obstacle to the conductors and contributors of the Journal, and should be very sorry to stand in the way of any other arrangements or connections. Ex-ministers are always in the wrong, I know full well. However, if the base and truly jobbing plan of some *would-be ministers* and their adherents (in London) had taken effect, and you had, 'for fear of giving offence,' kept all politics out of the last, as you had done out of the Number before, my belief is that the *Review* would have died in the course of the Spring. I am sure the political character of the last Number did it much service and no harm, except disappointing the *good-for-littles* I allude to."

It is plain that Lord Brougham would still have considered himself "next thing to laid on the shelf" unless permitted at least an occasional repetition of the feat ascribed to him by Lord Cockburn in his *Life of Jeffrey*,—that of having written the whole of one number of the *Review*, including an article on lithotomy and another on the music of the Chinese. Napier's reply is not preserved, but it must have been in a conciliatory tone, for within a week Brougham wrote another letter which comes as near to the *amende honorable* as anything could be which proceeded from his pen. It was only too servile.

About this time several interesting letters passed between Napier and Macaulay on the subject of the latter's Indian appointment. But these we must not refer to further than to mention Macaulay's generosity. Being now raised to affluence, he wished to forego money payments, and only to receive in recognition of his services any new books that Napier might think it worth while to send. This proposal the latter would not consent to. Indeed, it was a rule in

the *Edinburgh Review* not to accept gratuitous help. The first article Macaulay sent from Calcutta was the famous one on Lord Bacon, composed during his voyage out. The different opinions entertained as to its merits by his compeers at home is well illustrated in the following quotations from our editor's correspondence. Jeffrey was, as usual, lavish in his praise of Macaulay's latest production. The length of it had been an objection, and the ex-editor writes:—"What mortal could ever dream of cutting out the least particle of this precious work, to make it fit better into your *Review*? It would be worse than paring down the Pitt diamond to fit the old setting of a dowager's ring. It is altogether magnificent—*et prope divinium*. Since Bacon himself, I do not know that there has been anything so fine. I have read it not only with delight, but with emotion—with throbbings of the heart, and tears in the eye."

Bulwer thinks Macaulay has not read Bacon's character aright, and exposes his weakness as to Bacon's philosophy.

"Macaulay's paper is triking and brilliant, as is all that comes from his vigorous mind and brilliant fancy. But I think, though Bacon was quite as bad a public man as he represents, that his vices were not the consequences of a weak and servile temperament, but of the same profound and subtle mind that he evinced in his letters. He chose his means according as they could bring success to his ends. And it is remarkable (and this Macaulay overlooks) that his worst and meanest acts *invariably succeeded* in their object,—nay, that they were the only means by which his objects *could* have been gained. Thus his ingratitude to Essex was his great stepping-stone to his after distinctions, and his cowardly submission on the detection of his corruption not only saved his head, but restored him to liberty, wealth, and rank. I could show, too, from Bacon's letters that Macaulay is mistaken as to his religious sincerity. As Bacon himself says, he wrapped up his physic in sweets for the priests to swallow. In fact, he was not a weak, irresolute actor in politics, but a consummate and masterly hypocrite, trained in the rules of Italian statesmanship. The biographical part is, however, the best of Macaulay's article. The view of Bacon's philosophy seems to me merely brilliant declamation. All detail, all definition of the exact things Bacon did and omitted to do, are thrown overboard. The comparison with Plato, as a fair illustration of ancient and modern philosophy, is mere rhetoric. And the illustration would have ruined his own position if he had substituted Aristotle for Bacon. Aristotle was a *useful* philosopher as well as Bacon, and it was in combating Aristotle that Bacon learned the use of his own limbs and weapons.

Enough of these criticisms on Criticism. I may differ with Macaulay, but his genius in this article, as in all else, is of a prodigious and gigantic character. He is formed to be the man of his age."

Stephen's comments are mostly laudatory, or intended to be so.

"In the paper on Lord Bacon, he shows powers of a far higher order than in any other of his writings. It is the most considerable performance of its kind which has appeared in my day, and would have conferred a lasting place in English literature on him, had he written nothing else. His scorn for the mystical, and his honest determination to write nothing which he does not fully understand, and which he cannot make intelligible to his readers, seem to me to have injured his estimate of Bacon's character. He leaves out all mention of the *gaseous* part of it, which Coleridge and his disciples would have employed themselves in an attempt to fix, by combinations of words conveying no meaning to the many, and but half a meaning to the few. But in his contempt for this kind of pretension, Macaulay has, I think, made the great Philosopher too much into a mere promoter of inventions for improving the condition of mankind in what relates to their lower faculties. His Bacon, or rather his Baconian system, is (in the pet phrase of Coleridge and Co.) rather too sensuous. It is, however, a noble paper, and the more so as the glare of his earlier style is so much subdued, without the loss of any of its vivacity, or even of its learning, which is now to be detected through a decorous veil instead of challenging the admiration of his readers."

Brougham was irreconcilable.

"The *Bacon* is, as you say, very striking, and no doubt the work of an extremely clever man. It is so very long that I think you might have cut it in two, there being an obvious division. But (not to trouble you with the superfluous enumeration of its good qualities) it has two grievous defects,—a redundancy, an overcrowding of every one thing that is touched upon, that almost turns one's head; for it is out of one digression into another, and each thought in each is illustrated by twenty different cases and anecdotes, all of which follow from the first without any effort. This is a sad defect in Macaulay, and it really seems to get worse instead of better. I need not say that it is the defect of a very clever person—it is indeed exuberance. But it is a defect also that old age is liable to. The other fault you have alluded to, but I will expose it after Macaulay's own manner of writing. 'You might as well say that all men balance themselves in order to walk and, therefore, there is no science of mechanics, or that every child learns to suck, and, therefore, the Torricellian experiment was of no use to science, or that the dullest of human beings goes to his



point by one straight line and not by the other two sides of a triangle, and, therefore, there is no Geometry, or that the most ordinary workman, be he mason building an arch, or cooper making a cask, forms a curve by joining straight lines short in proportion to the whole length, and, therefore, the fluxional calculus was no discovery ;' through two or three pages as easy to fill with such trash as it would be unprofitable. In fact, this way of treating a subject is somewhat mistaking garrulity for copiousness, but I am now complaining much more of the matter than the manner. Greater blunder never was committed than the one Macaulay has made on the Inductive Philosophy. He is quite ignorant of the subject. He may garnish his pages as he pleases with references : it only shows he has read Bacon for the *flowers* and not the *fruit*, and this is indeed the fact. He has no science at all, and cannot reason. His contemporaries at Cambridge always said he had not the conception of what an argument was ; and surely it was not right for a person who never had heard of Gilbert's treatise, to discuss Bacon's originality, nay, to descant on Bacon at all, who seems never to have read the *Sylva Sylvarum* (for see p. 83 about ointments for broken bones) ; and who goes through the whole of his speculation (or whatever you choose to term it) without making any allusion to Bacon's notorious failure when he came to put his own rules in practice, and without seeming to be at all aware that Sir I. Newton was an experimental philosopher."

Macaulay in his turn, being made acquainted with these last unfavourable criticisms, thinks he can defend his doctrine as to what Bacon did for inductive philosophy, and imagines that "Lord Brougham's objections arise from an utter misconception of the whole argument, and every part of it." In this instance posterity will probably believe that, notwithstanding the splendour of Macaulay's style, the truth on these various points lies with his candid friends. Both he and they appear to have overlooked the extent to which this famous essay championed that very Utilitarianism which a few years before Macaulay himself had taken such pains to demolish.

There is much more of correspondence between Napier and Macaulay, and between Napier and Brougham, but we cannot enlarge upon it. The following specimens will illustrate the manner in which each rival for public favour unbosomed his sentiments concerning the other to their mutual friend. "I have no heart to say one word on any subject of the last number [that for January, 1840] but one—I mean, one which absorbs all others—Macaulay's most profligate political morality. In my eyes, his defence of Clive,

and the audacious ground of it, merit execration." This is the introduction to a long tirade, in the course of which the noble correspondent mourns the failure of his efforts to restore, by means of the *Review*, "a better, a purer, a higher standard of morals." The second correspondent—all unconscious of the opinions expressed about him—thus retorts upon the first. "He is not a malignant or bad-hearted man, but he is an unscrupulous one, and where his passions are concerned or his vanity irritated, there is no excess or dereliction of principle of which he is not capable." We must put down much of this vilification to temporary feeling. But Macaulay was perhaps often in danger of being a little blinded by the glorious achievements of Britain's heroes to the character of the means by which they were accomplished. As for Brougham, he never in the heat of his passion bears false witness against his neighbour, without at the same time bearing witness that is not false against himself.

The miserable ruse by which, in the Autumn of 1839, he sought to win back a portion of his lost popularity, is well known. He thought it at the time a wonderful success, though, of course, he disclaimed the responsibility. He says, "My relations with the Government are less hostile by a great deal. They were I find quite stunned to find the sensation caused by my departure from this lower world. Their silly vanity, and the flattery of their sycophants, and the noise of their vile newspapers, had really made them fancy that I was utterly gone into oblivion. They have now found a marvellous difference, for they are obliged to admit that they, and all their people, might have died, and been quietly buried, compared with my decease." But all this feeling was, so to speak, conditional. And, as Jeffrey says, on the failure of the condition, the British public was entitled to a *jus retractus*, or a *restitutio in integra*, "like the worthy man who was persuaded to tender his forgiveness to an ancient foe who was said to be dying, and turned round after he had shaken hands, and said, "Remember, though, that if you recover, I retract my forgiveness." Our references to Brougham may well conclude here, as the book stops short by twenty years of his real death in 1868 in his ninetieth year. In justice to so great a name we will quote a sentence from the edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* now in course of publication. "His indomitable energy, his vehement eloquence, his enthusiastic attachment to the cause of freedom, progress and humanity, to which he rendered so

many signal services, caused him to be justly regarded as one of the most extraordinary and illustrious men of his age and of his country."

Another contributor, not so renowned as those last named, must not be passed over in silence: we mean Sir James Stephen. At the outset of its career, and long afterward, the *Review* steadily ignored religion, or treated with contempt the only form of it that was worth the name. And it thereby forfeited an influence for good that might have been a great strength to it and an incalculable benefit to the British nation. But this task it disdained. It left to others the glory of infusing into the thought of the country that moral earnestness which now characterises it. The narrowness and formality at that period of Scottish ecclesiasticism may have partly accounted for this. But much of the responsibility attaches to the founders themselves. Witness the following remarks from Jeffrey to his great coadjutor so early as 1804. "You are very much mistaken if you suppose I countenance Wilberforce or his principles. I have much respect for his talents and great veneration for his character. I shall read his book [the *Practical View*, published 1797] at a convenient season, but scarcely expect to get the length of W—or King Agrippa. In the meantime I am very much flattered by the favourable opinion of such men, and should be sincerely sorry to do anything to scandalise them." Scandalise them he did, however, by the publication of Sydney Smith's scurrilous and ignorant brochure on the Methodists, the reception of which by the public warned the editor that, whether he held with the hare or not, it was not quite safe to run with the hounds. With the accession of Napier a different feeling prevailed, and articles on religious subjects were occasionally admitted, which did not shrink from acknowledging religion to be a potent and beneficial element in the life of the nation. Among the writers who followed this line none was more conspicuous than Sir James Stephen, whose contributions were afterwards published under the title of *Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography*. Curiously enough, his first article (April number, 1838) was on that very member of the Clapham sect whose principles Jeffrey had once so zealously forsworn. This was followed by others. In July appeared "Lives of Whitefield and Froude;" in January, 1839, "Luther and the Reformation;" in October of the same year, "Baxter;" in April, 1840, "Works of the Author of Natural History of Enthusiasm," &c.

About the last but one the following testimonies were borne. Empson, Jeffrey's brother-in-law, said, "Baxter has been generally put down to Macaulay, who admires it, but not quite as much, I think, as Jeffrey and I do. I told him that Whishaw said, 'I hear there is a canting article on Baxter by Macaulay.' Denman, too, took it for his. The tone might be cant in Macaulay, but it is sincere in Stephen." The flippant Jeffrey is even more eloquent. "Are you prepared to hear that my favourite article is that on old Baxter? I think it very touching, eloquent, and amiable; and you may depend upon it that such papers are of inestimable value to the *Review*, not merely for the pleasure and edification they minister to pious persons like me, but from their taking away from you the reproach (or suspicion) of infidelity or indifference at least to religion, and thus giving tenfold weight to your Liberal opinions upon other subjects, with the best and steadiest friends of liberality. It is so sweetly, and candidly, and humanely written, that all good people, I think, must love and reverence the author, and I hope you will try to get as much out of him as possible." The simplicity of this confession is quite charming. The value of religion is precisely the amount of credit it will bring to Liberal politics and the amount of profit it will by consequence bring to the *Review*. But we must not suppose that Jeffrey was a mere cynic, who utterly lacked feeling. The above bears witness to the contrary, and however harsh his treatment of Wordsworth and Keats, his sympathy with those he took to be true poets is seen in one of the letters published with his "Life," in which he says he could get down into the dust and weep to think of the "arrangements" which thwarted the normal growth of such a man as Burns. As a parting tribute, let us cite Lord Cockburn's summary. "The peculiar charm of his character lay in the junction of intellectual power with moral worth. His honour was superior to every temptation by which the world could assail it. The pleasures of the heart were necessary for his existence, and were preferred by him to every other gratification except the pleasures of conscience. Passing much of his time in literary and political contention, he was never once chilled by an unkind feeling even towards those he was trying to overcome." The "pleasures of conscience" seem almost to open to us a new domain of human felicity. By Jeffrey they were perhaps enjoyed as the necessary accompaniments of "natural religion."

The last number of the *Review* that Macvey Napier edited was that for January, 1847. He died in February. From a sketch which appeared in the *Scotman* shortly after his death, we cull the following tribute, which we believe to have been honestly earned.

“In the conduct of that brilliant publication it is well known that he was preceded by men of the finest genius, as well as of the purest, firmest, and most consistent principles; and it is no light praise to say that this leading organ of constitutional and liberal doctrines, and of manly and enlightened criticism, suffered no decay under his steady and unflinching management. In these respects the absolute and unassailable purity of his character as a public man had the natural consequence of bringing him into close and confidential intercourse with many of the highest and most influential men of the age; and nothing can reflect brighter honour on his character than the strict fidelity, and truthfulness, and independence, with which that intercourse was invariably maintained. Within the circle of his private acquaintance—more remarkable, perhaps, for its intimacy than for its extent—his memory will be always cherished as that of a most intelligent, kindly, and pleasing companion—a zealous, disinterested, and devoted friend.”

One quotation more, *à propos* of the whole subject, we must make, not from this volume, but from Carlyle's *Characteristics*, referred to above.

“Nay, is not the diseased self-conscious state of Literature disclosed in this one fact, which lies so near us here, the prevalence of Reviewing! Sterne's wish for a reader ‘that would give up the reins of his imagination into his author's hands, and be pleased he knew not why, and cared not wherefore,’ might lead him a long journey now. Indeed, for our best class of readers, the chief pleasure, a very stinted one, is this same knowing of the Why; which many a Kames and Bossu has been, ineffectually enough, endeavouring to teach us: till at least these also have laid down their trade; and now your Reviewer is a mere *taster*: who tastes, and says, by the evidence of such palate, such tongue, as he has got, It is good, It is bad. Was it thus that the French carried out certain inferior creatures on their Algerine Expedition, to taste the wells for them, and try whether they were poisoned? Far be it from us to disparage our own craft, whereby we have our living! Only we must note these things: That Reviewing spreads with strange vigour; that such a man as Byron reckons the Reviewer and the Poet equal; that at the last Leipzig fair, there was advertised a Review of reviews. By-and-by it will be found that all Literature has become one boundless self-devouring Review; and, as in London routs, we have to *do* nothing, but only to *see* others

do nothing. Thus does Literature also, like a sick thing, super-abundantly 'listen to itself.' "

This would seem to condemn the whole art and mystery of reviewing. But, we may ask, does the critical faculty stand in any necessary antagonism to the intuitive? We think not. The star-gazer does not enjoy the heavens less, but more, for being able to tell the constellations. Analysis should lead to a more perfect synthesis than was possible without it. The evil is not in making the analysis, but in stopping short at it. And if the state of literature be one of diseased self-consciousness, this shows that the analysis is still imperfect, or at least that men, rightfully or wrongfully, are not satisfied with it. After all, society is only the sum of the units that compose it. One man, or set of men, may think the main problems settled. Another man, or set of men, may not yet have been able to solve them, or may have solved them in a different way. With a good deal of what is chaotic, we think the tendency of the age, its serial literature included, is at least toward clear definition, if not satisfactory solution, of the problems of existence. In Church and State, in Art, Literature, and Science, parties and principles are more and more clearly marked off. And it only needs that each party should be faithful to its own principles for victory ultimately to crown the right. For no principles can be true in theory which will not stand the test of practice. If recent tendencies, for instance, in the direction of superstitious symbolism on the one hand, or of scientific scepticism on the other, are what they profess to be, discoveries of new truth or rediscoveries of old truth, they will exalt the intelligence and purify the morals of those who embrace them. If not, the opposite results will follow. And though mischief, great and irretrievable, may in the meantime be done, yet in the end it will work its own cure. So those must believe who believe in a plan of the universe.

In this present article we have gone a step beyond the merchant of Leipzig fair. He only proposed to review Reviews: we have been reviewing Reviewers of reviews. Our consolation is that no one can criticise us without carrying on the process to the fourth degree.

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- ART. VI.—1. *Forty Years in New Zealand.* By REV. W. J. BULLER, Wesleyan Minister. Hodder and Stoughton. 1879. With Illustrations.
2. *Reminiscences of the War in New Zealand.* By THOMAS W. GUDGEON, Lieutenant and Quartermaster Colonial Forces No. 3. With Twelve Portraits. London: Sampson Lowe. Auckland: E. Wayte. 1879.
3. *Travels in New Zealand; with Contributions to the Geography, Geology, Botany, and Natural History of that Country.* By ERNEST DIEFFENBACH, M.D., Naturalist of the New Zealand Emigration Society. Two Volumes, Plates. Longmans. 1843.

AN ominous paragraph has lately been going the round of the papers:—"The Maori King will not agree to the recommendations of the Colonial Government touching the sale of land; but it is believed that, nevertheless, Rewi and his tribe will sell and lease their lands." We trust this does not mean another Maori war, in addition to the rest. We trust, too, that it does not mean that dying out of the Maori race which we hoped timely measures had averted. No doubt our people will have elbow-room, and emigration to New Zealand has so increased that a cry for more land is very plausible. But the system of fixing a certain limit for native reserves, and then continually trenching upon it, is doubly disastrous as well as dishonourable. Its effect on the whites can only be to make them wholly regardless of any right but that of the stronger—to lower the whole standard of political and social morality. To the natives it is simply ruinous. With what heart can a Maori till land, make improvements, go in for culture and progress, when he feels that, by-and-by, his civilised and Christian neighbours will "desire his land" (to use the expressive Old Testament word), and, by getting together an illusory meeting of the ne'er-do-weels and drunkards of his tribe—the men who have learnt from civilisation only its vices—will manage to secure possession of it and to shunt him off to fresh ground, of which he may again be dispossessed as soon as more allotments are wanted for other colonists? The example of the United States of America is a very instructive one. Certain fragments of Indian tribes—Creeks,

Cherokees, &c.—had started on the high road of settled civilised life. They cultivated and exported cotton, and published newspapers written in their own language and printed in characters invented by one of their nation. The Government of Washington moved them off westward, and settled them in the basin of the Arkansas. The Americans, in spite of their theories about liberty and equality, could not bear the sight of Indian reserves in the midst of populous States. Two or three such transplantings have, not unnaturally, been enough to justify the reiterated assertion that the Red men are incapable of civilisation; they have proved incapable of it under conditions which would turn even a Norfolk farmer into a shiftless hand-to-mouth sloven.

To deal in a like way with the remnant of the Maoris is to act altogether unworthily both of the religion which we profess and of the position which we claim among the nations of the earth. In the old time Christian philanthropy was almost unknown; the savage, unless he could be profitably enslaved, was a nuisance to be got rid of. Romanists, believing in the inevitable doom of all the unbaptised, believed the natives by hordes, and taught them some sort of travesty of Christianity. Till lately, Protestants did not even do as much as this. In Tasmania, in Australia, in North America, everywhere, that the native should disappear before the white man was looked on as a law of nature, "the survival of the fittest." A truer sense of what Christianity means is making us think otherwise. Christianity we believe to be God's great instrument for modifying the law of survival, which would else often come to be a survival of the unfittest—the coarsest and strongest—and for preserving for the future advantage of the human family much that would else be crushed out in the struggle for existence. In this way the gentle, the good, the kind and sweet-natured have, here at home, an advantage which, without Christianity, they would not have over the rough, the overbearing, the selfish and hard. It must be the same in our dealings with other races, unless our sharing Christianity with them is a sham. If the Maori is our brother in Christ, we must treat him as such, and must give him additional consideration to make up for the relative disadvantages with which God has seen fit to surround him. He belongs to that great class, "the weak," whose infirmities we are to bear. The practical working of this should be that the native reserves in New Zealand should be as sacred as the most strictly entailed property at home. When the colonists,



who already hold such a very large share of the islands, are really pressed for room (which they certainly are not yet), let them go elsewhere—seek land in the unoccupied parts of Australia or of New Guinea, if they prefer doing so to working on the second-best land at home. If, because there is in the colony a dearth of thoroughly eligible plots, we are therefore to tell the Maoris to “move on,” we had better at once all attempt to be their spiritual guides. A policy which should combine the offer of heaven with gradual but inevitable extinction upon earth would be nothing but a monstrous hypocrisy.

We write strongly; but those who read Mr. Gudgeon's book will feel that we do not write too strongly. The whole of the sad story of the original land war of 1860-64, followed by the Hau-hau war, which resolved itself into a long and exciting chase after Te-Kooti, shows how entirely our eagerness for land has been the cause of bloodshed and extermination. The Maoris, who were much in the social condition of the Scotch Highlanders of a century and a half ago, and (except in the matter of cannibalism) not far behind them in civilisation, had no notion of personal property in land. Mr. Buller tells us how Colonel Wakefield, prospecting for the Emigration Company, purchased (as he thought) large tracts from natives who were on the steamer with him, and who looked on the whole transaction as a profitable joke—a joke which gave them blankets and guns and ammunition, but a joke nevertheless.

We need scarcely say that Lieutenant Gudgeon's view of the land question is not ours. He seems to think Government was right in “making some of the earlier settlers disgorge what they had got for a keg of spirits or a few knives, and buy again at a fair price.” He does not see that, by Maori law, as definite on the subject as our own, it was impossible for a single native to alienate any part of his tribe's territory. He could no more do so than any one of the Campbell clan could have sold away a part of the clan's land, which (under our modern arrangements) forms the inheritance of the ducal house of Argyle. It was just the same in Ireland; the “undertakers” who went over always found some disaffected clansman ready to part with his allotment of the tribal land; and this, when acquired, the new comers claimed to hold in full ownership, not caring that by the Brehon law there was no such thing as ownership without regard to tribal rights. Even in England we have our survivals of

tribal usage in Lammas lands and commons, &c.; and in Epping Forest the old system has lately won a victory over that which has been only too successfully carried out in New Zealand.

Mr. Gudgeon, with whose sneers about "the noble savage," and whose general tone about the Maoris we have not the slightest sympathy, says that "when the natives saw the Pakehas (whites) improving land and selling it at very advanced prices among themselves, they not only got ideas of perpetual property in land, but became very sharp in their dealings. Some blocks were given back to them, because the titles were manifestly bad. They then marked out the best bits as reserves, and put into the concessions lots of nearly useless land, *so cunning had they become.*" We might ask who taught them to be thus cunning in self-defence; but we prefer to join issue with Mr. Gudgeon as to the Waitara block, the cause of the war of 1860. Our author says it had been *already purchased twice over*; the point at issue is were the purchases legal? On this point many of the best men in New Zealand held with the natives; even Sir G. Grey was far from being convinced, though he thought (as is too often thought under the like circumstances) that it would never do for England to back out. So far from rushing into war with savage recklessness, the Maoris tried negotiations for ten years. At last the Taranaki natives declared war by building a *pah* on land which Governor Gore-Brown had told them he was going to take possession of. This war was mostly carried on on our side by Government troops. At one time there were ten British regiments in Taranaki and Auckland, to which districts the fighting was confined till 1865, when the hostile natives left Waitara and joined the Wanganui. Some of us may remember the astonishment, not unmixed with rage, which was felt because the Maoris stood so well on their defence, actually giving us lessons in the use of rifle-pits. It was even proposed that the Sikhs should be taken over to help us. How daring the Maories were may be judged from what happened soon after the outbreak. General Cameron had given orders for his camp to be pitched. An officer, who knew the natives well, hinted that they were much too near the bush. "Do you imagine, Major Witchell," was the reply, "that any body of natives will dare to attack 2,000 of Her Majesty's troops?" Very soon a volley was fired, which killed an adjutant-general and fifteen men, and, had not Major Witchell told his troop to keep their horses saddled, the casualties would have been many more.

As it was, one native was cut down only twenty yards from the General's tent.

Our sympathies with the natives are lessened by what are styled "murders." We forget that, for a Maori, all was fair in war; not to cut off a straggler or to kill a white who happened to come in the way, would have been considered mere folly. We taught the Maoris one thing—to give up cannibalism—and all through the long twenty-five years' struggle, never, save once during the very wildest outbreak of Hau-hau fanaticism, was there any attempt to return to it. But we could not teach them that their way of fighting was inhuman. Our Maori allies were fully as bad in this respect as our enemies. Of this Mr. Gudgeon gives many instances. It must certainly be hard to persuade a native that for you to shell his village and kill his people in incomprehensible ways with Gatlings and Martini Henry rifles without giving them a chance of coming to close quarters is fair and honourable, while for him to cut down, *more majorum*, a white who falls into his power is the reverse.\* Instead of thinking our way all fair, their way murderously unfair, we should try to put ourselves in their place, though they are "only niggers;" and this, by bravery and endurance rarely paralleled, the Maoris forced us to do.

One thing all through Mr. Gudgeon's book has caused us much pain. We did not realise the extent to which native help was used, when "the self-reliant policy of Messrs. Weld and Stafford" had gradually got rid of the Imperial troops. The settlers, when trained to bush-fighting, made admirable troops, and were much more dreaded by the natives than the regulars—"they had something to avenge," says our author. But as if this was not importing enough blood-thirstiness into the conflict, tribal jealousies and old hatred were played upon to make some tribes willing agents in subduing their fellows. The Arawas joined us, "having a great desire to get guns, and a still greater wish to shoot some one with them." Lieutenant Gudgeon would have liked the Maoris very well "if we could have had them without their chiefs." They

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\* Here is Mr. Gudgeon's view of the case:—"The Maoris of 1860 were not Hau-haus, and though, like all savages, they held peculiar notions as to what constituted a murder, still they respected non-combatants." Before the Waireka fight, the leading chiefs had *tapued* Rev. W. Brown's house, affixing a notice forbidding any one to interfere with him or his neighbours. And, after the battle, lest some of the young men might seek revenge for their heavy losses, Rapata, the great chief of the Taranaki tribe, took the inmates all under his protection.

served us remarkably well. Major Kepa, Ensign Poma, &c., often saved the volunteers from annihilation in the days when, unused to bush-fighting, they were subject to panics and given to pack together. But this was dearly purchased at the cost of arousing feelings and encouraging conduct wholly inconsistent with the Christianity which we had so long been inculcating. It was for their own ends, and not for love of us, that some of the tribes joined us; and Mr. Gudgeon hints that they were never to be wholly relied on. The true relation between Englishmen and friendly natives is seen from the following:—"Do you trust me?" asked Katene of an officer. "I do." The Maori sat looking at the fire, and then, laying his hand on his friend's knee, replied, "You are right, and you are wrong; you are right to trust me now, for I mean you well; but never trust a Maori. Some day I may remember that I have lost my land, and that the power and influence (*mana*) of my tribe are gone, and that you are the cause; at that moment I shall be your enemy." By-and-by Katene—whom M'Donnell considered so valuable that he once let him out of prison, where he had been put for stealing, in the hope of getting information from him—saw a relative of his who had been killed in some skirmish with "friendlies." A few nights after he went away, and probably joined in the war against us.

What came of using friendly Maoris—selfishly interesting, *i.e.*, all the latent savagery and evil passions of their nature in our cause, is shown over and over again in Mr. Gudgeon's book. Here is a case which happened at the very outset. At Te Matata, in 1864, Toi, the chief of the Arawas, who had just joined us, was killed. Among the prisoners was a Whakatohea chief, for whose safety, when he surrendered, Captain M'Donnell became personally responsible. Toi's wife, however, persuaded a man to lend her a loaded rifle, and, walking up to the prisoner, blew his brains out.

After this the following sinks into insignificance:—"One of the Hau-haus was shot; and little Winiata (one of the contingent, a very hero in Mr. Gudgeon's eyes), to square things in accordance with Maori ideas of right and justice, dealt him the same number of tomahawk cuts that Haggarty had received, and formed a very low opinion of the Pakehas because they rebuked him."

Here is another unedifying scene:—Katene and his brother (both of them Kupapas, *i.e.*, contingent men) went to a half-friendly pah, in order to draw a great fighting man, Te Waka,

into an ambush laid for him by M'Donnell. Te Waka began to reproach Katene for fighting against his own people. "Pish!" said he; "the Pakehas are fools, and I have more brains than you. In one month I shall steal more ammunition than I can use in two years; then I shall return to you. If you disbelieve me, come, and I'll show you a thousand caps I've stolen already." Te Waka, greedy for ammunition, fell into the trap. When they were ten yards from the ambush, Katene seized his gun, the brother laid hold of his tomahawk, and as he prepared to escape by leaping down a cliff, the men in ambush shot him dead. "Why did you take the gun and not the man, as I told you?" asked M'Donnell. "Because you would have saved him, *and I wanted him killed, for he had done me an injury.*" No wonder men of unblunted military honour were disgusted at taking a share in a war conducted in such a way.

In 1864 the war assumed a new shape. At first a quarrel between ourselves and a single tribe, it had spread, owing to the patriotism of the most intelligent chiefs. A Maori king had been chosen, and an endeavour made to combine, as the only way of saving themselves from being driven out in detail by the encroaching Pakeha.

But patriotism was not enough to overcome old tribal feuds. Religion was brought in, either advisedly, by able unscrupulous men, who only made use of the fanaticism of their fellows, or (more probably) the fanaticism developed amid the despair of what seemed a hopeless struggle, and was (as is too often the case) a mixture of half-unconscious imposture with real belief. This is the way in which Hau-hauism is said to have begun. Te Ua, a man of little account, assaulted a woman of his tribe, and was caught by her husband. The man tied him up and left him. While he was lying bound the Angel Gabriel came to him and bade him burst his bonds. He did so; and when the husband chained him up the angel enabled him to break the chain. Thenceforward the tribe looked on him as some great one, and his spiritual intercourse became constant, not only with Gabriel, but with Michael the Archangel, and with a host of minor spirits, "who landed from the *Lord Worsley* (a steamer lately wrecked on Taranaki coast. Mark the strange notion that spirits, like Pakehas, come in winged canoes). He began to have visions. Gabriel showed him all the tribes of the earth; and, while he was gazing, a voice said, "Rise, Te Ua, and kill thy son." He took the boy, broke his legs, and was about to carry out the command, when Gabriel said,

"Not so; wash him with water." He obeyed, and his son became whole as before. The Hau-hau ritual consisted chiefly in dancing round a pole, called Niu, and singing a *waiata* (hymn) about the Trinity. The dancers got into an ecstatic state, and were then believed to have the gift of tongues. The Hau-haus called themselves *pai-marire* (good and perfect), and Te Ua strictly forbade any violence till they should have made the round of all the tribes, converting as they went. "Then," he said, "the angels will come and annihilate the Pakehas, and will teach you all their arts. You will only have to sit still and see the salvation of the Lord." Attacked by Captain Lloyd and a detachment, they were thoroughly successful. Captain Lloyd was killed, and the Hau-haus cut off his head and carried it about with them, believing that it gave forth prophecies. Had Te Ua's programme been carried out, Lieutenant Gudgeon knows not how serious might have been the result; but Hēpanaia and other sub-prophets could not wait. They attacked a redoubt, called Sentry Hill, some twenty miles north of Mount Egmont, and rushing on under the idea that if they cried Hau-hau and held up the left hand, they would be invulnerable, they were driven off with great loss. Their four front ranks went down to a man under a withering fire. Explaining this as due to the lack of faith of those who fell, their prophet led them on again, only to fall as before. Then followed the murders of Mr. Völckner, a Lutheran in Anglican orders, and of Fulloon, a half-caste interpreter. Another missionary, Mr. Grace, was rescued by Captain Levy, the Jewish master of a coasting vessel. The Hau-haus looked on themselves as the modern chosen people, and therefore had a special regard for those who had held that place of old. Hence Captain Levy was unharmed, and was able to save others. Against Völckner the charge was that he kept a light in his window at night as a beacon to guide the coasters between Auckland and Opotiki. There was also some dispute between him and one of the Roman Catholic priests, of the trouble caused by whom Mr. Buller gives more than one instance.

We can well understand, however, why missionaries should be special objects of attack. The Maoris would, of course, suspect them of betraying their secrets; and not without reason, for the field map used during most of the Hau-hau war was drawn chiefly by Father Pézant, who, having gone much among the natives, knew the position of every *pah*.

Then came the taking of the Wereroa *pah*, a strong position, which General Cameron declined to attack without 2000 men; and yet 500 Wanganuis, with a few volunteers under Captain M'Donnell (Mr. Gudgeon's hero), surprised it early one frosty morning, "although the Hau-haus talked gibberish (their miraculous tongues being Maori, pronounced with a ridiculous English accent) to bewitch us." "Grey dawn" seems to have been the best time for attacking those whom Mr. Gudgeon unaccountably calls "our sable foes." The Maoris, immigrants from a warmer climate, and with no animals to furnish them with skins, feel the weather, and are not much on the alert while the frost is on the ground. The suffering of the native contingent during some of the cold rains must have sickened them of helping the Pakeha. The treatment of prisoners may be judged of from the following:—Enter Sergeant Duff, with a native boy, part of whose brains are protruding, thrown across his horse. "Boy's very bad," says an officer. "He's only wounded, Sir. I've brought him in to give information." Many were killed as accessories to Völckner's murder on the word of private enemies who wished to be rid of them. Captain Biggs (p. 80) shot a prisoner in cold blood because an enemy denounced him. It is but fair to say that not all the sub-prophets (there were twelve, after the number of the apostles) were as ferocious as Kereopa, the murderer of Völckner. Patara, another prophet, exclaimed against him, and thereby saved Bishop Williams and his family.

The origin of Hau-hauism we take to have been political; Mr. Gudgeon thinks otherwise. It is not our business in this paper to enter into religious disputes; we shall content ourselves with quoting Mr. Gudgeon's statement of the case. "An agreement (he says, p. 23) was entered into that the Church of England Missionary Society should occupy and evangelise the upper half of North Island, and the Wesleyan the lower; and this agreement was strictly adhered to for some years, in fact, until a Bishop of New Zealand was appointed, who carried the doctrines of his own Church through the whole island, invading the Wesleyan territories, and preached their condemnation, telling the Maoris that they (the Wesleyans) had no authority even to baptise, but were the grievous wolves spoken of in Scripture." Mr. Gudgeon then refers to the Rev. Hanson Turton's correspondence with Bishop Selwyn (see Brown's *New Zealand*), in the course of which the question was asked and not

answered: "Who gave the bishop this authority that he denied to others?" Other sects came in, each condemning the rest, and each eager for converts; and to the scandal of their rivalry Mr. Gudgeon attributes the rise of Hau-hauism. We think the desire to preserve their land, on which their existence depended, from the greed of speculating Pakehas, so worked on the excitable feelings of the Maoris as to rouse them to religious frenzy. No wonder they rejected our religion, while they saw us acting so contrary to its precepts. It is remarkable that while rejecting Christianity they went (as the Taepings are also said to have done) to the Bible as the source of their new faith.

Bishop Williams's work had been round Poverty Bay, which, at the time of the outbreak, Mr. Gudgeon says was "one vast orchard, all the fruit even now exported being from trees planted by Maoris." It was then rich in wheat crops and cattle and horses, and was peopled by three tribes who were progressing rapidly in wealth and civilisation. To them came Kereopa, and in spite of all the bishop's efforts, persuaded them to join the Hau-hau sect, and to hoist the flag of the war-god.

We cannot follow Mr. Gudgeon through details trifling enough, but showing a most lamentable state of things. His hero M'Donnell, who, he says, "had no fear of Exeter Hall before his eyes," was accused by Messrs. Graham and Parris of needless violence and cruelty at Pokaikai, which was surprised one intensely cold night, and the *whares* (huts) burned, and those who were escaping from them fired upon. Mr. Gudgeon thinks them wholly unworthy of credit. Of one he says: "As for Mr. Parris, the force had the same opinion of him as Captain Chute in 1866 when he requested him to clear out of the camp on short notice." There certainly seems to have been some firing on surrendered prisoners; and the Government defence minister checked the eagerness of the volunteers by an edict that no operation was to be undertaken without Government orders except for self-defence. M'Donnell's early morning surprises so disgusted his enemies that they called him "a rat that moves only by night."

The East coast was soon reduced, mainly by the help of Kopu, a Wairoa chief whose tribe went two ways. The help was invaluable; but it is sickening to read that "the friendlies having been successful in the killing line, alarmed our camp by a terrific war-dance." The dense bush round Mount Egmont, with a *terai* (to use an Indian word) of scrub, flax,



and fern, was a far harder fighting-ground; and General Chute's expedition from Manutahi, east of New Plymouth, near Sentry Hill, across to the Waimata landing, was beset with difficulties.

How general was the feeling against us is shown by the conduct of the Hawke's Bay tribes. They had not sold their land, but had leased it at a high rent to private Pakehas; their well-cleared country was not suitable for the war of ambushes in which the Maori delights. Yet at last they rose, only to get a crushing defeat, our numbers being at least four times theirs.\* In spite of this there now began for us a tide of ill-success, connected with the appearance of Te Kooti, the most remarkable man who came to the front on the native side. He had been our friend, but had been collared by one of the "friendly" chiefs and accused of intercourse with the enemy. Another accusation was made against him by some settlers (falsely, Mr. Gudgeon thinks); for the men with whom he was said to have had dealings were a hundred miles off. However, he was sent prisoner to the Chatham Isles, and there organised a wonderful escape for himself and his fellow prisoners. They overpowered the whites; held possession of the islands for several days, hurting no one, save one man who would insist on attacking them, treating our women and children with chivalrous tenderness. It may be doubted (confesses Mr. Gudgeon) whether Europeans would have behaved more moderately in like circumstances. They then seized a schooner and forced the crew to navigate it to Poverty Bay. The wind was contrary; they cast lots, and threw an old man overboard, like another Jonah, and at last got safely to their chosen landing place.

By Te Kooti's advice the Maoris left off endeavouring to defend their *pahs* and took to bush-fighting. Our reverses then began. In a skirmish with the Te-*Ngutus* in the bush west of Waihi, Von Tempsky, a soldier of fortune who had been the soul of the volunteer horse, was killed, along with a fifth of the whole force engaged. By-and-by Major Hunter, serving under Colonel Whitmore, was killed, and a quarter of those engaged were killed or wounded.

Te Kooti stained the successes, some of which he inspired, in others of which he shared, by massacring thirty-three settlers and thirty-seven "friendlies" at Poverty Bay. The

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\* The numbers of the Maoris were always surprisingly small. General Cameron never had (we are told) more than 700; nor had Chute more than 400 in arms against him.

tide then turned; he was defeated with great loss. "Surrender," said Major Biggs. "No; God has given us arms and liberty, and I am but an instrument in His hands carrying out His instructions." Then followed the lamentable murders of Lieutenant and Mrs. Gascoigne and their three children, and of the Rev. W. Whiteley, of whom Mr. Gudgeon says: "He was not one of those missionaries who think it necessary to abuse their own country-people, and therefore he was respected by the natives."

Te Kooti was driven to great straits; but he took advantage of a storm on Lake Moana, round which there was much fighting, to re-establish his authority as a prophet of God. The fighting against him now gradually dropped into the hands of the Kupapa (native contingent), and his hair-breadth escapes were marvellous. They often came upon his warm trail. Once he was left with eight men; once his wife was captured while cooking his supper. The hunt went on "through the black-birch forest where hardly a rat can live, and where the traveller will rarely see a bird or an insect." The chief hunter was Rapata, with that half of the Ngatiporou tribe (near East Cape) which had sided with us. The story is not edifying. We cannot patiently read (p. 319) of a girl-prisoner killed in cold blood, or of a "friendly" flourishing about with a prisoner's head. We can conceive no system better suited to degrade the friendly natives and prepare them for certain extinction. Mr. Gudgeon lets us into the secret when he says that after Von Tempsky's death "the liquor had to be stopped;" Dieffenbach notes that the Maoris are remarkable among savages for their strong dislike to alcoholic drinks: "it takes a long apprenticeship to make them endure the taste." How sad to think that, through the agency of Christian civilisers, they were, in less than twenty-five years, so changed that spirit-drinking was one of the bribes to keep them on our side.

Te Kooti finally got off; in August, 1871, he and Kereopa were together; the prophet was captured, but the chief slipped through Captain Porter's hands into "the king's country," the still independent part of Maori-land.

To show the character of the pursuit and of the men engaged in it we cannot forbear giving a short extract from Rapata's journal of the hunt after Te Kooti. "Perhaps we shall all die from cold and snow brought by south wind. No: we will not die from the cold; if we were the descendants of Ruaimoko we might do so, but we are the offspring of Tongia,

who thought only of wearing rough warm clothing. Ruaimoko was lazy and cared only for fine clothes, so that the women might take a fancy to his party. When he got near Hikurangi mountain he was pursued by Tongia, who found the whole party frozen to death. Their bones lie there to this day. It is from thinking of our ancestor that I make these remarks. His thoughtfulness has descended to us who now carry tents and warm clothing, by means of which alone we could carry out this great work. Perhaps some of our friends think it is only the ordinary work of a campaign. Can this be decided by those who live in comfortable houses? No; the magnitude of the work can only be ascertained by treading it with the feet."

Mr. Gudgeon's closing paragraph echoes the words of Sir Donald McLean, the Defence Minister: "Wait; no more war yet." He writes that Sir George Grey has settled out there, and that in February, 1878, he had an interview with the king, Tawhiao. Persuasion, he thinks, is best, along with a simpler way of buying lands—though what way he would suggest he does not tell us.

We have left ourselves little room for the other books on our list. We call special attention to that of Mr. Dieffenbach, because he saw the country when immigration was only beginning, and because, as an outsider, he was able to give a disinterested opinion of the native character. Things would have been very different had colonists imitated him in scrupulous care for native feelings. Mr. Buller's book there is less need that we should notice, because it is likely to be in the hands of many of our readers; it is a plain, unvarnished account of a life's labour in the cause of God. We do not go along with the writer in his low estimate of the natives—though even he allows that in many instances they showed wonderful self-sacrifice. Sensuality and cruelty are, alas, in human nature and therefore are sure to come out—not more in Maoris than in other heathens. Mr. Buller's hearty appreciation of the labours of other denominations does him great credit, as does the way in which he avoids unpleasant reference to the disputes with the Church of England. His illustrations of New Zealand scenery are very interesting.

To return to Mr. Gudgeon, we find, among other strange assertions, the following most amusing instance of a *non-sequitur* "The natives, finding that the more they demanded the more they obtained, the chiefs being mostly native assessors with good salaries, finished by entering into a league, proclaimed

a king, and declined to sell any more land." We marvel to find Mr. Gudgeon giving it as an instance of Maori shrewdness that just when their chiefs were drawing large salaries and their land was bringing more than it was worth, they should throw up the whole affair and put a sudden end to their gains. The fact is that, in spite of those gains, the far-sighted among them began to discern that as things were going on their own extinction was but a question of time, and so they tried the only possible remedy, seeing that the fair-spoken Government arrangements had proved delusive. Whether it will prove an effectual remedy or not must depend partly on the Christian temper of the settlers, partly on the action of the Government. If Government insists on peace between white man and Maori, and when the pinch comes and settlers are anxious to swarm over the yet unoccupied lands, distinctly forbids extension, then the Maoris may be preserved, educated in European culture, and eventually absorbed in a peaceful way. But if continuous colonisation is permitted on the plea that the reserves are needlessly large and that the wants of the immigrants are pressing, we shall have the same farce repeated in New Zealand which has so often sickened the Christian world in North America. The native will be told to give up a part of what he still retains; and then, by-and-by, to give up yet more; till at last, after a war of extermination, if indeed he still retains spirit enough to fight, what yet remains will be wrested from him, and the Chatham Isles will become the Maori Flinder's Island, the pitiable dying-out-ground of a race worthy of better things. This will be a sad end indeed to all that has been done by devoted Christian effort in an island where it was at one time sincerely hoped that the problem had been successfully solved of Christianising and civilising the native race without exterminating it.

A few words more upon the land question. Those who think that the Maori tribal system was nothing but the childish whim of savages, should read M. Laveleye or Sir H. S. Maine on early village communities. They will then learn that the tribal system, as opposed to individual proprietorship, has been, nay is, the rule over the greater part of the world.

"But the Maoris had a great deal more than they could use; and, therefore, we were justified in taking some from them." This needs qualification. No tribe occupied at one time all its land; but when Lieut. Gudgeon says the uncultivated

lands of New Zealand were nothing but barren fern wastes and bush, which the natives offered in miles to the first settlers for a blanket or a gun, he leaves out several needful qualifications. First, the fern wastes were by no means barren; every farmer knows that land must be rich to carry fern. And though, as he remarks, the Maoris had no hunting grounds, there being no wild animals except the rat, and no eatable birds since the moa was killed out save the parrot and the pigeon, and they did not care to till more than their garden patches, their system of tillage nevertheless involved the possession of a large surface of good ground. Their plan was to exhaust the soil close to the pah, and then to shift their quarters, building another pah and breaking up fresh ground, and so on, till having gone through all the best land belonging to the tribe they would find the original patch in good heart after a long fallow. Next as to selling land. It is not likely that men who were accustomed to the system just described would barter away their land recklessly: and further it is highly improbable that when the first settlers came among them the Maoris could form any notion of alienating land by absolute sale. A drunken Maori might, after rubbing noses with his white tempter, profess to sell him what the other so much coveted; but, even if the drunken man knew what he was about, he was doing what he had no right to do, for land among the New Zealanders was as much a tribal possession as it was among our Aryan forefathers.

This is a point that can never be too often insisted on. The modern English ideas about land are very modern as well as very limited in their acceptance. Among the Jews, as we see from the case of the daughters of Zelophehad, individual ownership was not allowed to stand against tribal right. The old Celts and Germans looked on all land as the property of the tribe, managed by the chief in the interest of all. In later times the king took the chief's place; and English law long recognised the king as paramount owner of all the soil in England, in trust, of course, for the nation. Hence, the whole system of fiefs, all land being held as a benefice in consideration for certain services.

Among the Maoris tribal ownership had not yet been modified even by feudalism; and to talk of a man selling (as we understand selling) land for a blanket or a gun betrays an ignorance as dense as that of Colonel Wakefield, alluded to above.

Hence many of the early treaties made by our Government were based on a mistake. No doubt we meant well for the Maoris, while we were certainly not indifferent to our own interests. It is something that in one instance at least a Christian nation, as a nation, imitated the policy of the Quakers in Pennsylvania. We did not assume that the whole island belonged to us by right of our inborn superiority, and (in Mr. Gudgeon's words), "then deal out the benefits of civilisation as they could comprehend and enjoy them." What these benefits are to aborigines, the Maoris might learn from the case of Tasmania. "We made a treaty acknowledging them as lords of the soil, and they agreed to sell their land as the Government required it for immigration purposes." In making such a treaty the Maoris could have no clear idea of what they were doing; they knew nothing of England, its resources, its teeming population; as to immigration, at most they would expect a few settlers such as were their own forefathers when, not so many generations before they had come into the island. Such a settlement they would have welcomed, for it would have brought them the arts of life without crushing them out by pressure of numbers. But, when they saw the scale on which the immigration was going on, when they saw the land around Auckland and the other towns wholly Europeanised and felt themselves being edged out in all directions, they would feel that though the treaty was being kept in word, it was broken in spirit—was interpreted by the Pakehas as something very different from what they had intended. Hence, looking at the matter from a Maori point of view, we see that land disputes and land wars were inevitable, unless the immigration had been (as we hold it ought to have been) strictly limited in numbers. Either these people were or they were not put by God into our hands to be first Christianised and then raised to a higher level of civilisation, and made (as they are fully capable of being) our equals in the world's work. If not, there was no need for treaties. "Supply and demand" should have been left to do their work. There was the supply of land, and the demand for it was strong enough among those who had no hope of finding a living at home. But, if we felt ourselves to be God's stewards in dealing with these His less favoured children, we should have taken care to make our stewardship a reality and not a sham. As it is, the Maoris had to teach us, during a grievous war of nearly fifteen years—a war which did very much to upset all the

missionary work,—that they were not going to be got rid of with impunity. For this very reason, no doubt, they have been far better treated than any other aborigines. Government honestly meant in most instances to give them a fair price for their land; but no price could be fair under such conditions, for to sell their land would be to give up the future of their race. Even to lease it must be a somewhat dangerous experiment. A tribe that had advantageously leased their land would be sorely tempted to live on their rents, in idleness and debauchery, instead of devoting themselves to industry of some kind. Uncivilised races are relatively mere children, and must be dealt with paternally. The one way to save the remnant of the Maoris (and it is certainly not to our credit that they are only a remnant) is to protect them as well against themselves and the consequences of their own folly as against the too rapid influx of whites. By-and-by they will be able to bear this influx—able to hold their own in the competition which the presence of whites among them will bring. By-and-by, too, the race of half-castes, of which Dr. Dieffenbach speaks in such high terms, will, we hope, have multiplied. But at present, surely, our duty is to insist on the Maori kingdom being not further circumscribed. This is our duty as Christians; and, further, it is for us a matter of national honour. Our self-complacency would be rudely shaken could we hear how French and Germans contrast our loud professions of Christianity with the actual results in Tasmania and through all the South Pacific. We have only to see what a calm philosopher, M. de Quatrefages, says about us in his recent book on *The Human Species*.

It will be no use pleading, when the Maoris are extinct, that they were unimprovable, and we could not help their destruction; for they are improvable, and we can help it if we will. If not, we must admit that our Christianity is useless in regulating our relations with other races.

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**ART. VII.—*Il Buddha, Confucio e Lao-Tse : notizie e Studi intorno alle Religione dell' Asia Orientale.*** Di CARLO PUINI. Firenze : Sansoni. 1878.

- 2. *Chips from a German Workshop.* By MAX MULLER, M.A. Volume I. *Essays on the Science of Religion.* Longmans.
3. *Buddhism : Being a Sketch of the Life and Teachings of Gautama, the Buddha.* By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law, and late of the Ceylon Civil Service. London : Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.

FROM the earliest times when the doctrines and dogmas of the religion of Sakyamuni began to be studied it has been disputed, and the dispute is not yet at an end, what the Buddhists mean by their Nirvana, the name they give to the final destiny reserved for man. Some interpret the word as the total extinction of every kind of existence ; others, on the contrary, desirous to defend Buddhism, so deeply compromised as an atheistic system, from the monstrous doctrine of those who make the death of the body the death of the soul, would make the word signify a certain form of existence possible only after death : an existence that is of absolute rest from the turmoil of changeful and passionate being. Some learned students of comparative religion deny that the founder of Buddhism ever taught the dogma of annihilation, and assert that this was afterwards introduced by a modern school ; others, equally learned, invert the hypothesis, insisting that Sakyamuni taught the absolute extinction of being, and that the modern schools of thought which sprang up from contact with various races introduced the innovation of an eternal Nirvana of untroubled existence. It certainly is admitted by all who have authority on this subject, that the founder, in his preaching, omitted the Uncreated and Eternal Being, and that his system may be called atheistic ; but they admit also that later schools of the system (reverting back to Brahmanism) introduced the idea of a supreme intelligence, the Creator of the universe.

Down to the first century of the Christian era the doctrines taught by Gautama had been, according to



tradition, transmitted orally for more than four hundred years, and faithfully preserved in this secret teaching. Buddhism had already established itself in a great part of Northern India, in Cashmire, in some parts of Central Asia, and in Ceylon, when it was thought the fitting time to give a written form to the teachings of this philosopher. The Buddhists of the north—that is, those of India and Cashmire—and the Buddhists of the south, or of Ceylon, undertook the compilation of the sacred Scriptures; but independently of each other. In Ceylon that compilation was made under the reign of the Vartagamani (88—76 B.C.), and the Singhalese vernacular was probably adopted for it, from which, in the fifth century of an era, it was translated into Pali, the sacred language of the Buddhists of the south. In the north the undertaking began later, and took effect in the time of the synod convoked by the king Kanishka, who reigned in Cashmire 10—40 A.D., using in the compilation the Sanscrit tongue. The primitive Buddhism maintained its original form distinct from all other systems, during the first two centuries of its existence. From that time, it separated into various schools, springing from the philosophical speculations of the many Brahmans who espoused the new doctrine; and this was in part the reason that some of these schools were confused, as to their metaphysical teachings, with others of India. This might easily be foreseen, when we consider the tendency there was in the proselytes of Sakyamuni, not contented with the simple truth announced by him, to elaborate new theories which should adapt themselves to Buddhism and wear its appearance. In the sequel, when Buddhism, having gone beyond India, established its dominion in Thibet, in China, in Mongolia, in Japan, it found itself in the midst of new beliefs; and its tolerant nature led it to accept modifications by no means indifferent, which took from it much of its primitive character. The place where it underwent fewest alterations through internal influences, and where it consequently maintained itself in most purity, was Ceylon, whence it was introduced into Burmah and Siam. There, beyond any other region, we may find true accounts of the original Buddhist doctrine: preserved by a body of clergy which Childers calls “one of the most enlightened, generous, and liberal-minded in the world.” But the Buddhism professed by the northern nations, besides being impregnated at the outset

with many Brahmanical ideas, appropriated a vast number of popular superstitions and beliefs.

Hence, Buddhism may be divided into three periods: first, the primitive form it assumed in the preaching of Sakyamuni; secondly, the period when it began to elaborate philosophical doctrines, which made it approximate to Brahmanism; and, thirdly, the later period when, besides the Brahmanical symbolism, it incorporated endless superstitions which reigned in the regions to which it had been carried. The Buddhist system which bears the name of Hinayana corresponds pretty nearly to the first period; that is, to the period of the undiluted teaching of Gautama. The elements of that teaching are given in the volume of Signor Puini, with great fulness; and, as our present subject cannot be understood without placing it in relation to Buddha and Buddhism generally, we shall condense our author's sketch mostly in his own words freely translated:

"Buddhism is at this day professed by a third part of the human race; and under its beneficial influence the ferocious nomads of Central Asia became civilised and social. Many peoples owe to it all their culture, civil and moral. India owes to it that great reformation by means of which, resisting all the persecutions of the most arrogant clergy in the world, was proclaimed the perfect equality of men, and the utter abolition of caste. However strange and absurd may seem some of its dogmas to us in the West, we ought to make ourselves acquainted with a system which has played so long so prominent a part in the moral and civil history of Asiatic peoples. Buddhism, says a modern writer, is the vastest religious system of the world; and it embraces all those branches of science which Western nations have been accustomed to regard as summing up human knowledge. It is indubitable that Buddhism, exploring the free mystery of nature, brought to light many truths which Western science discovered much later. As to the plurality of worlds, and their formation, it anticipated by two thousand years the nebular hypothesis, and in its researches into the cosmic life of this earth it intuitively perceived not a few of the results of modern astronomy and geology.

"But the question may be asked if the doctrines of Sakyamuni and their development constitute a religion or a philosophy. If we consider Buddhism as it is in the countries which it now pervades, if we look at its temples, convents, idols, altars, priests, if we cast our eyes on the worship of the superstitious and ignorant crowds, it must appear to be a religion. But, although behind the dogmas, ceremonies, and absurd beliefs of the present

Buddhist system, we may still perceive, in more or less corrupt forms, the fundamental forms of the Buddhas original doctrine, yet it is plain that the Buddhism which is professed by four hundred millions of men in the present day, is very far from being that which issued from the mind of Sakya Muni."

Hence the importance of studying the system in the earliest written documents, and of separating them from the enormous mass of its subsequent literature. And in studying them it must appear to the thoughtful mind that it was a philosophy which aimed to conduct men to a state of purity and ideal perfection. Viewed as a religion it is the most grotesque religious system the world has ever known. It knows no divinity, admits no creator, denies a soul capable of proper and eternal existence, regards life as the sum of all misery, and exhibits as its supreme good, and the only reward of men who are counted worthy of it, an eternal rest, whence the aliment of life is banished, and where all the energies of body and soul are for ever suppressed. Whatever that ultimate goal may have been in the mind of the founder of this system, it included no personal active existence either before a personal god or within His essence; and in every variety of form it taught the suppression of conscious activity and enjoyment. Such a system must needs be one of the greatest wonders to men generally, and a perpetual enigma to the philosophic student: a doctrine that places Nothing at the end of many successive existences, nevertheless subdued the hearts of some of the fiercest tribes of Asia, set multitudes of men on the severest pursuit of virtue, and some centuries before Christ inculcated the brotherhood of mankind and the perfect love of the neighbour.

"The Buddhist faith sprang from the sorrow and despair of life. The ancient and general lamentation sent up by man showed that he did not count himself the most perfect of beings. But, among all those who have sent up this profound lamentation, among all those who have bewailed the distresses of men, no man conceived of sorrow in a way so grand as Sakya Muni; no one equalled him in the deep feeling of human infelicity. Like the elegiac psalmody of a whole race immersed in thick melancholy, Buddhism bewailed the miseries of life, the fleeting nature of joy, the vain hopes which recede further and further, and leave the human soul in bitter and cruel disenchantment. It aimed to calm, to destroy, to annul the misery inherent in human nature, under whatever form life may manifest itself; its ambi-

tion was to liberate humanity on the largest scale. The Buddha consecrated himself supremely to this. The means which he adopted to attain this end, Nirvana, or the extinction of being, may seem to many a monstrous and frightful theory, incompatible with the ideas of our race, contrary to those aspirations which our psychology has not hesitated to call a universal sentiment of mankind, but it was not on that account less really the true, only, and inevitable consequence of its system. As to the Buddha himself, we are bound to confess that, notwithstanding the errors into which he fell, there never was a man in the world, save Jesus, who so much loved mankind as he did; so much sympathised with its sorrows, and so entirely gave himself up first to ameliorate and then to end its troubles. 'Reading the details of the life of Sakya Muni,' says Bigaudet, vicar apostolic of Ava and Pegu, 'it is impossible not to be reminded of many of the actions of the life of our Saviour. The Christian system and the Buddhist have an extraordinary resemblance, in spite of the abyss that separates them; and the assertion ought not to be held inconsiderate, that many of the moral truths which adorn the Gospel are found in the Buddhist Scriptures.' .

Our object is not to treat of Buddhism in general as a system of metaphysics or theology, nor to examine the history whether of its founder or of its subsequent sects. But a few words may be spent upon both by way of necessary introduction, and we cannot do better than borrow from Professor Max Müller a few sentences, which we shall take the liberty of selecting and combining into one paragraph.

"Buddha, or more correctly the Buddha—for Buddha is an appellative meaning enlightened—was born at Kapilavastu, the capital of a kingdom of the same name, situated at the foot of the mountains of Nepal, north of the present Oude. His father, the King of Kapilavastu, was of the family of the Sakyas, and belonged to the clan of the Gautamas. The name of Buddha, or the Buddha, dates from a later period of his life, and so probably does the name Siddharta (he whose deeds have been accomplished), though we are told that it was given him in his childhood. . . . The child grew up a most beautiful and most accomplished boy, who soon knew more than his master could teach him. He refused to take part in the games of his playmates, and never felt so happy as when he could sit alone, lost in meditation in the deep shadows of the forest. It was there that his father found him when he had thought him lost; and, in order to prevent the young prince from becoming a dreamer, the king determined to marry him at once. When the subject was mentioned by the aged ministers to the future heir to the throne,

he demanded seven days for reflection, and, convinced at last that not even marriage could disturb the calm of his mind, he allowed the ministers to look out for a princess. Their marriage proved one of the happiest, but the prince remained, as he had been before, absorbed in meditation in the problems of life and death. 'Nothing is stable on earth, he used to say ; ' nothing is real, life is like the spark produced by wood. It is lighted, and is extinguished : we know not whence it came and whither it goes. There must be some supreme intelligence where we could find rest. If I attained it, I could bring light to man ; if I were free myself, I could deliver the world.' "

Here is the germ of his whole doctrine. Multitudes of legends embellish the account of his final determination to forsake the world and betake himself to contemplation and the separation of his soul from all phenomenal things.

" Making every possible allowance for the accumulation of fiction which is sure to gather round the life of the founder of every great religion, we may be satisfied that Buddhism, which changed the aspect not only of India, but of nearly the whole of Asia, had a real founder ; that he was not a Brahman by birth, but belonged to the second or royal caste ; that, being of a meditative turn of mind, and deeply impressed with the frailty of all created things, he became a recluse, and sought for light and comfort in the different systems of Brahman philosophy and theology. Dissatisfied with the artificial systems of their priests and philosophers, convinced of the uselessness, nay of the pernicious influence, of their ceremonial practices and bodily penances, shocked, too, by their worldliness and pharisaical conceit, which made the priesthood the exclusive property of one caste, and rendered every approach of man to his Creator impossible without their intervention, Buddha must have produced at once a powerful impression on the people at large, when, breaking through all the established rules of caste, he assumed the privileges of a Brahman, and, throwing away the splendour of his royal position, travelled about as a beggar, not shrinking from the defiling contact of publicans and sinners. Though, when we now speak of Buddhism, we think chiefly of its doctrines, the reform of Buddha had originally much more of a social than of a religious character. Buddha swept away the web with which the Brahmans had encircled the whole of India. Beginning as the destroyer of an old he became the founder of a new religion. . . . The most important element of the Buddhist reform has always been its social and moral code, not its metaphysical theories. That moral code, taken by itself, is one of the most perfect which the world has ever known. On this point all testimonies, from hostile and from friendly quarters agree, and hence Hardy, a Wesleyan missionary,

speaking of the Dhamma Padan, or the 'Footsteps of the Law,' admits that a collection might be made from the precepts of this work which in the purity of its ethics could hardly be equalled from any other heathen author. M. Laboulaye remarks: 'It is difficult to comprehend how men not assisted by revelation could have soared so high, and approached so near the truth.' Besides the five great commandments not to kill, not to commit adultery, not to lie, not to get drunk, every shade of vice, hypocrisy, anger, pride, suspicion, greediness, gossiping, cruelty to animals, is guarded against by special precepts. Among the virtues recommended we find not only reverence of parents, care for children, submission to authority, gratitude, moderation in time of prosperity, submission in time of trial, equanimity at all times, but virtues unknown in any heathen system of morality, such as the duty of forgiving insults, and not rewarding evil with evil. All virtues, we are told, spring from Maitri, and this Maitri can only be translated by charity and love. 'I do not hesitate,' says Burnouf, 'to translate by charity the word Maitri; it does not express friendship or the feeling of particular affection which man has for one or more of his fellow-creatures, but that universal feeling which inspires us with goodwill towards all men and constant willingness to help them.' We add one more testimony from the work of M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire: 'I do not hesitate to add that, save Christ alone, there is none among the founders of religion that presents a figure more pure and more touching than that of Buddha. His life has no stain. His constant heroism equals his conviction; and, if the theory he preaches is false, the personal examples he gives are irreproachable. He is the finished model of all the virtues he proclaims; his abnegation, his charity, his unalterable sweetness, are not belied a single moment. He abandons at nineteen the court of the king his father to become a religious and a mendicant, he silently prepares his doctrine during six years of retreat and meditation; he propagates it by the sole power of word and persuasion during more than half a century; and, when he dies in the arms of his disciples, it is with the serenity of a sage who has practised piety all his life, and is assured of having found the truth.'

To this we shall return. Meanwhile it is desirable to consider the relation of Gautama to the state of things by which he was surrounded. India presented at the time of Gautama Buddha a state of things very much like that of Greece in the time of Socrates and Plato, when rival schools and philosophers everywhere encountered each other. Celebrated Brahmans gathered around them numerous disciples. Not a few sages, in order to reach perfection in science and morals, lived in hermitages, far from

the impure converse of society, dedicating themselves to meditation and the contemplation of nature; men of the Brahmin caste were distinguished as priests or sacrificers, and wise men or philosophers. The former conducted all religious functions, had wives, and were heads of families. The philosophers lived for the most part in celibacy, removed far from the world in woods and hermitages. Their religion was of a different stamp from that of the priests; it took the form of a secret doctrine imparted mysteriously to disciples carefully chosen. Three fundamental dogmas lay at the foundation of this religion: The creation of the world, the existence of one supreme spirit pervading the universe, and the transmigration of souls. The one end to which these Indian philosophers directed their aims was to purify their spirit by delivering it from human passions, by rendering it superior to pleasures and pains, indifferent to everything that moves the human heart, and worthy to be at last received into the unspeakable and imperishable joys which await the pure in the bosom of the supreme spirit who penetrates and glorifies every place in the universe. In order to this they lived temperate and chaste lives, mortifying the flesh and living on vegetables which themselves gathered, or on the alms which their neighbours might bring them. Such were the Brahmins of the time of Gautama and Alexander the Great.

In the Punjaub and in the Valley of the Ganges there was a great number of these philosophers and anchorites. The most eminent of these attracted disciples, who placed themselves under discipline, while many of them went into the populous cities to seek proselytes and expound their doctrine. Hence arose the many schools in which were elaborated those systems of philosophy for which India has been famous from hoar antiquity. Siddharta, the son of a king, or Gautama, afterwards the Buddha, was himself one of them; and his whole system was a new school which aimed at the reformation of Brahmanism. He first retired into privacy, and then spent his life in wandering as a missionary of his own doctrine. With his life and history we have not here to do. Suffice that he won great success, saw kings and Brahmins converted, and was recognised by the poor and afflicted as their saviour. He made no pretence to supernatural aid, nor did he declare himself clothed with Divine authority. His desire was to be a sage and not a God; and the people

called him Buddha, or the Wise, because they reputed him the most instructed of men. "The Buddha," says Koepen, "is a man, and nothing more than a man; not the incarnation of any celestial being. His wisdom was not revealed to him from above, nor revealed to him by any god, but was the fruit of his own meditative nature." So Burnouf writes: "He lived, and taught, and died as a philosopher; and his humanity was a fact so incontestably acknowledged by all, that the legendists, to whom miracles were so easy, had no idea of making him a god after his death. There are few faiths that repose on so small a number of dogmas and impose fewer sacrifices on common sense. I speak here particularly of the Buddhism that seems to me the most ancient of the human Buddhism, if I may venture so to term it, which consists almost entirely of some very simple rules of morality.

But, in proportion as Sakyamuni himself receded into the distance, the doctrine concerning him assumed other proportions, lost its human simplicity, and elevated him above mortals in the eyes of his adorers. The Buddha of the Hinayana, that is of Buddhism primitive, is no other than the only man who, until then, had been able to liberate himself from the sufferings of existence, which the Buddhists call Sansara, or, as we should say, the world; the only man who had been able to effect the annihilation of himself; to deliver himself from transmigration, and from the penalty of any future birth. He was not the sovereign of the universe, nor did he become so after death and Nirvana. But the Buddha of the Mahayana is a very different personage. He is in communion with all worlds of which the Buddhist universe is composed, and did not lose his own personality, not even after death. Moreover, the new Buddhism peoples its universe with an infinite multitude of Buddhas. It admits, contrary to the primitive doctrine, that an Arrhat, or eminent saint, after being immersed in Nirvana, remains still in the world for the instruction of men; to excite their imitation, and to unfold to them the deep mysteries of the Buddhist law. Yet these diverse Buddhas are not themselves, even in that system, creators or governors of the universe.

Returning, however, to the original Gautama on his way to Buddhahip, we find him adopting the great principles that had always regulated Indian philosophy, but giving them an altogether new direction. To liberate the soul from



sense, and the dominion of the unreal world of illusion, and to cut off the entail of transmigration, had been long the scope of Indian thought, whether in the Vedanta or in the Samkhya. Signor Puini gives us the following vivid sketch of the first dawn of Buddhism in the mind of the Buddha :

"We have now reached that crisis in the life of Siddharta at which the legends invest him with the quality of Buddha, placing him finally in possession of the longed-for science that he had been seeking for seven years. It was under the shade of the gigantic *Ficus religiosa*, the ornament of the forests of India, that, according to the canonical scriptures, the Prince of Kapilavastu was transformed into the Buddha, or the Sage of sages, in possession of the true doctrine which alone could 'deliver human souls from the ocean of transmigration, and conduct them to a state of eternal repose and quiet.' The legend preserves the words which he pronounced on the act of becoming Buddha, and he felt the truth revealed to him, 'I have gone through infinite existences, seeking the architect of this receptacle of concupiscence which is called man, and in sorrow have always been born again. At last I see thee and know thee, O maker of life ! and thou shalt no more make for me the tabernacle of passions and appetites. I will lay aside thy ornaments, I will destroy thy stones. My mind reposes for ever ; every desire is stilled in my heart.' For seven days the Buddha remained in this place in continual meditation, reasoning out in himself the principal points of the doctrine and the few principles which run through the Bhuddist writings. He asked himself first, "What is the cause of all the miseries and sorrows which afflict man ? It is no other than existence. And the cause of existence ? Love. And love springs from desire and concupiscence in the senses which are moved and disturbed by that which is in the world. But if that which is in the world begets in the senses concupiscence, love, life, grief, it is because man looks at the world with an infirm mind and a false judgment. Ignorance, therefore, is the cause of the evils that afflict mankind ; *from ignorance springs the world and all that it contains.* The knowledge that has dissipated in me every illusion, as light dissipates darkness, has shown me all things in their reality, and I have seen the vanity of all that surrounds me. Meanwhile, there is nothing in the universe but affliction and sorrow. All beings, miserably held in the vortex of life, are driven hither and thither by the disorderly waves of concupiscence, attracted by fallacious appearances towards objects which never satisfy their desires. Knowledge alone can save humanity. The knowledge to which the Buddha ascribed so much value and power has its foundation in the *Four Noble Truths* so familiar in Buddhism : (1) Sorrow as the inheritance of all beings, in whatever condition

of life they may be found (gods, man, animals, and demons) ; (2) the infinite number of desires and passions which fill the heart of the living is the cause of sorrow ; (3) the destruction of passions and desires is the sole means of salvation ; (4) the destruction of the passions and desires is found in Nirvana, or in the destruction of being. Such was the result reached by his long study and meditation. This was the basis on which was built the hinge on which revolved the whole Buddhist system. The tree under which Siddharta meditated and formulated the fundamental truths of his doctrine was called *The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil*, as its Indian name was translated by P. Georgi, *The Tree of Bodhi*. It is supposed to exist still, and is the object of great devotion."

It has been seen that the fourth of the noble truths prescribes the way in which to reach Nirvana. The moral way consisted in eight things, which give the main principles of Buddhist morality. But the physical way—it may be so called—was the series of existences through which the soul must pass in order to its final detachment from all things sensible and material, which final detachment is the indispensable condition of attaining the final state. It is necessary, therefore, to consider what our Buddhist doctrine of transmigration meant.

Metempsychosis, or rather transmigration, is one of the fundamental dogmas of all Buddhism. And this must be rightly understood if we would rightly understand the system generally, and its Nirvana. It is common in its principle to Buddhism and Brahmanism. But there is a remarkable difference between the metempsychosis of the latter and what may be called the metamorphosis of the former. In the Brahminical system the soul of existence, which is only a part of the universal soul, clothes different bodies in successive states of being, until, purged through successive transmigrations through all the forms of creation, it is led back to the supreme essence from which it was taken. In this the individual being is confounded as a drop of water which falls into the ocean ; it loses its individuality and forms part of the divine substance of Brahm. The Buddhist metempsychosis is not the transmigration of the soul or spirit through various bodies, as the Brahmins and the Pythagoreans taught. Buddhism affirms, on the contrary, that after death the spirit perishes with the body ; but that out of the complete dissolution of the individual there is born another being which will be animal, or man, or deva, according to its merits ; that is, according to the

actions it had done in the life past. In the language of the Buddhists, transmigration is occasioned or regulated by the efficacy of merits or demerits, to which the name Karma is given; but this efficacy is of such a nature that a being which has reached the term of life does not transmit anything of its own entity to the individual immediately reproduced by the quality of its action. This last is a totally distinct entity, independent of the former; created, it is true, by the influence of the merits or demerits of the former, but yet having nothing in common with it. The Karma, or influence of merits and demerits, produces the creature, like a moral fate, just as the fruits, which may be good or evil, produce trees totally distinct from the one from the other. This is a marvellous doctrine, and one which requires to the Western mind almost a new metaphysical sense to understand it. Its originator, the Buddha himself, thus illustrates it by figures: "One lamp may be kindled by means of another. Being kindled, the two are quite distinct; but the second has its light from the first, and without it could not have been kindled. The tree produces the fruit, and from that fruit another tree grows, and so forth. The last tree is not, however, the same tree, while it is a consequence of the former. If that had not been, this had not been. Man is the tree; his actions are its fruit, and the vital force of the fruit is desire. Good and bad actions give their quality to the fruit, so that existence, springing from them, will be happy or unhappy; and the quality of the fruit has its effect on the plant which grows from it." Thus, on this strange theory, the souls of the living had not really an existence in other organised forms; but a being, under the influence of passion and desire, performed good or bad actions, in consequence of which, after his death, a new being is produced in a new body and a new soul. That which migrates or transmigrates is not, in fact, the spirit, the soul, the I, but as it were the conduct and the character of the man. The living universe is created by the works of its occupants: it is simply the effect of these.

But what does Buddhism say about the cause of these laborious transmigrations? Why are all creatures condemned to this inevitable law? The reply in its sacred writings is that all beings are impure and full of sin. But whence came their sin? Man, they say, from the time he appeared on this earth has given himself up to the guidance

of his desires, and run after pleasure ; whence have arisen bad passions, lusts, hatred, avarice, and has fallen into all kinds of sensuality. But, once more, how was this possible ? How could man thus fall into sensuality and sin unless they were so biassed from the beginning ? The only reply is, that all creatures have this inclination, which comes from the sin which they have in themselves, not yet extinct, bringing it with them into the world when they are born. Sin in the present world is the consequence of the continuation of sin which came from a former world, and so on to infinity. Of the ultimate origin of this the Buddhist scriptures say absolutely nothing. They know no God whose law was broken at the outset of human history. They know no spirit independent of the body, which therefore could carry its individual guilt into another form of existence. The soul or spirit or mind, the *manas*, is only a sixth sense or element of existence, residing in the heart : it is only a resultant or consequence of the animal organism, and disappears when this disappears. Hence the same obscurity that rests upon the past rests upon the future. No man knows the future of his destiny : no man can read his own Karma. However good he may have endeavoured to be, he knows not what sins of the past, not yet expiated, await expiation in the ages to come. The Buddhist must die without hope. But he knows that there is no eternity for him, either of pleasure or of pain ; since nothing is eternal but Nothing and the law of eternal mutability. On this point, however, there is great confusion in the writings. The issue of all would seem to be that the difference between the good and the evil, the wise and the unwise, is simply that the former never reach the annihilation of being. Here we may quote a Burmese account given in Bigandet, which is very suggestive :

“ It is written in the Scriptures that a Brahmin went to consult Gautama on some points of knowledge as to which he was in great perplexity, and said to him : ‘ I am agitated by many doubts touching the past, the present, and the future. I ask myself, Have I lived in other generations ? and, if so, what was my condition during these existences ? The reply I make to myself is that I know nothing about anything. What was my condition before I came into this world ? I know not. And is it a truth that I now exist ? or is my existence nothing but a dream ? Shall I live again or not ? What are these beings that I see around me ? Are they only illusions which delude me with the appear-

ance of reality? I know nothing about it, literally nothing. And the future is for me full of the most cruel uncertainty. What will be my condition during the existences that are to come? A dense veil hides from my eyes all that is prepared for me in the future. How may I carry a little light into the midst of so great a darkness? And the Buddha said: 'Consider in the first place this fundamental point: that what we are wont to call our person, our I, is no other than *name* and *form*; that is to say, is only a composite of four elements, which are subject to a perpetual transformation, under the power and influence of Karma. Persuaded of this truth, you have only to know the reason that produces the *name* and the *form*. As soon as you direct your thought to what I say every doubt will pass from your mind. What a difference with the followers of other doctrines which take not the trouble to search into the nature of beings, nor the occasion of their existence! They are tenacious of their beliefs; and die saying that what the ignorant, ruled by illusion, call an animal, a king, a subject, a stone, a hand, are really animals, kings, subjects, stones. These are truly full of error; whence it comes that they follow various paths; and we reckon among them more than sixty schools are different, but all united in rejecting with equal obstinacy the true doctrine of the Buddha. These are condemned to wander unceasingly in the circle of infinite existences. How different is the condition of the true believers, our disciples! They know that the living beings which inhabit the world have a cause; but they see the folly of seeking to penetrate the origin and the first cause, which is beyond the capacity of the loftiest intelligences. To them it is evident, for example, that the seeds of a tree contain in themselves the principle of reproduction; but no one presumes to know what this principle is. Our disciples know well that what the vulgar call man, woman, animal, horse, insect, are only illusory distinctions which vanish before the eyes of the wise, who sees only in what is around him *name* and *form*, or what is produced by Karma and Avidya, or ignorance. These are not the man or the woman, but the efficient causes of them. What I say as to the man and woman may be said of all other beings. They are all the result of Karma and Avidya, and are distinct from these two agents as the effect is from the cause. Our disciples know that the five Skanda which compose the human body pass from generation to generation through the whole series of rebirths to which that is condemned; but that they pass in such a manner that the second generation holds no memory of the Skanda of the first. Only the occasions which produce them, that is Karma and Avidya, never change.'"

When it is said that these two words are the cause of all the modes of being, Avidya is objective, Karma subjective. Avidya or ignorance gives birth in the mind of the

individual to a multitude of illusions, which he regards as real forms appearing in the inhabitants of the world. Thus the things which surround him have their origin for him through himself: their true nature is revealed to him by the science of Buddha. On the other hand, if he wants to know whence he himself comes, his origin must be sought in Karma, or actions performed in another existence: thus he comes to know the reason of the condition and manner of his present being. All beings are only a composite of four elements—earth, water, air, and fire. Intellectual operations are produced by the heart, where resides the manas, as vision resides in the eye. All existence is doomed to perpetual transformation through the action of Karma. But the parts which on transmigration make up a new being have no relation to the being which was before. Only the merit or quality goes on; and with endless processes of purification, total extinction is finally reached for him, while the series goes on eternally in the universe.

We are now prepared for the consideration of the great word that has exercised the thought of all students of Buddhism from the beginning. The question is as to what conception was entertained of Nirvana by the primitive doctrine, preserved in its most ancient canonical scriptures, and only a little altered by the more recent speculations of the philosophers.

On this point, as has been observed, much difference of opinion exists. The majority of the students of Buddhism, including Burnouf, Spence Hardy, Gogerley, hold that Nirvana meant absolute nullity; while very many, including Colebrook, Max Müller, Beal, Bunsen, Neander, deny, or at least much modify, this assertion. Our author classifies the objections urged by the latter to the notion that Nirvana was originally "a total extinction of every species of existence" under three heads: the impossibility that man would ever have accepted the Buddhist doctrine, if it had really pronounced nothing but absolute extinction as its *summum bonum*; the fact that in the Sutra-pitaka and Vinaya-pitaka, the two parts of the Buddhist canon containing its most ancient scriptures, the word Nirvana is never used in the sense of total "annihilation" but of that of "quiet," "immortality," "felicity," "wellbeing;" and, finally, the records of the Buddha's reappearance, after entering the state of Nirvana, to teach his disciples. These objections are examined in detail, in order to their

refutation. The argumentation is deeply interesting, and the reader must judge for himself what value it has.

The first argument against the extreme view of the original doctrine of Nirvana is the simple one that it is inconsistent with the moral teaching and vast practical influence of Buddhism as it sprang from its founder. It taught the highest virtue and disciplined men to perfect superiority over the world of sense, and yet is supposed to have offered no reward but extinction. Such a doctrine would not be accepted by half the world with the eagerness that welcomed the teaching of Buddha. To this it is replied that this teacher did not propound his doctrine as one likely to be acceptable. "My doctrine," he said, "is profound, difficult, and hard to be understood; it is sublime, and worthy to be known only of the wise;" and again, "very few men will attain to the Nirvana; the greatest part will continue their course among the pleasures of existence." His one end was to teach that existence as such was nothing but an infinite congeries of miseries, and to point out in the Nirvana the only means of liberation; and this was the necessary and inevitable consequence of his whole system. Moreover, he did not forget that men demand reward, and will not undertake the severities of virtue without hope of some good result. He taught that every good work will have its recompense, and every evil work its punishment. These retributions were, on his system, reserved for the future life, and connected with his doctrine of transmigration. Now these future births in new existence will be very numerous, or rather infinite; good actions may be of such a kind as to secure a state less unhappy, indeed, but still under the bondage of existence. Now Gautama undoubtedly taught that existence is essentially and as such miserable; but if men loved it, he would not take it away from them; all he would say was that they must be as virtuous as possible, that their existence might be hereafter less and less miserable. He whose high ambition spurned this attenuated misery and yearned to rest for ever from all the ills of being, had before him the Nirvana. But how awfully difficult its attainment! What manifold forms of being must be passed through, what many forms through how many ages of incarnation before every sin was purged away, and that perfect virtue or that perfect science reached which would make the man himself a Buddha! Nirvana was for the

saints alone, but men might become good without being such saints. Thus that most wonderful system, which has held captive more human minds than any other, did really stimulate the hope of reward; in the illimitable distance there was total extinction of sin and life together, but in the intermediate perspective transmigration after transmigration through a long series of improvements in the quality of existence.

Still the question arises, Was this final repose of the wearied spirit regarded as absolute extinction, and not rather as the return of the soul to the original source of being whence it came, or, if not that, at least a continuance in eternal repose without thought and feeling and energy?

It could not be the former in the original system of Buddhism, which in nothing more than in this differed from the Brahmanism which it aimed to reform. It had no place for a great first cause and final end of being. Among the Brahmans the soul, part of the universal soul, is invested with a variety of bodies through a succession of existences, until, purged by innumerable transmigrations through all created forms, it is conducted to the supreme essence whence it was taken. It falls like a drop into the ocean, loses its individuality, and is one with the Divine substance of the Brahm. Buddhism affirms, on the contrary, that at death the spirit dies with the body; but that, at death, there is born from the complete dissolution of the individual another being which will be animal, man, or deva, according to its merits or demerits; yet not the same spirit, or soul, or personality, but only its personified character or Karma. The person, in fact, dies in every transmigration, and dies finally and for ever after the last. As in Brahmanism the I is lost in Brahm, in Buddhism it is lost in Nirvana.

It would appear, then, that Nirvana is the goal of all created things, is literal annihilation, because Buddhism denied the existence of an eternal and supreme cause of all. Yet it seems hardly necessary to assume that because the system was without a God, therefore it was without immortality. The word itself certainly does not furnish decisive evidence; it deserves careful study.

“Nirvana is not a term of Buddhist origin. It had been already adopted in Brahminical literature to indicate that eternal recompense which all the Indian systems promised to their followers,



whether absolute nothing, eternal repose, absorption into divinity, or the enjoyment of beatitude in the celestial spheres. Hence it was synonymous with Moksha, Nirvitti, Apavarga, or liberation, cessation of existence, deep repose, or *summum bonum*. It is composed of the elements *nir* and *va* : *nir* being a negative or privative particle, and *va* a root which signifies wind or movement. The whole word therefore signifies 'cessation of movement,' or 'extinguished by a breath,' like the flame of a candle. According to Gogerley its etymology is *ni-vana*, from *vana* desire; and he defines it 'total cessation of existence' through 'total emancipation from desires.' With this accords the Buddhist meaning, which is usually expressed thus : 'destruction of the action of the Karma,' or the secret cause which demands the circulation of the being in the series of transmigrations; and 'total destruction of all the elements or aggregates, the factors of existence.' In the individual it is supposed that the five *Skandha*, which form the human nature, are destroyed; that is, the form, sensation, perception, discernment, knowledge."

Hence it will be evident that the word itself does not necessarily mean extinction of being. That was not its original signification. The restless desires or perturbations of life may cease while life itself goes on; the component elements of personality, as in the phenomenal world, may be dissolved, and yet the personality itself continue. But the whole system of Buddhist thought is supposed to require that the word was adopted in the sense of final annihilation. That system regarded life as a continued succession of pains, in which animals, men, and the deva appeared as transitory phenomena. From the eternal restlessness of the ocean of existence death is as deliverance, because the Karma, the character stamped on the individual by good or evil actions, constrains it to live on through an endless series of incarnations. All kinds of existence—not only animals and men, but demons and the gods who inhabit the blessed regions—are under the dominion of transmigration. According to the fundamental dogma of Buddhism life, in whatsoever manifestation, is only sorrow and misery, which is the fatal inheritance of men and gods alike. Hence Gautama admitted no solace but that of bursting the iron bonds of the prisonhouse, not of life events, but of existence; the extirpation of the cause which constrains every creature to live again. These are some of his words: "O religious man, from the destruction of passions comes the destruction of love to life; from destruction of love to life results the destruction of exis-

tence; and from the destruction of existence follows the destruction of birth, old age, death, grief, sorrow, anguish." Felicity is found only in the state beyond transmigration, where there is no movement nor life; that is, in Nirvana. It is certain that this, in the Buddhist system, could not be absorption into Brahm or any other divinity, since the Buddhists accept no uncreated Being, nor any form of spiritual life emerging from transmigration, since—according to Gautama—every operation of the spirit is the occasion of sorrow, and perfect calm could result only from the annihilation of the spirit itself as the personal centre of restlessness and change. Brahmanism and Buddhism have this in common, therefore, that Nirvana is rest from the dreary process of the transmigrations of life. But, in the latter, the conception of Nirvana is more abstract. The Sansara, or phenomenal existence, must be transcended by the absolute annihilation of the I of personality by its moral elevation above all personal thought, feeling, and wish; above all personal interest and cares. Brahmanism makes the end an absorption into Brahm; Buddhism an absorption into a Nirvana, which has no definition, save the negative one that all movement and activity are lost in a dreamless sleep of existence. And when we consider that the Buddhist system regarded a perfectly absorbed and abstracted state of mind, as both the preparation for the Nirvana and the pledge of it, it is natural to suppose that the profound meaning of the word was originally no other than that of perfect rest in unchanging life. But this brings us to the second argument considered by our author.

"Max Müller does not admit the interpretation of the word Nirvana which we have given above, because, says the illustrious philologist, in no passage of the Vinaya-pitaka, or of the Sūtri, which contain the discourses of the Buddha, do we find it used with the meaning of 'perfect annihilation,' such as we find in the Abhidharma, or the part of the metaphysical writings which are the most modern in the Buddhist canon. He affirms that in the Saitra its synonyms are 'rest,' 'supreme felicity,' 'wellbeing derived from the cessation of all passions and desires,' and even 'immortality,' expressions which are far from consistent with the idea of Nolling. Hence Max Müller maintains that the conception formed by Buddha and his disciples was that which is still preserved among the faithful, in opposition to that which is derived from the philosophical writings: that is, the word expressed the state of the spirit wrapped in a profound quiet, the

subjection of every concupiscence of the heart, indifference to joy and sorrow, to good or evil, and the absorption of the human soul into a soul universal. We have seen that such a mode of apprehending the final destiny of living creatures does not harmonise with the teachings of Sakyamuni, and belongs rather, as we shall soon see, to the state of *incomplete Nirvana*, which precedes the annihilation of being. But is his affirmation strictly true? It is allowed that in the Abhidharma, which contain all the speculations of the various schools, there are found more ample discussions of the annihilationist doctrine of Nirvana; and that these are wanting in Sutra, which record, for the most part, the simple sayings or preachings of the Buddha. In them the idea is presented as the term of the evils of existence, as victory over desire, sin, and ignorance, as the contrary of the mutable and transitory in the process of transmigration: whence the words rest, quietness, felicity, immortality. The signification of those expressions, taken literally, has led to a false conception with reference to this fundamental point of Buddhist teaching. Hence it has come to pass that too much love of the latter has found in their writings a Creator which the system does not admit, a human soul capable of living beyond its material prison, and made Nirvana equivalent to immortality, or the state of peace."

Of this instances are adduced. In the Dhammapada, one of the Sutra translated by Max Müller, we read: "Reflection is the path which leads to immortality (or Nirvana), thoughtlessness is the path of death. Those who reflect die not; those who do not think are as if they were already dead." The translator deduces from this an allusion to Nirvana as a state of eternal existence, quite different from absolute annihilation. The question is as to the meaning of the Pali word *amata*, which undoubtedly signifies a state of perpetual existence. But d'Alwys, followed by the author, argues that, as the Buddhist scriptures everywhere affirm that "everything is transitory," and that "there is nothing immortal," the term *amata* was used in the primitive sense it bore previous to its later signification of "immortal or eternal." From the negative *a* and *mata*, death, it means "not death, without death, free from death," with the emphatic opposition only to death. Hence d'Alwys translates less literally, it is thought, but more justly in the Buddhist sense: "Reflection leads to the lot which is devoid of death, and thoughtlessness to that which is (ever susceptible of) death. Those who reflect do not (enter the condition liable to) die; but those who are thoughtless are the same as those who

are already dead." We cannot help thinking this argumentation forced, as is also that of another passage: "Those who meditate profoundly on the origin and destruction of existence (or the five *Skandka*) will have an idea of the felicity of him who has reached the knowledge of what *amata* is." It is assured that the destruction of the five elements renders impossible any sort of existence; and that *amata* must mean, like the primitive Nirvana, a condition where there is no death, because there is no existence that can die. But the thought irresistibly returns that the deep meaning of these original contemplations was that of a being without the five elements of life necessary to the phenomenal world.

In the same book Max Müller translates one of the synonyms of Nirvana, "the quiet place." "The religious who acts well and practises joyfully the teaching of Buddha, will reach this quiet place, this condition of repose, which springs from the dissolution of the elements of existence or Sankharia." It is argued that the latter clause destroys the inference of the former; and that the dissolution of the elements of existence implies that the quiet place of Nirvana is annihilation. But existence in the composite form of earthly life is not being proper: "the sages who do injury to none, and always do right actions, will attain Nirvana, entering into which they suffer no more." There is much to support the notion that Buddhism placed its highest felicity in deliverance from the burden of being, and this is the prevalent notion formed of its Nirvana. Undoubtedly, the master's doctrine was philosophised upon in this sense, as we find in the following words: "In Nirvana there is no water, nor earth, nor fire, nor air (the four elements constituting all bodies); there is nothing that can be called great, little, short, or long, good, or evil. In it both the *nama* (mind and its faculties) and *rupa* (body) are extinct; and with the destruction of consciousness existence itself is annihilated."

Another objection, in appearance important but not really so strong as the former, is this, that Buddha, after having entered into Nirvana, appeared again to his disciples and continued his preaching. This objection is dealt with in an interesting manner; and here we shall again condense our author's arguments. In order to understand how this may be made to agree with what has been said above about Nirvana, it is necessary to say a

few words about the two modes or rather states of Nirvana itself. The word is used in two diverse significations. The principal is that of annihilation of existence; the other is applied to designate that particular state of the spirit which is a species of preparation, consisting in a general wellbeing, the result of release from passions and desires; a state which the devotee enjoys in the state which immediately precedes extinction of existence. This last stage of being, incomplete Nirvana, is more accurately described as *Kleśa Nirvana*, "annihilation of human passions"—a "Nirvana in which remain the elements of existence; while the finished Nirvana is called *Skandha Nirvana*, "annihilation of the elements of being," or a "state devoid of every trace of existence." When it is said in the old writings that a devotee having reached a certain stage of sanctity through victory over his senses and passions, had entered Nirvana, we must understand the word only in the former of these senses. In that state he still lives on a pure life, endowed with supernatural power, delighting in the unspeakable assurance that the great enemy of man, existence, has been finally discomfited and vanquished. When he is dead, he no more is born again into the circle of transmigration, because he has been found able to destroy the germ of life; the lamp of existence, as they say, has ceased to burn and is extinct. Then he finally reaches the true and proper Nirvana. Now in those passages of the scriptures where Buddha is represented as appearing, after entrance in Nirvana, in the midst of his disciples to teach them, and where Nirvana is spoken of as a state in which "the spirit rejoices in its true purity," allusion is always to the incomplete Nirvana. The acquisition of *Bodhi* or the old wisdom was necessary for the final salvation of man; because the world was regarded as in some sense the product of the mind weakened and obscured by ignorance, and there was no remedy but in the coming of supreme wisdom to illuminate the human mind and teach it the vanity, insufficiency, and unreality of the whole universe. The Bodhisattva attains to this elect science; and as such Buddha preached to his hearers, that is, in the incomplete Nirvana. But it is denied that any book represents him as having appeared after the perfected Nirvana received him. On the contrary, it is said in one of them: "As long as the body of Buddha, separated from the turmoil of existence, remains in the

world as the fruit and the flower separated from the stalk, gods and men may see him; but when his life reached its end, and his body was destroyed, neither gods nor men could see him any more."

The conclusion to which Puini comes as the result of much investigation may be thus summarised.

Nirvana, as conceived by the Buddha and his immediate disciples, is no other than the perfect extinction of every kind of existence, the destruction of all active faculties, whether of the spirit or soul or of the body; in fact, the absolute annihilation of the personal being. This truth must needs emerge as the natural and necessary consequence of the essential doctrine taught by Sakyamuni, and of the more ancient canonical scriptures which transmit to us his teachings. But, secondly, the word Nirvana has been adopted in the Buddhist books to indicate not only the state of annihilation, or the annulling of all being, but also the state of the human spirit in the period which precedes that annihilation. To this condition of the soul must be referred all those passages of these scriptures in which, when speaking of Nirvana, allusion is made to some sort of existence as nevertheless supposed. Thirdly, in a more recent period, when in the bosom of Buddhism various schools of philosophy had their development, and when the metaphysical side of the system of Sakyamuni approximated to Brahmanism, the word Nirvana lost, at least in some sects, its primitive value or signification. It passed into the definition of that idea which many insist upon finding in the word as its general and sole meaning, which expresses namely an existence of beatitude and repose, eternally translated into the bosom of a universal and divine essence.

We have reserved to the close the view of our subject taken by Mr. Rhys Davids, in the interesting little volume he has published on Buddhism. It is rather different from any already referred to, and will be best seen in his own words. After describing the Four Noble Truths, and the Eight Paths that lead to perfection, and the Ten Fetters that are gradually broken off—the first being the Delusion of Self and the last Ignorance—he then goes on :

"One might fill pages with the awestruck and ecstatic praise which is lavished in Buddhist writings on this condition of mind, the Fruit of the fourth Path, the state of an Arahāt, of a man made perfect according to the Buddhist faith. But all that could

be said can be included in one pregnant phrase—THIS IS NIRVANA. 'They who, by steadfast mind have become exempt from evil desire, and well trained in the teachings of Gautama, they, having obtained the fruit of the fourth Path, and immersed themselves in that ambrosia, have received without price and are in the enjoyment of Nirvana. Their old Karma is exhausted, no new Karma is being produced; their hearts are free from the longing after future life; the cause of their existence being destroyed, and no new yearnings springing up within them, they, the wise, are extinguished like this lamp.' What then is Nirvana, which simply means extinction—it being quite clear, from what has gone before, that this cannot be the extinction of a soul? *It is the extinction of that sinful, grasping condition of mind and heart which would otherwise, according to the great mystery of Karma, be the cause of renewed individual existence . . . .* Nirvana is therefore the same thing as a *sinless, calm state of mind*; and, if translated at all, may best perhaps be rendered 'holiness'—holiness, that is, in the Buddhist sense, *perfect peace, goodness, and wisdom.*"

This last qualification is necessary. Holiness is a Christian term; and the essential idea inherent in it, separation from sin as the condition of fellowship with God, must needs be absent from Buddhism. As Mr. Davids says:

"Our word holiness would often suggest the ideas of love to and awe in the felt presence of a personal Creator—ideas inconsistent with Buddhist holiness. On the other hand, Nirvana implies the ideas of intellectual energy, and of the cessation of individual existence, of which the former is not essential to, and the latter is quite unconnected with, our notion of holiness."

"It is better, therefore, to retain the word Nirvana as the name of the Buddhist *summum bonum*, which is a blissful holy state, a moral condition, a modification of personal character; and we should allow the word to remind us, as it did the early Buddhists, both of the 'Path' which leads to the extinction of sin, and also of the break in the transfer of Karma which the extinction of sin will bring about. That this must be the effect of Nirvana is plain; for that state of mind which in Nirvana is extinct (*upadana, klesa, trisha*) is precisely that which will, according to the great mystery of Buddhism, lead at death to the formation of a new individual, to whom the Karma of the dissolved or dead one will be transferred."

When a Buddhist has become an arahat, when he has reached Nirvana, he has extinguished *upadana*, the grasping, and *klesa*, sin, but he is still alive; the *upadi*, the Skandhas, his body with all its powers, that is to say the fruit of his former sin, remain. When these last are dis-

solved there can be no new individual, and the arahat or perfect man will be no longer existent in any sense. "Stars, long ago extinct, may be still visible to us by the light they emitted before they ceased to burn; but the rapidly vanishing effect of a no longer active cause will soon cease to strike upon our senses; and where the light was, will be darkness. So the living, moving body of the perfect man is visible still, though its cause has ceased to act; but it will soon decay, and die, and pass away; and, as no new body will be formed, where life was will be nothing." Mr. Richards sums up all in one sentence: "Death, utter death, with no new life to follow, is then a result of, but it is not, Nirvana. The Buddhist heaven is not death, and it is not in death but in a virtuous life here and now that the Pitahas lavish those terms of ecstatic description which they apply to Nirvana, as the fruit of the fourth Path, or Arahatsip."

Here we might seem to have reached the conclusion of the whole matter; and in such a way as to harmonise the discordant elements presented in the canonical writings of Buddhism. Nirvana is the perfect state of the soul, prepared as a finished sacrifice for its final immolation to nothingness. It seems a necessary qualification of the strong sentences penned by M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, on which Max Müller comments as we shall afterwards see:

"Buddhism has no god; it has not even the confused and vague notion of a Universal Spirit in which the human soul, according to the orthodox doctrine of Brahmanism, and the Sankhya philosophy, may be absorbed. Nor does it admit nature, in the proper sense of the word; and it ignores that profound division between spirit and matter which forms the system and glory of Kapila. It confounds man with all that surrounds him, all the while preaching to him the laws of virtue. Buddhism, therefore, cannot unite the human soul, which it does not even mention, with a God whom it ignores; nor with nature, which it does not know any better. Nothing remained but to annihilate the soul; and in order to be quite sure that the soul may not reappear under some new form in this world, which has been cursed as the abode of illusion and misery, Buddhism destroys its very elements, and never wearies of glorying in this achievement. What more is wanted? If this is not the absolute nothing, what is Nirvana?"

To this Professor Müller vaguely replies by a very poor defence:



“Such religion, we should say, was made for a madhouse. But Buddhism was an advance, if compared with Brahmanism; it has stood its ground for centuries, and, if truth could be decided by majorities, the show of hands, even at the present day, would be in favour of Buddha. The metaphysics of Buddhism, like the metaphysics of most religions, not excluding our own Gnosticism and Mysticism, were beyond the reach of all except a few hardened philosophers or ecstatic dreamers. Human nature could not be changed. Out of the very nothing it made a new paradise; and he who had left no place in the whole universe for a Divine Being was deified by the multitudes who wanted a person whom they could worship, a king whose help they might invoke, a friend before whom they might pour out their most secret griefs. And there remained the code of a pure morality, proclaimed by Buddha. There remained the spirit of charity, kindness, and universal pity with which he had inspired his disciples. There remained the simplicity of the ceremonial he had taught, the equality of all men which he had declared, the religious toleration which he had preached from the beginning. There remained much, therefore, to account for the rapid strides which his doctrine made from the mountain peaks of Ceylon to the Tundras of the Samoyedes; and we shall see in the simple story of the life of Hiouen-thsang that Buddhism, with all its defects, has had its heroes, its martyrs, and its saints.”

The pith of all this seems to be that the followers of Buddha were wiser than their master and better than their creed; that they revolted against the atheism of the Buddhist metaphysics; and represented that human nature which in its irrepressible instincts cries out for a living God. But if Buddha reformed Brahmanism by removing the grand faith of that system in a supreme Cause of all things, it is hard to see how it was an advance upon Brahmanism; but it is easy to see how it came to pass that in the course of generations the reforms in this supposed reformation brought back again the great Supreme, as manifested in Buddha. However, Max Müller is not content with this defence, and in another essay takes up the subject again in a rather different style:

“Whether the belief in this kind of Nirvana, that is, in a total extinction of being, personality, and consciousness, was at any time shared by the large masses of the people, is difficult either to assert or deny. We know nothing in ancient times of the religious convictions of the millions. We only know what a few leading spirits believed, or professed to believe. That certain individuals should have spoken and written of total extinction as

the highest aim of man is intelligible. Job cursed the day on which he was born, and Solomon praised 'the dead which are already dead, more than the living which are yet alive.' Voltaire said in his own flippant way, 'On aime la vie, mais le néant ne laisse pas d'avoir du bon ;' and a modern German philosopher, who has found much favour with those who profess to despise Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, writes : 'Considered in its objective value, it is more than doubtful that life is preferable to Nothing. I should say even, that if experience and reflection could lift up their voices they would recommend to us the Nothing. We are what we ought not to be, and we shall therefore cease to be.' Under peculiar circumstances, in the agonies of despair, or under the gathering clouds of madness, such language is intelligible ; but to believe, as we are asked to believe, that one half of manhood had yearned for total annihilation, would be tantamount to a belief that there is a difference of kind between man and man. Buddhist philosophers, no doubt held this doctrine, and it cannot be denied that it found a place in the Buddhist canon. But even among the different schools of Buddhist philosophers, very different views are adopted as to the true meaning of Nirvana. . . . We do not find fault with M. Sainte-Hilaire for having so emphatically pressed the charge of nihilism against Buddha himself. In one portion of the Buddhist canon the most extreme views of nihilism are put in his mouth. All we can say is that that canon is later than Buddha ; and that in the same canon the founder of Buddhism, after having entered on Nirvana, is still spoken of as living, nay, as showing himself to those who believe in him. Buddha, who denied the existence, or at least the divine nature, of the gods worshipped by the Brahmans, was raised himself to the rank of a deity by some of his followers, and we need not wonder therefore if his Nirvana too was gradually changed into an Elysian field. And, finally, if we may argue from human nature, such as we find it at all times and in all countries, we confess that we cannot bring ourselves to believe that the reformer of India, the teacher of so perfect a code of morality, the young prince who gave up all that he had in order to help those whom he saw afflicted in mind, body, or estate, should have cared much about speculations which he knew would either be misunderstood, or not understood at all, by those whom he wished to benefit ; that he would have thrown away one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of every religious teacher, the belief in a future life, and should not have seen that if this life was sooner or later to end in nothing, it was hardly worth the trouble which he took himself, or the sacrifices which he imposed on his disciples."

But if this style of argument is to have any force, it should extend its suggestive apology to the doctrine of the

Buddha concerning God. It is vain to hint that Buddha must have left room for an eternal existence of the purified spirit, if it is absolutely certain that he exterminated God from his system. What is all being without its eternal and substantial basis? What eternity can phenomena have without an eternal reality behind them? The fact remains, after a thousand special pleadings, that Buddhism is the most astounding system of incongruous elements the world has ever known. It is the most perplexing mystery that comparative religion has to present; and in two respects, especially, that mystery knows no approximation even towards human relation. Both these involve a certain remarkable resemblance to Christianity; one being its peaceful missionary propagation and widespread influence; the other the supremacy of its social ethics. The Christian, who believes in one absolute Revealer of one absolute religion has his own method of accounting for both. To him every religion of heathenism is only a particular form of a universal yearning for the Redeemer of mankind; and every one is doomed to exhibit in its own special way the hopelessness of the pursuit of truth without the direct guidance of revelation from heaven. Some of them exhibit the strangest paradoxes: Buddhism the strangest of all. Its beautiful morality is vitiated by the absence of two truths on which all true morality must hang: a Deity and a future life. Its ascetic description purifies only to destroy. Its duties of the second table are nothing worth, for they are not linked with or "like unto" the duties of the first table. All its graces and virtues are dead while they live, for they have not in them the hope of eternity. However much they resemble the Christian—and the resemblance is undeniable—their essential principles are diametrically opposed to those of the religion of Jesus. Meanwhile, the Buddhist self-renunciation and disinterested devotion to the good of all men is the glory of its ethics. They are the glory of Christian ethics also. But in Christianity they are bound up with consecration to God in Christ and the hope of eternal life. Alas, the fact that the wrong system is more generally honoured and acted up to by its adherents than the right system is, remains the standing opprobrium of Christendom. If the followers of the self-renouncing Redeemer of mankind served Him and followed His precepts on their way to eternal life as faithfully as the followers of Buddha walk in his four paths on

their way to annihilation, Buddhism would have accomplished its destiny and soon be absorbed in the true doctrine which it now caricatures and perverts.

We are tempted here to show in how many other respects Buddhism has its fundamental errors reflected in the present day; but space fails, and we must content ourselves with transcribing a suggestive passage which Max Müller quotes from M. Saint-Hilaire :

"This book may offer one other advantage," he writes, "and I regret to say that at present it may seem to come opportunely. It is the misfortune of our times that the same doctrines which form the foundation of Buddhism meet at the hands of some of our philosophers with a favour which they ill deserve. For some years we have seen systems arising in which metempsychosis and transmigration are highly spoken of, and attempts are made to explain the world and man without either a God or a Providence, exactly as Buddha did. A future life is refused to the yearnings of mankind, and the immortality of the soul is replaced by the immortality of works. God is dethroned, and in His place they substitute man, the only being, we are told, in which the Infinite becomes conscious of itself. These theories are recommended to us sometimes in the name of science, or of history, or philology, or even of metaphysics; and though they are neither new nor very original, yet they can do much injury to feeble hearts. This is not the place to examine these theories, and their authors are both too learned and too sincere to deserve to be condemned summarily and without discussion. But it is well that they should know by the example, too little known, of Bhuddism, what becomes of man if he depends on himself alone, and if his meditations, misled by a guide of which he is hardly conscious, bring him to the precipice where Buddha was lost. I am well aware of all the differences, and I am not going to insult our contemporary philosophers by confounding them indiscriminately with Buddha, although addressing to both the same reproof. I acknowledge willingly all their additional merits, which are considerable. But systems of philosophy must always be judged by the conclusions to which they lead, whatever road they may follow in reaching them; and their conclusions, though obtained by different means, are not therefore less objectionable. Buddha arrived at his conclusions 2,400 years ago. He proclaimed and practised them with an energy which is not likely to be surpassed, even if it be equalled. He displayed a childlike intrepidity which no one can exceed, nor can it be supposed that any system in our days could again acquire so powerful an ascendancy over the souls of men. It would be useful, however, if the authors of these modern systems would just cast a glance at the theories and destinies of

Buddhism. It is not the philosophy in sense in which we understand this great name, nor is it religion in the sense of ancient paganism, of Christianity, or of Mohammedanism; but it contains elements of all worked up into a perfectly independent doctrine which acknowledges nothing in the universe but man, and obstinately refuses to recognise anything else, though confounding man with nature in the midst of which he lives. Hence all those aberrations of Buddhism which ought to be a warning to others. Unfortunately, if people rarely profit by their own faults, they profit yet more rarely by the faults of others."

In conclusion, we recommend those of our readers who are interested in the study of the science of religions to spend much time on Buddhism. The two works from Italian and English pens which are at the head of this paper will be found of great value. But it must not be forgotten that the three works on the subject published by the lamented Spence Hardy still remain the classical standards in our language. They are highly prized all over Europe, and ought to be better known than they are among ourselves.

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# LITERARY NOTICES.

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## I. THEOLOGICAL.

### MAX MÜLLER'S HIBBERT LECTURES.

*Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as Illustrated by the Religions of India.* By F. Max Müller, M.A. The Hibbert Lectures. Second Edition. London : Longmans. 1878.

THE relations between the science of language and the science of religion are very close. To discover the origin and trace the growth of men's ideas on religious subjects, there is no better way than to analyse the words in which those ideas are expressed. The spoken word of the lips answers naturally and of necessity to the unspoken word of the heart. We do not wonder, therefore, that an acknowledged master in the field of comparative philology should now push his researches into the neighbouring field of religion. His preliminary essay was the *Lectures on the Science of Religion*, which dealt mainly with the general pre-suppositions of the question, and seemed to many readers simply to formulate truths which nobody thought of disputing. The charm of Professor Müller's style is such that nothing he says can ever appear commonplace. The present volume is of a higher order altogether, more after the fashion of his invaluable works on language. He never wrote with more force and brilliance, and at the same time, instead of confining himself to vague generalities, discusses a definite subject. That subject is nothing less than the development of religious ideas in a literature of which he is a perfect master. In doing this, he is faithful to his calling as a philologist. The witnesses to whom he appeals, and whom he cross-examines in a searching way, are words and phrases as symbols of ideas and beliefs. Many of his discussions of single words, as of *religio*, p. 11, are interesting in the highest degree. In the following quotation it is the enthusiastic philologist who speaks :

"I like to quote one instance, to show the intimate relationship between Vedic Sanskrit and Greek. We know that the Greek *zēus* is the same word as the Sanskrit *Dyaus*, the sky. *Dyaus*, however, occurs in the later Sanskrit as a feminine only. It is in

the Veda that it was discovered, not only as a masculine, but in that very combination in which it became the name of the supreme deity in Greek and Latin. Corresponding to Jupiter, and *Zeús* *πατήρ*, we find in the Veda *Dyaush pitar*. But more than that, *Zeús* in Greek has in the nominative the acute, in the vocative the circumflex. *Dyaus* in the Veda has in the nominative the acute, in the vocative the circumflex. And while Greek grammarians can give us no explanation of that change, it is a change which in Sanskrit has been shown to rest on the general principles of accentuation. Now I conceive that such a vocative as *Dyaus*, having the circumflex instead of the acute, is to my mind a perfect gem, of the most precious material and the most exquisite workmanship. Who has not wondered lately at those curious relics of pre-Hellenic art, brought to light at Hissarlik and Mykenæ by the indefatigable labours of Dr. Schliemann? I am the last man to depreciate their real value, as opening to us a new world on the classical soil of Greece. But what is a polished or perforated stone, what is a drinking vessel, or a shield, or a helmet, or even a gold diadem, compared with this vocative of *Dyaus*? In the one case we have mute metal, rude art, and little thought; in the other, a work of art of the most perfect finish and harmony, and wrought of a material more precious than gold—human thought. If it took thousands, or hundreds of thousands of men to build a pyramid, or to carve an obelisk, it took millions of men to finish that single word *Dyaus*, or *Zeús*, or *Jupiter*, originally meaning the illuminator, but gradually elaborated into a name of God! And, remember, the Veda is full of such pyramids, the ground is strewn with such gems."

The first and second lectures are introductory; and, although not in form yet in reality, contain a powerful argument against the theories of modern positivism. Some of the discussions in these and the following lectures are not perhaps relevant in the strictest sense to the main subject, but they are all valuable. Even Professor Müller's "chips" are most precious. We may instance the discussion of fetishism, both name and thing, in the second lecture, which is set in a very fresh and original light. The lecturer deals a heavy blow at one of the fundamental parts of the Positivist position—i.e., at the notion that all religion necessarily begins in fetishism. We may add that there is no trace of fetishism in the early history of India. In the first lecture the author argues just as powerfully against another fundamental of the Positivist creed—i.e., that the infinite is unknown and unknowable; that all human knowledge is imprisoned within the bounds of the finite. On the contrary, he maintains that the two are given in inseparable connection, that each implies and involves the other. "What I hold is that with every finite perception there is a concomitant perception, or, if that word should

seem too strong, a concomitant sentiment or presentiment of the infinite; that from the very first act of touch, or hearing, or sight, we are brought in contact not only with a visible, but also at the same time with an invisible universe. Those, therefore, who deny the possibility or the legitimacy of the idea of the infinite in our human consciousness, must meet us here on their own ground. All our knowledge, they say, must begin with the senses. Yes, we say, and it is the senses which give us the first intimation of the infinite. What grows afterwards out of this intimation supplies materials both to the psychologist and to the historian of religion, and to both of them this indispensable sentiment of the infinite is the first pre-historic impulse to all religion. I do not say that in the first dark pressure of the infinite upon us, we have all at once the full and lucid consciousness of that highest of all concepts: I mean the very opposite. I simply say we have in it a germ, and a living germ; we have in it that without which no religion would have been possible, we have in that perception of the infinite the root of the whole historical development of human faith." This principle is very strikingly illustrated in relation to time and space, sound and colour.

It is very far from Professor Müller's intention to represent the course of religious development in India as typical of all cases. He repeatedly disclaims this. All that he professes to do is to describe the development in one particular case. Thus understood, we quite agree with his exclusion of the notion of a primitive revelation. We believe that in India we have an example of the development of natural religion by man's unaided powers. Let us note the steps. The Vedic deities are classed as consisting in tangible, semi-tangible, and intangible objects. Evidently it was chiefly in connection with the second and third classes that the idea of a higher power first arose. The growth of that idea is then traced in concrete instances—in relation to fire, the sun, the dawn, thunder, wind. One of the most deeply interesting portions of the volume is the fifth lecture, in which it is shown that the ideas of infinity and law are actually present in the most ancient Hindu documents. *Aditi* is the exact equivalent of infinite; *diti* being = finite, and *a* the negative particle. *Rita* again expresses what is orderly, fixed, regular. It was applied in the first instance to the orderly movements of the heavenly bodies, and then transferred to the moral world. "Think only what it was to believe in a *Rita*, in an order of the world, though it be no more at first than a belief that the sun will never overstep his bounds." When we reach the sixth lecture, we have serious fault to find with the Professor. The lecture is entitled "Henotheism, Polytheism, Monotheism, Atheism," and the suggestion is that these are different stages in the way the Hindus trod. But the Monotheism in the title does not appear in the text at all.



All that we find there is a "tendency towards monotheism"—a tendency which never comes to anything. This exactly corresponds with the state of the case. Hinduism perhaps ought to have led to monotheism, but it did not. Monotheism, which, as Professor Müller says, means the worship of one God to the exclusion of every other, never did exist as a creed in India. What then is meant by inserting the name in the title? We do not suggest for a moment that the Professor intended to conceal the gap which meets us in Hindûism, but he does not emphasise it as he ought. We look upon India as a crucial test of the ability of man by the powers of unaided reason to "find out God." The achievements of the Hindus in philosophy leave the efforts of the ancient Greeks far behind in many respects. Yet they never discovered the simplest article of the Christian creed. Indeed in one point they were less advanced than the Greeks. Professor Müller dwells with emphasis on the fact that there is nothing in the Indian pantheon to correspond with the single supremacy of Jupiter in the Greek and Roman. No Hindu deity figures as sovereign of all the rest. Such a notion might conceivably have formed a point of transition to monotheism, but it never emerged above the horizon of Hindu faith. We believe that the various stages of the religious development of India would be more correctly marked as Henothenism, Polytheism, Pantheism. The countless gods of polytheism came to be regarded as manifestations of a single higher power. The subjective self and objective self, about which Professor Müller, founding on the philosophy of the Upanishads, discourses so eloquently, were identified. The *jivâtman* is simply the reflection of the *paramâtman*, as the shadow in the water is of the substance.

By Henotheism, which is Professor Müller's substitute for fetishism, is meant the worship of single gods without reference to others. In the Vedas we are met by this phenomenon, that we find invocations of different deities, each of whom for the moment seems to be supreme. "This is the peculiar character of the ancient Vedic religion which I have tried to characterise as *Henotheism* or *Kathenotheism*, a successive belief in single supreme gods, in order to keep it distinct from that phase of religious thought which we call polytheism, in which the many gods are already subordinated to one supreme god, and by which, therefore, the craving after the one without a second has been more fully satisfied. In the Veda one god after another is invoked. For the time being, all that can be said of a divine being is ascribed to him. The poet, while addressing him, seems hardly to know of any other gods. But in the same collection of hymns, sometimes even in the same hymn, other gods are mentioned, and they also are truly divine, truly independent, or, it may be, supreme."

The lectures abound in matter for quotation, comment, and sometimes protest. For example, the drift of much that the Professor says is that the differences between one religion and another are inconsiderable, at least in the eyes of God, and that this ought to be the case among men. This indeed is not said in so many words, but it is the meaning. The less acceptance such teaching finds the better. But the solid merits of the work as a whole are very great. Commenting on the requirement of *faith* in India, Professor Müller says: "The word here used for the first time for faith, *shraddhâ*, is the very same word which meets us again in the Latin *credo*, and still lives in our *creed*. Where the Romans said *credidi*, the Brahmins said *shraddadhan*; where the Romans said *creditum*, the Brahmins said *shraddhitam*. That word and that thought, therefore, must have existed before the Aryan family broke up, before Sanskrit was Sanskrit, and before Latin was Latin. Even at that early time people believed what neither their senses could apprehend nor their reason comprehend. They believed; and they did not only believe, as a fact, but they had formed a word for belief, that is, they were conscious of what they were doing in thus believing, and they consecrated that mental function by calling it *shrad-dhâ*."

The number of typographical errors is greater than ought to occur in a second edition printed at the Oxford University Press, e.g., "precept" for "percept" on p. 210. The sign of interrogation is persistently omitted, of which the last sentence in the volume is an example. Professor Müller refers more than once to his *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, published in 1859. Such a work ought not to be allowed to remain out of print so long as this has been. We have no doubt that the publisher would report many inquiries for it.

#### MURPHY'S HABIT AND INTELLIGENCE.

*Habit and Intelligence: A Series of Essays on the Laws of Life and Mind.* By Joseph John Murphy. Second Edition, Illustrated. London: Macmillan and Co. 1879.

ALTHOUGH Mr. Murphy calls this book a second edition of one that was published about ten years ago, it is practically a new work. In some instances his old materials reappear, but rarely without some improvement upon the mode in which they were arranged before. Various chapters, of little use in the development of the theory which binds together the otherwise discordant subjects of which he treats, have been omitted. And long sections, dealing with such matters as the fixation of characters, the anticipation of function by structure, and automatism, appear

now for the first time in print. The result is a work, very bulky, containing still far too many details that are easily accessible elsewhere, and that are introduced here occasionally for the sake of their interest rather than for that of their relevancy, but withal in some measure original, and not without vigour and utility.

The professed purpose of the book is to "investigate the special and characteristic principles of both unconscious and conscious life," and chiefly "those vital principles which belong to the inner domain of life itself, as distinguished from the principles" (*e.g.*, laws of nutrition and respiration) "which belong to the border-land where life comes into contact with inorganic matter and force." That investigation leads Mr. Murphy to a twofold conclusion—that life with the power of forming and transmitting habits is distinct from all merely chemical and physical forces, and that intelligence, whilst co-extensive with all life, is distinct from the power of forming and transmitting habits. According to him, there are two and only two principles peculiar to living organisms. The one he calls *Habit*, which he defines as "that law in virtue of which all the actions and the characters of living beings tend to repeat and to perpetuate themselves, not only in the individual but in its offspring." The other he calls *Intelligence*, embracing under that term alike "the organising intelligence which adapts every part of an organism for its work," and "the conscious intelligence of the mind," both of which he maintains are simply separate manifestations of the same power. It will be seen that Mr. Murphy is in agreement with no dominant school, biological or psychological, of the present day. One after another, the distinguishing tenets of every one of them are exposed to his assault. Natural selection is dethroned, and its action confined within very narrow borders. Association of ideas is rejected as the sole solution of mental nature, and subordinated to a higher and controlling intelligent agency. And the popular belief that formative and mental intelligence are distinct—the former being *Divine*—is opposed by the theory, which is asserted and re-asserted all through this book, and is indeed its *raison d'être*, that "the unconscious intelligence which directs the formation of the organic structures is the same which becomes conscious in mental action." Notwithstanding, Mr. Murphy leaves no doubt as to his own philosophical position, but describes it with unusual clearness. "I am (he says) a Realist, because I believe, as a truth at once of science and of faith, that we live in a world of realities and not of phantoms; and that the function of philosophy is to interpret and thereby to justify the spontaneous dicta of consciousness. And I am a Natural Realist, because the facts of organic and mental science teach that intelligence acts spontaneously." And

when, as is inevitable in any thorough treatment of his subject, he is brought face to face with such difficulties as the nature and ground of the moral sense, he does not fail to confess that he has reached the limits of the sphere within which his own theory is held to be an adequate explanation. He describes holiness very incorrectly as the "preferring a higher aim to a lower one ; as, for instance, preferring the performance of a duty which is certain to be unrewarded to pleasure ;" but he adds, "I believe this sense of holiness is incapable of being referred to any principle belonging to either matter, life, or sensation, and can only be explained as a case not of vital but of spiritual intelligence." The closing sentences of the book exhibit his view still more fully. "No physical science (he writes) can elucidate the relation of the spirit to the brain ; but the fact that man's brain has no superiority to that of the highest apes from which his spiritual superiority could possibly be guessed, so far from giving support to a materialistic view of our spiritual nature, rather tends to cut away the ground from under any materialistic argument. The question, what point in the development, either of the individual or of the race, is that where the spiritual nature has come in, cannot be answered, but is not an important one to answer. It is, however, in accordance with all the analogies of creation, if the same Creative Power, which at the beginning created matter and afterwards gave it life, finally, when the action of that life had developed the bodily frame and the instinctive mental powers of man, completed the work by breathing into man a breath of higher and spiritual life."

In several respects this contribution of Mr. Murphy's to the settlement of one of the most perplexing questions of the day is admirable. He has not, however, succeeded in preventing the presence of that feature which is perhaps the most general feature of all such books. The urgency of his assault far exceeds the strength of his defence. With unusual and more than once with irresistible skill, he marshals his forces against some point he is attacking. Nothing more, for example, need be said against Darwin's hypothesis of sexual selection as the principal factor in the perpetuation of ornamental colouring and structures than is said here. For when it has been shown, as Mr. Murphy shows with many illustrations and obvious familiarity with his subject, that that hypothesis depends upon assumptions as to the mental nature of animals that are not verifiable, and does not explain facts as well (say) as Wallace's theory of the increased intensity of life at pairing season, and is fundamentally opposed to the phenomenon of the fixation of ornament, and supposes endless variation in the numerical proportion of the sexes, and overlooks alike the reversal of sexual characters in man and the beauty of shells which is certainly not utilitarian : the necessary logical

conclusion is that the hypothesis of sexual selection is not merely improbable, but impossible. Similarly with the wider matter of the origin of species, the operation of natural selections amongst spontaneous variations is demonstrated to be so far limited that the necessity of some other or additional agency is readily yielded. Or if we turn to the later section of the book, in a chapter which would be almost the gem of the whole, were it not for an earlier one entitled "Structure in Anticipation of Function," Mr. Murphy summarises the arguments against automatism in a masterly manner, which leaves little to be desired. Indeed no objection need be made to that part of the book which is devoted to the exposure of the insufficiency of the current theories, except that occasionally, as in the chapter upon "Metamorphosis," where Mr. Murphy founds his conclusions upon the metamorphoses of three out of five groups, and "leaves out of consideration" those of the remaining two groups, there is traceable a tendency to compromise and not to push his arguments against natural selection quite as far as phenomena would warrant him in doing.

But when Mr. Murphy proceeds to vindicate his own theory, he does not succeed so uniformly in carrying his reader with him. It will have been observed already that, as he confesses, he uses the word habit "in an unusually wide sense," and takes for granted in its definition much which is, to say the least, doubtful. But, to omit all matters of definition which are rarely altogether satisfactory, and all minute details, Mr. Murphy's theory itself will not bear examination. Many objections could be raised against it, of which we can refer to but a few. According to him, the organising intelligence is, like the conscious intelligence of men, internal to the organism, and presides over and controls those vital functions and organic forms in which the relation of means and purpose is more evident than that of cause and effect. In other words, every indication of adaptation in an organism is the indication also of the presence of an "unconscious organising intelligence," the seat of which is also within. Even if the inappropriateness of such a word as intelligence in such a context be overlooked, it cannot be allowed that the so-called organising intelligence is identical in kind with the conscious intelligence of man. Mr. Murphy's proof amounts to nothing more than the elaboration of such analogies as that, just as the organism is constructed out of food by the organising intelligence, so mind is constructed out of impressions of sense by the mental intelligence—analogies which obviously prove nothing. And yet they form the basis of chapter after chapter. One compares the development of an organism out of a simple germ with the development of mind out of the germ of sensation. Another contains a parallel, after the manner of Hobbes or of Herbert Spencer,

between the processes of development in the individual and in the social organism. Another traces certain similarities between political progress and mental education. But it does not appear to have struck Mr. Murphy that he was merely illustrating the great law of progress in different spheres of thought or life, but by no means demonstrating that "organising intelligence" and mental intelligence were one and the same.

There are two recommendations of the author's theory upon which he lays some stress. "The view of direct creation," he writes, "cannot be reconciled with the imperfections of the organic world, and its slow and interrupted progress towards relative perfection," or with the existence of parasitic worms and immoral instincts. To which it might be replied, either that the existence of parasitic worms is a greater difficulty in the case of the theory of an internal organising intelligence than in the case of any other theory; or that the view of direct creation is not accompanied by forgetfulness of the facts that organised beings exist only on condition of being co-ordinated with certain media in nature, and that nature is not bound to accommodate itself in everything to the private convenience of organised beings. Mr. Murphy gives but one instance of an imperfection in nature—viz., that "the human eye, even when healthy and normal, is asserted by Helmholtz to be very imperfect in comparison with the best optical instruments that human skill can produce." But Helmholtz not merely makes that assertion; he also explains the optical defect just as an advocate of direct creation would explain it, in words which our author seems to have overlooked: "The appropriateness of the eye to its end exists in the most perfect manner, and is revealed even in the limit given to its defects. A reasonable man will not take a razor to cleave blocks; in like manner, every useless refinement in the optical use of the eye would have rendered that organ more delicate and slower in its application" (Helmholtz, *Revue des Cours scientifiques*, 1<sup>re</sup> série, t. vi., p. 219).

Nor does instinct become less mysterious under the treatment which Mr. Murphy applies to it. On the one hand, he hardly frames the argument as strongly as he might have done against the theory of the transmission of instincts by hereditary habit, for such cases as those of the necrophores and the pompilia are neglected. On the other hand, the definition of instinct as "unconscious motor intelligence" is very misleading. For intelligence implies power of foresight and judgment and choice: whereas the distinguishing character of instinctive actions is that they are executed apparently without any foresight or determination whatever. Certainly they cannot be explained by the individual experience of the animal; and to attribute them to an unconscious organising intelligence is so far from removing the

difficulties in which, according to any view, they are involved, that it deepens them, and leads us from the obscure into the more obscure.

Though Mr. Murphy in our opinion fails to commend the theory for the sake of which he wrote, his book has much in it, especially in its side-issues, that is well worth reading. His style is not altogether free from awkwardness, but his method of prefixing its subject to each paragraph adds greatly to his intelligibility. Evidently he has read much and thoughtfully, and this product of his reading and thought is not without value.

#### WALLON'S JESUS ET LES JESUITES.

*Jésus et les Jésuites. Moïse, Jésus, Loyola. Les Jésuites dans l'Histoire.* Paris: Charpentier. 1879.

NEARLY a generation ago we had a Jesuit scare. Half the footmen in London, with a good percentage of the butlers, were believed to be Jesuits in disguise, their object in assuming that disguise being supposed to be the conversion of our nobility and gentry. We have now grown so used to the sight of titled perverts that perhaps we have gone into the other extreme, and have ceased to be as watchful as the ceaseless aggressiveness of the Society of Jesus demands that we should be.

In France they cannot venture to be so quiescent; for there Jesuit influence permeates the whole of political and social life, making it, for instance, "bad form" to be a republican. It has, moreover, during the long pontificate of Pius IX. profoundly modified the character of the French priesthood and its relations to the Papal See. This change began much earlier, with the unhappy Concordat of the first Napoleon. That most self-seeking of men, for the sake of securing his recognition by the Pope and of being consecrated by him in Notre Dame, gave up the clergy, bound hand and foot, to the tender mercies of Rome. It was a cruel change, for many of the priests, some even of the bishops, who had accepted the Constitution, were married; the communion was celebrated in both kinds; the old Gallican liberties were fully insisted on. All this was crushed out by the Emperor. But, says M. Wallon, the political maxim enunciated in 1845, *l'état n'est pas théologien*, gave fuller play to Jesuit influence, and therefore left the clergy more completely unprotected. Since then the priests have been absolutely under the thumb of the bishops, while these have almost universally been inspired by the *Génu*. Here comes out at once the difficulty of the French liberal's position. His principles forbid him to refuse free action to any sect; but the Jesuits no sooner have scope for teaching than they begin to plot against the Government which has permitted them to teach.

Separation of Church and State is the panacea in the eyes of most French liberals. M. Wallon easily shows that in France it will be insufficient. It is all very well, he says, to affirm that *la politique n'aura plus rien à faire avec la religion*; but how can you provide that men shall act regardless of that which for nine-tenths of mankind is the chief end and aim of action? His method is rather problematical, "to conquer the Jesuits by means of liberty." According to him, the great power of the body is mainly due to its being unfairly protected. "Under the Second Empire, you need only be a Jesuit to get everything you wanted. Let mammas see that the good Fathers have not the entire control of all the best appointments, that they can't succeed as they once did in making eligible matches for their pupils, and they'll soon care less about sending their children to Jesuit schools." France must also take up what she has let slip, the higher theological training. The State gives theological degrees (p. 161); let it then watch over the instruction and make the different degrees compulsory. In this way, if Rome has her doctors, France will have hers also. But how if the head of the Government is an unbeliever? M. Wallon foresees this difficulty, but fails to meet it, except by vague phrases. He admits that an unbeliever would be more dangerous than even a Jesuit, because he would, in his Gallio-like indifference, be so easily hoodwinked. He talks of councils, general, cantonal, and communal, to which (he says) the Concordat, which he had before anathematised, gives the right of choosing clergy and electing bishops; and he believes a Council of State would help and support the Government. Of course he foresees trouble with Rome; Louis XIV. found he could not make bishops of his own will. The thing will be to get your educated clergy; and then, when there is a sufficient number of vacant bishoprics, Rome will make a compromise. The lower clergy would undoubtedly rejoice at being emancipated. Their feeling now is that "monkery is stifling them; and this monkery keeps up a vast staff of Jesuits to organise these monastic hordes into an army." It appears that in France there are more than half a million monks—a monstrous percentage on the full-grown population of the country; and M. Wallon is eloquent on the mischiefs which this brings about, on the unfair position in which it places France with regard to other nations. But we cannot find that he is able to name any definite remedy. Things have come to such a pass, he says, that nothing but the nation can save itself; we can't go on for ever in this unwholesome state, the clergy preaching disobedience to the laws, and submitting the national decrees to the Roman *curia*. But then the Jesuits must be beaten *par la liberté*; and how this is to be done we are certainly not told.

That they must be kept in check if France is to hold her place in Europe, is plain enough. Already, says our author, they have



created three parties, and by making them neutralise one another they manage to secure a large share of power. If they succeed in making a fourth and a fifth, they will turn France into another Poland or Spain, and will lead it in like manner along the high road to ruin. Poland is, says M. Wallon, a terrible warning for France; no doubt Poland fell through divisions fostered by the Jesuits; and the fierceness of French parties, the brutal language used against the Commune even by a sober statesman like M. Thiers, show that, were it not for the restraining hand of Government, French parties would be ready enough to fly at each other's throats and tear their country to pieces.

M. Wallon is much more satisfactory as a historian than when he proposes measures for the future. His proposals are—Don't admit a pupil of the Jesuits into any Government school; open free Catholic churches, and guarantee the pay of those curés who reject the *Syllabus*; insist that the clergy shall not be removable except for misconduct; do away with surplice-fees in poor parishes; and, above all, keep the Jesuits out of all Government employments. It will, we fear, be difficult to bring about all these measures; but it is not difficult to show that the Jesuits have inverted almost every point of Scripture teaching. They are against the Law and against the Gospel alike. Self-sacrifice is the main-spring of Christianity; sacrificing others to yourself is the principle of Jesuitism. Self is made predominant; your advancement, in this world or in the next, is to be your sole aim.

In proof of this M. Wallon gives us an abstract of Loyola's teaching. "I don't reproach them with their doctrine (he says), for they have no doctrine—in all their spiritual works there is not a word of theology. I shall say nothing of their politics; they boast of working solely for themselves under every form of government. The world has criticised their morality; they have no such thing. Their rule is to choose in all things the opinions which are most widespread and best received."

Then taking Father Ravignan's *Exercises* as his basis, he proves the cynical selfishness of the system, and how it makes salvation a difficult science, beyond the reach of all save the rich or idle classes. These exercises and the meditations which form a part of them will be new to most of our readers. They are meant for that *time of retreat* which is so strongly recommended by the Jesuits, and during which those who are attending to their soul's health are to sit in darkened rooms and in an almost Trappist silence.

Next follows an able and interesting summary of the history of the Jesuit body, especially at Rome and in France, and then an account of their origin and constitution.

Perhaps the affair of Father Theiner, whom Pius IX. in his more liberal days commissioned to print at the secret press of the Vatican the unabridged records of the Council of Trent, and who

was so persecuted by the Jesuits in 1870 because of his opposition "to that sham Council which was really a den of robbers," was never more clearly set forth than in these pages. M. Wallon gives in full Theiner's letters to his friend Friedrich, most interesting in their bearing on the growth of the Old Catholic body.

The striking feature of M. Wallon's book is its calmness. Most books on the subject deal in such violent tirades that weak minds have sometimes been led by a mistaken sense of fairness to give up the truth. Our author, on the contrary, is content with letting facts and documents speak for themselves. He shows unanswerably how the Jesuits falsify history, how they have two sets of books (a false and an authentic) adroitly mixed (p. 353), how they give in their adhesion to every Government, and pursue their own ends alike under each. All this is pointed out with the least possible amount of angry comment. The maxim "No faith with modern society; it is all based on liberalism," is strangely at variance with the submissiveness which in 1796 said: "He who is not a good republican is a bad Christian." Nowadays, on the other hand, we find the Archbishop of Aix asserting that "the decrees of the republic *violent l'honnêteté*!"

To those, then, who wish a sober statement of what Jesuitism is and of the dangers with which it threatens modern society, we recommend M. Wallon's book. Happily we are not quite in the same position as the French; but the state of Ireland, and the continual cropping up of questions like this Irish University, show that for us too Jesuitism is a power which it will tax all our best statesmanship to cope with.

#### BOWEN'S MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

*Modern Philosophy, from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann.* By Francis Bowen, A.M., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Harvard College, America.  
London: Sampson Low.

PROFESSOR BOWEN has for many years held a high position in America as a writer on metaphysical subjects, and the volume before us is in every sense worthy of its author. We consider the title a little misleading. "Studies in Modern Philosophy" would have been a truer description of the contents of the book. The author in his preface says it is not his purpose to write a complete history of Modern Philosophy: his purpose is rather to present an analysis and criticism of those works which have permanently influenced the course of modern European thought, paying most attention to the earlier French and later German philosophers, with whom comparatively few English readers are at all familiar.

Hence he says little of such writers as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, as these works are accessible to all English

readers. "But the great names of Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, of Leibnitz, Kant, and Hegel, are little more than names to most English students."

He believes that Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer have not been fairly appreciated by English students, because they have not been thoroughly understood. Professor Bowen's object, therefore, has been to furnish an exposition of their systems which should be intelligible and comprehensive enough to enable the student to estimate their merits and defects. He has particularly endeavoured to give a complete analysis of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, as he considers that book to contain a key to German metaphysics. It is refreshing to find in this book how thoroughly its author combines the earnest Christian with the cultured philosopher. As an illustration of this we quote the following:—

"No man can be an earnest student of philosophy without arriving at definite convictions respecting the fundamental truths of theology. In my own case nearly forty years of diligent inquiry and reflection concerning these truths have served only to enlarge and confirm the convictions with which I began, and which are inculcated in this book. I have studied faithfully most of what the philosophy of these modern times and the science of our own day assume to teach, and the result is, I am now more firmly convinced than ever that what has been justly called the 'dirt philosophy' of materialism and fatalism is baseless and false. I accept with unhesitating conviction and belief the doctrine of one personal God, the Creator and Governor of the world, and one Lord Jesus Christ, in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, and in the literature of modern infidelity I have found nothing which, in my mind, casts even the slightest doubt upon that belief." He also adds that "the civilisation which is not based upon Christianity is big with the elements of its own destruction."

In the introductory chapter we have a history of philosophy in the seventeenth century. In contrasting the sixteenth with the seventeenth century philosophy he observes, "The leading philosophers of the sixteenth were great scholars, rather than great thinkers. They hunted out and collated all manuscripts; with indefatigable zeal and industry they translated, annotated, and lectured on Plato and Aristotle." But of the seventeenth he says, "They no longer deigned to controvert ancient philosophy or mediæval metaphysics, but passed them by as obsolete, perhaps with silent contempt, and busied themselves with an attempt to reconstruct the philosophical edifice from its foundations. They accepted nothing upon authority; they borrowed not a stick nor stone from those that went before them." The most comprehensive analyses in the book are those upon Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann.

We would call the special attention of the English student to the chapters in which the works of the two last-mentioned authors are treated. We think he will find there the most accurate and comprehensive exposition of modern German pessimism to be found in the English language. In speaking of the pessimism of Hartmann, Professor Bowen says, "The Philosophy of the Unconscious is a great improvement upon the doctrine of Schopenhauer, though it is built in the main on the same foundations, and often seems to arrive at similar results. But the qualifications of his predecessor's opinions are numerous and important, and are generally such as to take away much of their offensive character, and to prepare them, perhaps after further modification, for general acceptance. Thus, he is nominally a pessimist; but he also fully accepts and defends the doctrine of Leibnitz, that this is the best of all possible worlds, making this qualification, however, that though it is the best possible, it is still so bad that it would be better for us all if it did not exist at all."

But Leibnitz also teaches the inevitable character of what he calls "metaphysical evil," which even omnipotence could no more obviate than it could create two mountains without a valley between them. At the worst, then, Hartmann only exaggerates the amount of this "metaphysical evil;" and therefore I cannot see why he has not as good a right to be called an optimist as either Leibnitz or Pope. In fact, his pessimism appears rather speculative and theoretical in character than earnest and profound. It is only his rhetorical presentation of the old difficulty, which all theologians feel the weight of, respecting the origin of evil. He is *not* a misanthrope, he has not a suspicious and gloomy temperament, and his experience of life has not been so unhappy as was that of Schopenhauer. Hence, if he should be entirely cured of the malady which has so long crippled him, and if his family should increase in number and contentment, his admirers may well hope to learn that he has abjured pessimism as bravely as he has already renounced his inclination to dabble in poetry and the fine arts.

To all who take an interest in the history of philosophy we cordially recommend this book.

#### BRYCE'S ANCIENT BRITISH CHURCH.

*The Ancient British Church. An Historical Essay.* By John Pryce, M.A., Vicar of Bangor. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1878.

THE preface sufficiently explains the origin of this book, and prepares us for its defects and excellences. "The following essay," writes the author, "having been adjudged to be the best on *The Ancient British Church* of the essays submitted for

competition at the National Eisteddfod of 1876, I have not felt myself at liberty to introduce alterations except in the way of phrase and illustration, together with the addition of some of the notes and the latter part of Chapter V. The necessity of keeping closely in my treatment of the subject to the lines marked out by the committee in their programme, is my apology for the disproportionate length at which I have discussed some points, and for the consequent want of symmetry which I feel pervades the whole essay." The result of adhering to such a plan is that the quality of the book is about as unequal as it could well be. Some topics are discussed with great erudition and skill; others are hurried over, to the dissatisfaction of the reader, who finds that, instead of having lighted upon a synopsis of all that is known concerning the early British Church, he must read much that he would fain not read, and turn elsewhere for much that he was justified in expecting to meet with here. And certainly the additions in Chapter V. to the Essay, as it originally stood, are the weakest part of the book. By no ingenuity can the existence of the ancient British Church be prolonged beyond the year 1188, when Baldwin, Archbishop of Canterbury, preached the crusade through Wales, and received in every Welsh diocese due recognition of his supremacy; and Mr. Pryce would have done better had he closed his history at that date, or, indeed, four centuries earlier. A sketch of the origin of Welsh Calvinistic Methodism, in the course of which Mr. Charles is defended from the charge that he bitterly repented his share in the formation of the Association in 1811, and at the same time strangely accused of "outrunning the will of God:" an attempt to urge re-union amongst Welsh Christians, which starts with such a grotesque position as "that while among the Welsh dissenting bodies piety is degenerating into a series of short-lived emotions, which, stirred up for a moment, under the influence of stirring appeals to the feelings, die away amidst the duties and trials of life, there is, on the other hand, in the Church a deepening of the spiritual life," it was surely not wisdom upon the part of Mr. Pryce to waste his own time and to irritate his reader by additions of this character, especially when as his admirable notes show, he was capable of much better things.

If we omit all matters which do not belong to Mr. Pryce's subject, and which, it is but fair to add, occupy relatively only a small part of his book, we have much to say in its favour. Evidently no pains have been spared in research; and the facts thereby discovered are narrated with precision and distinctness, and often with much grace. The most interesting question connected with the ancient British Church is undoubtedly—when and by whom was that Church founded? Unfortunately that question is one which cannot be answered with any confidence.

We have reliable testimony to the existence of Christianity in Britain in the latter part of the second century in Tertullian's extant words, that "places in Britain not yet visited by the Romans had been subjugated to Christ." (These words occur in Tertullian, *Adv. Judæos*, which Mr. Pryce, following Haddan, dates A.D. 208, but which, according to perhaps better authorities, might be dated seven years earlier.) It is almost certain, too, that Christianity was introduced into Britain from Gaul. Whether by missionaries from Lyons, shortly before the outbreak of persecution in that city in A.D. 177, as Mr. Pryce supposes, or, as seems more likely, by the irregular efforts of Christians in the Roman legions, and of civilians who visited Britain for purposes of trade, it is impossible to say. But there are indications that for several generations Christianity took but feeble hold of the people of the land, and was confined mainly to Roman residents and such of the natives as were brought into closest contact with Romanising influences. Mr. Pryce probably overrates what he calls "the providential preparation of the Britons for the reception of the Gospel," their national characteristics disposing them, as he argues, speedily to accept Christianity, which would be further recommended to them by its affinity with their previous national creed. If the Galatians were members of the Cymric branch of the Celtic race—and probabilities largely favour that view—we ought to expect to find Christianity after its introduction into Britain passing through much the same stages as marked its early history among the Galatians, impulse playing a larger part in the process than conviction, and passionate attachment to the cruel creed of their forefathers retarding the advance of the gentler Gospel.

Although after the opening of the fourth century the dearth of information about the British Church ceases to be almost total, there are but a few incidents, separated frequently by an interval of several generations, that can be disentangled from the legends that obscure them. The martyrdom of St. Alban, if divested of all the romance and marvel wherewith subsequent veneration draped it, is the earliest event that can with any confidence be regarded as historical. Three British bishops were present at the Council of Arles, and more than three at the Council of Ariminum. Then follow St. Ninian's mission to Galloway, the replanting of the faith in Ireland by St. Gildas, the visit of Germanus and Lupus, and their successful opposition to a spreading Pelagianism, the hallelujah victory, the local synods of Llanddewi-Brefi and Caerleon-on-Usk, and the foundation of a few monasteries; and hardly anything more is known of the external history of the British Church until it appears in conflict with Augustine at the Conference of Austcliffe. Mr. Pryce not only describes these events about as fully as they can be described

without a free use of the imagination, but he gathers from different sources much information as to the organisation of the Church, its ritual and its peculiar usages. The foundation, ever-varying boundaries, and early history of the different Welsh sees receive as much attention as even at an Eisteddfod they deserve. Monasticism is traced in its spread through Wales, and in its influences upon the ferocity that surrounded it and upon the future, though it may well be doubted whether the link between practical Christian heroism and the monkish suppression of affection is as close as Mr. Pryce supposes. A few clear paragraphs contain an outline of the history of the relationships between the Welsh and the English Churches, until, all differences in observance having disappeared, in about the ninth century the two Churches became one. That the supremacy of Canterbury over Wales has been marked occasionally by imprudence, by nepotism, and by several other faults, no one can reasonably doubt; nor can any one reasonably fear that the errors of the past will be repeated generally in the future.

#### MEMORIALS OF SAMUEL CLARK.

*Memorials of the Life and Letters of the Rev. Samuel Clark, late Principal of Battersea Training College, Rector of Eaton Bishop.* Edited by his Wife. Macmillan. 1879.

IF the late Frederick Denison Maurice had been rewarded in proportion to the influence which he exercised on Church of England thought, he ought at least to have been made Archbishop of Canterbury. Bishop Colenso, in the preface to a little volume of sermons preached at Forncett St. Mary's, long before the famous Zulu began his disquieting inquiries, speaks of Maurice as the father of his mind. Mr. Llewellyn Davies and Mr. Harry Jones are both Mauricians. Men like Mr. Haweis and Mr. Stopford Brooke owe him much more than perhaps they themselves imagine. We should like to see a careful study of the relation between Dean Stanley and the late Cambridge moral philosophy professor; we feel sure that even here the influence of Maurice has been great.

And this influence is due not only to the force of an intellect which was rather subtle than commanding, but also to two quite distinct causes. First, the character of the man was so lovely and so loveable that it irresistibly drew to him those with whom he came in contact. His father, the subject of this memoir testifies, was the most unselfish of men; and his son inherited this fascinating trait. Next, Maurice was intellectually not subtle only; but hazy. To outsiders he seemed always in a fog; and though his own footing was firm, though he made his own way steadily enough, and held to the last a well-defined position, he

did not always succeed in securing this position for his followers. Hence he was naturally a rallying point for restless minds. Men who in the last or the earlier part of the present century would have seceded, held their ground because Maurice, with whom they felt they had something in common, declared himself a steady well-satisfied Churchman. A generation ago, the current phrases among advanced thinkers were: "Maurice has made Christianity possible for me." "I'm a Churchman, as Maurice is."

The subject of this memoir, however, was very different from the lax unsettled theorists who once formed the rank and file of the Maurice school, and many of whom have, ere now, probably gone in for Tyndalism or something like it. He felt that his mission was to work and not to theorise, and he deemed not only that it was impossible for him to work unattached, but that, as a Christian, he must attach himself to a body which had on its side the prestige of antiquity and organisation. The way in which the young Quaker is led first to join (if not to set going) the party of reform in his own body; and then, feeling the want in the Society of Friends of many things inseparably connected with the true idea of a church, to go over to the Church of England, is traced in the early part of these *Memorials* in a very interesting way. One of Mr. Clark's pupils, Mr. Evan Davies, in a long and delightful letter, printed in the Introduction, speaks of him as a sound Churchman, somewhat of the old school. No doubt he became so, but there is at the outset no sign of any very fervent Church feeling. It was his surroundings which determined his future. Falling in with the Maurices, and being plied with the arguments which were afterwards reproduced in that first of F. D. Maurice's works, *The Kingdom of Christ*, he became a member of the Established Church. Had he come under other influences, he might have become a Romanist, a Methodist, a Presbyterian. All we can find in him at the time when the change was beginning, is a deep dissatisfaction with the deadness and formality of the system in which he had been brought up, above all, with the compatibility of so much talk about special spiritual influences with thorough worldliness, and at the same time a longing, inevitable in such a mind, for such an organisation as the Society of Friends has not.

Maurice proved to the young Quaker that the Anglican Church had all that he longed for—the sacraments, which his own body kept in the background, the breadth which contrasted with their exclusiveness, the spirituality which he found wanting in what claimed to be an especially spiritual body. To understand at all the working of young Mr. Clark's mind, one must read *The Kingdom of Christ* along with these *Memorials*; but, as we said, the conclusion we have come to is that the special form of



Christianity which he adopted was due to the influence under which he was placed. Held spell-bound by the Maurices, he did not pause to consider the claims of other Christian churches, into which drifted (he tells us) some of his young friends, disappointed, like he was, at the failure of this attempt to reform Quakerism from within.

Of Mr. Clark's life there is not much to tell. Born in Southampton, in 1810, the youngest of a Quaker family of ten children, he early showed signs of what was to be his strong point as a man. Some of the elder children had taught him the rudiments of astronomy, whereupon he read more of the subject, and constructed transparencies of the planets out of old band-boxes, and gave a lecture which his audience thought worthy an embryo Newton. At thirteen he was taken into his father's business. His mother begged he might have a little more schooling, and he went down on his knees to support the petition. But "thou knowest quite enough for what I want of thee," was his father's reply. In those days business hours were long, and holidays very rare. He had always kept a book in his desk to fill up the minutes of leisure; and in this way he read a surprising amount of classics and general literature—surprising, until we note in the extracts from his diaries the very stringent rules by which he bound himself to a certain amount of work every week. He was not wholly unaided; there was a doctor brushing up his rusty Latin and Greek, who read with him and helped him much; there was also a German with whom he read, and to whose rhapsodies on the grandeur of *Æschylus* and the glories of the *Acropolis* he would listen with delight. It is characteristic that he introduces the story with the remark, "I was young and inexperienced, and he was unscrupulous, so we read on Sunday." The same feeling leads him later in life elaborately to justify the plan which he had adopted of writing letters on Sunday.

When he was about seventeen the Maurices came to Southampton. James Maurice, the father, was struck with the intellectual deadness of the place, and soon strove to give life to the *Mechanics' Institute*, the *Literary Institution*, &c. In this work he met young Clark, and at once took in hand to guide his reading and advise him as to his future. By-and-by, but not before he had thoroughly passed under Maurice's influence, Mr. S. Clark went as partner into Darton's book-shop on Holborn Hill, and soon after he had settled in London was baptised by F. D. Maurice, in St. Saviour's, Southwark. But having joined the Anglican Church, he seems very soon to have felt that longing to do something for which, till quite lately, that Church made no other provision than taking orders. One who wanted to work must get ordained; and, as Mr. S. Clark wanted to work, he determined

to get ordained. This he accomplished in a manner which at once marks the energy of the man and how he was helped by circumstances. He was able to arrange with the authorities of Magdalen Hall (now Hertford College), Oxford, on the one hand, and with Messrs. Darton on the other, for an irregular residence at the University, broken by turns at business, and in this way (including a longish spell of foreign travel) protracted through seven years. While keeping terms, he employed his evenings in writing to help to pay his expenses. He early showed ability in map-drawing; several of the best sets of maps published by the National Society were drawn by him, and the geographical numbers of *Peter Parley's* series are from his pen. His mode of residence, of course, precluded him from going in for honours; but he read hard, and went to whatever University lectures were going on. His notes on Oxford men and things are amusing. Sewell seems to have struck him, though he began by abusing his favourite Carlyle; and when, in a later lecture, Sewell actually finds in Carlyle a complete scheme of Church government, he becomes quite enthusiastic in his praise. Clearly an apostolic manner, positive and yet vague, still had a charm for the ex-Quaker. The companion of his travels was Mr., now Sir Edward, Strachey, who continued his friend and correspondent through life. Among other places they went to Greece; and Mr. Clark earned the Oxford *sobriquet* of "Athenian Clark" through buying a fish in the Piræus in the very words of Aristophanes. His letters from abroad are very lively; indeed all those describing his various tours are well worth reading.

Finally, severing the connection with Messrs. Darton, he was ordained to a curacy, but only held it a few weeks, being appointed Vice-Principal of St. Mark's Training College, under the Rev. Derwent Coleridge. Here his talents as a lecturer soon became apparent, and some years after he was made Principal of Battersea College, which he soon raised to a very high degree of efficiency.

Ill-health, his enemy through life, made him at length resign, and accept the living of Bradwardine, in Herefordshire, from which he was a few years before his death duly promoted to the neighbouring living of Eaton Bishop. He devoted the comparative leisure of his parochial charge to writing various parts of the so-called *Speaker's Commentary*.

The book abounds with evidence of his kindness of nature and readiness to sympathise with men of various views; it is throughout the record of a busy, uneventful, very useful life, but for most readers we think the chief interest will be in the earlier part—that which shows how the young Quaker was, thanks to Maurice and Oxford, transformed into a firm Churchman. Mr. Clark never went with F. D. Maurice in his social theories; there

is a letter to Mr. Ludlow disavowing "Christian socialism" altogether. At the same time, he points out that "thee" and "thou" was in Fox's day a proper protest against class distinctions. People thee'd and thou'd their dependents and the poor; and, but for the Quaker protest, the usage might have become stereotyped, as it has abroad.

### RAINY'S THE BIBLE AND CRITICISM.

*The Bible and Criticism.* Four Lectures by Robert Rainy, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

THE design running through these lectures is to show the compatibility of Biblical criticism with the strictest faith. The author evidently wishes to disarm the suspicions and fears which ordinary Christians are apt to entertain towards anything which even appears to call in question the accuracy of any detail in Scripture, and to vindicate the rights and functions of a reverent, well-guarded criticism. Thus in the first introductory lecture we read: "Those who love the Bible are apt to be impatient at the substance and the manner of the questions raised. Criticism comes in with assertions based on microscopic points that have no apparent connection with edification; it takes liberties with things that the Christian heart delights to reverence. To be obliged to think whether something is true about a minute point in the Bible, which is difficult to harmonise with Christian faith and devoutness, is discomposing, even if the difficulty is successfully solved. Why torment us with it? Or, if unbelievers will make work of that kind, why should those who are not unbelievers help them? If the Bible be the Bible, let us have the comfort of using it for our daily necessities without disturbance. However these things may be, one thing must be said. It would be a great mistake to look upon criticism as only a source of troubles and difficulties for people who read their Bibles. Criticism has performed, and continues to perform, the most essential service to the Christian faith. It both enables us to construct our historical evidences, and it throws light in a thousand ways upon the Bible and its teaching. There may be those who do not want to be troubled with it, and who would willingly part with its aid if they could, at the same time, get rid of its embarrassments. These are not wise Christians. And there may be others who may be very willing to take the aid of criticism, if only they may be allowed to shut their eyes when its aspect becomes less helpful. Those are not honest Christians. Either way, there is no help for it. This is one of the things we must reckon with, and the more deliberately and calmly the better."

Every one knows the sensitiveness and jealousy of Scotch orthodoxy—a fact in every respect honourable to the Scotch

character. It must be extremely difficult with such an audience to gain a hearing for a study which professes to criticise the records of Divine revelation. Dr. Rainy's object is to show that, setting aside the absurd lengths to which criticism has been pushed, it is still capable of being turned to good account in the service of faith. Thus, his work is rather apologetic for sound criticism as against morbid fear than apologetic for sound faith against rationalistic criticism. The latter is ruled out of court altogether. The lecturer argues only with believers, on the ground and within the lines of faith. This is the point of view announced in the first introductory lecture and maintained throughout. In the same lecture a very happy illustration, too long for quotation, is given of the nature, methods, and results of criticism from a supposed case of family letters, whose date, order, and authenticity are to be settled by internal and external evidence. In all the lectures in the same way the discussion of abstract principles is enlivened by interesting cases in point. Criticism is defined as "the science of the means by which a book has its character and place in history determined." It takes account of the date of a book, "its authorship; the relations in which its statements, its style, its thinking, stand to the modes of statement, and forms of style, and currents of thought of the past; the sources on which it draws; the effects it has produced; the notices of it that have occurred since its appearance; also the discrimination of its various parts, if perhaps different parts of it have to be ascribed to different sources and different periods, and have afterwards come together." It is pointed out that criticism is by no means limited to the field of Scripture, but is applicable to the entire domain of literature. The Bible comes within its sphere as a literary product. Faith in the divinity of Scripture upon higher grounds does not make the work of criticism superfluous. "Sometimes this study yields results that promote the full understanding and right use of Scripture teaching. Sometimes, again, the result for the interpretation of the Scriptures, or for edification, may seem to be little or none. But in either case it is part of our duty to knowledge, to investigate whatever can be investigated; and it is part of our duty to the Bible to know all about every aspect of it that can be known."

We have noticed only a few points in the first lecture, which is not the most interesting of the series. The whole volume is marked by great vigour and clearness both of thought and style. Dr. Rainy advocates a candid, fearless faith. He holds it to be an attribute of strong faith in the divinity of Christianity that it need not fear the results of the most searching inquiry and can afford to be generous to opponents. "I wish there were a more general recognition, in some quarters, of the peculiar kind of en-

thusiasm which animates many workers on this line. It is the enthusiasm of an intense faith in the truth of Christianity, in Divine supernatural revelation. It is a burning confidence in this, that the strictest and most thorough historical investigation, if quite strict and thorough, will exhibit the track of a revealing God, moving down through history, in a manner that will prove irresistible, and will rise over against all the scientific certainties so as to command the assent of men no less cogently than they do. This enthusiasm may be sanguine, like other enthusiasms. It may not always be wise. It may play into the hands of the enemy by concessions which do not represent what is due to truth, but rather what is suggested by a too eager confidence. Some of those to whom I ascribe it belong to schools of theology from which I am far removed; some of them deem it honest, and according to the facts, to take up positions on critical questions which I, endeavouring to put together the various lines of evidence, cannot share and must oppose, which I regard as neither sound nor safe. But all that does not hinder me from recognising this enthusiasm as a thoroughly believing one, and honouring accordingly those whom it inspires."

#### THE MYSTERY OF MIRACLES.

*The Mystery of Miracles.* By the Author of "The Supernatural in Nature." London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1879.

THE anonymous author undertakes to show the harmony of science and faith, of the natural and supernatural. The prime requisite for such a task—mastery of the facts and principles of science—he possesses in abundant measure. On this field he must command, or at least deserves, the respect of professed scientists. His work, while somewhat peculiar in form and style, is really remarkable for thoughtfulness and genuine eloquence. In this respect a high key-note is struck and uniformly sustained. The volume is suggestive and stimulating in the highest degree. A certain unity of subject binds together the brief essays or chapters, which are somewhat eccentrically headed "Thought I., Thought II.," &c. We have perhaps no right to say that greater simplicity of style might be desirable, for this would be to erect our own taste into a standard for others. All that we can require of a writer is that his style shall be free from defect and affectation, and this the style of the present volume is. The richness of poetical expression is evidently "to the manner born." The titles of some of the twenty-seven "Thoughts" will indicate the line of argument and discussion pursued: "Inner Impulse to the Miraculous, Cosmical and Mental Analogies, The Universe a Complement of Intellect, Symbols, Spiritual Insight, Action of

Spirit on Matter, Mechanical View of the World." Other Thoughts deal with topics like the denial of miracles unscientific, miracles probable, reasonable, natural, credible, and capable of proof. These subjects are illustrated with great wealth of analogy and proof.

The author has a poet's eye for detecting analogies and resemblances. He loves to trace in nature presentiments and prophecies of the supernatural. The miraculous thus becomes the natural. A favourite thought with him is the gradation which binds together all existences, from the lowest to the highest, into one grand unity. "There is no rock-barrier between the natural and supernatural. If the finger of God touch the trigger marvellous things are done : done softly, done blessedly, done without observation ; yet they hold back the wind, send rain, bring prosperity, renewal of life ; and, sometimes, so grandly that nations are amazed." "One grand system of life and intelligence occupies the world. Every living creature proceeds from a germ, which has power to build up the organism with all its members and faculties. There is no great difference between the process by which is born the wild ass's colt and that by which man is brought forth. The advance from low to high degree is by an immense number of grades, contemporary or successive, from the undifferentiated particle to the sublime human organism. The plant grows from a germ, first in the dark, then through sunshine and rain, producing stem, leaves, flowers, and fruit. From zoophytic life up to the mammalia is another vast ascending scale ; not only in bodily perfection, but in animating principle—whatever that may be—lifting up dull, sluggish automatism, hovering on border of the insensate, to the speechless reason of the elephant and dog ; thence to human intellect and language. To every seed, to every kind, belong its own powers of growth, or of automatism, or of sensation, or of sensibility, or of all of them, in the ranks from lowest dulness to the fullest splendour of intelligence. Throughout all this range and curious variety, from the glimmer of the glow-worm to the genius that blazes in the human countenance, there is that unity of power and plan which shows that the whole comes from one and the same universal and eternal source."

A proposition of Spinoza's is thus commented on :—"The statement 'Miracles are impossible' cannot be maintained ; it is a pure negative extending over all time, space, circumstance ; and, except by an omniscient being, is incapable of scientific verification. The assertion, 'There is no transcendental beginning,' can only be maintained on the assumption that nature is, and ever was, in itself organically and eternally complete ; for want of completion in any of its parts would render the whole to that extent imperfect. That which has no beginning cannot grow in

beauty and power, otherwise every act of growth would be a partial beginning. It cannot, at any time, occupy a new place ; must remain eternally the same, or move in a series of recurring cycles, in which is neither first nor last, beginning nor end. . . . In contrast with such boastful statements concerning God and the world, and in proof that even a small part of that world cannot be fully searched out, remember that no one can tell the secret of atomic obedience in the familiar changes from ice to steam ; nor tell the acting law of the pressures and resistances which a flying bird encounters all around from the atmosphere ; nor are the forces at work in our finger-nail, or in our hairs, or in the hair of a nettle, scientifically understood. Think of the entomologist, Pierre Lyonnet, devoting many years to the study of one insect, *Phalana cossus*—a caterpillar which infects the willow tree. The book describing and figuring it is a quarto-volume of more than 600 pages, adorned with eighteen plates. The number of muscles alone, all described and figured, is 4,041. The labour, nevertheless, did not acquire all the knowledge ; nor does the book narrate all that is to be narrated ; nor do the plates, nor the muscles described and figured, reveal more than a small part of the mystery and the wonder contained in that one insect."

#### GRIMM'S NEW TESTAMENT LEXICON.

*Lexicon Græco-Latinum in Libros Novi Testamenti, auctore C. L. W. Grimm. Leipsic, 1879. London : Williams and Norgate.*

THIS work is a complete dictionary, in Latin, of the Greek of the New Testament, and gives in alphabetical order all the words there used, and all their inflexions. A special feature is that it contains all the forms brought to light by the textual researches of Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles, and adopted in their critical editions of the Greek Testament. Another feature is that, with the exception of very common words, every passage is noted in which each word is found ; and this is indicated by an asterisk. This is done even for such words as *δικαιοσύνη, πίστις, πιστεύω, χάρις*. The work is, therefore, practically a concordance as well as a lexicon. The use of each word by the classic writers, by Philo and Josephus, and by the Christian Fathers, is carefully noted, and apposite quotations from all these sources are given. The references to the Septuagint are specially valuable. And there are quotations from the best modern grammarians and commentators.

We are not sure that the work before us can claim to have contributed much original matter to New Testament philology. But as a collection of facts, gathered with great care and toil

from all sources and arranged in a very convenient form, it is invaluable.

In the April number of this journal a review was given of another New Testament lexicon, that of Dr. Cremer. This work differs from that of Dr. Grimm as being not so much grammatical as theological. And, while Dr. Grimm gives every word in the New Testament, Dr. Cremer discusses only those words of which the meaning has been moulded and developed by Christianity ; and discusses them at much greater length, as expressions of the new life breathed into human thought and speech by the voice of Christ. Dr. Grimm's book is specially designed for those beginning the study of the Greek Testament ; Dr. Cremer's work is rather for those who have made some entrance into its outer grammatical form, and are seeking its inner significance. We do not hesitate to say that Dr. Cremer's lexicon deserves a place on every minister's bookshelf. But Dr. Grimm's book is even more indispensable. It meets the need of the youngest student, and is of undiminished value to the advanced scholar. It is about a sixth larger than Cremer's lexicon, and can be had in this country, well bound, for about fifteen shillings, and the money cannot be more profitably spent. We cordially recommend it to our readers.

#### WYCLIFFE TO WESLEY.

*Wycliffe to Wesley. Heroes and Martyrs of the Church in Britain.* One Volume. Wesleyan Conference Office. 1879.

THIS is a most attractive volume of biography, and one which we especially commend to the authorities of Sunday-school libraries. It contains within the compass of 250 pages short accounts of the lives of the most eminent leaders in the religious life of this country during the stirring times which elapsed from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century. Wycliffe, Tyndale, Knox, Latimer, Baxter, Bunyan, Howe, Watts, and Wesley, not to name others mentioned in the twenty-one sketches of this volume, are among the noblest names in our national history, and every effort to make them more widely known and their memory more fervently cherished in our day is as commendable as it is necessary.

The sketches in this volume are necessarily short, often far too short for anything like a fair presentation of the life under review ; but they are full of interest, and are rich in lessons of courage, fidelity, and all nobility of character.

We regret, however, that each of the notices is so detached from all else in the volume ; had they been linked so as to show the continuity of the work of God committed in turn to these



"Heroes and Martyrs of the Church," both interest and information would have been added to the volume. This omission is especially noticeable in the first part: Wycliffe prepared the way for Tyndale, Tyndale and Coverdale were united in the work of Biblical translation, and they were together the means of the conversion of John Rogers. Rogers, in his turn, carried on the task by his edition of *The Matthew Bible*, in which, by his notes, he furnished the first general English commentary. All this is the history of one work carried on by many workers, and we think it would have been wise to point out links of connection; a few dates and notes of contemporary English history were all that was needed. The history of the Church is one, and, in volumes similar to the one before us, it seems to us necessary to point out the proofs of God in history, fulfilling Himself and perfecting His work in many ways. Here is the true doctrine of Development.

We must refer to the general appearance of the book. It is clearly printed, largely and admirably illustrated: some of the woodcuts, notably that of Archbishop Usher on p. 118, in clearness, depth, and strength of outline are excellent specimens of the engraver's art.

#### HAGGARD'S CREATION AS A DIVINE SYNTHESIS.

*Creation as a Divine Synthesis.* A Contemplative Treatise concerning the Inter-Relations between Deity and His Creation, as Discoverable by and to the Human Understanding. By Wm. N. Haggard. London: J. Ridsdale, 27, Ivy Lane, Paternoster Row. 1878. All Rights Reserved.

THE author proposes to furnish "to the scientific and philosophic mind a theology which is intelligible to the human understanding," and then proceeds to expatiate through one hundred and fifty pages on "concretive universes, creation, or the totiety of concretive universes," on "sentionalising, sensito-emotionalising, mentalising," and still more unintelligible things. In order to make the new theology intelligible to us, he even translates the Prologue of St. John and the Nicene Creed into this jargon. But it is all of no use. Probably because ours are not "scientific and philosophic" minds, though we believe our understandings are "human," the author seems to us to be somewhere in the clouds. Mr. Haggard, to judge from the quotations, is very fond of Swedenborg, but we hope that even Swedenborg would not adopt such nonsense. J. S. Mill spoke of worlds in which two and two might make five. In such worlds Mr. Haggard's book might possibly be understood. Almost the only sentence that we agree with or understand we are happy to quote, italics and all: "No doubt the Darwinian theory is true, *so far as it legitimately goes.*"

## MISCELLANEOUS.

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### ARGYLL'S EASTERN QUESTION.

*The Eastern Question, from the Treaty of Paris, 1856, to the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, and to the Second Afghan War.* By the Duke of Argyll. Two Volumes. London: Strahan and Co.

Two bulky volumes on the everlasting Eastern Question, the first volume and two-fifths of the second dealing with the Turkish branch of the subject, the remainder with the difficulties which have sprung up in Afghanistan. The history of the work is this. The noble author was prevented by indisposition from taking his place in the late Parliamentary discussions, and employed his time in drawing up a connected history of the question on all sides. Thus we have the substance of many speeches. In one respect the Duke's illness was not unfortunate. His history will have a permanent value, such as could not attach to speeches which are forthwith buried in the pages of Hansard. No such exhaustive treatment of the subject has previously appeared. To those for whom political questions have a perennial charm no more instructive study could be recommended than the present work. Many of those who dissent from its conclusions will refer to it as a repertory of facts and dates. These it is always possible to separate from the criticisms. The author says in the Preface: "I have endeavoured throughout to make it quite clear as to what is stated as fact, what is direct quotation, what is my own representation of the effect of documents not quoted *in extenso*, what is inference, and what is comment. I cannot hope that among materials extending over several thousand pages I have made no mistakes, but at least I can say that I have taken pains to be accurate." Every one who knows the style of the author will know that he is pre-eminent for clearness and vigour both of thought and statement, and there is abundant evidence of these qualities in the volumes before us. The clearness is almost judicial. Many of the chapters might have been read from the bench. The desire to be fair is just as conspicuous. The criticism, while trenchant enough, never passes into invective and

declamation. The reasons are always set forth at length, so that every one can judge how far they sustain the inferences. Considering the connections of the author, his utter fearlessness and honesty are altogether admirable, and still more his burning sympathy with the downtrodden and oppressed. These are the qualities which are the very salt of the public life of England.

There is no more prevalent delusion than that respecting the independence of Turkey, and, accordingly, in his first chapter the Duke sets himself to discuss the question in the light of the treaties of 1856. All parties alike must allow that the independence belonging to Turkey is, and has long been, of a very modified kind. What sort of independence is that which it needed the arms of two foreign Powers to defend in 1854, and which became the subject of treaties between the several European States? It is quite true that by the Treaty of Paris "the Sublime Porte is admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system of Europe." From the circumstances of the case this did not and could not mean that Turkey was placed on an equal footing with the other Powers. It simply meant that a government which previously had been outside the European family, an outlaw, at the mercy of Russia or any other Power, should now have a place in the family. A general European protectorate was substituted for an exclusively Russian protectorate. If Turkey could not stand alone before the war, still less could it do so after the war. The treaties did not bar the right of other Powers to interfere, as previously, on just cause shown. They only laid down the principle that the interference should be exercised under the supervision of Europe, instead of by each Power separately. Here is a crucial proof. By the famous "Capitulations" Europeans resident in Turkey are withdrawn from Turkish jurisdiction and subjected to European jurisdiction. "There is no part of the law of nations more thoroughly understood and more universally recognised than the principle that within its own territory every Government has supreme jurisdiction over all persons. If men choose to live in countries other than their own, they must submit to the laws of the State in which they live. There is not one of the civilised States of Europe which would not resent it as an intolerable pretension on the part of any foreigner that he should claim any exemption from its laws or from the jurisdiction of its Courts. Yet this is precisely the pretension which all the European Powers not only make but insist upon on behalf of their own subjects as against the Government of Turkey." Lord Russell said in 1862: "The Capitulations rest on the principle that Turkish rule and Turkish justice are so barbarous that exceptional privileges are required. No one would think of separate tribunals for Englishmen in France or for Frenchmen in England; but so

long as law in Turkey is undefined, so long as pashas are allowed to sell justice and protection, so long will the privileges of the consular tribunals be necessary." The Prince Consort defined the object of the treaties of 1856 as "the cancelling of all previous Russian treaties, and the substitution of an European for a Russian protectorate of the Christians, or rather of European protection for a Russian protectorate." And again Lord Derby said in 1876: "As to the obligations imposed on us by treaty to do what in us lies to protect the subject-races of Turkey from misgovernment, the obligation to intervene for the protection of the empire from external attack implies a corresponding duty of control." It may be convenient to describe a State in such a condition as independent, but "dependent" would be more in accordance with facts.

Two very full and able chapters deal with the condition of Turkey, and the conduct to it of the European Powers, between 1856 and 1875. The evidence adduced as to the unchanged character of the Government, despite promises and firmans, is unanimous; and it is the evidence of British consuls like Taylor and Zohrab in Asiatic, and Holmes, Stuart, and Longworth in European Turkey. Present events show only too clearly the backwardness of Russian civilisation. But in this world things go by comparison. The question is a choice, not between Russia and England, but between Russia and Turkey. Who are so well qualified to judge on this question as the Christians who are actually subjects of Turkey? What is the explanation of the constant emigration that went on from Turkish to Russian ground, both on the Asiatic and European side? Consul Taylor in 1869 reports that in one district "750 families have within the last six years emigrated to Russia, whilst 500 more have sent this year representatives to Erivan to negotiate a similar step." We need not quote from the consular reports accounts of the fearful outrages to which Christian families were subjected. The wholesale emigration into Austrian territory is matter of public notoriety, and has formed the subject of diplomatic negotiations. The suggestion that the emigration was stimulated by foreign agencies is wholly without evidence and is contradicted by every probability. We know the burden which has thus been imposed on Austria. With respect to the general charge that the insurrections and disturbances of the Christians were instigated from without, we may observe that the charge was made just as much against Austria, with which England has acted throughout in cordial alliance, as against Russia. In a despatch of March 24, 1873, Consul Holmes classes Austria and Russia together in this respect (p. 80). Probably there was as much foundation for the charge in one case as in the other. On the subject of foreign interference the Duke of Argyll says: "On October 8, 1876, Mr.

Baring felt constrained to make a most important explanation in respect to one passage of his report on the Bulgarian massacres. He had ascribed the revolt to the work of 'foreign' agitators and emissaries. He desired now to explain that the principal men concerned were all Bulgarians by birth, but had lived many years in Roumania and Servia: it was true they came from abroad, but as regarded Bulgaria they should not be called foreigners. He had never intended to convey the impression that *bonâ fide* foreigners took an active part in the revolt." The Duke then proceeds: "Considering that the liberties of England were secured by the help of foreigners, and that 'intrigues' with them formed a principal part of the work done by the patriots who brought about the Revolution, it does not seem very intelligible why it should be thought a fatal condemnation of insurrections against the Turks that they have been aided and abetted by foreigners. English officials in Turkey like Consul Holmes are never weary of repeating this charge. It is satisfactory, therefore, that as regards the rising in Bulgaria, Mr. Baring puts the facts in their true light. The 'foreigners' were natives who had become accustomed to liberty in lands free from the Turks; and they were the natural leaders of their countrymen in their attempts to throw off the Moslem yoke."

We can only quote a few sentences from the evidence given by our consuls. When Consul Holmes, certainly no prejudiced witness against the Turks, was challenged in 1871 by Sir H. Elliot to substantiate some strong statements about Government officials, he replied: "They are all corrupt. I do not hesitate to say that of all cases of justice, whether between Mussulmans alone or Turks and Christians, ninety out of a hundred are settled by bribery alone." Positive proof is impossible, because "there is a common bond of interest among all classes of Turkish *employés*, which causes them to unite in stifling evidence and preventing exposure." Consul Stuart, in Epirus, says, in 1873: "Notwithstanding the alleged reforms about which so much has been said and written, the inequality between Christian and Mussulman before the law was never more strikingly and openly illustrated than it is at present in the daily practice of the so-called courts of justice. The rights of Christians, when opposed to the claims of Mussulmans, are, in contempt of all law and equity, utterly ignored. . . . In the matter of taxes, the last farthing is wrung from the Christian; time and indulgence are granted to the Mussulman. The Christian defaulter is handed over to the rigour of the law; the Mussulman is mildly dealt with and easily let off." In the same year Sir H. Elliot sums up the condition of the whole Turkish Empire thus: "Almost all Her Majesty's consuls concurred in reporting that the nominal equality of Mussulmans and Christians before the law, which had never thoroughly existed in

practice, was now in most provinces more illusory than it had been a few years ago."

What were the European Governments doing all this time? Why did they not exert the power of intervention given them by the treaties of 1856? These are questions often asked. It is often said that if former English Ministries had done their duty, no such crisis as that of 1876 would have arisen. Our author shows that the period between 1856 and 1876 was one continuous story of interference up to the full measure allowed by the treaties. The other Governments had been most careful to provide that the promised reforms should be carried out by the Turkish Government itself, and that all appearance of foreign dictation should be avoided. It was for this purpose that the pledges were embodied in a firman issued in the Sultan's name, apparently *proprio motu*, and taken note of as such by the Powers. To have gone beyond strong remonstrance and persuasion would have been to do what Russia did in April, 1877. "Turkey was to be entrusted with the fulfilment of her own promises, and the European Powers did not, as indeed they could not, make themselves responsible for Turkish administration. Yet this, and nothing short of this, would have been the result of any formal and authoritative right of interference in that administration." In May, 1857, by Lord Clarendon's directions, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe remonstrated with the Grand Vizier on the prodigal expenditure on the marriage of the Sultan's daughters. In 1859 Lord Russell writes to our ambassador urging concert between the different ambassadors in pressing reforms on the Government. In 1860 came the massacres in Lebanon, and the direct interference of England and France. In a despatch, dated January, 1861, Lord Russell says: "The Ottoman Ambassador called upon me yesterday, and said he supposed that at the end of the three months Her Majesty's Government would ask at Constantinople for an account of what the Grand Vizier intended to do. I said, an account not of what he intended to do, but of what he had done. The time is past when mere vague promises, little known at Constantinople, and neither known nor regarded in the provinces, can satisfy the European Powers." In 1867 occurred the terrible massacre in Crete, when Lord Stanley absolutely interdicted British men-of-war from carrying away helpless fugitives. In 1870, when the defeat of France showed that one of the old supports of Turkish power was no longer available, England again urged upon Turkey the necessity of strengthening itself and conciliating European regard by internal reforms. What could be clearer than the following warning in a despatch of Lord Granville's in 1870? "Although I am willing to place confidence in the explanations which have been given to Sir. A. Buchanan as to any design being entertained by the

Cabinet of St. Petersburg of a hostile character to Turkey, and although I believe that Russia is not now prepared for war, it is impossible to rely permanently on this state of things. No one can doubt that it is a universal wish in Russia to modify, or even abrogate, the conditions of the treaty of 1856, even if she has no ulterior object of ambition. The last fourteen years have been prosperous to Russia. The material resources of the country have been developed by the emancipation of the serfs, by the extension of commerce and manufactures, by a great development of the railway and telegraphic system, and by an increase of political liberty. Russia believes she is as strong as she ever was. The continuance of the war, or even the conclusion of peace, would favour diplomatic action on her part, and even more decided measures. Her Majesty's Government desires carefully to consider what position it would become this country to take in such a contingency. England made great sacrifices of blood and money during the Crimean war for an object which was deemed to be of great importance both to itself and the rest of Europe. The nation would be loth to see all the results sacrificed which had been thus obtained. But would it be wise, would it be compatible with ordinary prudence, for Great Britain, single-handed, to throw itself into such another struggle? How far could Turkey defend itself even with such assistance as England could afford? Is it fair to Turkey to encourage her in the belief that she may rely on the support of Europe, and with absolute certainty on that of Great Britain? I have already told the Turkish ambassador that I could not give assurances as to future contingencies." Turkey is reminded that "her real safety will depend upon the spirit and feelings of the populations over which she rules," and that "the feelings of the Christian subjects of the Porte will be in favour of the Porte or of Russia, exactly in proportion to the amount of liberty, prosperity, and order which they enjoy under the one, or are likely to obtain under the other." There were remonstrances "in 1871 as regarded Bosnia, in 1872 as regarded Crete, in 1873 as regarded Bosnia again. As regarded Syria in the same year, Lord Granville had to warn and to rebuke." In 1875 Lord Derby wrote to Sir H. Elliot: "I approve your Excellency having communicated a copy of Mr. Brophy's despatch to the Porte respecting the outrages committed on the Bulgarians by Circassians under the guidance of Turkish zaptiehs, and it would be well that you should urge that such atrocities deserve the severest punishment of all concerned." In the presence of such facts, how can it be said that former Governments in England neglected their duty?

The subsequent events—the Berlin Memorandum, the Conference, the political issues of the war, the Congress—are all fully discussed. With respect to the Conference two points are

sharply criticised—first, the discourtesy of settling the affairs of Turkey in its own capital, while the Turkish representative was excluded; and secondly, the refusal of England to enforce the conclusions arrived at by anything stronger than persuasion. It was scarcely worth while for the plenipotentiaries of all Europe to go to Constantinople to do nothing more than make recommendations. Europe had been doing nothing else but making recommendations for twenty years. When Turkey knew that she had nothing to fear from refusal, her decision was quickly taken. The proposals were pared down again and again. The “irreducible minimum” was reduced till scarcely anything was left, only to meet with the same absolute negative. It is indeed impossible to say that the mere threat of compulsion would have been enough to ensure compliance; but the Duke of Argyll gives an instructive illustration of the effect of firmness. It respects the demand of an armistice for Servia. “On October 31, 1876, the Russian Government ordered General Ignatieff to demand from the Porte the acceptance within forty-eight hours of an armistice for six weeks. Should the Porte not accept, the Russian ambassador was to leave Constantinople, and all diplomatic relations were to be broken off. The result is best described in the two following telegraphic despatches from Sir H. Elliot, both dated on November 1—the one at 11.40 A.M., and the second at 7 P.M. The first was, ‘Russian ultimatum was sent in last night.’ The second was, ‘Porte will consent to the demands of the Russian ultimatum, and orders are already sent to the military commanders to suspend all operations. An answer in this sense will be sent to General Ignatieff this evening.’”

Through recent events the Eastern Question has taken large strides towards a just settlement. Time, the laws of God, the best sympathies of human nature fight against wrong and for right. The silent, invisible forces of nature will prove too strong for artificial barriers. The ultimate victory is with the progressive, not with the stationary, races of the world. That justice may be done all round, that the Turkish Government may receive its due, and the Christian peoples, who form the vast majority, may also receive their due, is a wish in which all may join.

#### GODKIN'S LIFE OF VICTOR EMMANUEL.

*Life of Victor Emmanuel II., First King of Italy.* By G. S. Godkin. In Two Volumes. London: Macmillan and Co. 1879.

A CONCISE, unbiassed memoir of King Victor Emmanuel, written for English readers, has hitherto been a desideratum. The want, so far as the conciseness of the record is concerned, is



here supplied; nor is it too much to say that, though writing with an ardent admiration for his subject, our author has, with suppressed emotion, confined himself to a faithful recital of facts. Those facts are the best portrayal of the character of Italy's first King. Victor Emmanuel was eminently a man of action, not a man of ideas. He did not lack sentiments; but they were such as found expression in deeds. There was nothing hidden: there was no wide diversity between his convictions and his conduct that needed harmonising by the skill of a biographer. The King's faults are known: we neither apologise for them nor parade them. The character may have been imperfect: we may detect the absence of some features we would fain have seen, and we could earnestly wish some features absent which are all too obvious; but what was there was consistent with itself. Frank and outspoken, true to his word, faithful to his conception of the duties of his high office, he earned, as a due testimony to his honour and as the descriptive title of his character, the distinction of the honest King—*Il Re galantuomo*—his claim to which title is well told in these volumes. The incident of its first application is thus related:—

One day Massimo D'Azeglio, talking alone with his sovereign, said:

“‘There have been so few honest kings in the world, that it would be a grand thing to begin the series.’

“And Victor, looking at him with a smile, asked—

“‘Have I to play the part of honest King?’

“‘Your Majesty has sworn to the *Statuto*, and has thought of all Italy, and not of Piedmont only. Let us continue in this path, and hold always that a king, as well as an obscure individual, has one word only, and by that he must stand.’

“‘Well, in that case,’ replied the monarch, ‘the profession seems easy to me.’

“‘And the *Re galantuomo*, we have him,’ concluded the Minister.

“His Majesty was pleased with the title and proud of it. When the register of the census of Turin was brought, and he was asked to sign his name, he wrote, under the head ‘Profession,’ ‘*Re galantuomo*.’”

The life of Victor Emmanuel could only be written in a detail of stirring national events—events of so great moment to the history of Italy and of all Europe, and stretching in their influence to the limits of Christendom—events the effect of which must continue to be felt for many generations to come. The special value of the volumes before us lies in their clear recital of these events in as far as Victor Emmanuel was a central figure and an active mover; so that the reader has not so much a private view of the King's life which might gratify a morbid

curiosity, as a view of him as he moved amongst men, and as he influenced the destinies of his nation—those features of his life which distinguished him from the multitude of men around him.

It was needful to precede the memoir by a general view of the condition of Italian society; and a sketch, in the form of introduction, is designed to do this. It is brief, and somewhat limited in its range: otherwise it is suitable to prepare the mind of the reader for the stirring account which follows. A mere glimpse is taken of the state of affairs in the several States; but it is sufficient to show the imperative need for reformation—a reformation which meant revolution.

The entire story explains how so great a reformation was effected with so little bloodshed; how, while on the one hand the peoples groaned for liberty, and the national sentiment so long suppressed by priestly domination burst forth at length into definite expression, on the other hand sagacity, patience, bravery, and heroic patriotism contended against faction within and strong forces without; and how, throughout the whole, those singular combinations of favourable circumstances occurred which, at particular junctures in national history, disclose the working of a hidden power in the sphere of human affairs, and illustrate that doctrine of a Divine supervision which is expressed by the one word providence.

The interesting story begins with Charles Albert, of whom sufficient is said to show the precise conditions under which his son, Victor Emmanuel, began his reign. The star of hope first caught the eye of the Italian patriot in the cold grey of that morning when Massimo D'Azeglio, after a rapid tour throughout the country, testing the condition of the national feeling and sowing the seeds of national life, returned to the King, and, with distrustful heart, explained his errand. He spoke of the disturbed state of the country, the causes and effects of the rebellions, the danger of a great revolution in the event of the Pope's death, of the desire of the more prudent and better-advised to secure the desires of the nation by moderate means, and of the general confidence in Piedmont as the only suitable leader in the national cause. Then, having assured the King that he had never been a member of a secret society, he told him of his dealings with the Liberal party, begging his Majesty to say whether he approved or disapproved of what he had done.

"He paused for a reply, and, according to his preconceived idea of Charles Albert's doubleness, expected an evasive one. Instead of that the King, without a moment's hesitation, fixed his eyes frankly on those of Azeglio, and said in a calm, resolute tone: 'Let those gentlemen know that for the present they must remain quiet; but, when the time comes, let them be certain *my*

*life, the lives of my sons, my arms, my treasures—all shall be freely spent in the Italian cause!*

"Azeglio, whose loyalty till now had been of the coldest, was touched by the King's heroic sentiments, and thanked him with emotion for his confidence. When they both rose to their feet, Charles Albert laid his hands on Azeglio's shoulders, and touched first one cheek and then the other with his own. There was something so solemn, almost funereal, in this embrace, that it somewhat chilled Azeglio's enthusiasm. In after years he said he could never see without a thrill those green silk chairs in the bay window where they sat while the King offered, through him, to his country, all he possessed—even his life."

With this incident the history fairly begins. Victor Emmanuel, as Prince Carignano, speedily appears in view, and on his war-charger, as was most meet, first at Santa Lucia, where, in his first taste of war, he behaved so nobly that a silver medal was awarded to him for his valour; again at Goito, where he received the double honour of a gold medal, and, what to him was a greater honour still, a wound—for by it he shed his blood for Italy; and once again on the fatal field of Novara. Nor do we lose sight of him until the day when the nation, weeping around the mausoleum of its first King, paid its utmost tribute to the faithful citizen and the victorious soldier, up to whom it had learned to look as "*IL PADRE DELLA PATRIA*."

The chequered course of the history is traced almost too briefly, but through all the record Victor Emmanuel is present. Neither the excitement of scenes of the deepest interest, nor the attraction of persons of the highest eminence, beguiles the biographer from the one life he had undertaken to portray.

Thus the history ends:—"Victor Emmanuel was now at the zenith of his glory; his utmost ambition was attained. He had found Italy oppressed by a host of petty tyrants, dominated by Austria, torn by lawless combinations, misjudged and condemned by the other countries of Europe. She was now a free, united nation, tranquil and law-abiding, respected everywhere. At peace with all the world, beloved and honoured by his people, what was left for him to desire? He might say, with the poet—

'I have touched the highest point of my greatness.'

But he was not happy; and, during the last few months, he had been subject to unaccountable fits of melancholy. That this gloom had its origin in a feeling of dissatisfaction with himself is very probable. Notwithstanding his long and resolute struggle against clerical pretensions, Victor Emmanuel had preserved a simple child-like faith in the religion he had been taught at his mother's knee; and, through all the stormy passions of his fitful career, he had preserved sacred the image of his pure young wife, whose

memory he revered as that of a saint. In Turin, where he passed the autumn of this year, having gone there to inaugurate a monument to his brother, the Duke of Genoa, he was heard to say more than once, 'I am not a good man, but I cannot die a bad death; she who is in heaven would not permit it.'

"On the last day of the year 1877 Victor Emmanuel received all the Foreign Ministers who waited on him to exchange the compliments of the season in the name of their respective sovereigns. The following day he gave audience to deputations from both Houses of Parliament, and others who presented congratulatory addresses. The King spoke cheerfully and hopefully of the future, and bade his Ministers trust always in the Star of Italy.

" 'The Star of Italy is your Majesty,' replied Signor Depretis, at which the King smiled sadly.

"They did not dream that it was his last New Year's Day; but he was even then feeling indisposed, and in nine days after he was dead."

Our space will not permit us even to glance at the great events in the midst of which the life of King Victor Emmanuel was passed—events which have so recently become history, enacted, indeed, before our eyes. Nor can we dwell on the part which Victor Emmanuel played in them. We must refer our readers to Mr. Godkin's handy volumes, which, if too small to satisfy all curiosity, are sufficiently large to place in its true light the life of its illustrious subject. It is scant praise to say the story is well told. It thrills one as a romance, but with no mere undertone of truth. The facts are patent, and the stirring statements of the narrative are constantly backed up by reference to official documents and well-attested records. These volumes contain a plain and truthful account unencumbered by needless reflections. The life of Italy's brave King speaks for itself, and no more requires the dress of sentiment to give it vigour than a marble bust dug up from the Campagna needs a name to give it worth.

#### CUNYNGHAME'S MY COMMAND IN SOUTH AFRICA.

*My Command in South Africa in 1874—1878. Comprising Experiences of Travel in the Colonies of South Africa and the Independent States.* By General Sir Arthur Thurlow Cunyngame, G.C.B., the Lieutenant-Governor and Commander of the Forces in South Africa. With Maps. Second Thousand. Macmillan. 1879.

THE value of a book like this just now is that it throws light on the causes of the unhappy struggle in which we are engaged, and helps us to some extent to judge how far such a war was, sooner or later, inevitable.

General Cunynghame's range is a wide one. He begins with Capetown, treating of ostrich-farming, about which he gives details invaluable to any who think of going in for it; of wine-growing, of the descendants of the Dutch settlers and their ways, and of federation and its prospects. He then crosses into Kafferaria (*sic*) and Natal, getting from the Komgha, the artillery station of the frontier army, in Gaikaland, near the Kei, right on to the now so famous Tugela. In his chapter on this river our author says a good deal about "Mr. John Dunn, in whom Cetewayo appears to have great confidence." He also remarks on the dangerous extent to which the natives are being armed, not only with the old smooth-bore guns but with excellent modern rifles. "For what purpose is this insatiable craving for arms? It is to possess the all-powerful weapon with which the white men conquered and brought them into subjection, but which they hope to employ in their turn against their conquerors. Then, of course, the British soldier will be implored to come to the help of the colony. Generous old England will be asked once more to pay the bill. And the colonists will be ready to send waggons and teams of oxen, with supplies at fabulous prices, and to undertake all the necessary contracts for the supply of the troops." These words, though things have not turned out precisely in this way, come as near the fact as most prophecies do. Every native who earned a little money at the diamond-fields laid it out in buying a gun; and free trade in guns and ammunition has been the rule with colonial traders and merchants, despite the not unreasonable protests both of the Boers and of our own frontier farmers.

While in Kaffraria our author sees and hears a good deal about witchcraft. Every thinking man who has been in the country wonders, he says, that something has not been done to suppress it. "How loudly Englishmen talk of the evils of slavery; yet here is a greater evil than slavery, for it is manslaughter and murder, the result of a false and lying priestcraft, practised in countries where the chiefs are paid out of the Government revenue." Of the fearful horrors of the system, several instances are given. Thus: "A rein is lost from a span; recourse is had to a diviner. He says, 'So-and-so's *baboon* (familiar spirit—note the likeness to the early Italian satyrs) took it, and So-and-so and another have the rein between them.' They are caught and horribly tortured, and finally roasted alive or strangled for this imaginary fault, their property plundered, their families scattered." Surely something should be done to put down a system far more destructive than Indian suttee.

General Cunynghame's next inspection tour was to the diamond-fields, Griqualand West; and next he went to the Transvaal, then just annexed. His last chapter contains an account of the

sixth Kaffir war—that against Krelli; the book thus ending as it began, for the first incident in his landing at Capetown is his being told of Langalebalele's rising.

It is needless to note how very much of present interest the book contains. We cannot do more than dwell for a brief space on one or two points.

The Bushmen's talent for drawing we had never before realised. On the rocks are portrayed hunting-scenes, showing how the lion, eland, gnu, &c., were killed or taken, all sketched with wonderful vigour and in colours so permanent that one might fancy they were done yesterday. Can it be that a strain of Bushman blood gave their artistic talent to the old Egyptians? The modern fellah, we believe, never tries to imitate his ancestors, if indeed they were his ancestors. These Bushmen General Cunynghame summarily dismisses as unimprovable. Certainly the only way Dutch and English have discovered of improving them is to improve them off the face of the earth. The last poor remnant of them was destroyed in the glens of the Drakenberg in 1871 by a set of Basuto ruffians, whom our author dignifies as an "expeditionary force," under one of the sons of our friend Moshesh.

The profit of ostrich-farming, in his chapter on which our author tells a good deal about emu-breeding in England, must vary much. In 1875 a pair of birds cost as much as £500. Even then they may have been a profitable investment, especially as feathers were selling at from £30 to £40 the pound. Ten pages further on we are told that in 1868 the price had sunk to £2 and £3 a pound. In 1874 it was £5 or even £8 at Natal. The figures hardly seem reconcilable; and there is some doubt whether a full-grown bird yields a pound of first-class feathers or not. It is worthy of note that the ostrich feather differs from all others—the quill is in the middle of the plume. Hence the old Egyptians made it the symbol of justice.

Of Bloemfontein General Cunynghame speaks very highly as a health-resort in cases of consumption. The only drawback is the cost of living: eggs 6d. each, butter 5s. a pound, cabbage 2s. 6d. each, and so on. They must get some Chinese gardeners out there, to do what they have done in Queensland, provide cheap vegetables.

The cruelties which led to the annexation of the Transvaal are given in detail in chap. xxiii. Here is one case: "A Kaffir with flag of truce was shot. The other three ran off, but a few days after gave themselves up. They were shot in a most brutal way, for if they had got into Leydenburg they would have told the English about shooting at them when going in with the white flag." The Hollander is like the wicked man in the Psalms; his tender mercies are cruel. On principle he treats the native as if he was a brute beast.

In the war against Kreli there were some episodes which might have ended like Isandula. "Our communications are cut off. We are surrounded on all sides by Kaffirs, who are destroying everything. I do not see any way of relieving Fort Linsingen at present. Spencer's camp was attacked last night," &c. So ran a letter in cypher received from Captain Wardell.

Kreli and his Kaffirs, however, had small chance against the telegraph, of which much use was made in the campaign; and the Martini-Henri rifle, "then for the first time fairly used by British soldiers," which killed the astonished natives at 1,000 and even at 1,800 yards.

General Cunynghame is not half severe enough upon the spirit trade which is demoralising the natives, and even threatening them with extinction. "On Sandilli's border there were five canteens in thirty-five miles of road; the aggregate sale amounted to 250 gallons a week, and each took at least £2,000 a year over the counter." Some chiefs forbid canteens in their territories, and, as we know, have petitioned earnestly to have them prohibited on their borders and in other parts. "The answer of authority has always been that the natives should place a moral restraint upon themselves and not drink too much, and that trade cannot be impeded simply because it may engender evil consequences among the natives." The fearful hypocrisy of such language, or else the judicial blindness of those who can use it, is unparalleled even in the history of other colonial dealings. "Cape smoke," our missionaries have found, has been the worst enemy to the Gospel. Unhappily this miserable war will give a great impulse to the sale of it. The soldiers drink; and the friendly natives learn to drink harder than ever. And for a native to drink "Cape smoke" is a very different thing from indulging in harmless native beer.

ENGLISH MEN OF LETTERS: GOLDSMITH, BURNS, SPENSER,  
HUME.

*English Men of Letters.* Goldsmith, by William Black; Burns, by Professor Shairp; Spenser, by Dean Church; Hume, by Professor Huxley. London: Macmillan.

GOLDSMITH'S life usually serves as a text for a sermon upon the world's ingratitude and neglect of its greatest men. This was the key-note struck by Forster's otherwise excellent biography, and it has been taken up by most other biographers. Mr. Black, on the other hand, takes the part of the world, and we think with success. Without enlarging unnecessarily on the defects of Goldsmith's character, he insists that, during his latest years at least, the poet's troubles were his own fault. During the earlier period of course

he had given no proof of genius ; the work he did was paid for as all work of the same class was paid for. But when once his position was established as a man of genius, he had no reason to complain of neglect. During the last seven years of his life he received what should have been an ample fortune for a bachelor of simple tastes. But Goldsmith's habits were far from simple. On the contrary, he was a typical specimen of improvidence and extravagance. No amount of money would have kept him out of debt. The £400 received for one play were at once spent in the purchase of sumptuous chambers, and this is a fair illustration of what he was always doing. "If Goldsmith had received ten times as much money as the booksellers gave him, he would still have died in debt." As Mr. Black insists, Goldsmith went in for excitement at its highest, and he paid the inevitable penalty.

The incidents of Goldsmith's life are few and well known. The same may be said of his best works. They are few in number. Their value depends not on bulk, but quality. A very moderate-sized volume contains them all. And no English classic is better known or more popular. While Mr. Black has nothing new to tell, his biography and criticisms are fresh and interesting.

"To a degree" (p. 115) is a Scotticism which Goldsmith would have avoided, and which we hope will never be naturalised in English. "Happy-go-lucky" very aptly describes Goldsmith's temperament, but it recurs somewhat too frequently in the biography. Mr. Black also speaks of "cut-throats," metaphorical of course, more frequently than is pleasant. He gives interesting illustrations of the care with which Goldsmith corrected and revised his writings. "Goldsmith put an anxious finish into all his better work ; perhaps that is the secret of the graceful ease that is now apparent in every line." But scarcely enough is made of the element of natural genius undoubtedly present in Goldsmith's case. Sometimes indeed the very existence of genius is questioned or denied. It is defined or explained away as "the faculty for taking pains." Thousands have taken far more pains than Goldsmith, without attaining the charming ease and grace of his style. Of education he had comparatively little. He only took to literature, after failing to get a livelihood in any other way. And yet he reached the front rank in prose and poetry alike.

The force of genius is still more conspicuous in the case of Burns. What else is there to explain the bursting forth of that bright fountain of song in so lowly a place and amid such ungenial conditions ? His parents did not rise intellectually above the average of Scotch peasants. Burns's independence is just as clearly marked, in a painful way, in moral respects. His character was in utter contrast with that of his parents, who represented the best type of Scotch peasant piety. With all his invectives against cant and hypocrisy, the poet always revered the religious



character of his parents. His inimitable *Cotter's Saturday Night* was intended as a picture of his own early home. Burns's life is as painful, as his poems are delightful, reading. There is little or no relief in the picture. The cloud, instead of lifting, darkens as time goes on. The tyranny of appetite and passion became more and more inveterate. Burns's last days were the unhappiest. One by one, friends had been obliged to hold aloof, and he stood almost alone. Professor Shairp well says: "How often has one been tempted to wish that we had known as little of the actual career of Burns as we do of the life of Shakespeare, or even of Homer, and had been left to read his mind and character only by the light of his works!" It can never be an easy task for a Scotchman to be impartial in judging the character of Scotland's truest poet. We believe that Professor Shairp is thoroughly impartial. His volume is altogether an admirable one, alike in its clear narrative, moral judgments, and poetical criticism. While giving no more of painful details than is necessary, he does not allow enthusiastic admiration of genius to blind him to serious shortcomings. The passage from which we most strongly dissent is one on p. 188, in which the author seems to represent the poet's character as altogether the work of circumstances. The substance of the passage is, "Given such natural tendencies and outward conditions, and no other result was possible." True, but other things were given—Christian example and training, clear perceptions and strong convictions of truth—which are not enumerated in the catalogue. These, if we are to believe in human responsibility, were strong enough to counteract, and ought to have counteracted, the unfavourable circumstances.

Professor Shairp dwells with much force on the poet's services in fostering a national spirit among his countrymen. "When he appeared, the spirit of Scotland was at a low ebb. The fatigue that followed a century of religious strife, the extinction of her Parliament, the stern suppression of the Jacobite risings, the removal of all symbols of her royalty and nationality, had all but quenched the ancient spirit. . . . Though he accomplished but a small part of what he once hoped to do, yet we owe it to him first of all that the 'old kingdom' has not wholly sunk into a province. If Scotchmen to-day love and cherish their country with a pride unknown to their ancestors of the last century, if strangers of all countries look on Scotland as a land of romance, this we owe in great measure to Burns, who first turned the tide, which Scott afterwards carried to full flood."

It is a pleasant surprise to us to hear Burns commended for the purity of his writings. But as all things go by comparison, and the comparison is here with preceding writers, the praise is no doubt just. "He was emphatically the purifier of Scottish song. There are some poems he has left, there are also a few among his

songs, which we could wish that he had never written. But we who inherit Scottish song as he left it, can hardly imagine how much he did to purify and elevate our national melodies. To see what he has done in this way, we have but to compare Burns's songs with the collection of Scottish songs published by David Herd, in 1769, a few years before Burns appeared."

Spenser is very far from being the popular poet that Burns is. Just as there are preachers for preachers, so Spenser is rather a poet for poets than for the people; and we believe that not a few of the latter have often wondered at the reverence and enthusiasm of poets for *The Faery Queen* and its author. "Our greatest poets have loved him and delighted in him. He had Shakespeare's praise. Cowley was made a poet by reading him. Dryden calls Milton 'the poetical son of Spenser'; 'Milton,' he writes, 'has acknowledged to me that Spenser was his original.' Dryden's own homage to him is frequent and generous. Pope found as much pleasure in the *Faery Queen* in his later years as he had found in reading it when he was twelve years old; and what Milton, Dryden, and Pope admired, Wordsworth too found full of nobleness, purity, and sweetness." The reason of the popular indifference is easy to find. It is the allegorical form in which Spenser's masterpiece is cast. The allegory, as Dean Church shows us, was in keeping with the stateliness of the Elizabethan age, but is altogether remote from ours. We have little patience with an ideal world of shepherds and knights, virtues and vices. We soon grow tired of a long poem, every line of which needs a key to explain it. On the other hand, we leave too much out of sight Spenser's originality in his day. "Spenser had but one really great English model behind him; and Chaucer, honoured as he was, had become in Elizabeth's time, if not obsolete, yet in his diction very far removed from the living language of the day. Even Milton, in his boyish compositions, wrote after Spenser and Shakespeare, with their contemporaries, had created modern English poetry. Whatever there was in Spenser's early verses of grace and music was of his own finding: no one of his own time, except in occasional and fitful snatches, like stanzas of Sackville's, had shown him the way."

Dr. Church had a harder task than most of his co-labourers in the series. As Spenser's life has not been a favourite theme of biographers, the materials are not all ready to hand. What Dr. Church has done is to give us not merely the poet's life, but its general surroundings. The political, social, and literary characteristics of the age, so far as these touch the poet's sphere, are ably sketched. We get a vivid glimpse into the miserable condition of Ireland, where most of Spenser's mature life was spent, and which was then, as now, England's difficulty. The turbulence, treachery, confiscations, bloodshed, mistakes, make a sad picture. The

English believed but in one means of government—force; the Irish but in one means of redress—rebellion. "Ireland had the name and the framework of a Christian realm. It had its hierarchy of officers in Church and State, its Parliament, its representative of the Crown. It had its great earls and lords, with noble and romantic titles, its courts and councils and administration; the Queen's laws were there, and where they were acknowledged, which was not however everywhere, the English speech was current. But underneath this name and outside all was coarse, and obstinately set against civilised order. There was nothing but the wreck and clashing of disintegrated customs; the lawlessness of fierce and disintegrated barbarians, whose own laws had been destroyed, and who would recognise no other; the blood-feuds of rival sept; the ambitions and deadly treacheries of rival nobles, oppressing all weaker than themselves, and maintaining in waste and idleness their crowds of brutal retainers. In one thing only was there agreement, though not even in this was there union; and that was in deep, implacable hate of their English masters. And with these English masters, too, amid their own jealousies and backbitings and mischief-making, their own bitter antipathies and chronic despair, there was only one point of agreement, and that was their deep scorn and loathing of the Irish." Spenser himself, who was a servant of Government, thoroughly endorsed the English policy. "Men of great wisdom," he writes, "have often wished that all that land were a sea-pool." Spenser also says: "They say, it is the fatal destiny of that land, that no purposes, whatsoever are meant for her good, will prosper or take good effect, which, whether it proceed from the very genius of the soil, or influence of the stars, or that Almighty God hath not yet appointed the time of her reformation, or that He reserveth her in this unquiet state still for some secret scourge, which by her shall come unto England, it is hard to be known, but yet much to be feared." Spenser himself was driven by the rebels from the estate he had received as a grant from Government, his house burnt; he himself a wretched, beggared fugitive to England, where he soon died prematurely with his great work but half finished.

One-fourth of the volume is occupied by a very full and eloquent analysis and criticism of *The Faery Queen*, which we hope may do much to explain, if not to popularise, Spenser's great poem. Its faults and merits are all carefully set forth. As to the latter, the spell of the poem is to be found mainly in three things. (1) "In the quaint stateliness of Spenser's imaginary world and its representatives; (2) in the beauty and melody of his numbers, the abundance and grace of his poetic ornaments, in the recurring and haunting rhythm of numberless passages, in which thought and imagery and language and melody are interwoven in one perfect and satisfying harmony; and (3) in the

intrinsic nobleness of his general aim, his conception of human life, at once so exacting and so indulgent, his high ethical principles and ideals, his unfeigned honour of all that is pure and brave and unselfish and tender, his generous estimate of what is due from man to man of service, affection, and fidelity. His fictions embodied truths of character which, with all their shadowy incompleteness, were too real and too beautiful to lose their charm with time."

It seems a curious arrangement to assign the life of a purely mental philosopher like Hume to a purely physical scientist like Professor Huxley. The result is what might be expected. Professor Huxley gives, as he could not but give, an exceedingly clear and often lively analysis of Hume's teaching, but of the relations of that teaching to the work of other mental philosophers both before and after, *i.e.*, of Hume's position in the order of philosophical development, nothing is said. Yet it is evident that, without such comparison and contrast, Hume's theories can only be half understood. Professor Huxley has evidently made a long and loving study of Hume's works, takes him as his master in psychological research, adopts all his conclusions and more, and ably epitomises and discourses all that is to be found within the four corners of Hume's philosophy. But this is not enough. An expositor of one part of a vast system must be master of the whole system, and Professor Huxley's work has been in another field than that of psychology. Would the editor of this series assign the discussion of the work of a great natural philosopher like Herschel or Faraday to a pure metaphysician? The arrangement seems the more remarkable as there are many eminent psychologists to whose hands the work might have been fitly entrusted. As a simple presentation of Hume's theories in themselves, Professor Huxley's volume is unobjectionable; but, as it seems to us, the whole subject needed to be handled in an altogether different method. For all that we are told here, Hume might almost have been the first and the last philosopher who ever discussed psychological questions or attempted to analyse mental faculties and operations. Mr. Green's introduction to Hume's works suggests the right method of treatment.

Hume's life occupies one-fourth of the volume. There was not much to tell, and less that was worth telling. The different points of Hume's teaching are then discussed in order. As might be expected, Professor Huxley is strongest in dealing with "The Mental Phenomena of Animals," where his special knowledge as a physiologist serves him in good stead. He does his best to shade away the barrier between mind in man and in animals. To all the other positions of Hume, especially those of a sceptical cast he endeavours to add new buttresses. We cannot reconcile all Professor Huxley's opinions. If there is any fundamental point

in philosophy, it is the distinction between mind and matter. But after enumerating the different theories held, Professor Huxley professes himself an Agnostic as to the "substance" of either matter or spirit (p. 166). How is this consistent with the bald materialism of passages like the following? "What we call the operations of the mind are functions of the brain, and the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral activity." He also endorses the substance of the dictum of Cabanis, that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. It seems to us that one who holds such definite views is no Agnostic—he does know, or professes to know, the nature both of matter and mind. In presence of such conflicting statements, we might well confess ourselves Agnostics as to what Professor Huxley's views are. He might indeed take refuge in the distinction between substratum and phenomena, just as in his *Lay Sermons* he argues that he is no materialist, because he does not believe in any substratum of matter apart from its properties; as if a materialist had ever been defined as one who does so believe. The defence is worthy of Dr. Newman's subtlety. If Professor Huxley had given us an account of Bacon and his writings, he would probably have rendered better service than he has done by the present volume.

#### WIESENER'S YOUTH OF QUEEN ELIZABETH.

*The Youth of Queen Elizabeth, 1533—1558.* By Louis Wiesener. Edited, from the French, by Charlotte M. Yonge. Two Volumes. Hurst and Blackett.

WHEN *Sneer*, in "The Critic," expressed the hope that there was "no scandal about Queen Elizabeth" in Ruff's play, the "scandal" only existed in flying rumours or spiteful stories. Cobbett was the first English historian systematically to degrade "Gloriana" into "old Betsy;" and though his view of her was, like most of his dicta, pushed to extremes and "hedged round with wilful prejudice," it has been strongly supported by investigations made since his time. All students may not be prepared, indeed, to hurl at Shakespeare's "fair vestal throned in the West," the coarse epithet employed by Walter Savage Landor; but few can doubt that Elizabeth had something of the hero in her composition; she was not of the stuff which makes martyrs. Her support of the doctrines of the Reformation was, like her father's overthrow of monastic orders, dictated by personal ambition and political expediency, rather than by conscience and conviction, as is shown by her rigorous treatment of the Puritan party. M. Wiesener is no panegyrist of Elizabeth, though he feels the true biographer's interest in his subject; he does not attempt to disprove the craft and cruelty which made her just as small as a woman as she was great as a queen. But he shows that no other

result could have been reasonably expected from the peculiar trials and temptations of her youth. Nature combined in her the levity and ready wit of her mother with the pride and turbulence of her father. For twenty-five years circumstances compelled her to be a hypocrite in order to save her life; and when she became absolute mistress of her actions she did not throw aside the habit of disguising her motives. The outline of her story is so familiar that there is no necessity for recapitulating it here, especially as M. Wiesener, though consulting every known authority on the epoch to which he confines himself, and referring to original documents in England and France, has not discovered any fact of material importance, nor thrown any new light on those already known. In alluding to the labours of his predecessors he cordially acknowledges Agnes Strickland's general accuracy—testifying to her usefulness, indeed, by paraphrasing many passages of her narrative—but Froude he calls “perhaps the least reliable of all living historians;” a dictum certainly not justified by the very trifling inaccuracies he points out. Great stress is laid by both author and editor on the prominence given by Wiesener to the *Bedingfield Papers*, Miss Yonge stating in her Preface that they are “here for the first time brought forward;” while Wiesener, admitting that Miss Strickland put him “on the track” of them, claims that he has “drawn much more largely upon this source than the English author;” whereas there is only one extract from the *Bedingfield Papers* in Wiesener, which the later editions of Miss Strickland's *Lives of Mary and Elizabeth Tudor* do not contain, while she has taken many anecdotes from them not to be found in Wiesener. Two chapters are devoted by M. Wiesener to the studies of Elizabeth, especially while under the care of the learned and pious Roger Ascham, whose treatise, *The Scholemaster*, throws light on the method he pursued with his Royal pupil. In his account of Mary Tudor's entry of the Tower after her accession, M. Wiesener has fallen into a curious error. Among the State prisoners kneeling on the grass were, he says, “Edward Courtenay, and his father the Marquis of Exeter, who had been decapitated in 1539, without trial or crime” (vol. i., p. 125). The amazing statement that the headless father joined his son in welcoming the new queen may be due to some confusion of the translator's. But M. Wiesener seems to be unaware that the Marquis of Exeter and Lord Montacute were sentenced to death in 1538 for “treasonable adherence to Cardinal Pole, and treasonable discourses.” The *Baga de Secretis*, parch. xi., contains the minutes of their trial. In the original M. Wiesener's work will no doubt be acceptable to French students, as presenting in a consecutive narrative incidents hitherto scattered over old chronicles and bulky histories; but English readers will be deterred on the threshold by the incompetence of the translator, who more frequently confuses the reader than

interprets the author. Speaking of the rigid composure with which Elizabeth heard of the execution of Thomas Seymour, we are told: "However, that the heart whose self-control borders so closely upon the hardest dryness, had throbbed for the handsome cavalier, this is certain;" and, "There was an absolute need of occupation worthy for the mind as well as moral power against these days of trial." (Vol. i., pp. 75—93.) Here the sense, though obscured, is not lost entirely. But the following sentence, supposed to be complete, has absolutely no meaning: "Notwithstanding all their efforts, all the talk, and all the influence that were visible on the opposite side from patriotic aversion to the foreigner and distrust of Austrian ambition" (p. 202). Equally perplexing, but too long for quotation, are the opening sentences of chapters v. and vi., vol. i. As an instance of a genuine Irish bull, almost unique in the work of a Frenchman, we may quote two lines from vol. i., p. 186, where, after saying that neither Mary nor Renard understood the bearing of their conversation, but the attendants present understood them both, it is added—"Their secret, though in real truth it no longer existed, was penetrated and divulged." Of singular metaphors we need only cite three: In vol. ii., p. 48, it is said of Noailles, that "in his heart he was championing the bit." In vol. i., p. 271, we are told that Elizabeth "fortified her house at Ashbridge and filled it with soldiers—no doubt without any direct idea of using them against her sister, for she was not one to burn her ships." And in vol. ii., p. 131, after quoting Heywood's description of Elizabeth, as she wandered among the groves and gardens of Woodstock, comparing the "strait and extending trees" to the nobility and the briars and bushes to "the meanest of the people," we are informed that "the germs of Elizabeth's plan of government are to be found in these meditations, and that, when queen, "she cuts openings among these oaks, where they are *so consequential* as to absorb the light and dew of heaven" (vol. ii., p. 132). It is unfortunate for M. Wiesener that the interest his book possesses as a narrative should be so impaired by its clumsy English dress. We expected better things from a book bearing the editorial *imprimatur* of so accomplished a writer as Miss Yonge. Many Gallicisms in these volumes suggest the idea that the translator may be a Frenchman, which would excuse much that we have objected to in style and construction. But in that case careful editorial supervision was yet more imperatively called for.

#### STOKES'S EARLY CHRISTIAN ARCHITECTURE IN IRELAND.

*Early Christian Architecture in Ireland.* By Margaret Stokes. Illustrated with Woodcuts. London: George Bell. 1878.

IN her dedication to "Edith Chenevix Trench," Miss Stokes

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quotes from *Piers Plowman's Vision*, how that a certain company asking the Ploughman the road to Truth, gets for answer that he cannot "the way teche" until he has sown his half-acre. Whereupon a veiled lady among them replies—

"This were a long lettyng.  
What sholde we wommen  
Wercke the while?"

Her woman's work Miss Stokes finds in the book before us. Still adapting the passage from the *Vision*, she says, "No country stands more in need of clothing, of honour, and of that food by which the soul is fed than does our own beloved Ireland;" and, therefore, by opening up to the reading public the treasures of early Irish architecture, she trusts she is "the helper not the hinderer of such men as have striven and still do strive to work worthily in her cause." The book is indeed well fitted to do good service if only readers can be found to take it in hand. There is and always has been this grand difficulty in regard to Irish matters. To a few English people it comes as a sacred duty to learn all they can about the past as well as about the present of a country which has suffered so much from its connection with England. By them everything that concerns Ireland is studied with enthusiasm; but they are few, and the masses care more about the habits of an obscure African tribe than about the records of those to whose labours their forefathers owed their Christianity. Of this small company of sympathetic students we trust that Miss Stokes's book may increase the number. It is full of information conveyed in such a pleasant way that few who begin the work will be able to lay it aside unread. It is, of course, wonderfully accurate,—to those who know anything of Irish literature, Miss Stokes's character for scrupulous conscientiousness in detail is warrant for this. Its price, moreover, puts it within everybody's reach. It is otherwise in regard to those two grand volumes mainly made up of the late Lord Dunraven's Autotypes and Drawings, of which this book is in some sort an abridgment. They are so costly that the general reader has to content himself with such a glimpse of them as he can get during a hasty visit to London or Oxford. We trust the time may come when culture will be so widely spread that no free or public library will be without such a work as Lord Dunraven's. But, meanwhile, Miss Stokes has met the present want by giving us, in a cheap form, a series of illustrated essays on Pagan Forts, Early Christian Monasteries, Churches without Cement, Ecclesiastical Towers, the Northmen in Ireland, Irish Romanesque, and the other subjects on which she had already given us her views in another form in Lord Dunraven's magnificent volumes.

We do trust that every one who feels the least interest in what manner of men were St. Patrick, and St. Colman, and Columbkille,



and Columbanus, will not fail to read Miss Stokes's account of the stone records which they have left of themselves. Their interest in the men whose work as missionaries only the densest ignorance can nowadays ignore, will surely be strengthened by what they read.

The special interest attaching to early Irish ecclesiastical architecture is not its beauty (though this is great), nor an antiquity too often exaggerated, but the fact that it is home-grown. Whatever Briton or Saxon built has almost wholly disappeared. Two little churches in West Cornwall, Gwithian and Perran-in-the-Sands, strongly resembling some of the cell-churches in Ireland, are perhaps the sole remains of British Christian architecture. A few towers, like Barnack in Northamptonshire, with their "long and short work," are claimed as Saxon. All else is gone. Whereas in Ireland there is a whole series of monuments, "untouched by the hand either of the restorer or of the destroyer," from the sixth to the thirteenth century, in which we may trace a gradual development from the consecrated enclosure (*cashel*) with its uncemented boundary wall and rude beehive huts, scarcely distinguishable from the Pagan fort which served as its model, to the stately Irish Romanesque of Cormac's Chapel.

Pagan forts and Christian *cashels* are alike almost confined to the wildest parts of the country; elsewhere, tillage or rebuilding has done away with them. Steague Fort, in Kerry, and Dun Ængus are good instances of the former; the monastery of St. Michael on the Skellig is the best example of the latter.

In the next period cement is gradually introduced; a chancel with its arch is added to the hitherto uncemented cell; and, though the doors still have horizontal lintel and sloping sides, ornament and mouldings begin to be used—some of them such as are elsewhere held to mark a late period in architecture. This is very important; and we recommend those who wish to understand the complete difference in this respect between England and Ireland, and the impossibility of arguing from one to the other, to study Miss Stokes's remarks on the continuance in Ireland of that school of Celtic decorative art which in England died out during the Roman occupation.

We have in a former number of this Review spoken of Miss Stokes's theory about round towers—that they date mostly from the tenth century, and were set up as shelter-places against the Norsemen. This is the view of M. Viollet le Duc in regard to church towers generally. Why the Irish round tower so often stands alone is because "Irish churches before the Cistercian period were invariably low and small, while the Continental buildings reach nearly to the height of the tower beside which they stand." Irish churches, too, were no doubt often built of perishable materials. The absurd theories about the antiquity of

these towers are in part due to the not unnatural desire of the Irish to find a golden age of culture far back across the centuries, a quiet time anterior to the trouble which has scarcely ever in historic times been calmed, but partly also to the malignity which, having barbarised the Irish Celt, denies that he was ever anything but a barbarian. "The native Irish never understood the use of hewn stone; therefore, as these buildings are clearly pre-English, they must be pre-Irish also." That was the strange argument led by which some attributed the round towers to Cuthites or Phœnicians, while soberer writers thought them the work of the Danes. We forget if Mr. J. H. Parker, who is at much pains to prove that the Irish never used any more durable material than willow-wood, adopts the Danish theory.

All this nonsense, both of foolish glorifiers and more foolish detractors, is conclusively answered by the Annals, some of which (e.g., the *Chronicon Scotorum*) have been published by the Irish Rolls Commissioners. These give the dates of the building of several of the *cloichteachs* (round towers): that at Tomgraney, in Clare, for instance, was built in 965, and a good many belong to the great revival of church architecture, when the victories of Brian Boroihme had secured a temporary respite from Danish incursions. Next to the round towers, the most distinctive feature of Irish church architecture is the vaulted stone roofs, several of them double. Some of these belong to the pointed arch period; but some are undoubtedly very early, and Miss Stokes thinks that in them can be traced in a regular series the *striving after and final achievement of the pointed arch*. This is a matter (as she says) of the deepest interest; and we recommend architectural readers to carefully study the four churches which she gives as typical instances—Gallarus, Friars' Island near Killaloe, St. Columba's house at Kells, and Cormac's Chapel at Cashel. "Had the Irish been allowed to persevere in the elaboration of their own style they would probably have applied this expedient (the double vault) to the roofing of larger buildings" (Fergusson's *History of Architecture*, vol. ii., p. 110), "and we should then have seen whether the Irish double vault is a better constructive form than the single Roman arch. It was certainly an improvement on the wooden roof of the true Gothic style." On Irish Romanesque, so very different from that other form of Romanesque which we call Norman, Miss Stokes remarks: "It was a native style, springing from a people possessed of original power and mind, lowly in aspect when placed beside the grand monuments of Norman art in England, lowly, but not therefore unloveable."

One great feature of this book, as of all that Miss Stokes has written, is its judicial calmness; thus, in speaking of domed beehive huts (p. 27), she confesses: "The dome formed by the projection of one stone beyond another till the walls meet in one flag

at the apex is a form universally adopted by early races in all periods of the history of man, and in various portions of the globe, before the knowledge of the principle of the arch had reached them." Nowhere does she show a trace of the desire, too common among Irish writers, to claim certain forms as exclusively Irish, and as proving that Ireland in prehistoric times was a land of exceptional culture.

Of Irish Romanesque perhaps the most typical instances are the arcades at Ardmore (p. 121-2), though the west door at Freshford (plate 98) is beautiful and characteristic.

We should say that among the appendices there is a valuable essay "On the preservation of national monuments." It appears that the ladies of Alexandra College Archæological Society are drawing out lists and descriptive catalogues of such monuments. We wish something of the same kind was being done in our own country; it would greatly strengthen Sir John Lubbock's hands.

#### RICHARDSON'S TOTAL ABSTINENCE.

*Total Abstinence.* A Course of Addresses. By Benjamin Ward Richardson, M.D., F.R.S., &c. London: Macmillan and Co. 1878.

THIS well-argued protest against alcohol as a food by a scientific physician, who has had his own prejudices to overcome, and whose advocacy is a work of supererogation, deserves thoughtful attention. Dr. Richardson theorises little; he appeals to actual facts, including an interesting though fragmentary account of his own experience when conscientiously putting the opinions forced upon him by experiment to personal test. From a scientific as well as a social point of view he shows that total abstinence from alcohol in health is a right and reasonable practice. It would be an injustice to both sides to assert that small quantities of the drug have a perceptibly injurious action on the system: experiment, however, proves that the dose of alcohol that can be imbibed without perverting the normal functions of the body is so small that it would not produce the desired effect, if taken for the sake of its stimulating properties. Occasional drinkers must therefore regard the pleasure derived from indulgence in alcohol as bought at the expense of temporary perversion of function. That the regular ingestion of this liquid causes organic in addition to functional disease none can deny; and Dr. Murchison, in his now classical work on diseases of the liver, does not fail to notice the surprise and even indignation aroused in so-called moderate drinkers when their maladies were attributed to the use, or rather abuse, of alcohol. Those, therefore, who advocate and practise regular moderation should bear in mind that serious disease

may be induced, and life shortened, without the production of intoxication.

In this, as in his other works, Dr. Richardson is clear, at times racy, and always readable. He treats ably of the difficulties in the way of total abstinence, pointing out both their source and remedy; and even those who do not agree with him cannot but admire his conscientious earnestness and generous spirit.

#### ARNOLD'S JOHNSON'S LIVES.

*The Six Chief Lives from Johnson's "Lives of the Poets," with Macaulay's "Life of Johnson."* Edited, with a Preface, by Matthew Arnold. London: Macmillan and Co. 1878.

THIS is a most admirable piece of book-making. Mr. Arnold's preface, which is a very pleasant and brilliant essay, sketches graphically the birth and development of the modern prose of English literature as distinguished from the old style. This great change occurred during the century and a half covered by the lives of Milton, Dryden, Swift, Addison, Pope, and Gray; and Johnson, whose biographies of these six men are among the imperishable treasures of literature, had himself a large share in the perfecting of the modern prose. Thus these six chief lives form a series of very unequal merit and interest, taken in connection with that splendid biography of Johnson which Macaulay contributed to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; form a book eminently fitted for helping in the cultivation of a rising generation but little likely to find time to wade through the whole of Johnson's *Lives of the Poets*, or equipment to discriminate between what is just and what is unjust in those lives. In the matter of discrimination as regards these six chief lives, Mr. Arnold is an ideal guide; he seldom errs in matters of literary criticism, has but little fault to find for erring in such matters; and his own style and method, while forming as pointed a contrast with that of Macaulay as Macaulay's does with that of Johnson, may be fearlessly pronounced not inferior to either; indeed, the setting of three such prose styles before the young student as are brought together in this book is of itself a lesson not easy to overrate, quite apart from the excellent coherence of the whole subject-matter as here arranged. The book should be as popular as it is readable, instructive, and well planned.

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